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The fascist army is a control system. What is the Wehrmacht of the Third Reich

The fascist army is a control system. What is the Wehrmacht of the Third Reich

The German Wehrmacht became a symbol of the Second World War.

Consequences of Versailles

The Entente's victory over Germany culminated in the Treaty of Versailles, signed in Compiegne at the end of 1918. The incredibly difficult conditions of surrender were complemented by the demand for the actual liquidation of the army. The German Republic was allowed to have a small professional army, totaling one hundred thousand people, and an equally reduced naval force. The military structure created on the remains of the army was called Reichwehr. Despite such a small number, the Reichwehr, under the leadership of General von Seeckt, managed to become the base for the deployment of a new army of the Third Reich, and soon there were no those left who did not know what the Wehrmacht was.

Revival of the army

The coming to power of the National Socialists led by Hitler in 1933 was aimed at breaking Germany out of the rigid framework Treaty of Versailles. The Reichwehr had a highly trained and highly motivated personnel reserve to transform it into a real army. The Wehrmacht law, adopted shortly after Hitler took power, sharply expanded the scope of military development. Despite the envisaged increase armed forces five times, in the first years it was not completely clear what the Wehrmacht was. His appearance has not yet taken shape, distinguished by dynamic aggressiveness, high discipline and readiness to fight any enemy in any conditions. The Wehrmacht adopted the best traditions of the Prussian and German Imperial armies, in addition to them receiving a powerful ideological base based on the ideology of National Socialism.

Military ethics in the era of fascism

Nazi ideology had a significant influence on the personnel and fate of the Wehrmacht. Many perceive him as a party army, whose main task was to spread National Socialism to the occupied territories. To some extent this was true. But life is more complex than dogma, and within the Wehrmacht the old Prussian and German military traditions remained in force. It was they who made him such a formidable opponent and a powerful instrument of Nazi domination. It is very difficult to formulate what the Wehrmacht is ideologically. It bizarrely combined soldier camaraderie and party fanaticism. Defense of Vaterland and construction of a new ideological Empire. The preservation of the corporate spirit of the Wehrmacht was facilitated by the creation of SS troops, which accumulated the most fanatical elements

The Wehrmacht's only war

The war demonstrated strong and weaknesses army of Hitler's Germany. When World War II began, the Wehrmacht represented the most powerful ground army in the world. An excellent personnel base and the highest motivation were complemented by the industrial and scientific potential of Germany and Austria. The course of the war proved the highest combat capabilities of this army. But it became clear with utmost clarity that the most good tool useless for achieving adventurous goals. The history of the best army at the beginning of World War II warns against the temptation of repetition sad experience. The Reich was striving for war, and its army was a symbol of the word "war". The Wehrmacht as it is known today would not exist without her. The losses incurred during the battles changed the personnel composition. Instead of a highly professional army, the Wehrmacht increasingly acquired the features of the adventurous line of the Reich leadership posing the same impossible tasks. The restructuring of thinking from war to conquer territories to the defense of one’s own country in such conditions turned out to be impossible. As the fronts shrank, the rhetoric of propaganda changed, but its meaning did not change. The decline in professionalism, as a consequence of large losses, was not compensated by the influx of soldiers tuned to the defense of the state. At the end of the war, the Wehrmacht looked like a loose conglomerate of individual combat-ready units, blurred by a demoralized mass of conscripts and Volssturmists. They did not have time to adopt Prussian military traditions in order to become soldiers, and did not have the motivation to die for

Defeat and consequences

The defeat of Nazi Germany by 1945 became inevitable. When did the Second End? world war, The Wehrmacht ceased to exist. Along with him, much of what formed the basis of the combat effectiveness of the German army became a thing of the past. Despite the declared anti-fascism, the Soviet Union most fully preserved the traditions and spirit of the Prussian army in the recreated army of the GDR. Perhaps this is explained by the deep commonality inherent in Russian even before the First World War. Many Wehrmacht soldiers and officers continued their service, passing on the old traditions. They managed to demonstrate this during the suppression of the Czechoslovak uprising of 1968. This event reminded us what the Wehrmacht was. The German army underwent a greater transformation to interact with the Anglo-American troops, which had a completely different structure and history.

The Third Reich was preparing for an attack on the USSR very thoroughly; by the time the war began, a group of the armed forces of the Reich and the armed forces of Germany’s satellite countries, which had no analogues until that time, was concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union. To defeat Poland, the Reich used 59 divisions; in the war with France and its allies - Holland, Belgium, England - it deployed 141 divisions; 181 divisions were concentrated to attack the USSR, this together with the allies. Berlin made serious preparations for war, literally in a few years transforming its armed forces from one of the weakest armies in Europe, because according to the Versailles agreements, Germany was allowed to have only 100 thousand. an army, without combat aviation, heavy artillery, tanks, a powerful navy, universal conscription, into the best army in the world. This was an unprecedented transformation, of course, influenced by the fact that in the period before the Nazis came to power, with the help of the “financial international” it was possible to preserve the military potential of industry and then quickly militarize the economy. The officer corps was also preserved, passing on its experience to new generations.

The myth that “intelligence reported on time.” One of the most persistent and dangerous myths, which was created under Khrushchev, and even more strengthened during the years of the Russian Federation, is the legend that intelligence has repeatedly reported on the date of the start of the war, but “stupid”, or in another version “enemy of the people” “Stalin brushed aside these reports, believing more in his “friend” Hitler. Why is this myth dangerous? He creates the opinion that if the army had been brought into full combat readiness, it would have been possible to avoid the situation when the Wehrmacht reached Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, they say, it would have been possible to stop the enemy at the border. Moreover, it does not take into account the geopolitical realities of that time - the USSR could be accused of armed provocation, as in 1914, when Russian Empire began mobilization and was accused of “starting a war,” Berlin received a reason to start a war. There was a possibility that we would have to forget about the creation of the “Anti-Hitler Coalition.”

There were intelligence reports, but there is a very big “But” - in the spring of 1941, the intelligence of the People’s Commissariats of State Security and Defense literally bombarded the Kremlin with reports about the “final and firmly established” date for the start of the invasions of the Reich troops. At least 5-6 such dates were reported. April, May, and June dates were reported about the Wehrmacht invasion and the start of the war, but they all turned out to be misinformation. So, contrary to the myths about the War, no one ever reported the date of June 22. The Reich troops should have learned about the hour and day of the invasion only three days before the war, so the directive stating the date of the invasion of the USSR reached the troops only on June 19, 1941. Naturally, not a single intelligence officer had time to report this.

The same famous “telegram” from R. Sorge that “an attack is expected early in the morning of June 22 along a wide front” is a fake. Its text differs sharply from real similar ciphergrams; Moreover, no responsible government leader would take any serious action on the basis of such reports, even if it comes from a reliable informant. As already mentioned, Moscow received such messages regularly. Already in our years, on June 16, 2001, the organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation “Red Star” published the materials of a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, where SVR Colonel Karpov confessed: “Unfortunately, this is a fake that appeared in Khrushchev’s times. Such “fools” are simply launched...” That is, the lie that Soviet intelligence knew everything and reported the day and hour of the start of the invasion was launched by N. Khrushchev when he “debunked” the cult of personality.

Only after the Wehrmacht received the directive of June 19, various “defectors” began to cross the border and signals went through the border service to Moscow.

Intelligence also made a mistake in the size of the Wehrmacht troop group, which was supposedly thoroughly revealed by Soviet intelligence officers. The total strength of the Reich's armed forces was determined by Soviet intelligence to be 320 divisions; in reality, at that time the Wehrmacht had 214 divisions. It was believed that the Reich's forces were divided equally in the western and eastern strategic directions: 130 divisions each, plus 60 in reserve, the rest in other directions. That is, it was not clear where Berlin would direct its attack - it was logical to assume that it would be against England. A completely different picture would have emerged if intelligence had reported that out of 214 Reich divisions, 148 were concentrated in the East. Soviet intelligence was unable to track the process of increasing the power of the Wehrmacht in the east. According to USSR intelligence data, the Wehrmacht grouping in the east from February to May 1941 increased from 80 to 130 divisions, a significant build-up of forces, but at the same time it was believed that the Wehrmacht grouping against England had doubled. What conclusions could be drawn from this? One could assume that Berlin was preparing for an operation against England, which it had been planning to do for a long time and was actively spreading disinformation about it. And in the east they strengthened the group to more reliably cover the “rear”. Wasn't Hitler planning a war on two fronts? This is unequivocal suicide for Germany. And a completely different picture would have emerged if the Kremlin had known that in February, out of all 214 German divisions, there were only 23 in the east, and by June 1941 there were already 148.

True, there is no need to create another myth, that intelligence is to blame for everything, it worked, collected information. But we must take into account the fact that she was still young, in comparison with Western intelligence services, she did not have enough experience.

Another myth is that Stalin is to blame for incorrectly determining the main direction of attack of the German armed forces - the most powerful group of the Red Army was concentrated in the Kiev Special Military District (KOVO), believing that it would be there main blow. But, firstly, this is a decision of the General Staff, and secondly, according to intelligence reports, the Wehrmacht command deployed at least 70 divisions, including 15 tank divisions, against the KOVO and the Odessa Military District (OVO), and the German command against the Western Special Military District (ZOVO) concentrated 45 divisions, of which only 5 were tank divisions. And according to the initial developments of the Barbarossa plan, Berlin planned the main attack precisely in the southwestern strategic direction. Moscow proceeded from the available data; we are now able to put all the pieces of the puzzle together. In addition, in southern Poland, south of Lublin, at the beginning of June 1941, there were actually 10 tank and 6 motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht and SS troops. And therefore, opposing them with 20 tank and 10 motorized divisions of KOVO and OVO was quite the right step our command. True, the problem is that our reconnaissance missed the moment when 5 tank and 3 motorized divisions of Heins Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group were transferred to the Brest area in mid-June. As a result, 9 tank and 6 motorized divisions of Germany were concentrated against the Western Special Military District, and 5 tank divisions and 3 motorized divisions remained against KOVO.



T-2

The Wehrmacht group in the east consisted of 153 divisions and 2 brigades, plus reinforcement units; they were distributed mainly across theaters of military operations: from Norway to Romania. In addition to the German troops, large forces of the armed forces of Germany's allied countries were concentrated on the borders with the Soviet Union - Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian divisions, a total of 29 divisions (15 Finnish and 14 Romanian) and 16 brigades (Finnish - 3, Hungarian - 4, Romanian - 9).

The main striking power of the Wehrmacht was represented by tank and motorized divisions. What were they? In June 1941, there were two types of tank divisions: tank divisions with a tank regiment of two battalions, they had 147 tanks - 51 light tanks Pz.Kpfw. II (according to the Soviet classification T-2), 71 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. III (T-3), 20 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. IV (T-4) and 5 command tanks without weapons. A tank division with a tank regiment of three battalions could be armed with German or Czechoslovak tanks. The tank division, equipped with German tanks, had: 65 T-2 light tanks, 106 T-3 and 30 T-4 medium tanks, as well as 8 command tanks, for a total of 209 units. The tank division, equipped mainly with Czechoslovak tanks, had: 55 T-2 light tanks, 110 light Czechoslovak Pz.Kpfw tanks. 35(t) or Pz.Kpfw. 38(t), 30 T-4 medium tanks and 14 Pz.Kpfw command tanks. 35(t) or Pz.Kpfw. 38(t), total – 209 units. We must also take into account the fact that most of the T-2 and Pz.Kpfw tanks. 38(t) had time to modernize, their frontal armor of 30 and 50 mm was now not inferior in armor protection to medium tanks T-3 and T-4. Plus better than Soviet tanks, quality of sighting devices. According to various estimates, in total the Wehrmacht had approximately 4,000 tanks and assault guns, with the allies - more than 4,300.


Pz.Kpfw. 38(t).

But we must take into account that a Wehrmacht tank division is not only tanks. Tank divisions were reinforced: 6 thousand motorized infantry; 150 artillery barrels, along with mortars and anti-tank guns; a motorized sapper battalion that could equip positions, set up minefields or clear minefields, and organize a crossing; A motorized communications battalion is a mobile communications center based on cars, armored cars or armored personnel carriers that could provide stable control of division units on the march and in battle. According to the staff, the tank division had 1963 units of vehicles, tractors (trucks and tractors - 1402 and passenger cars– 561), in some divisions their number reached up to 2300 units. Plus 1,289 motorcycles (711 units with sidecars) in the state, although their number could also reach 1,570 units. Therefore, tank divisions were organizationally an excellently balanced combat unit, which is why the organizational structures of this formation of the 1941 model, with minor improvements, were preserved until the end of the war.

Tank divisions and motorized divisions were reinforced. Motorized divisions differed from ordinary Wehrmacht infantry divisions by the complete motorization of all units and subunits of the division. They had two regiments of motorized infantry instead of 3 infantry in the infantry division, two light howitzer battalions and one heavy artillery division in the artillery regiment instead of 3 light and 1 heavy in the infantry division, plus they had a motorcycle rifle battalion, which was not in standard infantry division. Motorized divisions had 1900–2000 cars and 1300–1400 motorcycles. That is, tank divisions were reinforced with additional motorized infantry.

The German armed forces were the first among other armies in the world not only to understand the need to have self-propelled artillery to support their infantry, but also to be the first to put this idea into practice. The Wehrmacht had 11 divisions and 5 separate batteries of assault guns, 7 divisions of self-propelled tank destroyers, and another 4 batteries of 150-mm self-propelled heavy infantry guns were transferred to the Wehrmacht tank divisions. The assault gun units supported the infantry on the battlefield; this made it possible not to divert tank units from the tank divisions for these purposes. Divisions of self-propelled tank destroyers became the highly mobile anti-tank reserve of the Wehrmacht command.

The Wehrmacht infantry divisions numbered 16,500–16,800 people, but you need to know that, contrary to military myths, all the artillery of these divisions was horse-drawn. In the Wehrmacht infantry division, there were 5,375 horses on staff: 1,743 riding horses and 3,632 draft horses, of which 2,249 draft horses belonged to the artillery regiment of the unit. Plus high level motorization - 911 cars (of which 565 are trucks and 346 are cars), 527 motorcycles (201 units with a sidecar). In total, the German armed forces, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union, had more than 600,000 vehicles various types and more than 1 million horses.


Artillery

Traditionally, the artillery of the German Armed Forces was strong: up to a quarter of the guns of German divisions were guns with a caliber of 105–150 mm. Organizational structure Wehrmacht military artillery made it possible to provide significant reinforcement of infantry units in battle. Thus, the infantry regiments had 150-mm heavy field guns. This provided the German infantry with a significant advantage in battle. When firing direct fire with shells weighing 38 kg, 150 mm guns could quickly suppress enemy firing points, clearing the way for advancing units. Divisional artillery could support infantry and motorized regiments with a division of light 105-mm howitzers, while the commanders of the Wehrmacht infantry and motorized divisions still had a heavy howitzer division of 150-mm howitzers at their disposal, and the commanders of tank divisions had at their disposal a mixed heavy division of 105-mm guns and 150 mm howitzers.

The tank and motorized divisions also had air defense guns: according to the staff, the division had a company of ZSU (18 units), these were self-propelled anti-aircraft guns based on half-track tractors, armed with single-barreled or quadruple 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. The company was part of the anti-tank fighter division. The ZSU could fire both stationary and on the move while on the march. Plus anti-aircraft divisions with 8–12 88-mm Flak18/36/37 anti-aircraft guns, which, in addition to fighting the enemy air force, could fight enemy tanks, performing anti-tank functions.

To strike the Red Army, the Wehrmacht command also concentrated significant forces of the Reserve of the Main Command of the Ground Forces (RGK): 28 artillery divisions (12 105-mm heavy guns in each); 37 divisions of heavy field howitzers (12 150 mm units each); 2 mixed divisions (6 211 mm mortars and three 173 mm guns each); 29 heavy mortar divisions (9 211 mm mortars in each division); 7 motorized heavy artillery divisions (9 149.1 mm heavy guns in each division); 2 heavy howitzer divisions (four 240 mm heavy Czechoslovak howitzers in each division); 6 anti-tank fighter divisions (36 37-mm Pak35/36 anti-tank guns in each); 9 separate railway batteries with 280 mm naval guns (2 guns per battery). Almost all of the RGK's artillery was concentrated in the direction of the main attacks, and all of it was motorized.

To ensure comprehensive preparation for combat operations, the Wehrmacht strike groups included: 34 artillery instrumental reconnaissance divisions, 52 separate engineer battalions, 25 separate bridge-building battalions, 91 construction battalions and 35 road-building battalions.

Aviation: 4 Luftwaffe air fleets, plus Allied aviation, were concentrated to strike the USSR. In addition to 3,217 bombers and fighters, the Reich Air Force had 1,058 reconnaissance aircraft, which played a vital role in supporting the actions of ground forces and the German Navy. Plus 639 transport and communications aircraft. Of the 965 German single-engine Bf.109 Messerschmitt fighters, almost 60% were aircraft of the new Bf.109F modification; they surpassed in speed and climb rate not only the old Soviet I-16 and I-153 fighters, but also the new ones, only "Yak-1" and "LaGG-3" entered into the Red Army Air Force.

The Reich Air Force had a large number of communications and control units and units, which made it possible to maintain their high controllability and combat effectiveness. The German Air Force included anti-aircraft divisions that provided air defense for ground forces and rear facilities. Each anti-aircraft division included air surveillance, warning and communications units, logistics and technical support units. They were armed with 8-15 anti-aircraft divisions with 88-mm Flak18/36/37 anti-aircraft guns, 37-mm and 20-mm Flak30 and Flak38 anti-aircraft automatic guns, including quadruple installations of 20-mm Flakvierling38/1 automatic guns. At the same time, the Air Force anti-aircraft divisions interacted well with ground forces, often moving directly along with them.

In addition to the armed forces themselves, the striking power was enhanced by numerous auxiliary paramilitary formations, such as the Speer Transport Corps, the Todt Organization, the National Socialist Automobile Corps and the Reich labor service. They carried out logistical, technical and engineering support tasks for the Wehrmacht. There were many volunteers from Western and Eastern Europe, which were not formally at war with the USSR.

To summarize, it must be said that this military machine at that time had no equal. It was not for nothing that Berlin, London and Washington believed that the USSR would not withstand the blow and would fall within 2-3 months. But we miscalculated once again...


Sources:
Isaev A.V. Unknown 1941. The stopped blitzkrieg. M., 2010.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M., 2005.
Pykhalov I. The great slandered leader. Lies and truth about Stalin. M., 2010.
http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2011-06-10/1_2ww.html
http://militera.lib.ru/h/tippelskirch/index.html
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Patriotic_War
http://vspomniv.ru/nemetskie.htm
http://www.sovross.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=588260
http://waralbum.ru/
http://ww2history.ru/artvermaht
http://www.airpages.ru/lw_main.shtml
http://putnikost.gorod.tomsk.ru/index-1271220706.php

What is the Wehrmacht? The definition of this word has a broad meaning. In German, this term refers to any armed forces. But nowadays the word “Wehrmacht” is used to refer to the army of Nazi Germany. It included ground forces, navy and aviation. After the Nazis came to power in 1933, Adolf Hitler's most daring step towards the world community was the formation of a modern army capable of conducting offensive operations. To implement grandiose plans to seize new territories, the Third Reich required numerous and well-organized armed forces.

Treaty of Versailles

After defeat in the First World War, Germany was forced to submit to the victorious countries, which imposed a number of severe restrictions on the size and equipment of its army. Under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty, the maximum permissible number of German armed forces was 100 thousand people. Germany was prohibited from having submarines, heavy artillery and combat aircraft. The navy could include no more than 6 cruisers, 6 battleships and 12 destroyers. The new army, created during the era of the Weimar Republic, was called "Reichswehr", which literally means "imperial defense". In accordance with the peace treaty, the German government abolished universal conscription.

However, Germany secretly sought to rebuild its armed forces. Already in the twenties of the last century, she began to look for ways to circumvent the terms of the Versailles agreements. In the hope of a revival of combat aviation in the foreseeable future, secret schools were created to train military pilots.

The Nazis came to power

After the death of German President Paul von Hindenburg, Adolf Hitler became head of state and holder of unlimited power. He took command of the armed forces. Soon, the entire personnel of the German army took a special oath, the text of which mentioned personal devotion to the Fuhrer.

In 1935, the Reichswehr was officially renamed the Wehrmacht. This was the beginning of an open violation of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Universal conscription was reintroduced in the country. Hitler announced plans for a large-scale rearmament of the German army. The Nazi government significantly increased the level of spending on the defense industry. It was supposed to bring the total number of Wehrmacht divisions to thirty-six, which most openly violated the terms of the Versailles agreements.

Personnel

The troops of the Third Reich were formed from volunteers and conscripts. All recruits were exclusively Germans. Residents of occupied countries were not subject to mobilization into the Wehrmacht. This rule was a consequence of fascist ideology, which proclaimed the superiority of the German nation. Even foreign volunteers were generally not allowed to join the German army.

This policy changed after the invasion of Hitler's troops into the Soviet Union. Propagandists of the Third Reich stated that the fight against world communism, waged by the Wehrmacht, is the concern of not only Germany, but also the European countries it occupied. German authorities began conscripting residents of the Netherlands and Poland for military service. On the territory of the USSR, the Wehrmacht included the so-called eastern legions, formed from Soviet citizens opposed to the communist regime.

SS troops

The combat units of the National Socialist Party were originally intended to ensure the personal safety of Adolf Hitler. Gradually, the small paramilitary organization turned into a full-fledged army, the number of which in 1945 reached 1 million people. SS divisions operated autonomously and were not part of the Wehrmacht. This made it difficult to exercise overall command of the armed forces of Nazi Germany. SS troops participated in combat operations and also committed acts of genocide. Subsequently, an international tribunal declared this organization criminal.

Air Force

The Wehrmacht aviation, known as the Luftwaffe, was key element offensive strategy, which was used in the capture of Poland and France. The German Air Force primarily used fighters and small tactical bombers. Combat aviation worked closely with ground forces. A huge number of fighters ensured air superiority. This made it possible to effectively bomb enemy command posts and supply lines.

Fleet

In historical sources, the naval forces of the Wehrmacht are usually called the Kriegsmarine. The main task of the fleet was to establish control over trade routes in the Atlantic, which were critical for the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the war, German submarines managed to cause significant damage to the naval convoys of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. The Kriegsmarine forces destroyed over a thousand Allied ships. However, the advent of detection tools such as radars and sonars sharply reduced the effectiveness of Germany's use of submarines.

War crimes

Despite the fact that the Nuremberg Tribunal laid the bulk of the blame for violating all norms of international law on the SS divisions, and not on the Wehrmacht, photographs and other documentary evidence indicate the participation of the German army in punitive actions and mass executions.

After the surrender of Germany and the end of World War II, the Third Reich ceased to exist. Together with him, the Wehrmacht went down into history.

IN modern Russia At every opportunity, from television screens: in the news, historical programs or some kind of show, they like to reproach their neighbors for the fact that during the Second World War, SS units, police units or organizations supporting anti-Bolshevik, anti-Soviet sentiments were formed on their territory.

First of all, it goes to the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, with their SS divisions, formed one, respectively, in each of these countries - Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia. And also the SS division “Galicia” formed on the territory of Ukraine is especially mentioned in these programs or broadcasts. At the same time, cynically keeping silent about their own SS units formed from Russians. If it were the will of the current fighters against the “Bandera” and “forest brothers”, they would no doubt try to erase the Vlasov ROA from their own history.

To finally appear in all their glory, the one and only fighters for saving the world during the Second World War.
However, history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood. And the truth, no matter how bitter and unpleasant it is, and no matter how much one wants to hide it, the current generation of Russians cannot avoid, gloss over or embellish.

And, in addition to the already notorious ROA - the Russian Liberation Army, under the leadership of the former Soviet general A.A. Vlasov, who, by the way, made a significant contribution to the victory Soviet troops near Moscow in 1941 and commanded the 2nd Shock Army before being captured by the Germans, there are also other little-known SS divisions and units formed from Russians. Little known primarily to the Russian fighters themselves and their collaborators. Yes, yes.

Unlike the Latvians or Estonians and Ukrainians, who were only one division at most, there were not even several Russian SS units.

Here they are:

  • SS Volunteer Regiment "Varyag".
  • 1st Russian national SS brigade "Druzhina".
  • 15th SS Cossack Cavalry Corps.
  • 29th SS Grenadier Division "RONA" (1st Russian).
  • 30th SS Grenadier Division (2nd Russian).
  • 36th SS Grenadier Division "Dirlewanger".

CORPS OF SS TROOPS OF THE MAIN OPERATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF THE SS FHA-SS

  • 15th Cossack Russian Corps of SS troops FHA-SS - 3 divisions, 16 regiments.
  • SS FHA-SS (TROOP-SS)
  • 29th Russian FHA-SS - 6 regiments.
  • 30th Russian FHA-SS, 1st formation 1944, - 5 regiments.

BRIGADES OF THE MAIN DIRECTORATE OF IMPERIAL SECURITY SS RSHA-SS

  • 1st Russian National SS Brigade "Druzhina" - 3 regiments, 12 battalions.
  • 1st Guards Brigade ROA "Sonderkommando Љ113" SD - 1 battalion, 2 companies.
  • SS Brigade of the Center for Anti-Bolshevik Struggle (CPBB) - 3 battalions.
  • The reconnaissance and sabotage unit of the Main Team "Russia - Center" of the Sonderstaff "Zeppelin" RSHA-SS - 4 special forces detachments.

As you can see, there are Russian SS divisions and regiments and corps and brigades, and even reconnaissance and sabotage formations. So why do modern Russian “Herodotus”, when they brand Estonians, Latvians or Ukrainians with shame on the next May 9th, do not remember the Russian SS units?
It's very simple. Such an example does not fit with the image of the Russian soldier-liberator (as if only Russians served in the Red Army and there were no Ukrainians, no Belarusians, no Georgians, no Armenians, no Latvians or Estonians), the only one not tainted by connections with the German fascism.
And, you can argue and prove for as long as you like whether they participated or did not participate in punitive operations against civilians, whether they reached the size of a full-blooded division or not, whether they fought at all or were just on paper, but the fact remains - Russian divisions There were SS and they fought on the side of the Third Reich.
But, in addition to the Russian SS units themselves, who fought on Hitler’s side with weapons in their hands, there were other military units and units consisting of Russians in the Wehrmacht’s service. Which, according to the already established “good” tradition, the new Russian historians and patriots themselves “forget” to talk about. Meanwhile, as they say, there is something to see. For example:

MAIN COLLABORATION FORMATIONS. ARMED FORCES OF THE "UNION STATE"

  • Armed forces of the Congress of the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR) (1 army, 4 corps, 8 divisions, 8 brigades).
  • Russian Liberation Army of the Congress of the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (3 divisions, 2 brigades).

"ARMY" OF THE WEHRMACHT

  • Russian Liberation Army of the Wehrmacht - 12 security corps, 13 divisions, 30 brigades.
  • Russian Liberation People's Army - 5 regiments, 18 battalions.
  • Russian National People's Army - 3 regiments, 12 battalions.
  • Russian National Army - 2 regiments, 12 battalions.

AVIATION BODY

  • Air Force KONR (Aviation Corps KONR) - 87 aircraft, 1 air group, 1 regiment.

SECURITY CORPS OF THE ARMY REAR AREAS OF THE VERMACHT

  • 582nd Security (Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 11 battalions.
  • 583rd Security (Estonian-Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 10 battalions.
  • 584th Security (Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 6 battalions.
  • 590th Security Cossack (Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 1 regiment, 4 battalions.
  • 580th Security Cossack (Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 1 regiment, 9 battalions.
  • 532nd Security (Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 13 battalions.
  • 559th Security (Russian) Corps of the Wehrmacht - 7 battalions.

EASTERN LEGIONS OF THE WEHRMACHT

  • Russian Legion "White Cross" of the Wehrmacht - 4 battalions.

ABWERH DIVISIONS

  • “Special Division “Russia”” by General Smyslovsky - 1 regiment, 12 battalions.

ABWERH BRIGADES

  • Brigade "Graukopf" - "RNNA" of General Ivanov - 1 regiment, 5 battalions.

WEHRMACHT DIVISIONS OF SPECIAL PURPOSE

  • 442nd Special Purpose - 2 ROA regiments.
  • 136th Special Purpose - 2 ROA regiments.
  • 210th Special Purpose Stationary Infantry (Coastal Defense) - 1 regiment, 2 separate ROA battalions.

"NATIVE" SECURITY CORPS AND SELF-DEFENSE

  • Russian security corps of the Wehrmacht in Serbia - 1 brigade, 5 regiments.
  • Russian "People's Guard" of the General Commissariat "Moscow" (Rear Area of ​​Army Group "Center") - 13 battalions, 1 cavalry division.

(RUSSIAN-CROATIAN)

  • 15th Special Purpose Mountain Rifle Corps of the 2nd Tank Army:
  • Russians - 1 security corps, 5 regiments, Croatian - 2 divisions, 6 regiments.
  • 69th Special Purpose Corps of the 2nd Tank Army: Russians - 1 division, 8 regiments, Croatian - 1 division, 3 regiments.

Thus, the majority, both in the foreign SS units and divisions, were Russians, and in the Wehrmacht units itself, the majority of the collaborators were the same Russians. But how many Russians, at least approximately, fought on the side of Hitler and the Third Reich? Is it even possible to calculate their total number? In principle - yes.

According to various estimates by different researchers, the total number of Russians who fought on the side of the Third Reich ranges from zero (actually the calculations of today’s ardent Russian patriots, who manage to classify all Russian SS units and divisions as Ukrainians, Belarusians and Latvians with Georgians) and up to two million. But, most likely, the truth, as always, is somewhere in the middle, between these two figures.

Moreover, the Germans themselves, as of 1943, put the total number of Russians who fought on the side of the Third Reich at 800 thousand people.

So, for example, Vlasov’s army itself was not very large. His two divisions, which had already been formed, represented no more than 40 thousand fighters. Plus there was another poorly armed and not yet fully formed third division. This is approximately 10-12 thousand more soldiers.

Adjoining Vlasov was the Cossack corps of General Helmut von Panivitz, which became part of the ROA. These are 45 thousand Cossacks who fought in Yugoslavia. It included the Russian corps, formed from emigrants, who fought in Serbia: about six thousand people. In total there are about 120 thousand people. This is what was actually called ROA.

Thus, the ROA alone produced approximately 120 thousand Russians who fought on Hitler’s side.

By adding to these 120 thousand all the other known Russian SS divisions, security regiments and units, formations and detachments, we will just reach the figure of 1 million Russians!!! soldier on the side of the Third Reich. In general, if we take into account that soldiers died in battles and reinforcements were constantly sent to military units, then to these 800 thousand - a million, we can safely add another 200-300 thousand Russians.

A very remarkable thing about the actual number of Russians who fought on Hitler’s side is the fact that when in 1943, Hitler demanded that all Russians be removed from the Eastern Front and transferred to the Western Front, the generals grabbed their heads: this was impossible, because every fifth Eastern Front was Russian then.

So it turns out that those who today so vigorously vilify their neighbors for collaborating with the fascist regime were themselves the most massive and loyal supporters of the Third Reich and Hitler during the Second World War. Perhaps this is precisely what explains the incomprehensible craving in modern Russia for neo-Nazi symbols and ideology.

So maybe it’s enough to reproach others for the speck in their eye when they themselves have a log sticking out of each eye?

Although this is not even in the realm of science fiction. Because then you will have to recognize the past as it really was, and this is neither partial nor heroic and not as idealistic as it has been portrayed for more than 70 years. And as one Soviet comrade from the top said: “Who needs your truth if it interferes with living.”

This is how the current and subsequent generations of Russians will most likely live, basing their knowledge of history primarily on myths, silence, and in some places outright lies.

There is an opinion that the Germans are a punctual people, and therefore the control system of the fascist army differed from other armies in the world in its ideal precision and accuracy. But is this statement true? Let's figure it out.

The leader of the German people, Hitler, held many different positions. He was party leader, Reich Chancellor, President of Germany, Minister of War, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Stalin had something similar. He was general secretary Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

But no matter what capacity Joseph Stalin acted in, all the levers of power converged in his secretariat. Any reports, reports, denunciations ended up on the desk of the assistant leader of the peoples, Poskrebyshev. He processed the information, reported to his boss and received appropriate instructions. And Hitler had a separate office for each of his positions. In total, the Fuhrer had five such structures, and each of them had its own apparatus of employees.

It is quite understandable that each such structure strived for leadership. She gave orders and instructions on behalf of the leader of the German people and was not interested in the orders and instructions of the other four structures. All this gave rise to chaos, confusion and bickering between employees of different administrative apparatuses.

The control system of the armed forces of Nazi Germany worked on a similar principle. Every army in the world has a brain - General Staff. And in the fascist army there was not one, but three brains, that is, three General Staffs absolutely independent from each other. The ground forces, air force and navy had their own General Staffs, and each of them planned their own military actions. There were also SS troops who reported only to Himmler, who reported directly to the Fuhrer.

It is quite understandable that the three General Staffs and the command of the SS troops could not thoroughly coordinate their actions. Each proceeded from personal departmental interests and tried to wage the war that was convenient only for him. Each command authority planned its operations and deployed its own command and control systems. All this had the most negative impact on the conduct of both offensive and defensive military operations.

Stalin had nothing like this. Its control system was simple and efficient. The front was considered the main organizational unit. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, five Soviet fronts operated against Germany; at the end of the war there were ten. At the head of each front was a commander with his own staff. It was the front commander who led the combat operations of the combined arms, tank armies and aviation. Therefore, both ground forces and aviation acted according to a single plan.

This organization of leadership made it possible to control tanks, artillery, aviation, and infantry from a single center. If, for example, infantry with artillery and tanks are in deep defense, and aviation is leading air battles, then all front-line assets are directed to support its actions, according to the order of the commander. And if rifle divisions and tank corps move forward, and aviation is not needed, then communications, transport, fuel reserves and everything else work for the attackers.

The fascist army had a completely different control system. If in some area of ​​​​combat operations the pilots had huge reserves of fuel, and the tank crews had almost none, then there was no mechanism capable of providing such information, much less taking the surplus from the aviation and transferring it to the tank unit. And all because the ground forces had their own commanders, and the aviation had their own. And they did not obey each other in any way. Therefore, the issue of transferring fuel could only be resolved through the Fuhrer.

The commander of the army group of ground forces had to contact Hitler's headquarters, and there he could be asked to wait a few hours until the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht decided on some other issues. Then, having received the information, Hitler had to contact Goering and give him the order to allocate surplus fuel to the tank unit. Goering, in turn, had to contact the commander of the air fleet and give him the order. The latter had to give the order to the squadron commander, and only after that the tankers’ fuel tankers would be refueled.

Yes, discipline and order are evident, but who needs them in difficult combat conditions, when the situation changes hourly. True, there was a second option. The tank unit commander could directly contact the air unit commander and ask for help with fuel. But exactly ask, and applicants are often refused.

From this it is clear that in the fascist army the land, air, naval and SS commanders had to negotiate with each other, like traders at a market. Is this a military approach? Could the Nazis have won with such a control system? And this was the case everywhere – in Africa, Greece, Italy, France.

But we must give Adolf Hitler his due. He thought about how to properly and effectively organize the interaction of three mutually independent General Staffs. And, in the end, I came up with it. Above these headquarters, he placed two more headquarters, but made it so that they were also not subordinate to each other. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, headed by Field Marshal Keitel, and the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht, headed by Colonel General Jodl, appeared. All this led to even greater confusion in the fascist army.

The new headquarters, trying to prove their necessity, began to interfere in military operations on individual fronts, sending orders and directives, often contradicting the orders and directives of the General Staffs. As a result, disputes began to arise between competing headquarters. They became increasingly bitter as the situation on the Eastern Front worsened.

Any comparisons with the Soviet control system are not in favor of Germany. Here it should also be taken into account that the SS troops were not at all subordinate to all these piles of headquarters. And their forces were impressive: the SS cavalry division “Florian Geyer”, the SS division “Adolf Hitler”, the SS mountain rifle division “Skanderbeg”, the motorized division “Reichsführer SS”, the SS division “Totenkopf”, the SS grenadier division.

In total, there were 43 such divisions, and among them were tank, cavalry, infantry, mountain rifle, etc. Himmler even had the 6th SS Panzer Army under his command. Also under the personal control of the Reichsführer SS there were 50 Volkssturm divisions. In total he commanded 93 divisions. This entire armada fought on the fronts, but had nothing to do with the General Staffs and ignored their orders. By the way, the SS men fought very bravely, but the losses in their ranks were the greatest.

Thus, the fascist army with its control system could not resist the clear, simple and perfectly streamlined Stalinist system. A huge number of German headquarters could not find a common language among themselves. In fact, all these military structures lived among themselves in the same way as the cardinal’s guards lived with the royal musketeers from Dumas’ novel. Each structure rowed everything for itself and supplied only itself. That is, the German army consisted of hostile clans. And how could she win in such a situation?

At the end of the war, even Goebbels recognized the superiority of the Soviet control system over the German one. He declared that the German pyramids of orders and instructions destroyed Germany. Who would argue with the Minister of Propaganda? Indeed, the German army simply drowned in confusion and chaos. It could not resist a more progressive system and suffered a complete collapse.

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