The fascist army is a control system. For what reason did the Wehrmacht and SS troops feud?

Defeat in the West. The defeat of Hitler's troops on the Western Front

In his book, Milton Shulman provides an opportunity to look at the events of World War II through the eyes of the enemy. Analyzes the reasons for the victories and defeats of the German army from the fall of France to the Battle of Berlin. Based on numerous documents, he studies Germany's military mistakes, as well as the role of Hitler and his General Staff in the rise and fall of the Third Reich.

From the Kharkov disaster to the Stalingrad triumph, from the Rzhev meat grinder to the breaking of the Leningrad blockade - this book allows you to take a fresh look at the decisive battles of the war, revealing the background of the events and restoring the true history of the turning point year of the Great Patriotic War.

New tourist routes have opened in the region, which have already been appreciated by federal tour operators, and tourists are mastering a new type of transport - the tourist express. The Moscow region has made a real breakthrough in the field of tourism. Oksana Kosareva, Minister of Culture of the Moscow Region, talks about how the outgoing year will be remembered and what events in the cultural sphere of the Moscow region can be expected in the future.

This year in the Moscow region passed under the sign of an anniversary - it was on the borders of the Moscow region in the fall-winter of 1941 that the myth of the invincibility of the German army was dispelled and Hitler’s “quick war” plan finally failed. 75 years ago, the defeat of fascist troops near Moscow became a decisive turning point in the course of the war and the entire world history.

Exhibitions, film screenings, meetings with veterans of the Great Patriotic War, commemorative events dedicated to memorable date, took place in almost all museums, cultural centers, and libraries in the region. The culmination of the anniversary year was a large-scale event near the village of Dubosekovo in the Volokolamsk region.

Details are in the report from the scene. The outgoing Year of Russian Cinema will be remembered for its high-profile premiere, also associated with the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow. The film “Panfilov’s 28” is called a truly popular film - the creators of the film collected over 34 million rubles in voluntary donations from more than 35 thousand people, setting a world record for crowdfunding in cinema.

Read about how the film was received in Volokolamsk, actually at the scene of the events, in the latest issue of the Horizons of Culture magazine.

NKVD and SMERSH against Abwehr and RSHA

The first military shock during the Second World War in the fall and winter of 1941 near Moscow forced the Abwehr and the RSHA to look for new forms of waging an “invisible war”: reconnaissance and sabotage groups, with the help of aviation, began to be deployed not only to the front-line, but also to the deep regions of the USSR.

The Soviet side countered the enemy’s attempts with a noticeably improved rear security system: SMERSH began to occupy a leading position in matters of military counterintelligence. The final period in the “secret war” occurred at the end of 1944 - 1945.

When Hitler's intelligence services sought to stop the offensive at any cost Soviet troops by strengthening contacts with various collaborators and nationalist organizations. At the same time, units of the “Waffen SS Jagdverband”, “popular resistance” with the participation of the Volssturm and the Nazi underground, called “Werewolf” (“Werewolves”), were organized.

Despite the two-fold numerical superiority (two Nazi divisions against our rifle brigade), it took the enemy a month and a half to break the resistance of the Soviet troops - and this was at the height of the Battle of Leningrad, when the Wehrmacht threw its last reserves into battle, every battalion counted, the fate of the city was hanging by a thread and two divisions could decide the outcome of the assault... Is it true that the defenders of Moonsund, who stood to the death in the deep German rear, saved Leningrad? Did you know that it was from these islands that our long-range aviation bombed Berlin for the first time in August 1941 (although Goering swore that “not a single bomb would ever fall on the capital of the Reich”)? Should we believe the German reports on the results of the battles for Moonsund, which stated that “the Russian soldier fights stubbornly and bravely, but the command, as elsewhere, turns out to be incompetent”? And was it possible to evacuate the Moonsund garrison to avoid excessive losses?

The author talks about methods of recruitment, ideological processing and training of recruits conscripted into parts of the Wehrmacht or SS troops. Considers the reasons that forced them to fight on the side of Nazi Germany. The book is supplied with maps and photographs.

Occupation of Europe. Military diary of the Chief of the General Staff. 1939-1941

Military diary of the Chief of the General Staff ground forces Hitler's Germany contains Franz Halder's daily service notes, covering the period from 1939 to 1941. Detailed information about the Norwegian Campaign, the occupation of Poland, Belgium and France.

This play was the first work to expose the betrayal of the Allies - prominent American figures at the time of the surrender of Nazi Germany, who were striving to take advantage of the fruits of our victory with the greatest benefit - to seize all the equipment of the German division, opening the way for the German group to the territory occupied by their troops.

By this they wanted to deprive the Russians of their rightful trophies and preserve the German raiders for future wars. The conflict is not based on the beliefs and actions of individuals, but on the strictly thought-out policy of the reactionary circles of American imperialism, striving for world domination.

The foresight of the Soviet command, not only in the sense of military strategy, but also in the sense of politics and diplomacy, destroyed all the plans and intentions of the American allies and brought freedom and independence to the peoples of Europe on their banners. Central Academic Theater of the Soviet Army.

Radio show. Recorded in 1948. General Klimov, division commander - Daniil Sagal; Zhilin, chief of staff - Sergey Kulagin; Major Lagutin - Evgeniy Bykadorov; Kudrov, fighter - Konstantinov Peter; Nozhkin, fighter - Zeldin Vladimir; Good day, fighter - Nassonov Konstantin; Fokin, fighter - Gerasimov; Sokol, adjutant of Klimov - Chodrishvili; Zoya, field postal worker - Lyudmila Kasatkina; Alekseev, communications officer - Nikolay Pastukhov; Warne, commander of the American army - Polezhaev; General Willard, commander of the American division - Alexander Khovansky; Edgar, his nephew - Andrey Popov; Martin, Willard's chief of staff - Mark Pertsovsky; Stevens, Villard's adjutant - Fedor Savostyanov; Jim Pool, photo reporter -Shahet I.

; Ridzhi, commander of the sapper company - Yakov Khaletsky; Joe, a black man, Willard's driver - Anthony Khodursky; Moller, German general - Rumyantsev Georgy; Czechoslovakian announcer - Kamensky I.; The explanatory text is read by Mikhail Mayorov. Music - Khrennikov Tikhon.

In addition, the book contains detailed description all major battles fought by Soviet troops; special attention is paid to the Battle of Stalingrad.

Thanks to Soviet films about the war, most people have a strong opinion that the mass-produced small arms (photo below) of the German infantry during the Second World War is a machine gun (submachine gun) of the Schmeisser system, which is named after the name of its designer. This myth is still actively supported by domestic cinema. However, in fact, this popular machine gun was never a mass weapon of the Wehrmacht, and it was not created by Hugo Schmeisser. However, first things first.

How myths are created

Everyone should remember the footage from domestic films dedicated to the attacks of German infantry on our positions. Brave blond guys walk without bending down, while firing from machine guns “from the hip.” And the most interesting thing is that this fact does not surprise anyone except those who were in the war. According to movies, the “Schmeissers” could conduct aimed fire at the same distance as the rifles of our soldiers. In addition, when watching these films, the viewer got the impression that all the personnel of the German infantry during the Second World War were armed with machine guns. In fact, everything was different, and the submachine gun is not a mass-produced small arms weapon of the Wehrmacht, and it is impossible to shoot from the hip, and it is not called “Schmeisser” at all. In addition, carrying out an attack on a trench by a submachine gunner unit, in which there are soldiers armed with repeating rifles, is clearly suicide, since simply no one would reach the trenches.

Dispelling the myth: MP-40 automatic pistol

This Wehrmacht small weapon in WWII is officially called the submachine gun (Maschinenpistole) MP-40. In fact, this is a modification of the MP-36 assault rifle. The designer of this model, contrary to popular belief, was not the gunsmith H. Schmeisser, but the less famous and talented craftsman Heinrich Volmer. Why is the nickname “Schmeisser” so firmly attached to him? The thing is that Schmeisser owned the patent for the magazine that is used in this submachine gun. And in order not to violate his copyright, in the first batches of the MP-40, the inscription PATENT SCHMEISSER was stamped on the magazine receiver. When these machine guns ended up as trophies among the soldiers of the Allied armies, they mistakenly believed that the author of this model of small arms was, naturally, Schmeisser. This is how this nickname stuck to the MP-40.

Initially, the German command armed only command staff with machine guns. Thus, in infantry units, only battalion, company and squad commanders were supposed to have MP-40s. Later, automatic pistols were supplied to drivers of armored vehicles, tank crews and paratroopers. Nobody armed the infantry with them en masse, either in 1941 or after. According to archives, in 1941 the troops had only 250 thousand MP-40 assault rifles, and this was for 7,234,000 people. As you can see, a submachine gun is not a mass-produced weapon of World War II. In general, during the entire period - from 1939 to 1945 - only 1.2 million of these machine guns were produced, while over 21 million people were conscripted into the Wehrmacht units.

Why weren't the infantry armed with MP-40s?

Despite the fact that experts subsequently recognized that the MP-40 was the best small arms of World War II, very few of the Wehrmacht infantry units had it. This is explained simply: the sighting range of this machine gun for group targets is only 150 m, and for single targets - 70 m. This is despite the fact that Soviet soldiers were armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles (SVT), the sighting range of which was 800 m for group targets. targets and 400 m for singles. If the Germans had fought with such weapons as they showed in Russian films, they would never have been able to reach the enemy trenches, they would have simply been shot, as if in a shooting gallery.

Shooting on the move "from the hip"

The MP-40 submachine gun vibrates strongly when firing, and if you use it, as shown in the films, the bullets always fly past the target. Therefore, for effective shooting, it must be pressed tightly to the shoulder, having first unfolded the butt. In addition, long bursts were never fired from this machine gun, since it quickly heated up. Most often they fired in a short burst of 3-4 rounds or fired single fire. Despite the fact that in tactical and technical characteristics it is indicated that the rate of fire is 450-500 rounds per minute; in practice, such a result has never been achieved.

Advantages of MP-40

This cannot be said that this small arms weapon was bad; on the contrary, it is very, very dangerous, but it must be used in close combat. That is why sabotage units were armed with it in the first place. They were also often used by scouts in our army, and the partisans respected this machine gun. The use of light, rapid-fire small arms in close combat provided tangible advantages. Even now, the MP-40 is very popular among criminals, and the price of such a machine gun is very high. And they are supplied there by “black archaeologists” who carry out excavations in places of military glory and very often find and restore weapons from the Second World War.

Mauser 98k

What can you say about this carbine? The most common small arms in Germany is the Mauser rifle. Its target range is up to 2000 m when firing. As you can see, this parameter is very close to the Mosin and SVT rifles. This carbine was developed back in 1888. During the war this design was significantly modernized, mainly to reduce costs, as well as to rationalize production. In addition, these Wehrmacht small arms were equipped with optical sights, and sniper units were equipped with them. The Mauser rifle at that time was in service with many armies, for example, Belgium, Spain, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Sweden.

Self-loading rifles

At the end of 1941, the Wehrmacht infantry units received the first automatic self-loading rifles of the Walter G-41 and Mauser G-41 systems for military testing. Their appearance was due to the fact that the Red Army had more than one and a half million similar systems in service: SVT-38, SVT-40 and ABC-36. In order not to be inferior to Soviet soldiers, German gunsmiths urgently had to develop their own versions of such rifles. As a result of the tests, the G-41 system (Walter system) was recognized as the best and adopted. The rifle is equipped with a hammer-type impact mechanism. Designed to fire only single shots. Equipped with a magazine with a capacity of ten rounds. This automatic self-loading rifle is designed for targeted shooting at a distance of up to 1200 m. However, due to the large weight of this weapon, as well as low reliability and sensitivity to contamination, it was produced in a small series. In 1943, the designers, having eliminated these shortcomings, proposed a modernized version of the G-43 (Walter system), which was produced in quantities of several hundred thousand units. Before its appearance, Wehrmacht soldiers preferred to use captured Soviet (!) SVT-40 rifles.

Now let's return to the German gunsmith Hugo Schmeisser. He developed two systems, without which the Second World War could not have happened. World War.

Small arms - MP-41

This model was developed simultaneously with the MP-40. This machine gun was significantly different from the “Schmeisser” familiar to everyone from the movies: it had a forend trimmed with wood, which protected the fighter from burns, it was heavier and had a long barrel. However, these Wehrmacht small arms were not widely used and were not produced for long. In total, about 26 thousand units were produced. It is believed that the German army abandoned this machine gun due to a lawsuit from ERMA, which claimed illegal copying of its patented design. The MP-41 small arms were used by Waffen SS units. It was also successfully used by Gestapo units and mountain rangers.

MP-43, or StG-44

Schmeisser developed the next Wehrmacht weapon (photo below) in 1943. At first it was called MP-43, and later - StG-44, which means “assault rifle” (sturmgewehr). This automatic rifle is appearance, and for some technical specifications, resembles (which appeared later), and differs significantly from the MP-40. Its aimed fire range was up to 800 m. The StG-44 even had the ability to mount a 30 mm grenade launcher. To fire from cover, the designer developed a special attachment that was placed on the muzzle and changed the trajectory of the bullet by 32 degrees. This weapon went into mass production only in the fall of 1944. During the war years, about 450 thousand of these rifles were produced. So few of the German soldiers managed to use such a machine gun. StG-44s were supplied to elite units of the Wehrmacht and to Waffen SS units. Subsequently, these Wehrmacht weapons were used in

Automatic rifles FG-42

These copies were intended for paratroopers. They combined the fighting qualities of a light machine gun and an automatic rifle. The development of weapons was undertaken by the Rheinmetall company already during the war, when, after assessing the results of airborne operations carried out by the Wehrmacht, it became clear that the MP-38 submachine guns did not fully meet the combat requirements of this type of troops. The first tests of this rifle were carried out in 1942, and then it was put into service. In the process of using the mentioned weapon, disadvantages associated with low strength and stability during automatic shooting also emerged. In 1944, a modernized FG-42 rifle (model 2) was released, and model 1 was discontinued. Trigger This weapon allows automatic or single fire. The rifle is designed for the standard 7.92 mm Mauser cartridge. The magazine capacity is 10 or 20 rounds. In addition, the rifle can be used to fire special rifle grenades. In order to increase stability when shooting, a bipod is attached under the barrel. The FG-42 rifle is designed to fire at a range of 1200 m. Due to the high cost, it was produced in limited quantities: only 12 thousand units of both models.

Luger P08 and Walter P38

Now let's look at what types of pistols were in service with the German army. “Luger”, its second name “Parabellum”, had a caliber of 7.65 mm. By the beginning of the war, units of the German army had more than half a million of these pistols. This Wehrmacht small arms were produced until 1942, and then they were replaced by the more reliable Walter.

This pistol was put into service in 1940. It was intended for firing 9-mm cartridges; the magazine capacity is 8 rounds. The target range of the "Walter" is 50 meters. It was produced until 1945. The total number of P38 pistols produced was approximately 1 million units.

Weapons of World War II: MG-34, MG-42 and MG-45

In the early 30s, the German military decided to create a machine gun that could be used both as an easel and as a manual one. They were supposed to fire at enemy aircraft and arm tanks. The MG-34, designed by Rheinmetall and put into service in 1934, became such a machine gun. By the beginning of hostilities, there were about 80 thousand units of this weapon in the Wehrmacht. The machine gun allows you to fire both single shots and continuous fire. To do this, he had a trigger with two notches. When you press the top one, the shooting was carried out in single shots, and when you press the bottom one - in bursts. It was intended for 7.92x57 mm Mauser rifle cartridges, with light or heavy bullets. And in the 40s, armor-piercing, armor-piercing tracer, armor-piercing incendiary and other types of cartridges were developed and used. This suggests that the impetus for changes in weapons systems and the tactics of their use was the Second World War.

The small arms that were used in this company were replenished with a new type of machine gun - MG-42. It was developed and put into service in 1942. The designers have significantly simplified and reduced the cost of production of these weapons. Thus, in its production, spot welding and stamping were widely used, and the number of parts was reduced to 200. The trigger mechanism of the machine gun in question allowed only automatic firing - 1200-1300 rounds per minute. Such significant changes had a negative impact on the stability of the unit when firing. Therefore, to ensure accuracy, it was recommended to fire in short bursts. The ammunition for the new machine gun remained the same as for the MG-34. The aimed fire range was two kilometers. Work to improve this design continued until the end of 1943, which led to the creation of a new modification known as the MG-45.

This machine gun weighed only 6.5 kg, and the rate of fire was 2400 rounds per minute. By the way, no infantry machine gun of that time could boast of such a rate of fire. However, this modification appeared too late and was not in service with the Wehrmacht.

PzB-39 and Panzerschrek

PzB-39 was developed in 1938. These World War II weapons were used with relative success on initial stage to combat wedges, tanks and armored vehicles with bulletproof armor. Against the heavily armored B-1s, English Matildas and Churchills, Soviet T-34s and KVs), this gun was either ineffective or completely useless. As a result, it was soon replaced by anti-tank grenade launchers and rocket-propelled anti-tank rifles “Panzerschrek”, “Ofenror”, as well as the famous “Faustpatrons”. The PzB-39 used a 7.92 mm cartridge. The firing range was 100 meters, the penetration ability made it possible to “pierce” 35 mm armor.

"Panzerschrek". This German light anti-tank weapon is a modified copy of the American Bazooka rocket gun. German designers equipped it with a shield that protected the shooter from the hot gases escaping from the grenade nozzle. Anti-tank companies of motorized rifle regiments of tank divisions were supplied with these weapons as a matter of priority. Jet guns were exclusively a powerful tool. “Panzerschreks” were weapons for group use and had a maintenance crew consisting of three people. Since they were very complex, their use required special training in calculations. In total, 314 thousand units of such guns and more than two million rocket-propelled grenades for them were produced in 1943-1944.

Grenade launchers: “Faustpatron” and “Panzerfaust”

The first years of World War II showed that anti-tank rifles could not cope with the assigned tasks, so the German military demanded anti-tank weapons that could be used to equip infantrymen, operating on the “fire and throw” principle. The development of a disposable hand grenade launcher was started by HASAG in 1942 (chief designer Langweiler). And in 1943 mass production was launched. The first 500 Faustpatrons entered service in August of the same year. All models of this anti-tank grenade launcher had a similar design: they consisted of a barrel (a smooth-bore seamless tube) and an over-caliber grenade. The impact mechanism and sighting device were welded to the outer surface of the barrel.

The Panzerfaust is one of the most powerful modifications of the Faustpatron, which was developed at the end of the war. Its firing range was 150 m, and its armor penetration was 280-320 mm. The Panzerfaust was a reusable weapon. The barrel of the grenade launcher is equipped with a pistol grip, which houses the trigger mechanism; the propellant charge was placed in the barrel. In addition, the designers were able to increase the grenade's flight speed. In total, more than eight million grenade launchers of all modifications were manufactured during the war years. This type of weapon caused significant losses Soviet tanks. Thus, in the battles on the outskirts of Berlin, they knocked out about 30 percent of armored vehicles, and during street battles in the German capital - 70%.

Conclusion

The Second World War had a significant impact on small arms, including the world, its development and tactics of use. Based on its results, we can conclude that, despite the creation of the most modern means weapons, the role of rifle units is not diminished. The accumulated experience in using weapons in those years is still relevant today. In fact, it became the basis for the development and improvement of small arms.

There is an opinion that the Germans are a punctual people, and therefore the control system of the fascist army differed from other armies in the world in its ideal precision and accuracy. But is this statement true? Let's figure it out.

The leader of the German people, Hitler, held many different positions. He was the leader of the party, the Reich Chancellor, the President of Germany, the Minister of War, the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Stalin had something similar. He was the General Secretary of the Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

But no matter what capacity Joseph Stalin acted in, all the levers of power converged in his secretariat. Any reports, reports, denunciations ended up on the desk of the assistant leader of the peoples, Poskrebyshev. He processed the information, reported to his boss and received appropriate instructions. And Hitler had a separate office for each of his positions. In total, the Fuhrer had five such structures, and each of them had its own apparatus of employees.

It is quite understandable that each such structure strived for leadership. She gave orders and instructions on behalf of the leader of the German people and was not interested in the orders and instructions of the other four structures. All this gave rise to chaos, confusion and bickering between employees of different administrative apparatuses.

The control system of the armed forces of Nazi Germany worked on a similar principle. Every army in the world has a brain - General base. And in the fascist army there was not one, but three brains, that is, three General Staffs absolutely independent from each other. The ground forces, air force and navy had their own General Staffs, and each of them planned their own military actions. There were also SS troops who reported only to Himmler, who reported directly to the Fuhrer.

It is quite understandable that the three General Staffs and the command of the SS troops could not thoroughly coordinate their actions. Each proceeded from personal departmental interests and tried to wage the war that was convenient only for him. Each command authority planned its operations and deployed its own command and control systems. All this had the most negative impact on the conduct of both offensive and defensive military operations.

Stalin had nothing like this. Its control system was simple and efficient. The front was considered the main organizational unit. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, five Soviet fronts operated against Germany; at the end of the war there were ten. At the head of each front was a commander with his own staff. It was the front commander who led the combat operations of the combined arms, tank armies and aviation. Therefore, both ground forces and aviation acted according to a single plan.

This organization of leadership made it possible to control tanks, artillery, aviation, and infantry from a single center. If, for example, infantry with artillery and tanks are in deep defense, and aviation is leading air battles, then all front-line assets are directed to support its actions, according to the order of the commander. And if rifle divisions and tank corps move forward, and aviation is not needed, then communications, transport, fuel reserves and everything else work for the attackers.

The fascist army had a completely different control system. If in some area of ​​​​combat operations the pilots had huge reserves of fuel, and the tank crews had almost none, then there was no mechanism capable of providing such information, much less taking the surplus from the aviation and transferring it to the tank unit. And all because the ground forces had their own commanders, and the aviation had their own. And they did not obey each other in any way. Therefore, the issue of transferring fuel could only be resolved through the Fuhrer.

The commander of the army group of ground forces had to contact Hitler's headquarters, and there he could be asked to wait a few hours until the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht decided on some other issues. Then, having received the information, Hitler had to contact Goering and give him the order to allocate surplus fuel to the tank unit. Goering, in turn, had to contact the commander of the air fleet and give him the order. The latter had to give the order to the squadron commander, and only after that the tankers’ fuel tankers would be refueled.

Yes, discipline and order are evident, but who needs them in difficult combat conditions, when the situation changes hourly. True, there was a second option. The tank unit commander could directly contact the air unit commander and ask for help with fuel. But exactly ask, and applicants are often refused.

From this it is clear that in the fascist army the land, air, naval and SS commanders had to negotiate with each other, like traders at a market. Is this a military approach? Could the Nazis have won with such a control system? And this was the case everywhere – in Africa, Greece, Italy, France.

But we must give Adolf Hitler his due. He thought about how to properly and effectively organize the interaction of three mutually independent General Staffs. And, in the end, I came up with it. Above these headquarters, he placed two more headquarters, but made it so that they were also not subordinate to each other. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, headed by Field Marshal Keitel, and the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht, headed by Colonel General Jodl, appeared. All this led to even greater confusion in the fascist army.

The new headquarters, trying to prove their necessity, began to interfere in military operations on individual fronts, sending orders and directives, often contradicting the orders and directives of the General Staffs. As a result, disputes began to arise between competing headquarters. They became increasingly fierce as the situation worsened Eastern Front.

Any comparisons with the Soviet management system are not in favor of Germany. Here it should also be taken into account that the SS troops were not at all subordinate to all these accumulations of headquarters. And their forces were impressive: the SS cavalry division “Florian Geyer”, the SS division “Adolf Hitler”, the SS mountain rifle division “Skanderbeg”, the motorized division “Reichsführer SS”, the SS division “Totenkopf”, the SS grenadier division.

In total, there were 43 such divisions, and among them were tank, cavalry, infantry, mountain rifle, etc. Himmler even had the 6th SS Panzer Army under his command. Also under the personal control of the Reichsführer SS there were 50 Volkssturm divisions. In total he commanded 93 divisions. This entire armada fought on the fronts, but had nothing to do with the General Staffs and ignored their orders. By the way, the SS men fought very bravely, but the losses in their ranks were the greatest.

Thus, fascist army with its control system could not resist the clear, simple and perfectly regulated Stalinist system. A huge number of German headquarters could not find a common language among themselves. In fact, all these military structures lived among themselves in the same way as the cardinal’s guards lived with the royal musketeers from Dumas’ novel. Each structure rowed everything for itself and supplied only itself. That is, the German army consisted of hostile clans. And how could she win in such a situation?

At the end of the war, even Goebbels recognized the superiority of the Soviet control system over the German one. He declared that the German pyramids of orders and instructions destroyed Germany. Who would argue with the Minister of Propaganda? Indeed, the German army simply drowned in confusion and chaos. It could not resist a more progressive system and suffered a complete collapse.

According to military experts, by 1941 the German army was the strongest in the world. Seasoned in battle, having experienced the taste of victory, the German units approached the Soviet border with a sense of their superiority. The Wehrmacht soldiers considered themselves invincible.
Systems approach
The German historian Werner Picht believed that it was the Treaty of Versailles, according to which Germany did not have the right to have an army of more than 100 thousand people, that forced the Berlin generals to look for new principles for the formation of the armed forces. And they were found. And although Hitler, having come to power in 1933, abandoned the “norms of Versailles,” the ideology of military mobility of the new army had already won the minds of German military leaders. Later, the transfer of German soldiers to Spain to protect the Franco regime made it possible to test 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, Me-109 fighters and Stuka-87 dive bombers in real conditions. There, the young Nazi aviation created its own school of air combat. The Balkan campaign of 1941 showed how important it is to coordinate a large amount of equipment. As a result, the German staff officers before the Russian company had successful experience in the use of mobile units reinforced by aviation. All this allowed them to create a military organization of a new and, most importantly, systemic type, optimally configured to carry out combat missions.
Special training
In 1935, the concept of special training for Wehrmacht soldiers arose in order to make a soldier into a kind of “motorized weapon.” For this purpose, the most capable young men were selected from among the youth. They were trained in training camps. To understand what the German military personnel of 1941 were like, you should read Walter Kempowski’s multi-volume book “Echo sounder”. The books provide numerous evidence explaining the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad, including soldiers' correspondence. For example, there is a story about a certain corporal Hans, who at a distance of 40-50 meters could hit a small window with a grenade. “He was an unsurpassed master of urban combat,” writes Hannes, a participant in the Battle of Stalingrad, “it was not difficult for him to destroy a machine gun nest, even if they fired from the other side of the street. If he had been alive, we would have easily taken this damn house, because of which half of our platoon was killed. But in August 1941, a captured Russian lieutenant killed him with a shot in the back. This was ridiculous, because there were so many who surrendered that we didn’t even have time to search them. Dying, Hans shouted that it wasn’t fair.” According to official data, in 1941 the Wehrmacht lost 162,799 soldiers killed, 32,484 missing and 579,795 wounded, most of whom died in hospitals or became disabled. Hitler called these losses monstrous not so much because of the numbers, but because of the lost quality of the German army. In Berlin they were forced to admit that the war would be different - a war by all available means. Russian soldiers offered active resistance in the summer and autumn of 1941. As a rule, these were attacks by desperate and doomed Red Army soldiers, single shots from burning houses, and self-explosions. In total, 3,138 thousand Soviet soldiers died in the first year of the war, most often in captivity or in “cauldrons.” But it was they who bled the Wehrmacht elite, which the Germans had so carefully prepared for six years.
Massive military experience
Any commander will tell you how important it is to have fighters under fire. The German army that attacked the USSR had this invaluable experience of military victories. In September 1939, the Wehrmacht soldiers, having easily defeated 39 Polish divisions of Edward Rydz-Śmigła, tasted victory for the first time. Then there was the Maginot Line, the seizure of Yugoslavia and Greece - all this only strengthened the self-awareness of its invincibility. No country in the world at that time had so many fighters motivated to succeed under fire. Retired infantry general Kurt von Tippelskirch believed that this factor was the most important in the first victories over the Red Army. Describing the concept of lightning wars, he emphasized that, in contrast to the anxious hours of waiting for a war with Poland, the territory Soviet Russia Self-confident German conquerors entered. By the way, the multi-day defense of the Brest Fortress is largely explained by the fact that the 42nd Rifle Division of the Red Army, which had combat experience in the Finnish War, was stationed on its territory.
Precision destruction concept
The Germans also emphasized the prompt destruction of pockets of resistance, no matter how well they were defended. According to the German generals, in this case the enemy develops a feeling of doom and futility of resistance. As a rule, precise, almost sniper-like artillery attacks were used. This was achieved through the successful use of visual optical observation posts, with the help of which the shelling was adjusted at a distance of 7-10 km from our positions. Only at the end of 1941 did the Red Army find an antidote to the all-seeing fascist artillery, when it began to build defensive structures on the reverse slopes of the hills, out of the reach of German optics.
High-quality communication
The most significant advantage of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army was high-quality communications. Guderian believed that a tank without reliable radio communications would not show even a tenth of what it was capable of. In the Third Reich, from the beginning of 1935, the development of reliable ultrashort-wave transceivers intensified. Thanks to the appearance in the German communications service of fundamentally new devices designed by Dr. Grube, the Wehrmacht generals were able to quickly manage a huge theater of military operations. For example, high-frequency telephone equipment served German tank headquarters without any interference at distances of up to one and a half thousand kilometers. That is why on June 27, 1941, in the Dubno area, Kleist’s group of only 700 tanks was able to defeat the mechanized corps of the Red Army, which included 4,000 combat vehicles. Later, in 1944, analyzing this battle, Soviet generals bitterly admitted that if our tanks had had radio communications then, the Soviet Army would have turned the tide of the war at the very beginning.
And still nothing helped them, not even elephants! Thanks to the selfless courage and great love for the Motherland of our fathers and grandfathers, the most perfect military machine in the world was defeated and, I hope, will never be reborn!

IN modern Russia at every opportunity from television screens: in the news, historical programs or some kind of show, they like to reproach their neighbors for the fact that during the Second World War, SS units, police units or organizations supporting anti-Bolshevik, anti-Soviet sentiments were formed on their territory.

First of all, it goes to the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, with their SS divisions, formed one, respectively, in each of these countries - Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia. And also the SS division “Galicia” formed on the territory of Ukraine is especially mentioned in these programs or broadcasts. At the same time, cynically keeping silent about their own SS units formed from Russians. If it were the will of the current fighters against the “Bandera” and “forest brothers”, they would no doubt try to erase the Vlasov ROA from their own history.

To finally appear in all their glory, the one and only fighters for saving the world during the Second World War.
However, history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood. And the truth, no matter how bitter and unpleasant it is, and no matter how much one wants to hide it, the current generation of Russians cannot avoid, gloss over or embellish.

And, in addition to the already notorious ROA - the Russian Liberation Army, under the leadership of the former Soviet general A.A. Vlasov, who, by the way, made a significant contribution to the victory of the Soviet troops near Moscow in 1941 and commanded until he was captured by the Germans 2nd Shock Army, there are also other little-known divisions and SS units formed from Russians. Little known primarily to the Russian fighters themselves and their collaborators. Yes Yes.

Unlike the Latvians or Estonians and Ukrainians, who were only one division at most, there were not even several Russian SS units.

Here they are:

• SS Volunteer Regiment "Varyag".
• 1st Russian national SS brigade "Druzhina".
• 15th SS Cossack Cavalry Corps.
• 29th SS Grenadier Division "RONA" (1st Russian).
• 30th SS Grenadier Division (2nd Russian).
• 36th SS Grenadier Division "Dirlewanger".

CORPS OF SS TROOPS OF THE MAIN OPERATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF THE SS FHA-SS

• 15th Cossack Russian Corps of SS troops FHA-SS - 3 divisions, 16 regiments.
• SS FHA-SS (TROOP-SS)
• 29th Russian FHA-SS - 6 regiments.
• 30th Russian FHA-SS, 1st formation 1944, - 5 regiments.

BRIGADES OF THE MAIN DIRECTORATE OF IMPERIAL SECURITY SS RSHA-SS

• 1st Russian National SS Brigade "Druzhina" - 3 regiments, 12 battalions.
• 1st Guards Brigade ROA "Sonderkommando Љ113" SD - 1 battalion, 2 companies.
• SS Brigade of the Center for Anti-Bolshevik Struggle (CPBB) - 3 battalions.
• The reconnaissance and sabotage unit of the Main Team "Russia - Center" of the Sonderstaff "Zeppelin" RSHA-SS - 4 special forces detachments.

As you can see, there are Russian SS divisions and regiments and corps and brigades, and even reconnaissance and sabotage formations. So why do modern Russian “Herodotus”, when they brand Estonians, Latvians or Ukrainians with shame on the next May 9th, do not remember the Russian SS units?
Everything is very simple. Such an example does not fit with the image of the Russian soldier-liberator (as if only Russians served in the Red Army and there were no Ukrainians, no Belarusians, no Georgians, no Armenians, no Latvians or Estonians), the only one who was not tainted by connections with the German fascism.
And, you can argue and prove for as long as you like whether they participated or did not participate in punitive operations against civilians, whether they reached the size of a full-blooded division or not, whether they fought at all or were just on paper, but the fact remains - Russian divisions There were SS and they fought on the side of the Third Reich.
But, in addition to the Russian SS units themselves, who fought on Hitler’s side with weapons in their hands, there were other military units and units consisting of Russians in the Wehrmacht’s service. Which, according to the already established “good” tradition, the new Russian historians and patriots themselves “forget” to talk about. Meanwhile, as they say, there is something to see. Eg:

MAIN COLLABORATION FORMATIONS. ARMED FORCES OF THE "UNION STATE"

• Armed forces of the Congress of the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR) (1 army, 4 corps, 8 divisions, 8 brigades).
• Russian Liberation Army of the Congress of the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (3 divisions, 2 brigades).

"ARMY" OF THE WEHRMACHT

• Russian Liberation Army of the Wehrmacht - 12 security corps, 13 divisions, 30 brigades.
• Russian Liberation People's Army - 5 regiments, 18 battalions.
• Russian National People's Army - 3 regiments, 12 battalions.
• Russian National Army - 2 regiments, 12 battalions.

AVIATION BODY

• Air Force KONR (Aviation Corps KONR) - 87 aircraft, 1 air group, 1 regiment.

SECURITY CORPS OF THE ARMY REAR AREAS OF THE VERMACHT

• 582nd Security (Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 11 battalions.
• 583rd Security (Estonian-Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 10 battalions.
• 584th Security (Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 6 battalions.
• 590th Security Cossack (Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 1 regiment, 4 battalions.
• 580th Security Cossack (Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 1 regiment, 9 battalions.
• 532nd Security (Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 13 battalions.
• 559th Security (Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 7 battalions.

EASTERN LEGIONS OF THE WEHRMACHT

• Russian Legion "White Cross" of the Wehrmacht - 4 battalions.

ABWERH DIVISIONS

• “Special Division “Russia”” by General Smyslovsky - 1 regiment, 12 battalions.

ABWERH BRIGADES

• Brigade "Graukopf" - "RNNA" of General Ivanov - 1 regiment, 5 battalions.

WEHRMACHT DIVISIONS OF SPECIAL PURPOSE

• 442nd Special Purpose - 2 ROA regiments.
• 136th Special Purpose - 2 ROA regiments.
• 210th Special Purpose Stationary Infantry (Coastal Defense) - 1 regiment, 2 separate ROA battalions.

"NATIVE" SECURITY CORPS AND SELF-DEFENSE

• Russian security corps of the Wehrmacht in Serbia - 1 brigade, 5 regiments.
• Russian "People's Guard" of the General Commissariat "Moscow" (Rear Area of ​​Army Group "Center") - 13 battalions, 1 cavalry division.

(RUSSIAN-CROATIAN)

• 15th Special Purpose Mountain Rifle Corps of the 2nd Tank Army:
• Russians - 1 security corps, 5 regiments, Croatian - 2 divisions, 6 regiments.
• 69th Special Purpose Corps of the 2nd Tank Army: Russians - 1 division, 8 regiments, Croatian - 1 division, 3 regiments.

Thus, the majority, both in the foreign SS units and divisions, were Russians, and in the Wehrmacht units itself, the majority of the collaborators were the same Russians. But how many Russians, at least approximately, fought on the side of Hitler and the Third Reich? Is it even possible to calculate their total number? I guess, yes.

According to various estimates by different researchers, the total number of Russians who fought on the side of the Third Reich ranges from zero (actually the calculations of today’s ardent Russian patriots, who manage to classify all Russian SS units and divisions as Ukrainians, Belarusians and Latvians with Georgians) and up to two million. But, most likely, the truth, as always, is somewhere in the middle, between these two figures.

Moreover, the Germans themselves, as of 1943, put the total number of Russians who fought on the side of the Third Reich at 800 thousand people.

So, for example, Vlasov’s army itself was not very large. His two divisions, which had already been formed, represented no more than 40 thousand fighters. Plus there was another poorly armed and not yet fully formed third division. This is approximately 10-12 thousand more soldiers.

Adjoining Vlasov was the Cossack corps of General Helmut von Panivitz, which became part of the ROA. These are 45 thousand Cossacks who fought in Yugoslavia. It included the Russian corps, formed from emigrants, who fought in Serbia: about six thousand people. In total there are about 120 thousand people. This is what was actually called ROA.

Thus, the ROA alone produced approximately 120 thousand Russians who fought on Hitler’s side.

By adding to these 120 thousand all the other known Russian SS divisions, security regiments and units, formations and detachments, we will just reach the figure of 1 million Russians!!! soldier on the side of the Third Reich. In general, if we take into account that soldiers died in battles and reinforcements were constantly sent to military units, then to these 800 thousand - a million, we can safely add another 200-300 thousand Russians.

A very remarkable thing about the actual number of Russians who fought on Hitler’s side is the fact that when in 1943, Hitler demanded that all Russians be removed from the Eastern Front and transferred to the Western Front, the generals grabbed their heads: this was impossible, because every fifth on the Eastern Front was Russian then.

So it turns out that those who today so vigorously vilify their neighbors for collaborating with the fascist regime were themselves the most massive and loyal supporters of the Third Reich and Hitler during the Second World War. Perhaps this is precisely what explains the incomprehensible craving in modern Russia for neo-Nazi symbols and ideology.

So maybe it’s enough to reproach others for the speck in their eye, when they themselves have a log sticking out of each eye?

Although this is not even in the realm of science fiction. Because then you will have to recognize the past as it really was, and this is neither partial nor heroic and not as idealistic as it has been portrayed for more than 70 years. And as one Soviet comrade from the top said: “Who needs your truth if it interferes with living.”

This is how the current and subsequent generations of Russians will most likely live, basing their knowledge of history primarily on myths, silence, and in some places outright lies.