Uprisings of 1956. Hungarian uprising

“Soviet troops drowned the Hungarian uprising in blood.” Option - " Soviet troops brutally suppressed the Hungarian uprising."

To understand how “bloody” or “cruel” the suppression of the “uprising” was, let’s look at the numbers.

As a result of the fighting, Soviet troops lost 720 people killed. Hungarians - 2500. It would seem that the significant losses of the Hungarian side clearly indicate the cruelty of the Soviet troops.

However, as always, the devil is in the details.

The fact is that 2,500 people were Hungarians killed from October 23 to December 1957 throughout Hungary. Including as a result of clashes between units of the Hungarian army, police and state security forces with the rebels; as a result of the “White Terror” in Budapest and other cities in the period from October 30 (the day of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest) to November 4 (large-scale offensive by Soviet troops, the beginning of Operation Whirlwind to suppress the rebellion); as a result of fighting between various rebel groups and, finally, as a result of clashes between rebels and Soviet units. In popular literature and newspaper articles, they usually miss the fact that the Hungarian army, police and state security troops took an active part in the first phase of the rebellion (23-28 October). And the fact that battles also took place between various rebel groups is completely unknown.

Now let’s take a closer look at what the losses of the Hungarian side consist of. So. Army battles with rebels. It is difficult to say reliably how many Hungarians were killed by the Hungarian soldiers, police and state security themselves during the suppression of the rebellion. Although, for example, the only surviving leader of the rebellion, General Bela Kiraly, testifies that, on the orders of Colonel Pal Maleter, at least 12 “revolutionaries” from among the defenders of the Corvin cinema were killed. But the losses of the Hungarian army can be approximately calculated. The fact is that we can take as a basis the losses in Budapest of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division of the Special Corps Soviet army during the period from October 24 to October 29. During 6 days of fighting, the division lost 350 people killed. That is, on average, the loss of life was more than 50 people per day. Such high losses are explained not so much by the ferocity of the fighting itself, but by the tactics chosen by the corps command: covering especially important objects and defense (do not open fire first). Moreover, Colonel Grigory Dobrunov, who at that time was the commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, testifies that there were no clear instructions and instructions when sending troops into Budapest. But there was a clear order “Don’t shoot.” Dobrunov’s words are also confirmed by the cryptographer of the Special Department of the Special Corps, Dmitry Kapranov. Moreover, the participants in the rebellion - in particular, the current member of the Hungarian Parliament, Imre Mecs - confirm this thesis. As a result, the rebels had the opportunity to throw Molotov cocktails at tanks with impunity, then shoot the crew who jumped out, shoot from the windows of houses and throw grenades at open BTR-152 armored personnel carriers in which soldiers were moving around the city, and shoot them with rifles and machine guns. The defensive tactics of the Soviet troops led to unreasonably high losses. But the fact is that the leadership of the Hungarian People’s Army (HPA), the police, and state security chose exactly the same tactics. With rare exceptions, they did not conduct offensive actions, which naturally irritated the Soviet military, who believed that the Hungarians themselves should still play the first fiddle. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to assume that the losses of the less protected and less armed VNA soldiers were at least no lower than the losses of the Soviet troops. That is, at least 50 people on average per day.

But this is Budapest. There were battles in other cities as well. In Miskolc, Gyord, Pécs, the army and police tried to fight. In Miskolc, rebel casualties on the first day alone amounted to at least 45 people. In some places bomb attacks were carried out on the rebels. Finally, in his speech on October 24, Prime Minister Imre Nagy stated that as a result of the actions of the fascists (this is exactly what the national hero of Hungary Imre Nagy said - this document is stored in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, RGASPI) many military personnel and civil servants died and mine citizens. That's it - a lot! And this is only for a day of rebellion.

Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest on October 30, fighting broke out in the city between various rebel groups. The deputy of Ivan Kovacs, the commander of one of the most significant rebel groups in the Korovin cinema, Gabor Dilinki, testifies that already on October 30, shootings began even within the Korovin residents themselves. In particular, Gabor's beloved girlfriend was killed. Western correspondents noted that incessant firefights began in Budapest after October 30, a period when Soviet troops simply were not there.

Particular attention is paid in Western correspondence from “free Budapest” to the actions of the troops of József Dudas, who first decided to expropriate the holdings of the National Bank. Naturally, this all happened with shooting.

Finally, in Budapest itself, after the departure of Soviet troops, the so-called “ white terror”, when Bela Kiraly’s guards and Dudash’s troops destroyed communists, state security officers and military personnel who refused to obey them. Photographs and newsreels of hanged people with signs of torture, with faces covered in acid, have spread all over the world and are well known to everyone.

On October 30, Kiraly’s guards shot state security soldiers guarding the building of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party. The assault on the building was carried out on a large scale, involving infantry and tanks. The soldiers and officers who surrendered were simply shot. A photo report by Life magazine correspondent John Sajova spread all over the world. Like his story about it:

« Six young officers came out, one very handsome. Their shoulder straps were torn off. Quick argument. We are not as bad as you think, give us a chance, they said. I was three feet away from this group. Suddenly one began to bend. They must have shot very close, right in their ribs. They all fell like cut corn. Very graceful. And when they were already on the ground, the rebels were still pouring lead on them. I've been to war three times, but I've never seen anything more terrible. ».

Finally, the actual cruelty of the Soviet troops in suppressing the uprising. Let's remember the total number of Hungarians killed: 2,500 people. It is interesting that at the time of the assault on Budapest on November 4, the city was defended, according to various estimates, from 30 to 50 thousand people. This is only Budapest. In the city of Pecs, a group of 2,000 people put up very stubborn resistance. Miskolc resisted very stubbornly. And with so many rebels resisting, 2,500 dead, including those who died in the intra-Hungarian civil conflict throughout Hungary??? Amazing. Still, even if we roughly estimate how many Hungarians died in clashes with the Soviet troops themselves, it would be barely a thousand people. And these are losses quite comparable to ours.

With all this, the Soviet army did not use aviation and artillery for combat purposes. Tank shelling was sporadic - in any case, the chronicle of rebel tanks firing at the building of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party is known to the whole world, but for some reason there are no newsreels or photographs of Soviet tanks firing.

The “cruelty” of the Soviet troops is also evidenced by the report on the military operations in Hungary of the 12th separate Rymniksky SME of the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR. For the uninitiated, this is special forces. Before the events in Hungary, its fighters waged an active and truly tough fight against UPA units in Ukraine. They were sent to Hungary on November 6 and arrived 3 days later. I was on a business trip for 2 months. Their task included: covering the Hungarian-Austrian border, destroying the rebels, arresting the rebels, and guarding important facilities. So, according to the report for two months of the mission, the special forces soldiers, who were not particularly scrupulous in their activities, killed... one Hungarian. In two months! And this is not a press release. This is a top secret document for internal use. The secrecy label was lifted just recently, and the document is stored in the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA).

Thus, it is clear that during the battles with Soviet troops a quite comparable number of Hungarians died - within a thousand people. The rest are victims of the intra-Hungarian conflict itself.

Myth 2

"Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter - fighters for the freedom of Hungary."

To understand this myth, it is worth familiarizing yourself with the biographies of these heroes. Pal Maleter. At the time of the mutiny - Colonel of the VNA. During World War II he fought in the army of fascist Hungary against the USSR. It is worth recalling here the obvious fact that the Hungarian soldiers on the Eastern Front were second only to the SS men in cruelty. And that's not always the case. In the Voronezh villages, the Magyars are remembered very well and are by no means kind words remember.

Maleter was captured and immediately began to re-educate. After some time, he was already conducting propaganda work among Hungarian prisoners. Then he collaborates with Soviet intelligence. Confidence in him is so great that in 1944 he took part in partisan actions against the Hungarians and Germans. Actually, this point is worth dwelling on in more detail. The fact is that during the war there were many defectors and surrenderers, but literally only a few were given such trust. It had to be earned. Unfortunately, the GRU archives, which could shed light on the secret of such trust in Maleter and his merits, are, alas, classified. But it would be naive to believe that a person who has once linked his fate with the intelligence of some country can easily resign from his service.

For his actions, Maleter was awarded the Order of the Red Star. He then studied at the Military Academy under Bela Kiraly. Kiraly remembers Maleter as an extremely fanatical cadet who even fainted from overwork. It even took an order to go to the hospital, as the doctors feared for his health. Bela Kiraly characterizes Maleter as follows:

“He changed his mind very often.”

Knowing his military biography and his behavior during the rebellion, it is difficult to disagree with Kiraly. On October 23-24, Maleter resolutely opposed the rebels, declaring his loyalty to the government and dedication to the cause of communism. Maleter decisively fights the rebels, which General Bela Kiraly still cannot forgive him for. On October 25, he, with five tanks, according to Kiraly, went to the Kilian barracks to suppress the rebellion in one of the military units. And he went over to the side of the rebels.

Imre Nagy. Also a hero. He fought in the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War. He was captured by the Russians. Participant civil war in Russia. Became a communist. Until 1945, he lived in the USSR with short-term trips abroad on assignments from the Comintern (Soviet intelligence, to put it simply). NKVD informer. It should be noted that when deciding on granting Nagy Soviet citizenship and admitting him to the leadership of the Comintern, his candidacy met with sharp rejection from the leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party led by Bela Kun. All of them were shot in 1937-1938. Except Nadya. In 1990, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, at the request of the Hungarian side, sent copies of Nagy’s case to Hungary. With his denunciations, slander against his fellow workers... For political purposes, these documents were hidden and have not been made public to this day. Some part, however, leaked to the Italian press in the early 90s.

Nagy then served for some time as Minister of the Interior. In this post, he achieved the return of most of the Hungarian prisoners from the USSR to Hungary, and also carried out repressions against fascists and nationalists. At the same time, Nagy was a creature of Beria himself. The same Beria in 1953 forced Rakosi to appoint Nagy as prime minister. True, the irony of fate is that three days later Nagy was appointed prime minister, and Beria was arrested in Moscow. By 1955, Nagy was relieved of his post and expelled from the Communist Party “for his right-wing views.” Simply put, Nagy, earlier than all the Hungarian communists, grasped the general trend towards a “thaw” in the countries of the socialist camp. As a man resented by the Rákosi regime, in this capacity he was popular among the masses. It is characteristic that he was popular for a reason, but at the suggestion of Radio Free Europe, which presented the communist Nagy as a kind of lamb. Why did the West rely on Nagy? Yes, it’s simple: political spinelessness and personal lack of will made his figure very convenient for the emerging transition period. And finally, Nagy probably hated his Soviet curators, who, as he knew, had powerful incriminating evidence on him. But one way or another, Nagy gradually became the leader of the Hungarian opposition. And in this capacity he speaks on October 23 in front of demonstrators on Parliament Square. As a witness, US Marine Sergeant James Bolek from the Embassy Security Corps, shows, Nagy begged people... to disperse, but in response to his appeal, “comrades,” the crowd roared:

“No more comrades, no more communism.”

And on October 24, having already been appointed prime minister on orders from the USSR, Nagy, in a radio speech, called on, as he put it, fascist provocateurs to lay down their arms. He calls the participants in the uprising nothing less than “fascists” and “reactionaries.” At the same time, Nagy assures that Soviet troops are in Budapest solely at the request of the government.

Nagy probably realized that power on the streets no longer belonged to those who demanded to appoint him prime minister just a day ago.

As events unfold, Nagy gradually begins to do more and more strange things. For example, it prohibits the VNA from conducting active offensive operations. That is, it imposes on the army the same disastrous tactics that the Soviet Army had - to defend itself. On October 28, Soviet and Hungarian troops almost completely blocked the main groups of rebels in Budapest, prepared for the assault and their destruction, but... Nagy managed to convince Mikoyan, and Khrushchev, to withdraw troops from Budapest.

After this, Nagy began calling yesterday’s fascists revolutionaries. But it was difficult for Nadya. A military revolutionary council headed by Maleter was already operating in the country. A National Guard was created in the country, led by Bela Kiraj and former Horthy officers. József Dudas demanded a place in the government and refused to disband his troops. Nagy tried to disband all the armed forces and begin their construction anew, on the basis of the National Guard, but Maleter and part of the Budapest garrison sharply opposed, Bela Kiraly spoke out against Maleter, for which Maleter gave the order to arrest him, Dudas generally refused to obey anyone . In addition, the United States generally relied on Cardinal Mindszenty, an active anti-communist who called on all Hungarian Catholics to fight for freedom of faith. Mindszenty also called for denationalization, the renunciation of all social gains, and the return of property to the former owners. Most of the army refused to obey both Maleter and Kirai, and especially Mindszenty. Nagy was, after all, a communist after all. But on October 30, an anti-communist coup took place in Budapest. The building of the Central Committee of the Party was stormed, the guards were shot, some of the communists were killed, and some were arrested. Nagy understood that the same awaited him. And he made an almost unmistakable move. He announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the establishment of “new relations” with the West. Maybe all this would have worked, since the West began to exert powerful pressure on the USSR, so powerful that even Zhukov and Khrushchev were inclined to reconsider relations with Hungary. But... the Suez crisis broke out and the West had no time for Hungary. As a result, on November 4, SA units entered Hungary from three countries, and Nagy, calling for resistance... fled to the Yugoslav embassy. It is very important that it was in Yugoslavia: since 1948, Tito was active in creating a split in the camp of socialism, and Hungary was one of the priorities. It was with her that Stalin planned to start the war against Yugoslavia. In fact, history knows examples of how state leaders fought for their beliefs, either proving they were right, or paying for mistakes. An example similar to Nadia is Salvador Allende. Having called for resistance, he did not flee, but died with weapons in his hands, defending his views and paying for his mistakes. Nagy acted differently. Well, every country has its own heroes. For example, the Hungarians also have General Bela Kiraly as their hero. Yes, the same one, the commander of the National Guard. He also gave his guards (most of whom, according to Kiraly himself, were “teenagers”) the order to hold out until the end and fled to Austria, and from there to the USA. This is such a general, such a hero. In our country, other generals are considered heroes.

What’s also interesting is that Imre Nagy formally remained... a Soviet citizen until the end of his days. In the RGASPI, in the files of the Hungarian communist leaders Rakosi and Gere, there are documents confirming that they were deprived of Soviet citizenship when leaving for Hungary in 1945. But in Nadya’s case there are no such documents. As far as I know, researchers also did not find such documents regarding Nagy in other archives.

Myth 3

the work of Soviet soldiers and Hungarian state security.”

The situation looks like this. On the morning of October 25, a crowd gathered in the square near the parliament. Mostly women and students. Opposite stood soviet tanks and an armored personnel carrier with soldiers. Everyone was in a completely peaceful mood. The Hungarians did not bully the Soviets, did not throw stones at them, but tried to communicate. Then the generally accepted outline of events is as follows: shots rang out from somewhere from the rooftops, Soviet soldiers opened hurricane fire from all types of weapons, bullets hit the fleeing people, in total about 200 (according to various versions, and more) people died.

Well, actually, a different number of deaths is more common - 20 people. But let it be 200, if corpses are not enough for someone. Let's try to look at the problem from a different angle.

First, witness testimony is required. But whose? Hungarians, like Russians, are interested and biased people. But we do have one important third-party testimony: US Marine Sergeant James Bolek. He saw everything that happened and later described it:

“At 10 o'clock in the morning, two sailors and I were standing on the balcony of our second-floor apartment, looking at the Soviet soldiers, when someone dropped explosives from the roof of our building - on Soviet tanks and their crews on the street in front of our building. When the explosives detonated, Soviet soldiers began firing their machine guns at our building, from the ground floor to the roof." .

So, it all started with someone throwing explosives from the roof of a house or the top floor onto a Soviet tank. Pay attention to one more detail: Soviet soldiers opened fire on the house from where the explosives were dropped. This is also important.

Simultaneously with the shots of the Soviet soldiers, automatic and machine-gun bursts struck from the rooftops - at the tankers and at the crowd, at people scattering in panic. There are photos of these moments. The crowd is very scattered and does not run densely. That is, there could not be a crush and there could not be a dense defeat. Who were the Soviet tankers shooting at? Hardly according to the crowd. Since soldiers usually very clearly determine where the shooting is coming from, and respond with fire to fire, and not in all directions. Moreover, from the very beginning they reacted correctly, opening fire on a very specific building. If our people fired at the crowd (for which there is no evidence even from the Hungarians), it was only because they were shot at from the crowd.

But who started throwing explosives and shooting from rooftops? The Hungarians are sure that this is a provocation of state security. But there are objections to this version.

Firstly, by October 25, the Hungarian state security was completely demoralized. Having its own troops and a huge operational apparatus, it, in fact, did nothing either to prevent the rebellion or to eliminate it in its infancy. State security units fought only in the provinces - and then only in defense. In Budapest itself, the Hungarian KGB officers did not show themselves in any way. In addition, by October 25, almost all district AVH (KGB) departments were destroyed. And why did the KGB people arrange this? At the very least, Soviet troops conducted operations against the rebels, as did the VNA. The task of the KGB agents is to seize and destroy. But they did not do this even under the cover of Soviet tanks. This provocation was beneficial precisely to the organizers of the rebellion: by the evening, all of Hungary knew that in front of the parliament in Budapest, Soviet soldiers and the GB had killed more than 200 Hungarians. The rebellion, which had almost died down by October 25, flared up with renewed vigor, and the ranks of the rebels were replenished with sincere volunteers. Part of the Hungarian garrison hesitated. All agreements that had been reached by this time were buried. Typically, supporters of the version that the execution in front of parliament was organized by state security cannot imagine a single corpse of a Hungarian intelligence officer at the battle site or on the roofs of houses around. Although the Soviet soldiers simply fired hurricanes from all types of weapons.

Myth 4

"There was a popular uprising in Hungary."

This myth does not stand up to criticism if you look at the documents, and documents that are declassified and in open use.

The fact remains: there was no uprising. There were several phases of a well-organized armed rebellion.

It is well known that the events began on October 23 at 15:00 with a peaceful demonstration of students, which was joined by significant sections of the population of Budapest. Within three hours the demonstration ended and an armed rebellion began.

But traces of a conspiracy, if there was one, must be looked for a little earlier. They are. And not so hidden. In an archive such as RGANI, one can find documents such as reports from the USSR Ambassador to Hungary Andropov or KGB Chairman Serov, in which they indicate that an armed rebellion is being prepared in the country. It is characteristic that these reports were sent in the summer of 1956. The testimony of Alexander Goryunov, an investigator of the special department under the Soviet military candidacy in Budapest, also dates back to the summer of 1956. It was during this period that our Hungarian colleagues informed our counterintelligence officers about the existence of a conspiracy and the preparation of a putsch.

There are other documents. US Army Intelligence Report, January 6, 1956. It, in particular, points to information from a Hungarian officer, recruited back in 1954, about the existence of a conspiracy in the army. This officer reports that although the underground movement consists of a relatively small number of officers, there are cells in almost every Hungarian unit. Meanwhile, according to the British correspondent Sherman (Observer), a certain VNA colonel played a significant role in the radicalization of the events of October 23. The night before the events he met at Polytechnic University with students and persuaded them to go to the demonstration. Moreover, under his influence, an appeal was drawn up to the government with radical and clearly impossible conditions, such as a ban on the export of uranium to the USSR, which no one, in fact, exported. Sherman writes that under the influence of the colonel the demands became as radical as possible. A little later, the captured rebels pointed out the identity of the colonel. His last name is Nodar. During the rebellion he became Bel Kiraly's assistant. It is characteristic that during interrogation Nodar named Kiraly one of the organizers of the rebellion. Considering that the head of the National Guard was not Nodar, who led an underground struggle at the risk of his life, but Kiraly, who seemed to have remained out of work until October 30, his testimony deserves attention. By the way, it was Nodar who was approached by the American military attache with a request to help him acquire and send to the United States a new Soviet MIG-17 fighter. Documents about this have again been declassified and are located in the Russian State Historical Institute and the Central Archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation.

There is also other evidence of the existence of a conspiracy and the preparation of a rebellion. The same Alexander Goryunov shows that shortly before the mutiny they received information that waybills for vehicles had already been prepared, that it was already known who would transport what - people, weapons..., their routes had been planned.

Literally shortly before the start of the uprising, members of the Hungarian youth sports and military organization (analogous to our DOSAAF) were gathered in the city from all over Hungary. At first they became the striking force of the rebellion.

Another interesting point. The situation was rocking long before the events. In particular, dissatisfaction with the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary was spreading throughout the country. True, not because the troops are in the country at all, but because the Soviet army in Hungary lives off the Hungarian budget, thereby eating up the not so well-fed Hungarians. It’s clear that this is nonsense. Soviet troops were on the USSR budget; they paid for purchases in Hungary with real money. But someone introduced these ideas to the masses, who immediately thought the same thing. How could it be otherwise: Hungary was always in a state of economic crisis, it was necessary to find extreme ones. Rumors were spread and picked up that it was cold in the houses in winter, since there was nothing to heat with: all the coal was sent to the USSR. Typically, during this period, coal was exported from the USSR to Hungary due to its acute shortage in Hungary itself. We helped them, in general.

The uranium issue stands out separately. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a literal uranium fever began. The United States has managed to lay its paw on uranium deposits almost all over the world, except Eastern Europe. On “our” territory there were deposits in East Germany (Gera), Czechoslovakia (Jachimov), Hungary (Pecs) and Bulgaria. We made the first atomic bombs from German and Bulgarian materials. It is clear that uranium mining was under strict control of the USSR and guarded by Soviet units. Serious counterintelligence work was carried out, including disinformation work. By 1956, in the strictest secrecy, development began on Soviet territory - in Kazakhstan. But in the USA they did not know this. But they knew about deposits in Eastern European countries from the Soviet high-ranking KGB officer Iskanderov, who defected to the West and stopped in the USA in 1950 (by the way, Iskanderov’s escape became one of additional factors the fall of the once all-powerful Abakumov). Uranium was not exported from Hungary (as well as from Czechoslovakia) to the USSR. However, for some reason the “masses” thought differently. And the “uranium” point in the historical document “14 demands” was number 6. Who inspired this stupidity in people? The answer is obvious. Those with whom the USSR was in a state of nuclear confrontation in those years. Although this moment is not hidden. All the demands of the “masses” to the government were first voiced on Radio Free Europe, or more precisely, as part of the CIA’s Operation Focus, which began in 1954.

But let's return to the popular uprising. As you know, the events began on October 23 at 15:00. Soviet tanks entered Budapest at 5-6 am on October 24th. And well-organized mobile groups of militants with commanders, communications, intelligence, weapons and clear coordination of actions were already waiting for them. Soviet troops began to suffer losses from the very first hours of participation in the Hungarian events. The good military training of Hungarian reservists and pre-conscripts is known. However, any military man will tell you that the distance from preparation to the creation of full-fledged combat units is very long. Soviet troops faced not teenagers, but rather well-trained troops. In addition, in addition to Budapest, the rebellion began almost throughout the country at the same time. And everywhere according to the same pattern: the seizure of government agencies, radio stations, armories, police departments and AVH. It is characteristic that the second largest and most intense rebellion was the events in the city of Miskolc. The already mentioned US Army intelligence report indicated that it was around Miskolc that there were at least 10 partisan camps, each of which had from 40 to 50 partisans with radio stations, weapons and food depots. By the way, the area around Miskolc is the only one in Hungary where partisans can be found - forests and difficult terrain terrain.

In Budapest itself, the production and transportation of nitroglycerin was even established. For information: for sabotage, you can only use so-called pure nitroglycerin, which cannot be made at home. Homemade, dirty nitroglycerin will explode either during manufacture, or, in the process best case scenario, during transportation. At the latest, as soon as you raise your hand with a bottle filled with dirty nitroglycerin to throw. However, in Budapest these issues were resolved in the shortest possible time, which only speaks of work done in advance.

How could the omnipresent Hungarian state security have missed the plot? It's simple. By 1956, state security was paralyzed by internal purges. Something similar happened here a little earlier - after the arrest and execution of Beria, when the most professional intelligence and counterintelligence personnel were dispersed in subsequent purges. In addition, in his memoirs, Alexander Goryunov shows that he and his colleagues had the impression that in the AVH leadership itself there were supporters of changing the country’s course.

The directives of the US National Security Council also do not support the version of the uprising. For example, in the directive NSC-158.

« Aims and Actions of the United States to Take Advantage of Unrest in the Satellite States,” June 29, 1953, states: “To fuel resistance to Communist oppression in such a way that the spontaneous character is not questioned.

Organize, train and equip underground organizations capable of conducting sustained military operations ».

By satellite countries we mean countries of the socialist camp.

Another directive, NSC-68, states: “ to intensify operations by covert means to cause and support unrest and uprisings in selected strategically important satellite countries.”

Oleg Filimonov

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Modern bourgeois Hungary, which drove out the communists, became a member of the EU, and finally gained the “freedom” long-awaited by some » live in a capitalist "paradise" » . What kind of freedom? To become unemployed, homeless, hungry and sick, to work for someone else’s capitalist uncle until exhaustion instead of contributing your labor to social production, to be useful to the whole society - i.e. to be a respected person in society, and not a “loser” » , not a marginalized person, powerlessly watching the death of loved ones for whose treatment there is no money?

In Hungary, a population of 10 million, 40% of the population is on the verge of poverty, 15% is beyond the poverty line. Many political parties and religious denominations took part in the charitable food distribution taking place in Hungary - from ultranationalists to socialists, from Hare Krishnas to Baptists. But everyone knows that a person needs to eat every day...

Photo from the publication “Népszava” ___________________________________________________________________________________

The Hungarian troops were defeated, its territory was occupied by Soviet troops. After the war, free elections were held in the country, provided for by the Yalta agreements, in which the Party of Small Farmers received a majority. However, the coalition government imposed by the Allied Control Commission, which was headed by Soviet Marshal Voroshilov, gave half the cabinet seats to the winning majority, with key posts remaining with the Hungarian Communist Party.

Matthias Rakosi

The communists, with the support of Soviet troops, arrested most of the leaders of the opposition parties, and in 1947 they held new elections. By 1949, power in the country was mainly represented by communists. The Matthias Rakosi regime was established in Hungary. Collectivization was carried out, mass repressions began against the opposition, the church, officers and politicians of the former regime and many other opponents of the new government.

Hungary (as a former ally of Nazi Germany) had to pay significant indemnities to the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, amounting to up to a quarter of GDP.

An important role was also played by the fact that in May 1955, neighboring Austria became a single neutral independent state, from which, after the signing of a peace treaty, allied occupation forces were withdrawn (Soviet troops had been stationed in Hungary since 1944).

A certain role was played by the subversive activities of Western intelligence services, in particular the British MI6, which trained numerous cadres of “people's rebels” at its secret bases in Austria and then transferred them to Hungary

Strengths of the parties

More than 50 thousand Hungarians took part in the uprising. It was suppressed by Soviet troops (31 thousand) with the support of Hungarian workers' squads (25 thousand) and Hungarian state security agencies (1.5 thousand).

Soviet units and formations that took part in the Hungarian events

• Special case:
  • 2nd Guards Mechanized Division (Nikolaev-Budapest)
  • 11th Guards Mechanized Division (after 1957 - 30th Guards Tank Division)
  • 17th Guards Mechanized Division (Yenakievo-Danube)
  • 33rd Guards Mechanized Division (Kherson)
  • 128th Guards Rifle Division (after 1957 - 128th Guards Motorized Rifle Division)
• 7th Guards Airborne Division
  • 80th Parachute Regiment
  • 108th Parachute Regiment
• 31st Guards Airborne Division
  • 114th Parachute Regiment
  • 381st Parachute Regiment
• 8th Mechanized Army of the Carpathian Military District (after 1957 - 8th Tank Army)
• 38th Army of the Carpathian Military District
  • 13th Guards Mechanized Division (Poltava) (after 1957 - 21st Guards Tank Division)
  • 27th Mechanized Division (Cherkasy) (after 1957 - 27th Motorized Rifle Division)

In total, the following took part in the operation:

• personnel - 31550 people
• tanks and self-propelled guns - 1130
• guns and mortars - 615
• anti-aircraft guns - 185
• BTR - 380
• cars - 3830

Start

The internal party struggle in the Hungarian Labor Party between the Stalinists and supporters of reforms began from the very beginning of 1956 and by July 18, 1956 led to the resignation of the General Secretary of the Hungarian Labor Party, Matthias Rakosi, who was replaced by Ernő Gerő (former Minister of State Security).

The removal of Rakosi, as well as the Poznań uprising of 1956 in Poland, which caused great resonance, led to an increase in critical sentiment among students and the writing intelligentsia. From the middle of the year, the “Petőfi Circle” began to actively operate, in which the most pressing problems facing Hungary were discussed.

The inscription on the wall: “Death of state security!”

October 23

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon a demonstration began, in which tens of thousands of people took part - students and representatives of the intelligentsia. The demonstrators carried red flags, banners with slogans about Soviet-Hungarian friendship, the inclusion of Imre Nagy in the government, etc. On the squares of Jasai Mari, on the Fifteenth of March, on the streets of Kossuth and Rakoczi, radical groups joined the demonstrators, shouting slogans of a different kind. They demanded the restoration of the old Hungarian national emblem, the old Hungarian national holiday instead of the Day of Liberation from Fascism, the abolition of military training and Russian language lessons. In addition, demands were put forward for free elections, the creation of a government led by Nagy and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

At 20 o'clock on the radio, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the WPT, Erne Gere, made a speech sharply condemning the demonstrators.

In response to this, a large group of demonstrators tried to enter the broadcasting studio of the Radio House with a demand to broadcast the program demands of the demonstrators. This attempt led to a clash with the Hungarian state security units defending the Radio House, during which the first dead and wounded appeared after 21:00. The rebels received weapons or took them from reinforcements sent to help guard the radio, as well as from civil defense warehouses and captured police stations. A group of rebels entered the Kilian Barracks, where three construction battalions were located, and seized their weapons. Many construction battalion members joined the rebels.

Fierce fighting in and around the Radio House continued throughout the night. The head of the Budapest Police Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Sandor Kopachi, ordered not to shoot at the rebels and not to interfere with their actions. He unconditionally complied with the demands of the crowd gathered in front of the headquarters for the release of prisoners and the removal of red stars from the facade of the building.

At 11 p.m., based on the decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, ordered the commander of the Special Corps to begin moving to Budapest to assist the Hungarian troops “in restoring order and creating conditions for peaceful creative work.” Formations and units of the Special Corps arrived in Budapest at 6 a.m. and began fighting with the rebels.

the 25th of October

In the morning, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division approached the city, in the evening - the 128th Guards Rifle Division, joining the Special Corps. At this time, during a rally near the parliament building, an incident occurred: fire was opened from the upper floors, as a result of which a Soviet officer was killed and a tank was burned. In response, Soviet troops opened fire on the demonstrators, as a result, 61 people were killed on both sides and 284 were wounded.

28 of October

Imre Nagy spoke on the radio and stated that “the government condemns the views that view the current grandiose popular movement as a counter-revolution.” The government announced a ceasefire and the start of negotiations with the USSR on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

October 30. Anarchy

In the morning, all Soviet troops were withdrawn to their places of deployment. The streets of Hungarian cities were left virtually without power.

Some prisons associated with the repressive GB were captured by the rebels. The security offered virtually no resistance and partially fled.

Political prisoners and criminals who were there were released from prisons. Locally, trade unions began to create workers' and local councils that were not subordinate to the authorities and not controlled by the Communist Party.

Having achieved success for some time, the participants in the uprising quickly radicalized, killing communists, employees of the State Security Service and the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and shelling Soviet military camps.

By order of October 30, Soviet military personnel were prohibited from returning fire, “succumbing to provocations,” and leaving the unit’s location.

There were recorded cases of murders of Soviet military personnel on leave and sentries in various cities of Hungary.

The Budapest town committee of the VPT was captured by the rebels, and over 20 communists were hanged by the crowd. Photos of hanged communists with signs of torture, with faces disfigured by acid, went around the whole world. This massacre was, however, condemned by representatives of the political forces of Hungary.

Re-entry of Soviet troops and the Suez crisis

October 31 - November 4

November 4

Soviet troops carried out artillery strikes on pockets of resistance and carried out subsequent mopping-up operations with infantry forces supported by tanks. The main centers of resistance were the working-class suburbs of Budapest, where local councils managed to lead more or less organized resistance. These areas of the city were subjected to the most massive shelling.

End

Immediately after the suppression of the uprising, mass arrests began: in total, the Hungarian special services and their Soviet colleagues managed to arrest about 5,000 Hungarians (846 of them were sent to Soviet prisons), of which “a significant number were members of the VPT, military personnel and students.”

Prime Minister Imre Nagy and members of his government were lured out of the Yugoslav Embassy, ​​where they had taken refuge, on November 22, 1956, and taken into custody on Romanian territory. They were then returned to Hungary and put on trial. Imre Nagy and former Defense Minister Pal Maleter were sentenced to death on charges of treason. Imre Nagy was hanged on June 16, 1958. In total, according to some estimates, about 350 people were executed. About 26,000 people were prosecuted, of whom 13,000 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, but by 1963 all participants in the uprising were amnestied and released by the government of János Kádár.

After the fall of the socialist regime, Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter were ceremonially reburied in July 1989. Since 1989, Imre Nagy has been considered a national hero of Hungary.

Losses of the parties

According to statistics, during the period from October 23 to December 31, 2,652 Hungarian citizens died and 19,226 were injured on both sides in connection with the uprising and hostilities.

The losses of the Soviet army, according to official data, amounted to 669 people killed, 51 missing, 1540 wounded.

Consequences

The entry of Soviet troops made it clear to the West that attempts to overthrow socialist regimes in Eastern Europe will cause an adequate response from the USSR. Subsequently, during the Polish crisis, NATO directly stated that an invasion of Poland would lead to “very serious consequences,” which in this situation meant “the beginning of the Third World War.”

Notes

1. according to definition communism Dictionary Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.
2. http://www.ucpb.org/?lang=rus&open=15930
3. K. Laszlo. History of Hungary. Millennium in the center of Europe. - M., 2002
4. Hungary //www.krugosvet.ru
5. Short story Hungary: from ancient times to the present day. Ed. Islamova T. M. - M., 1991.
6. R. Medvedev. Yu. Andropov. Political biography.
7. M. Smith. New cloak, old dagger. - London, 1997
8. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, p. 325
9. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, pp. 441-443
10. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, p. 560
11. O. Filimonov “Myths about the uprising”
12. Hungarian "thaw" of '56
13. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, pp. 470-473
14. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, pp. 479-481
15. Johanna Granville First Domino The First Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis of 1956, Texas A&M University Press, 2004. ISBN 1585442984.
16. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, pp. 336-337
17. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, pp. 558-559
18. http://www.ucpb.org/?lang=rus&open=15930
19. Cseresnyés, Ferenc (Summer 1999). "The "56 Exodus to Austria". The Hungarian Quarterly XL(154): pp. 86–101. Retrieved 2006-10-09. (English)
20. COLD WAR Chat: Geza Jeszensky Hungarian Ambassador (English)
21. Molnar, Adrienne; Kõrösi Zsuzsanna, (1996). "The handing down of experiences in families of the politically condemned in Communist Hungary." IX. International Oral History Conference: pp. 1169-1166. Retrieved 2008-10-10. (English)
22. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, p. 559
23. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: Statistical study. - M.: Olma-Press, 2001. - P. 532.

Links

• Hungarian uprising of 1956. Almanac “Russia. XX century Documentation"
• Hungarian Mutiny 1956: Anniversary. New economy, No. 9-10, 2006, pp. 75-103.
• V. Gavrilov. Black October 1956. Military industrial courier
• N. Morozov. Rising from the Past - Part 1, Part 2
• O. Filimonov. Myths about the uprising
• V. Shurygin. Letters from a Dead Captain
• Tamás Kraus. About the Hungarian workers' councils of 1956
• K. Erofeev.

The Hungarian uprising of 1956 lasted several days - from October 23 to November 9. This short period was referred to in Soviet textbooks as the Hungarian counter-revolutionary rebellion of 1956, which was successfully suppressed by Soviet troops. This is exactly how it was defined in the Hungarian official chronicle. IN modern interpretation Hungarian events are called revolution.

The revolution began on October 23 with crowded rallies and processions in Budapest. In the city center, demonstrators toppled and destroyed a huge monument to Stalin.
In total, according to documents, about 50 thousand people took part in the uprising. There were many casualties. After the suppression of the uprising, mass arrests began.

These days have gone down in history as one of the most dramatic episodes of the Cold War.

Hungary fought in World War II on the side of Nazi Germany until the very end of the war and fell into the Soviet zone of occupation after its end. In this regard, according to the Paris Peace Treaty of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition with Hungary, the USSR received the right to maintain its armed forces on the territory of Hungary, but was obliged to withdraw them after the withdrawal of the Allied occupation forces from Austria. Allied forces withdrew from Austria in 1955.
On May 14, 1955, the socialist countries concluded the Warsaw Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which extended the stay of Soviet troops in Hungary.

On November 4, 1945, general elections were held in Hungary. The Independent Party of Smallholders received 57% of the votes and only 17% - the Communists. In 1947, the communist HTP (Hungarian Workers' Party), through terror, blackmail and election fraud, became the only legal political force. The occupying Soviet troops became the force on which the Hungarian communists relied in their fight against their opponents. Thus, on February 25, 1947, the Soviet command arrested the popular parliament member Bela Kovacs, after which he was taken to the USSR and convicted of espionage.

The leader of the VPT and the chairman of the government, Matthias Rakosi, nicknamed “Stalin’s best student,” established a personal dictatorship, copying the Stalinist model of governance in the USSR: he carried out forced industrialization and collectivization, suppressed any dissent, fought Catholic Church. State Security (AVH) had a staff of 28 thousand people. They were helped by 40 thousand informants. ABH has created a file for a million Hungarian residents - more than 10% of the entire population, including the elderly and children. Of these, 650 thousand were persecuted. About 400 thousand Hungarians received various terms of imprisonment or camps, serving them mainly in mines and quarries.

The government of Matthias Rakosi largely copied the policies of I.V. Stalin, which caused rejection and indignation among the indigenous population.

Head of a destroyed statue of Stalin. Budapest, Luisa Blaha Square

The internal political struggle in Hungary continued to escalate. Rakosi had no choice but to promise an investigation into the trials of Rajk and the other Communist Party leaders he executed. At all levels of government, even in the state security agencies, the most hated institution in Hungary by the people, Rakosi was demanded to resign. He was almost openly called a “murderer.” In mid-July 1956, Mikoyan flew to Budapest to force the resignation of Rakosi. Rakosi was forced to submit and leave for the USSR, where he eventually ended his days, cursed and forgotten by his people and despised by Soviet leaders. Rakosi's departure did not cause any real changes in government policy or composition.

In Hungary, arrests followed of former state security leaders responsible for trials and executions. The reburial of victims of the regime - Laszlo Rajk and others - on October 6, 1956 resulted in a powerful demonstration in which 300 thousand residents of the Hungarian capital participated.

The people's hatred was directed against those who were known for their torment: state security officers. They represented everything that was disgusting about the Rákosi regime; they were caught and killed. Events in Hungary took on the character of a genuine people's revolution and it was precisely this circumstance that frightened the Soviet leaders.

The fundamental issue was the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Eastern European countries, that is, their actual occupation.The new Soviet government preferred to avoid bloodshed, but was ready for it if it came to the question of the satellites secession from the USSR, even in the form of declaring neutrality and non-participation in blocs.

The inscription on the wall: “Russians - go home!”

On October 22, demonstrations began in Budapest demanding the formation of a new leadership led by Imre Nagy. On October 23, Imre Nagy became prime minister and made a call to lay down his arms. However, there were Soviet tanks in Budapest and this caused excitement among the people.

A grandiose demonstration arose, the participants of which were students, high school students, and young workers. The demonstrators walked towards the statue of the hero of the 1848 Revolution, General Bell. Up to 200 thousand gathered at the parliament building. Demonstrators toppled a statue of Stalin. Armed groups formed, calling themselves “Freedom Fighters.” They numbered up to 20 thousand people. Among them were former political prisoners released from prison by the people. The Freedom Fighters occupied various areas of the capital, established a high command led by Pal Maleter, and renamed themselves the National Guard.

At the enterprises of the Hungarian capital, cells of the new government were formed - workers' councils. They put forward their social and political demands, and among these demands there was one that aroused the ire of the Soviet leadership: to withdraw Soviet troops from Budapest, remove them from Hungarian territory.

The second circumstance that frightened the Soviet government was the restoration of the Social Democratic Party in Hungary, and then the formation of a multi-party government.

Although Nagy was made prime minister, the new Stalinist leadership led by Gere tried to isolate him and thereby worsened the situation even further.

On October 25, an armed clash with Soviet troops took place near the parliament building. The rebellious people demanded the departure of Soviet troops and the formation of a new government of national unity, in which various parties would be represented.

On October 26, after the appointment of Kadar as the first secretary of the Central Committee and the resignation of Gere, Mikoyan and Suslov returned to Moscow. They followed to the airfield in a tank.

On October 28, while fighting was still ongoing in Budapest, the Hungarian government issued an order for a ceasefire and the return of armed units to their quarters to await instructions. Imre Nagy, in a radio address, announced that the Hungarian government had come to an agreement with the Soviet government on the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and the inclusion of armed detachments of Hungarian workers and youth in the regular Hungarian army. This was seen as the end of the Soviet occupation. Workers quit their jobs until the fighting in Budapest ceased and Soviet troops withdrew. A delegation from the workers' council of the industrial district of Miklós presented Imre Nagy with demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary by the end of the year.

Soviet troops were withdrawn from Budapest, but concentrated in the area of ​​the Budapest airfield.

17 combat divisions were sent to “restore order.” Among them: mechanized - 8, tank - 1, rifle - 2, anti-aircraft artillery - 2, aviation - 2, airborne - 2. Three more airborne divisions were put on full combat readiness and concentrated near the Soviet-Hungarian border - We were waiting for an order.

On November 1, the massive invasion of Soviet troops into Hungary began. To Imre Nagy's protest, Soviet Ambassador Andropov replied that the Soviet divisions that entered Hungary arrived only to replace the troops already there.

3,000 Soviet tanks crossed the border from Transcarpathian Ukraine and Romania. The Soviet ambassador, again summoned to Nagy, was warned that Hungary, in protest against the violation of the Warsaw Pact (the entry of troops required the consent of the relevant government), would withdraw from the pact. The Hungarian government announced on the evening of the same day that it was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, declaring neutrality and appealing to the United Nations to protest against the Soviet invasion.

What happened on the streets of Budapest? Soviet troops faced fierce resistance from Hungarian army units, as well as from the civilian population.

The streets of Budapest witnessed a terrible drama, during which ordinary people attacked tanks with Molotov cocktails. Key points, including the Ministry of Defense and Parliament buildings, were taken within a few hours. Hungarian radio went silent before finishing its appeal for international help, but dramatic accounts of the street fighting came from a Hungarian reporter who alternated between his teletype and the rifle he was firing from his office window.

Soviet tank IS-3 with a torn turret

The Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee began preparing a new Hungarian government. The first secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, János Kádár, agreed to the role of prime minister of the future government.On November 3, a new government was formed, but the fact that it was formed on the territory of the USSR became known only two years later. The new government was officially announced at dawn on November 4, when Soviet troops stormed the Hungarian capital, where a coalition government led by Imre Nagy had been formed the day before; The non-party general Pal Maleter also joined the government.

By the end of the day on November 3, the Hungarian military delegation led by Defense Minister Pal Maleter arrived at headquarters to continue negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, where they were arrested by KGB Chairman General Serov. It was only when Nagy was unable to connect with his military delegation that he realized that the Soviet leadership had deceived him.

On November 4 at 5 o'clock in the morning, Soviet artillery rained fire on the Hungarian capital, half an hour later Nagy notified the Hungarian people about this. For three days, Soviet tanks destroyed the Hungarian capital; armed resistance in the province continued until November 14. Approximately 25 thousand Hungarians and 7 thousand Russians were killed.

Imre Nagy and his staff took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. After two weeks of negotiations, Kadar gave a written guarantee that Nagy and his employees would not be prosecuted for their activities, that they could leave the Yugoslav embassy and return home with their families. However, the bus in which Nagy was traveling was intercepted by Soviet officers, who arrested Nagy and took him to Romania. Later, Nagy, who did not want to repent, was tried in a closed court and shot. General Pal Maleter suffered the same fate.
Thus, the suppression of the Hungarian uprising was not the first example of the brutal defeat of political opposition in Eastern Europe - similar actions on a smaller scale were carried out in Poland just a few days earlier. But this was the most monstrous example, in connection with which the image of Khrushchev the liberal, which he seemed to promise to leave in history, faded forever.
These events were perhaps the first milestone on the path that would lead a generation later to the destruction of the communist system in Europe, as they caused a “crisis of consciousness” among the true supporters of Marxism-Leninism. Many party veterans Western Europe and the United States was disillusioned, because it was no longer possible to turn a blind eye to the determination of the Soviet leaders to maintain power in the satellite countries, completely ignoring the aspirations of their peoples.

Today, Speaker of the Federation Council Sergei Mironov in Budapest publicly repents to the Hungarians for the events of 1956. He tears the shirt on his chest in half, and, smearing snot on his thin mustache, he sobs over the memorial to the fallen.
Of course, Mironov is no stranger, and the people have already adapted to his antics - such as refusing to meet with the “terrorist” Arafat or demanding an extraordinary term for the president. In the end, he said about himself quite figuratively: “We will work fruitfully, and this will never end!”
But we are adults and we should take a closer look at the past to understand its lessons.
So, what happened in Hungary in 1956 and what was the role of the Soviet Union in these events.

The liberal version of these events is as simple as Gaidar's bald head. The Soviet Union poured blood on Hungary, which had taken the path of liberal reforms.

Let's start with reforms
Who was our “reformer” and what “reforms” was he going to carry out?
So, the main fighter against communism and reformer Imre Nagy.

Born in 1896. He fought in the Austro-Hungarian army. In 1916 he was captured. And already in 1917 he joined the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and during the Civil War he fought in the Red Army. In 1921 he returned to Hungary, but in 1927 he fled to Vienna from the Horthy regime. Since 1930 he has lived in the USSR, working at the Comintern and the Institute Agriculture Academy of Sciences of the USSR with Bukharin. He was arrested but immediately released. And not just released, but accepted into... service in the OGPU. As it later turned out, he was recruited back in 1933 and reported to the authorities about the activities of his Hungarian compatriots who had found refuge in the Soviet Union. This may have then saved Nagy himself. In March 1938, he was also arrested by security officers from the Moscow department of the NKVD, but they were kept in jail for only four days. The 4th (secret-political) department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD stood up for him. Subsequently, security officer Nagy was involved in the “cleansing” of the Comintern, during which Bela Kun and a number of other Hungarian communists were repressed. Having “cleansed” the Comintern of “enemies of the people,” Nagy actually cleared a place for himself and became one of the most influential leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party in exile.
From 1941 to November 1944, Nagy worked quite comfortably at the Moscow radio station Kossuth Radio, which broadcast programs in Hungarian for residents of Hungary, Germany's former ally in the war.

It is worth recalling here that Hungary was one of the main allies of the Nazis in the war against the USSR. Almost one and a half million Hungarians fought on the Soviet front, of which 404,700 people died, more than 500,000 were taken prisoner. Hungarian troops committed many war crimes on the territory of the USSR, which were recorded by investigative bodies and commissions investigating fascist atrocities, but Hungary ultimately did not bear any responsibility for its crimes, betraying yesterday’s ally in time and leaving the war in 1944.

On November 4, 1944, Nagy returned to his homeland with the first group of communist emigrants. But to his great disappointment, he never became the “first person” of Hungary; he had to be content with ministerial posts under various coalition governments. Since 1945, Imre Nagy served as Minister of the Interior in Tildy’s cabinet - then this minister was also in charge of the intelligence services; under Nagy, a cleansing of Hungary took place from “bourgeois elements,” during which a huge number of former high-ranking military and civilian officials of Hungary ended up in the camps. Under the cabinet of Ferenc Nagy and Istvan Doby, Imre Nagy was removed from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and appointed Minister of Food.
Such a miserable career demoralized and embittered Nagy so much that in the end he openly opposed the leadership of the Communist Party, accusing the then General Secretary Rakosi of “perverting the Lenin-Stalin line” and inability to work with personnel. For this, in 1949 he was expelled from the Central Committee and removed from all posts. Realizing that he had clearly gone too far, Nagy immediately publicly repented and asked for forgiveness from his party comrades. He repented so skillfully and fervently that in December 1950 he was reinstated as Minister of Agriculture. True, they say that this could not have happened without the intervention of his Soviet curators, who stood up for their valuable agent. According to people close to the KGB archives, Nagy never broke up with the Soviet intelligence services.
In the summer of 1989, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov gave Gorbachev a bundle of documents from the KGB archives, from which it followed that Imre Nagy had been an NKVD informant in the pre-war years. Gorbachev then handed over these documents to the Hungarian side, where they were safely hidden and have not yet been presented to the public.
Why did Kryuchkov take out documents from the archive? He wrote about this in an accompanying note to Gorbachev.
Kryuchkov to Gorbachev: “An aura of a martyr and unmercenary, an exceptionally honest and principled person is being created around Nagy. Particular emphasis in all the hype around Nadya’s name is placed on the fact that he was a “consistent fighter against Stalinism”, “a supporter of democracy and a radical renewal of socialism, although documents prove quite the opposite.”
Nagy vegetated in this post until 1955.
During this time, several significant moments occurred. In the USSR, Stalin died and the debunking of his “cult of personality” began, which to many then seemed to be the threshold of the collapse of the Soviet system. The influence of the 20th Congress in Moscow also had an impact. The Hungarians demanded the same reckoning with the past that Khrushchev began with his famous anti-Stalin speech.
In July 1956, in the context of the outbreak of student unrest, the plenum of the Central Committee of the WPT dismissed General Secretary Rakosi. However, the new leader of the VPT was not Nagy, who by this time, like Yeltsin years later, had won the laurels of a “reformer” and a “victim oppositionist,” but his closest ally Ernő Gerő. IN Once again disappointed Nagy discharged another portion of criticism and on October 23, 1956, a mass student demonstration began in Budapest, ending in a pogrom. Demonstrators demolished a monument to Stalin and attempted to seize a number of buildings in Budapest. In such a situation, on October 24, 1956, Nagy was nevertheless appointed to the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. At the meeting where this appointment took place, Nagy vowed to leave the growing confrontation and begin a process of civil reconciliation. Under pressure from Moscow, the leadership of the Communist Party agreed to carry out political reform and declared its readiness to begin a dialogue on all the demands of the protesters. In fact, Nagy received carte blanche to carry out reform and peacefully resolve the political impasse.
But the former informer decided that he finest hour came, and instead of trying to calm people down and start a peaceful dialogue, Nagy actually provoked a civil war - by leaving the Communist Party and declaring it “illegitimate,” he dissolved the state security agencies by decree and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops.
In fact, immediately after this, the massacre began - the communists and the Hungarians who supported them entered into a battle with the “nationalists” and former Hortis, who actively supported the demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and began to seize government institutions. A wave of lynchings swept across Budapest, when caught communists, intelligence officers and even members of their families were hanged upside down from trees after brutal abuse. In an effort to stop the pogroms and murders, Soviet units were brought into Budapest with a categorical order not to open fire. And almost immediately the killings of Soviet military personnel and members of their families began. During the 6 days of unrest from October 24 to 29, 350 Soviet military personnel and about 50 family members died.

Trying not to completely interfere in the events taking place in Hungary, the Soviet leadership agreed to meet Nagy’s demands and on October 28, 1956, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Budapest, but this only led to an escalation of the civil war.
The very next day, on Republic Square in front of the city party committee building, a crowd dealt with state security officers and the capital city party committee. During the massacre, 26 people were killed, led by the secretary of the city committee, Imre Mese. They were all hanged from trees head down.
Today, many people like to talk about the “universality” of the uprising, although in fact a civil war began in the country, dozens of people fought and died on both sides. And how long this war would have lasted can only be guessed at, but one thing is certain – the death toll would have been in the tens of thousands.
The pinnacle of the OGPU agent’s “career” was his appeal to the UN with a request to protect the sovereignty of Hungary.

Actually, one thing is clear to me personally: the political adventurism of the former seksot led to the fact that a civil war was actually provoked in Hungary, the consequences of which are difficult to predict if not for the entry of Soviet troops.
Such, alas, is the flawed psychology of the “sext” - a bunch of repressed complexes, hatred of curators, contempt for others and a huge inferiority complex that can push to any adventure.

Now about the “bloody massacre” itself.
Today it has been established that as a result of the events of 1956 in Hungary, 2,740 people died, 25,000 were repressed, 200,000 fled the country.
At the same time, it is somehow generally accepted by default that all of them – 2,740 people – were destroyed by the “Soviet occupiers.” Although in reality this is not at all the case. These are ALL victims of these events. Moreover, according to documents, in the first days of the “uprising”, more than 300 “communists and their accomplices” died at the hands of the “rebels”, such as, for example, the soldiers shot near the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who were simply unlucky to be in the wrong uniform in the wrong place.

It must be said honestly that not everyone in Hungary lost their head and was eager to fight. For example, in the entire Hungarian army there were only a few officers who went over to the side of the putschists. However, not a single general took part in this massacre.
The most notable “hero” of that time turned out to be the head of the construction units, Colonel Pal Maleter, no matter how funny it is - another Soviet agent, a former officer of the Horti army, who was captured in 1944, trained in a Soviet intelligence school and sent to Hungary with the task of organizing partisan detachment(pictured left).

It was he who became the military leader of the putschists, although before that he managed to order the tanks to shoot at the “rebels” and personally shot two captured students. But when the advancing crowd actually left him no chance, he ordered the soldiers to go over to the side of the people and himself declared his allegiance to Imre Nagy. Nagy needed at least one senior officer to defect to his side so much that he calmly turned a blind eye to the execution committed by Maleter and appointed him First Deputy Minister of Defense.

And now about the losses and atrocities.
The garrison of Budapest at that time numbered about 30,000 soldiers; it is known that about 12 thousand went over to the side of the rebels, but not all of them took part in the battles. After Maleter's arrest, his subordinates actually went home. A total of about 35,000 people fought in various combat units, more than half of whom were former soldiers and officers of the “Khortists” who formed the backbone of the putschists.
Today the topic of research is not fashionable at all social composition"rebels". Most often they insist that these were “students and workers,” but judging by the lists of dead students there were not so many of them. Modern Hungarian historians were forced to admit through gritted teeth that the “Khortists” formed the backbone of the detachments.

Thus, the defense of the city of Pecs was commanded by an experienced Horthy officer, a veteran of the war in Russia, Major Csorgi, who had more than 2,000 militants under his command. Miskolc was also defended by Horthys and emigrants transferred here from West Germany, trained by Gehlen.
The putschists had at their disposal more than 50,000 small arms, up to 100 tanks, and about 200 guns and mortars. The power is not small. And in just 4 days of fighting, this entire group was scattered and disarmed. Hungarian losses amounted to about 1,300 killed, and in total during the entire period of hostilities from November 1 to January 5, 1,700 people died in battle.
Moreover, this figure includes the losses of both sides, the putschists and those who fought against them.

If you want to say that this is called “washing with blood,” then I don’t even know what humanism means.

Six years before the events in Hungary, British units were sent to suppress the communist uprising in Malaysia, and in the first year of fighting alone, more than 40,000 people were killed there. And no one was outraged by this.

Two years before the events in Hungary french army launched a punitive expedition in Algeria, where almost a million Algerians died during the war. And again, it never occurred to anyone to accuse the French of cruelty.

And in just 4 days, Soviet troops were able to defeat and disperse an army of almost fifty thousand rebels, take control of all the main cities and objects, while destroying only 2,000 rebels, and for this they earned the nickname “bloody executioners.” This is truly eloquence!
The losses of the Soviet side amounted to 720 killed, 1540 wounded, 51 missing.

During the investigation, 22,000 legal cases were opened. 400 death sentences were handed down, but just over 300 were carried out, and 200,000 people fled to the West. If we consider that ONLY opponents of the communist regime fled to the West (and in fact, many simply took the opportunity to arrange their lives in the West without being an active participant in the events), then it turns out that only 2.5% of the Hungarian population took part in the putsch (10 million) To put it mildly, not much...

That's why I'm very ashamed today. But not in front of the Hungarians, who can wring their hands as much as they want on the graves of their putschists, bashfully keeping silent about the much more shameful and bloody trace left by their grandfathers and fathers on Russian soil, for which for some reason they are not going to repent, I am ashamed in front of the graves of our fallen soldiers and officers who saved Hungary from civil war. Today, an over-aged imbecile from the Federation Council despicably betrayed them.
The dead have no shame! You did your job well, eternal memory to you!

Eyewitness testimony

I served in the Carpathian Military District in the communications battalion of a tank division. Lieutenant, commander of a training platoon, age - 23 years old, had no combat experience. When the division was alerted, neither I nor my comrades knew anything about the beginning of the Hungarian events. It later became known that after the exposure of Stalin’s personality cult, Hungarian political life came to life. On October 23, 1956, a demonstration took place in Budapest - I can’t say whether it was aggressive, but it was shot. Our army had nothing to do with this.
I was appointed as a platoon commander in a line-cable company of a communications battalion. The personnel are young people aged 19, 20 and 21 years. We met during a time of anxiety. They informed that the division would be transferred abroad.
The Hungarian border was crossed near the Chop station. Then they moved under their own power at high speeds. Tanks - on the ground, off roads. Wariness arose when an overturned statue of Stalin was seen in one of the border towns. At a short stop, a written order was handed out from the USSR Ministry of Defense: there is a counter-revolution in Hungary, we need to help the Hungarian people and government.
Due to my youth, I did not consider the counter-revolutionaries to be serious opponents. And it was unclear whether Austria’s neutrality was violated or not by NATO troops (we were in a hurry). Later we learned that Austria’s neutrality was being violated to recruit counter-revolutionaries. Already near Budapest, while on patrol, I was given the task of catching “foreigners.”
Our concerns about NATO policy also related to our families. We lived in Western Ukraine. My wife, who had just given birth to a daughter, thinking that the war had begun, asked to go to the North to be with her relatives.
... In front of a small town, the column was thrown with grenades. Among the dead was the commander of a tank company, who later learned that he had small children. The column stopped. The division commander ordered two warning shots to be fired from the tanks. They waited, the shelling did not resume, the column moved forward. The tank regiment that was moving next to us could have wiped out this settlement from the face of the earth. But there was no revenge for the killed and wounded. We had a rule: you don't shoot, we don't shoot.
I also remember the stop when the division commander in the headquarters car was negotiating with the commander of the Hungarian division. We learned from senior officers: the negotiations ended peacefully, our guards will be in the vehicle parks and at the weapons, so that weapons are not distributed to either supporters or opponents of the government and there is no attack from the rear. In essence, it was blocking the distribution of weapons, neutralizing the split Hungarian army.
Before the town of Gedelle we stopped to rest. A covered truck pulled up, with civilians in the car with machine guns. I immediately realized that these were not counter-revolutionaries. Otherwise they could have easily shot us. We disarmed them and took them to the political officer. It turned out that these were workers who were on their way to liberate Budapest from the putschists. Nevertheless, the political officer decided not to give them weapons, but insistently recommended that they return home and agitate for the settlement of differences peacefully (he spoke Russian, whether they understood it or not, I don’t know).
The division headquarters and communications battalion stopped near Budapest, in the city of Gedell. The local authorities allocated us a dormitory at the Agricultural Academy; it was completely empty. I was given the task of organizing wired telephone communication with the regiments, being on duty at the Gedelle telephone exchange (the Hungarians gave us two manual switchboard stands), and patrolling the city streets in the evening and at night. There was no front line or rear. Paving and rebuilding telephone lines, I walked. He spoke German and Russian. The overwhelming majority of the Hungarians I contacted were peaceful and helpful. But there was a danger of running into an ambush...
We went to duty on foot, past the market. I saw a demonstration in Gedell once. The division headquarters officers knew about it, but no one touched the demonstrators.
One day, a Hungarian younger than me came up to me and began to argue quite clearly in Russian (apparently he studied it at school) that the putschists were fascists, he knew them all and they needed to be arrested. I advised him to contact the local Hungarian KGB... Now they are called revolutionaries, but then the Hungarians themselves explained to us that both fascists and Horthyists took part in the rebellion.
… While patrolling late in the evening, I stopped a truck and checked the passes of two men; one of them was an armed policeman, he was crying bitterly. His comrade said that the “revolutionaries” shot the policeman’s wife and two young children when he was not at home.
When checking documents, I met many of our supporters; they had special passes. What I mean is that not only the government, but also Hungarian society has split into two camps. The fact that this is not the supreme power could be judged at least by the mediocrity of the machines...
Our tank regiments and motorized infantry were not used during the assault on Budapest; they stayed in the fields, in tent camps. I know this because I provided them with communications. But I must write the truth: the division’s reconnaissance battalion participated in the storming of Budapest... When the reconnaissance battalion officers appeared at the division headquarters, it became clear that the rebels had been pacified.
About a month after arriving in Gendelle, the local authorities and our rear service organized a bath for us. We went to the bathhouse on foot, without weapons. We calmly washed ourselves, changed our underwear...
The “people's revolution” does not pass so quickly, which means that it was not carried out by the entire people. There was an explosive mixture of anarchists, Horthyists, fascists, and “foreigners,” and they were concentrated mainly in Budapest. I won’t argue, there were reasonable democrats, but they were a minority.
Somewhere underneath New Year The division began to leave Hungary piece by piece. Our echelons were checked by representatives of the Hungarian People's Republic. They also checked my heating vehicle, there were no complaints.
Different people write about the Hungarian events of 1956 from different positions, adjusting and not adjusting... I am not a politician, but an eyewitness and I come to the following conclusions. No matter what they say today, mutual hatred and armed confrontation between Hungarians arose after the shooting of the October demonstration in Budapest by the Hungarians themselves. Society split. During the war, Hungary was a satellite of Germany; among part of the population, the Horthy-fascist worldview did not change. These people joined the ranks of the dissatisfied. The army distributed some weapons to both. She herself also split, although she did not take an active part in the events. Mutual reprisals began spontaneously and unspontaneously. Two groups of self-organized authorities were formed. It is impossible to do without armed struggle in such circumstances. I don’t know how thoughtfully the Soviet leaders acted, but without our intervention, the likelihood of the rebellion escalating into a civil war was objectively high.
If you look deeper, the Hungarian events are one of the local political confrontations between two systems. Europe was “pregnant” not only with political but also with military confrontation... As for the problem of the optimality of the social-state system, humanity has not yet resolved it. This issue was resolved in 1956 in Hungary - only not by intellectual means, but by force; after an erroneous decision by the Hungarian KGB, the “revolutionaries” took up arms.
There were many of our comrades - the fallen military - and their memory is eternal; they fulfilled their mission: they extinguished the hotbeds of the civil war in Hungary.
Boris Bratenkov retired colonel
http://www.ogoniok.com/4967/15/

5 years ago, Lieutenant General Yuri Nikolaevich Kalinin gave me his military order “Red Star” for safekeeping. This order No. 3397404 was awarded to him on December 18, 1956 in Budapest.
I hold it in my palm. Through the scarlet enamel I feel its calm, tough strength.
No one is forgotten, nothing is forgotten!

I would like to remind Mr. Mironov that in just one day in Moscow (October 3-4, 1993), according to the official version, 137 people were killed, and according to human rights activists, more than 400 people and for some reason no one in the Kremlin talks about “bloody executioners” or is going to apologize to the relatives of the victims.

On October 23, 1956, an armed uprising began in the Hungarian People's Republic, known as the Hungarian Uprising of 1956, or the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

The impetus for these events was personnel changes in the government of the republic. Or rather, the change of heads of state.

Until July 1953, the Hungarian Workers' Party and at the same time the government was headed by Matthias Rakosi, nicknamed "Stalin's best student."

After the death of the Soviet leader, Moscow decided that Rakosi was too fanatical, which did not contribute to the popularization of the Soviet model of building the future. In his place, the Hungarian communist Imre Nagy was appointed, who carried out a number of popular measures to improve the socio-economic situation in the country. In particular, to “improve the lives of the people,” taxes were reduced, salaries were increased, and land use principles were liberalized.

Nagy lasted in power for less than two years; according to the generally accepted version, an overly independent and democratic politician again did not suit Moscow.

Destroyed buildings due to unrest in central Budapest during the Hungarian uprising against the Soviet-backed communist regime in 1956. © Laszlo Almasi/Reuters

András Hegedüs was replaced in his place, and Nagy was removed from his post and expelled from the party. Hegedüs led the country along the previous Stalinist course, which caused discontent among large sections of the population, who already considered Hungary’s socialist course a mistake. There were demands for alternative elections and the return to power of Imre Nagy.

The internal party struggle in the Hungarian Labor Party between Stalinists and supporters of reforms began from the very beginning of 1956 and by July 18, 1956 led to the resignation of the General Secretary of the Hungarian Labor Party, who remained “Stalin’s best student” Matthias Rakosi. He was replaced by Ernő Görö (former Minister of State Security).

The mutilated corpse of a state security officer hanged upside down. Budapest, 1956.

The removal of Rakosi, as well as the Poznan uprising of 1956 in Poland, which caused great resonance, led to an increase in critical sentiment among students and the writing intelligentsia.

Student demonstration in Hungary.

The subversive work of Western intelligence services also played a role. MI6 documents, declassified 40 years later, admitted that since 1954, anti-Soviet dissidents had been transported across the border to Austria, into the British zone of occupation, where they were trained in military and subversive warfare. Also, since 1955, American intelligence has been preparing detachments of Hungarian emigrants for secret actions in their country.

Soviet soldiers! We are fighting for our homeland, for Hungarian freedom! Do not shoot!

On October 23, a demonstration began, in which about a thousand people took part, including students and members of the intelligentsia. The demonstrators carried red flags and banners with slogans about Soviet-Hungarian friendship, the inclusion of Imre Nagy in the government, etc.

Hungarian uprising of 1956.

Radical groups joined the demonstrators, shouting slogans of a different kind. They demanded the restoration of the old Hungarian national emblem, the old Hungarian national holiday instead of the Day of Liberation from Fascism, the abolition of military training and Russian language lessons.

At 20 o'clock on the radio, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the WPT, Ernő Görö, made a speech sharply condemning the demonstrators.

Central radio station in Budapest after shelling. © Laszlo Almasi/Reuters

In response to this, a large group of demonstrators stormed the broadcasting studio of the Radio House, demanding that the program demands of the demonstrators be broadcast. This attempt led to a clash with the Hungarian state security units AVH defending the Radio House, during which the first dead and wounded appeared after 21 hours. The rebels received weapons or took them from reinforcements sent to help guard the radio, as well as from civil defense warehouses and captured police stations. A group of rebels entered the Kilian Barracks, where three construction battalions were located, and seized their weapons. Many construction battalion members joined the rebels.

On October 23, 1956, the Hungarian fascist rebellion began, prepared and led by Western intelligence services.

Thanks to the efforts of provocateurs, the protests grew into real riots. The crowd turned their weapons against their communist opponents and the neutral Soviet army stationed in the country. Numerous victims appeared.

The new Hungarian government turned for support to the UN and NATO states, which did not dare to provide direct military assistance, given their enormous military power Soviet Union, with whom there were unspoken agreements.

The development of events in Hungary coincided with the Suez crisis. On October 29, Israel and then NATO members Great Britain and France attacked Soviet-backed Egypt with the aim of seizing the Suez Canal, near which they landed their troops.

Hungarian freedom fighters in Budapest near a Soviet tank.

On October 31, Nikita Khrushchev said at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee: “If we leave Hungary, this will encourage the American, British and French imperialists. They will understand [this] as our weakness and will attack.” It was decided to create a “revolutionary workers’ and peasants’ government” led by Janos Kadar and carry out a military operation to overthrow the government of Imre Nagy. The plan for the operation, called “Whirlwind,” was developed under the leadership of the USSR Minister of Defense Georgy Zhukov. The USSR Ambassador to Hungary at that time was Yuri Andropov.

By November 8, after fierce fighting, the last centers of resistance of the rebels were destroyed. Members of Imre Nagy's government took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. On November 10, workers' councils and student groups approached the Soviet command with a ceasefire proposal. Armed resistance ceased.

After November 10, until mid-December, the workers' councils continued their work, often entering into direct negotiations with the command of Soviet units. However, by December 19, 1956, the workers' councils were dispersed by state security agencies and their leaders were arrested.

Immediately after the suppression of the uprising, mass arrests began: in total, the Hungarian secret services and their Soviet colleagues arrested about 5,000 Hungarians (846 of them were sent to Soviet prisons), of which “a significant number were members of the VPT, military personnel and students.”

Reconstruction of the Hungarian uprising in modern times. © Laszlo Balogh/Reuters

Prime Minister Imre Nagy and members of his government were lured out of the Yugoslav Embassy, ​​where they were hiding, on November 22, 1956, and taken into custody on Romanian territory. They were then returned to Hungary and put on trial. Imre Nagy and former Defense Minister Pal Maleter were sentenced to death on charges of treason. Imre Nagy was hanged on June 16, 1958. In total, according to some estimates, about 350 people were executed. About 26,000 people were prosecuted, of whom 13,000 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, but by 1963 all participants in the uprising were amnestied and released by the government of János Kádár.

According to statistics, in connection with the uprising and fighting on both sides, 2,652 Hungarian citizens were killed and 19,226 people were injured between October 23 and December 31, 1956.

The losses of the Soviet Army, according to official data, amounted to 669 people killed, 51 people missing, 1540 wounded.

Imre Nagy's grave. © Laszlo Balogh/Reuters

In the official historiography of socialist Hungary, the rebellion was called “counter-revolutionary”.

October 23 became a public holiday in Hungary, established in memory of two revolutions - 1956 and 1989.