What is the highest good according to Aristotle. Greater Good

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1. Justice as a special, “perfect virtue.”

Aristotle's discussion of justice served as the starting point for almost all Western studies of justice. According to Aristotle, the key to justice is the likeness of like cases, an idea that gave later thinkers the task of figuring out which likenesses (needs, merits, talents) are relevant. Aristotle distinguished between justice in the distribution of wealth or other goods (distributive justice) and justice in the case of compensation, such as punishing someone for wrongdoing (retributive justice).

The concept of justice is essential to the concept of the just state, which is central to political philosophy.

Justice is a category not only of moral consciousness, but also legal, economic and political. It is no coincidence that the great ancient philosophers (Plato and Aristotle) singled out this category as the main one for assessing the state of the entire society.

However, to the extent that political decisions and laws are viewed as just or unjust, it is always a question of their moral assessment, that is, whether people agree to live in a society that pursues a given policy, or reject it as unjust. , inhumane, degrading to the dignity of a person or certain groups of people.

Without understanding the meaning of preserving this whole in the interests of everyone, assessing individual actions as fair or unfair becomes meaningless. For Plato, justice is a quality of the entire state, in contrast to other virtues (courage, moderation, wisdom), which characterize individual social groups.

Aristotle said that justice does not express any one virtue, but embraces them all. Therefore, justice is a special, “perfect virtue.” Justice (justice) is the greatest of the virtues, “and it is marveled at more than the light of the evening and morning stars” (Aristotle).

“The state good,” he writes, “is justice, i.e. something that serves the common good." Further, this idea receives the following expression: “uniformly correct means the benefit for the entire state and the common good of all citizens.” So, for Aristotle, the most important aspect of justice is the common good. Along with this, he emphasizes the connection between justice and equality, without at all absolutizing this principle: “According to the general idea, justice is a kind of equality,” it relates to the individual, “equals should have equal.” But justice can also be unequal: equality is fair for equals, and inequality for unequals, “of course, only equality in dignity can be fair.” “Dignity equality” is a version of distributive justice that should dominate the political sphere.

This, according to Aristotle, is one of the most important areas of justice. He constantly turns to the connection between the just and the political: “the only stable state system is one in which equality is realized in accordance with dignity, and in which everyone enjoys what belongs to him, between beings similar to each other, the beautiful and the just lies in the alternation (rule and subordination), for it creates equality and similarity, but inequality between equals and difference between the same are unnatural, and nothing unnatural can be beautiful.”

Aristotle proceeds from the need to establish a just political system or state and identifies its essential features. He notes that “the main reason for the collapse of polities and aristocracies is the deviations from justice found in their very state system.”

Without identifying justice with a certain form of state (despite the obvious preference for polity), Aristotle formulates the principle of the good, i.e. fair state order: “the best existence, both for each individual and for states in general, is one in which virtue is so ensured by external goods that as a result it becomes possible to act in one’s activities in accordance with the requirements of virtue.”

The simplest understanding of justice is the requirement of equality. Therefore, the first formulation of the principle of justice as a moral norm was Golden Rule morality: “Do unto others as they do unto you.”

2. Aristotle's doctrine of the soul.

Soul, a concept expressing historically changing views on the psyche and inner world of man; goes back to animistic ideas about a special substance that lives in the body of humans and animals (sometimes plants) and leaves it during sleep or death. Related to this is the idea of metempsychosis (transmigration of souls).

Ancient Greek natural philosophy is imbued with ideas about the universal animation of the cosmos (hylozoism); Plato and the Neoplatonists develop the doctrine of the world soul as one of the universal principles of existence; for Aristotle, the soul is the active, purposeful principle (“form”, entelechy) of the living body. In theistic religions, the human soul is a unique immortal spiritual principle created by God. Descartes' dualistic metaphysics separates soul and body as two independent substances, the question of their interaction is discussed in line with the psychophysical problem. In modern European philosophy, the term “soul” began to be primarily used to designate inner world person.

For Aristotle, this main representative of the late classics, the theme of the soul is one of his most beloved. He even devotes an entire treatise to this topic, which is called “On the Soul.” But it is precisely this circumstance, namely Aristotle’s extreme interest in the field of mental problems, that makes the research analysis of the soul in Aristotle a very difficult undertaking. Aristotle expresses many different kinds of judgments about the soul, which surprise with their diversity and great difficulty in any attempt to achieve final clarity here.

Namely, every thing, according to Aristotle, is, firstly, material, secondly, eidetic, thirdly, causal and, fourthly, it itself indicates its goal, or its purpose.

In psychology, Aristotle applied the general principles of his philosophy - the concepts of form and matter - in order to understand the relationship between soul and body. As a result, he created another great concept that Greek thought gave birth to in this area. According to this concept, the soul is not a substance that is divorced from the body, as Plato argued, but it is also not a body, as Democritus imagined.

According to Aristotle, it is the form, or energy, of the organic body, which means that the soul and the organic body form an inseparable whole: the soul cannot exist without the body, and the body cannot perform its functions without the soul that animates it.

The definition according to which the soul is the energy of an organic body meant that it is the cause of the spontaneous activity of an organic being. This was the dynamic concept of the soul, which was prepared by Plato. The dynamic concept was a broad concept that had not yet become specifically psychological; it rather had a general biological significance. The soul, interpreted in this way, was the main factor in organic life, and Aristotle’s reasoning is quite understandable, since the natural biologist deals mainly with living, and not with inanimate, bodies.

Consciousness was only one of the functions of the soul thus understood, which has as many functions as it can manifest itself in in how many organic bodies. Aristotle outlined these functions in the form of a hierarchy. He considered the highest functions to be those that cannot be carried out without the participation of the lower ones. In this sense, thought is higher than perception, and perception is higher than nutrition (since it is also a function of such a broadly understood soul). Aristotle noted threefold functions and, in accordance with this, identified three types of soul.

The plant soul has the simplest functions, governing nutrition and growth; it does not have the corresponding organs and is not capable of perception. This ability is possessed by a soul of a higher order - the animal soul. But since pleasure and pain are associated with perception, and with them the desire for something pleasant and the desire to avoid pain, therefore the animal soul - and only it - comprehends feelings and desires. Only on this second level do souls appear mental functions. There is an even higher level - the thinking soul, inherent only in man. Its ability - reason - is the highest of the soul's abilities.

So, highlighting four parts in the soul:

1) rational-cognitive (its ability is wisdom);

2) producing opinions (its ability is prudence);

3) vegetable;

4) subject to attraction and aspirations.

Aristotle associates mental and moral virtues with certain parts of the soul: mental virtues with the first two, moral virtues with the last part of the soul. The difference between these two types of virtues is that mental virtues are formed through learning, while moral virtues are formed through habit.

Associated with the threefold division of passions, abilities and skills introduced in the doctrine of the soul is Aristotle’s definition of virtues as skills, i.e. as stable, identical and consistent human actions. Virtue is fundamentally different from passions (attraction, anger, fear, courage, malice, etc.) and from abilities. Aristotle connects the formation of a virtuous person with his moral skills, since, “entering a person,” virtue becomes a state of mind and manifests itself in his activities, leading to the good performance of his work.

Reason cognizes both existence and goodness equally. Knowing the good, he controls the will, as a result of which the will becomes rational. Reason, when it controls the will, is called practical, in contrast to theoretical, or cognitive. Since the higher faculties include the lower, the human soul combines all the faculties of the soul.

Aristotle brought together opposites in this case: body and soul, feelings and mind. His psychology was typical example how a mind capable of compromises created concepts of the same series from factors that were contradictions for other thinkers. However, even in Aristotle, the length of this series was broken in one place, namely: the highest ability of the soul - reason - has a completely different character and is an exception to the principles of Aristotle's psychology.

There was a fundamental difficulty hidden in Aristotle's concept of reason. He was sure that any cognitive power of the soul must be receptive, if cognition is distinguished, however, on the other hand, an exclusively receptive soul would be a machine that is set in motion from the outside. Aristotle was ready to admit that the lower souls are machines, but not the rational soul. It must be self-motivated, must be the root cause of its actions.

This difficulty - the mind, on the one hand, is receptive, on the other hand, is self-motivated - Aristotle resolved by dividing the mind into passive and active. The passive mind gives satisfaction to the receptivity of knowledge, and the active mind expresses the self-movement of the soul. The passive mind is, as it were, the filtering apparatus of the soul, and the active mind is its engine.

The intentions of this teaching are clear, but the science itself is not clear. The active mind, to become the first cause, must be pure form, pure activity. All the functions of the soul associated with the body share the fate of the body, but the active mind does not, since, being free from matter, it is indestructible and therefore has a divine rather than human nature. Through the active mind the soul is a microcosm with its own first cause.

And just as God in the macrocosm, so the soul in the microcosm is an exception to general principle, which governs Aristotle's system, is based on the idea that any form can exist only in connection with matter. God and the soul, meanwhile, are forms in themselves. This was a trace of Platonism in the Aristotelian view of the world. What he denied from Plato, he introduced into his system in a different form.

3. The nature of good.

Aristotle believed that the nature of good can be found not through abstract reflection, but through the attitude that in real life people set for themselves through a goal. People's goals are varied, but there are high and low among them; the highest are those for which the lower ends serve as means. The sequence of means and ends cannot continue indefinitely, but must, as Aristotle assumed in accordance with his finite way of thinking, there must be some highest goal that is not a means to anything.

Such a goal is the highest achievable good. According to Aristotle, this is eudaimonia. It is the concrete goal that in his ethics took the central place that the abstract idea of good occupied in Plato’s ethics. Eudaimonia, in the understanding of the Greeks, was that perfection of personality or the achievement of that optimum that a person, in accordance with his nature, can achieve. In accordance with tradition, but not without encountering some misunderstandings, the word “eudaimonia” can be translated as “happiness.”

Eudaimonism, which considers eudaimonia the highest good, argued that the highest good is neither an ideal good, nor external, nor social - it is exclusively the perfection of the individual. What is perfection? Eudaimonism is a generalized and imperfect theory and does not yet explain this. Almost all Greek ethicists were eudaimonists, but each understood eudaimonia in his own way. Aristotle saw it in the activity that is inherent in man. And human nature, from the point of view of Aristotle’s rationalism, is characterized by reason.

Therefore, eudaimonia is contained in the activity of the mind and is the basis of a perfect life.

Aristotle divided the benefits of human life into 3 groups: external, spiritual and physical benefits. Maintaining only a threefold division, I assert that everything that determines the difference in the fate of people can be reduced to three main categories.

1) What is a person: - that is, his personality in the broadest sense of the word. This should include health, strength, beauty, temperament, morality, intelligence and the degree of its development.

2) What a person has: – i.e., property that is in his ownership or possession.

3) What is a person like? these words imply what a person is in the minds of others: how they imagine him; - in a word, this is the opinion of others about him, an opinion expressed outwardly in his honor, position and glory.

Aristotle's teaching about the good and especially about the highest good is closely connected with his political teaching and with the doctrine of the soul. Politics, according to Aristotle, “is the science of government and it determines by law what actions should be performed or what actions should be abstained from.” Therefore, in order to legislatively determine the morality of actions, it is necessary to identify the purpose of the science of the state. This goal “will be the highest good for people.” Moreover, she specifies by Aristotle “ we're talking about not only about the good of one person, but, above all, about the good of the people and the state.”

Aristotle first of all emphasizes the polysemy and diversity of good, as long as it is associated with pleasure: “The fact is that each disposition has its own ideas about beauty and pleasure, and probably nothing distinguishes a respectable person more than the fact that in all particular cases he sees the truth as if he were their rule and standard.”

It would seem that here Aristotle defends the idea of the relativity of moral actions, the relativity of good as a criterion of morality. He makes a distinction between the relative and non-relative meanings of the concept “good”. However, Aristotle, distinguishing between pleasure as a state and pleasure as an activity, considers pleasures as accomplished activities and as something that accompanies the use of what is. Pleasure, according to Aristotle, “adds: activity in the present, hope for the future and memory of the past; the greatest pleasure comes from what is associated with activity.”

So, one of the important distinctions between good made by Aristotle is good as a state of pleasure and good as pleasure obtained from various types of activity. This is a fundamental distinction for Aristotle’s ethics, since all others are in one way or another connected with this distinction.

Thus, in “Great Ethics” he distinguishes between external goods (wealth, power, honor, friends, fame), goods necessary for a person to satisfy bodily needs (so-called sensual pleasures) and benefits contained in the soul.

For Aristotle, the latter are preferable to all others. This is the second distinction between different types of good - external, physical and mental. In addition, emphasizing the variety of divisions of the good, he distinguishes between valued, praised, opportunity goods and goods that preserve or create other goods. The realm of moral action includes only those benefits that are an active manifestation of a righteous skill.

Considering pleasure as an active manifestation of a moral skill, Aristotle includes in ethical analysis a number of components that are characteristic specifically of activity - the goal, the conscious choice of the goal and means of its implementation, decision-making, the act of decision and action, a stable chain of which forms a certain skill, mindset, way of behavior. If good is the goal of an action, then “the highest good is the perfect goal,” and the perfect goal itself coincides with happiness.

The highest and perfect goal, according to Aristotle, is one that is pursued in itself, and pleasure, the goal of which is not different from itself, is identical to contemplation, contemplative activity.

It is contemplative activity that is characterized by self-sufficiency, concentration, continuity and autonomy in relation to all external goals.

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle, drawing a distinction between theoretical and practical activities, wrote: “the activity of the mind as contemplative is distinguished by concentration and does not set any goals apart from itself, and besides, it gives its inherent pleasure (which, in turn, contributes to the activity ); since, finally, self-sufficiency, the presence of leisure and tirelessness (as far as this is possible for a person) and everything else that is recognized as blessed, all this clearly takes place in this activity, to that extent it will be the complete and perfect happiness of a person...”

Contemplative activity is inherent in God, is an exceptional bliss, and contemplation, inherent in some forms of human activity, is close to the divine. This ability is most characteristic of the sages, who are the most fortunate and “more beloved than all the gods.” Goodness presupposes, according to Aristotle, the fullness of moral virtues and the fullness of life. The highest Good, or the highest ideal, for Aristotle is the fullness of the contemplative, theoretical life and the fullness of the moral virtues found in philosophical reflection and the activity of the philosophical mind.

Aristotle’s teaching about “moral beauty”, about the ideal of “kalokagathia” essentially completes his reflections on the criteria for the morality of actions: “A morally beautiful person is one who is inherent in goods that are beautiful in themselves, and who realizes these morally beautiful things in his actions.” good for their own sake. Beautiful are the virtues and the deeds produced by virtue.”

And just as for any type of activity it is necessary to “have before oneself a standard for implementation in actions and choice of goods,” similarly, contemplative activity must have this kind of standard, which is “contemplation of God.” This is “the most beautiful standard.”

Bibliography

Aristotle. Great ethics //Aristotle. Op. T. 4. M., 1983. – P. 297

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics //Aristotle. Op. T. 4. M., 1983. – P. 189, 192.

Aristotle. About the soul //Aristotle. Collection cit.: In 4 vols. T. 1. – M., 1976. – P. 439.

Aristotle. Policy. – M.: Publishing house AST. – 2002. – 393 p.

Good and truth: classical and non-classical regulatives / RAS. Institute of Philosophy; Rep. ed. A.P. Ogurtsov. – M., 1998. – 265 p.

Aristotle. Works: In 4 volumes. T. 4 / Trans. from ancient Greek; General ed. A.I. Dovatura. – M.: Mysl, 1983. – 830 p.

Materials from the site http://www.helpeducation.ru/

Reader on the history of philosophy. T.1, 2, 3. – M., 1997.

Aristotle. Great ethics //Aristotle. Op. T. 4. M., 1983. – P. 297

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Aristotle's doctrine of the soul, goodness and justice

1. Justice as a special, “perfect virtue”

The concept of justice is essential to the concept of the just state, which is central to political philosophy.

Justice is a category not only of moral consciousness, but also of legal, economic and political consciousness. It is no coincidence that the great ancient philosophers (Plato and Aristotle) singled out this category as the main one for assessing the state of the entire society.

The concept of justice reflects not only the relationships of people among themselves, but also in relation to some whole. Justice is a systemic quality that promotes the common good.

Justice is a principle that regulates the relationships between people regarding the distribution of social values (this includes wealth, prestige, respect, freedom). Justice is rewarding everyone according to his deserts, and injustice is arbitrariness that violates human rights.

It is unfair for some to receive benefits at the expense of others and to shift their own responsibilities to others. Objective decisions are fair and biased ones are unfair.

Justice is a principle that regulates the relations between people as members of society and having a certain social status and endowed with responsibilities and rights.

Aristotle identified several types of justice: distributive and equalizing.

The first is associated with the distribution of honors, property and other benefits among members of society in accordance with the principle of the dignity of each - that is, in proportion to his merits.

Equalizing justice is concerned with the attempt to make the parties equal; here dignity is not taken into account.

Justice presupposes some level of agreement among members of society regarding the principles by which they live. These principles may change, but the specific understanding of justice depends on what rules and habits have been established in a given society.

“The concept of justice,” Aristotle noted in “Politics,” is associated with ideas about the state, since law, which serves as a measure of justice, is the regulating norm of political communication” Aristotle. Policy. - M.: Publishing house AST. - 2002. - 393 p. .

Aristotle proceeds from the need to establish a just political system or state and identifies its essential features. He notes that " main reason The downfall of polities and aristocracies is the deviations from justice found in their very state system.”

The simplest understanding of justice is the requirement of equality. Therefore, the first formulation of the principle of justice as a moral norm was the golden rule of morality: “Do unto others as they do unto you.”

2. Aristotle's doctrine of the soul

For Aristotle, this main representative of the late classics, the theme of the soul is one of his most beloved. He even devotes an entire treatise to this topic, which is called “On the Soul” by Aristotle. About the soul //Aristotle. Collection cit.: In 4 vols. T. 1. - M., 1976. - P. 439. . But it is precisely this circumstance, namely Aristotle’s extreme interest in the field of mental problems, that makes the research analysis of the soul in Aristotle a very difficult undertaking. Aristotle expresses many different kinds of judgments about the soul, which surprise with their diversity and great difficulty in any attempt to achieve final clarity here.

Namely, every thing, according to Aristotle, is, firstly, material, secondly, eidetic, thirdly, causal and, fourthly, it itself indicates its goal, or its purpose.

Consciousness was only one of the functions of the thus understood soul, which has as many functions as it can manifest itself in in how many organic bodies. Aristotle outlined these functions in the form of a hierarchy. He considered the highest functions to be those that cannot be carried out without the participation of the lower ones. In this sense, thought is higher than perception, and perception is higher than nutrition (since it is also a function of such a broadly understood soul). Aristotle noted threefold functions and, in accordance with this, identified three types of soul.

The plant soul has the simplest functions, governing nutrition and growth; it does not have the corresponding organs and is not capable of perception. This ability is possessed by a soul of a higher order - the animal soul. But since pleasure and pain are associated with perception, and with them the desire for something pleasant and the desire to avoid pain, therefore the animal soul - and only it - comprehends feelings and desires. Only at this second level of the soul do mental functions appear. There is an even higher level - the thinking soul, inherent only in man. Its ability - reason - is the highest of the soul's abilities.

So, highlighting four parts in the soul:

1) rational-cognitive (its ability is wisdom);

2) producing opinions (its ability is prudence);

3) vegetable;

4) subject to attraction and aspirations.

Aristotle brought together opposites in this case: body and soul, feelings and mind. His psychology was a typical example of how a mind capable of compromise created concepts of the same series from factors that were contradictions for other thinkers. However, even in Aristotle, the length of this series was broken in one place, namely: the highest ability of the soul - reason - has a completely different character and is an exception to the principles of Aristotle's psychology.

The intentions of this teaching are clear, but the science itself is not clear. The active mind, to become the first cause, must be pure form, pure activity. All the functions of the soul associated with the body share the fate of the body, but the active mind does not, since, being free from matter, it is indestructible and therefore has a divine rather than a human nature. Through the active mind the soul is a microcosm with its own first cause.

And both God in the macrocosm and the soul in the microcosm are exceptions to the general principle that governs Aristotle's system, which is based on the idea that any form can exist only in connection with matter Aristotle. Works: In 4 volumes. T. 4 / Trans. from ancient Greek; General ed. A.I. Dovatura. - M.: Mysl, 1983. - 830 p. . God and the soul, meanwhile, are forms in themselves. This was a trace of Platonism in the Aristotelian view of the world. What he denied from Plato, he introduced into his system in a different form.

justice aristotle good virtue

3. Nature of good

Therefore, eudaimonia is contained in the activity of the mind and is the basis of a perfect life.

1) What is a person: - that is, his personality in the broadest sense of the word. This should include health, strength, beauty, temperament, morality, intelligence and the degree of its development.

2) What a person has: - i.e. property that is in his ownership or possession.

Aristotle's teaching about the good and especially about the highest good is closely related to his political doctrine and with the doctrine of the soul. Politics, according to Aristotle, “is the science of government and it determines by law what actions should be performed or what actions should be abstained from.” Therefore, in order to legislatively determine the morality of actions, it is necessary to identify the purpose of the science of the state. This goal “will be the highest good for people.” Moreover, she specifies with Aristotle “we are talking not only about the good of one person, but, above all, about the good of the people and the state.”

It would seem that here Aristotle defends the idea of the relativity of moral actions, the relativity of good as a criterion of morality. He distinguishes between the relative and non-relative meanings of the concept of “good” Good and truth: classical and non-classical regulatives / RAS. Institute of Philosophy; Rep. ed. A.P. Ogurtsov. - M., 1998. - 265 p. . However, Aristotle, distinguishing between pleasure as a state and pleasure as an activity, considers pleasures as accomplished activities and as something that accompanies the use of what is. Pleasure, according to Aristotle, “adds: activity in the present, hope for the future and memory of the past; the greatest pleasure comes from what is associated with activity.”

Considering pleasure as an active manifestation of a moral skill, Aristotle includes in ethical analysis a number of components that are characteristic specifically of activity - the goal, the conscious choice of a goal and the means of its implementation, decision-making, the act of decision and action, a stable chain of which forms a certain skill, mindset, way of behavior. If good is the goal of an action, then “the highest good is the perfect goal,” and the perfect goal itself coincides with happiness.

It is contemplative activity that is characterized by self-sufficiency, concentration, continuity and autonomy in relation to all external goals.

List of used literature

1. Aristotle. Great ethics //Aristotle. Op. T. 4. M., 1983. - P. 297

2. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics //Aristotle. Op. T. 4. M., 1983. - S. 189, 192.

3. Aristotle. About the soul //Aristotle. Collection cit.: In 4 vols. T. 1. - M., 1976. - P. 439.

4. Aristotle. Policy. - M.: Publishing house AST. - 2002. - 393 p.

5. Good and truth: classical and non-classical regulators / RAS. Institute of Philosophy; Rep. ed. A.P. Ogurtsov. - M., 1998. - 265 p.

6. Aristotle. Works: In 4 volumes. T. 4 / Trans. from ancient Greek; General ed. A.I. Dovatura. - M.: Mysl, 1983. - 830 p.

7. Reader on the history of philosophy. T.1,2,3. - M., 1997.

8. Chanyshev A.N. Philosophy Ancient world. - M., 1999.

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Aristotle (384-322 BC) .) first develops ethics as a systematic science. He gives it a definition, deriving it from a word that originally denoted a common home, a custom, human character traits generated by the conditions of living together. “If it is necessary to investigate the truth based on the letter (and this, perhaps, is necessary), ethical virtue received its name from this: the word ethos, disposition, comes from the word ethos, custom, so ethical virtue is called so in consonance with the word habit. From this it is already clear that not a single virtue of the extra-rational part of the soul arises in us from nature: what exists by nature will no longer change under the influence of habit.”*

* Aristotle. Works: In 4 volumes - T. 4. - M, 1984. - P. 306.

Aristotle makes a significant turn for all of antiquity when considering moral problems as a result of the fact that he draws attention to the positive role of emotions. He criticizes the teachings of Socrates and Plato for extreme rationalism. Aristotle says that, having connected morality with reason, they do not take into account the passions. But it is necessary not only to know virtue, but to act in accordance with it. Action comes precisely from the fact that reason is united with emotion. It is impossible to be virtuous and not rejoice in virtuous action.

The introduction of passions, considered in a positive way, into the theory made it possible to take significant steps towards the development of the theory. First of all, morality, virtuous behavior, appears in the teachings of Aristotle in connection with the idea of \u200b\u200bthe variability of human behavior, with the assumption of the thought of a certain freedom of action that a person possesses within the limits of his moral existence. Essentially, this means moving towards a deeper understanding of subjectivity. After all, if we assume that a person acts solely on the basis of reason and that everything is known, there would be no doubt left about how to act. Aristotle apparently understands this well when he says that knowledge of virtue generally does not provide knowledge in each specific case.

Virtue, according to Aristotle, is cultivated. But a person who is not at all predisposed to the perception of ethical knowledge will turn out to be deaf to the teaching. This conclusion is again associated with the introduction of the theory of the idea of the need for an emotional state to perform a moral action. If a person is not emotionally disposed towards goodness, moral enlightenment will be of no use to him.

Virtuous behavior is seen as an action performed under the influence of emotions guided by reason. To argue this point, Aristotle examines the interaction of various parts of the soul, largely using the Platonic understanding of its components. He divides the soul into rational and unreasonable. The latter is divided into vegetative and striving. The plant soul is capable of taking care of the reproduction of offspring, it is capable of feeling a lack of food, but there are no sensual aspirations, no affects in it. Therefore it has nothing to do with virtue. The striving soul contains affects and, accordingly, is related to virtue. But affects are capable of giving rise to a virtuous lifestyle only if they are controlled by reason. The interaction of the rational and unreasonable soul is ensured by its listening part. Thanks to the listening part, the unreasonable soul perceives the knowledge that is contained in the rational, primarily in its own rational part, containing intellectual virtues. The rational part of the soul also has some relation to virtue, since for the practical embodiment of virtue one must act wisely, that is, focus not only on the general concept of virtue, but also on specific goals that a person strives to achieve, being a virtuous being, acting in the name of your own good and the good of the policy.

This can be expressed the following diagram:

The soul, according to Aristotle, is inherent in all living things and for all living things it performs the same function: it ensures the desire for perfection. In accordance with his ideas, each individual life strives for perfection, for a model set by form. By form, Aristotle understands much the same as Plato, that is, some ideal example of perfection. But unlike Plato, he approaches the question of the relationship between a separate individual thing and its form in a more differentiated way. If for Plato there are general ideas of love in general, good in general, then Aristotle, in understanding form, stops at a level of generalization that corresponds to species differences. “The last specific difference... will be the essence of the thing and [its] definition”*. Neither the universal nor the genus, from Aristotle's point of view, is the essence and definition of a thing. However, essence cannot be understood as an individual. The latter is also given from the side of matter, which, when combined with form, gives what each specific thing is. For humans, the last species difference is apparently associated with profession. Therefore, just as an acorn, due to the presence of a vegetable soul, wants to become a good oak tree, a person, who already has a rational soul, consciously strives to become a good tailor, helmsman, philosopher, etc.

* Aristotle. Metaphysics. - M.; L., 1934.- P. 132.

Aristotle is known to have studied different types animals, he is considered the founder of biology (primarily zoology). His observations regarding the life of plants and animals were quite profound for his time. Thus, Aristotle said that the plant soul cares only about the reproduction of offspring, while the animal soul has sensations, it has the opportunity to feel the form of what is perceived without its matter. The human soul, in addition to this, also has a mind capable of critically evaluating the sensations themselves. But from all these judgments it remains completely unclear why, in one case, the desire for a perfect form requires enough of a plant soul, simple reproduction of offspring, and in another case, sensations and even reason are required. Speaking about ethical virtues, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that the uncertainty of human existence in comparison with plants and animals is for some reason increasing. Because of this, he has freedom of choice, will and the virtues associated with this, which in essence are a means that allows a person to stay within the boundaries of his own measure of being while a number of parameters of the latter are uncertain. But these conclusions were formulated by Aristotle only implicitly.

Ethical virtues are formed, according to Aristotle, on the basis of affects under the influence of the listening part of the soul. The principle of their determination is to find the measure between two vices. For example, courage is a certain measure between fear (cowardice) and insane courage. But the measure is not just a mean, but a ratio determined for each specific virtue. For example, courage is closer to crazy courage than to fear. Prudence (moderation) is a measure between dispassion and licentiousness, but closer to dispassion. Generosity is a measure between stinginess and extravagance, but closer to extravagance.

This principle of definition applies, however, only to ethical virtues. It is not suitable for the higher intellectual virtues, since the highest, rational activity, according to Aristotle, must be self-sufficient. There is no place in it for the combination of the sensual and the rational. Intellectual virtue is wisdom, as well as prudence (wisdom applied to practical matters) and intelligence. Aristotle's ideal of wise rational activity as the highest good is contemplation, which acts as the highest good, since it is an activity that contains a goal in itself.

In the ancient concept of the world, the order of being as a whole is set from above, from the all-pervading and organizing the world order of the mind “Nus”. The idea of "Nusa" first appears in Anaxagoras. The picture of the world as static perfection, only occasionally violated by deviations, is characteristic of both Plato and Aristotle. In Plato, this is manifested in the very idea of the imperfection of the world of earthly existence, which appears as a world of shadows. For Aristotle, every thing strives for its form as a perfect divine model. Such aspiration itself, the development that takes place on Earth, also testifies to the imperfection of earthly existence. Such an understanding as a whole inevitably leads to the conclusion about freedom as the freedom to contemplate the perfect order of being, accessible at top level development of a person’s cognitive abilities, when he is given the opportunity to look into the world of the gods. In Plato, as we have already seen, this happens when a person, overcoming the imperfect forms of earthly existence, rises to see the ideas of the beauty of good and justice in themselves. In Aristotle it manifests itself in intellectual (dianoetic) virtues, the highest of which is wisdom, which shows, in particular, that the highest good is contemplation.

But wisdom also has to do with practical matters. It is present in the form of prudence in all ethical virtues, because they, as already noted, arise precisely through the interaction of the affective and rational parts of the soul.

Aristotle did huge step in the development of ethical thought, positively assessing the role of affects in moral action. But he was against passions. Passion or strong emotional stress can, from his point of view, only lead a person away from the right action, since by succumbing to passions, we lose control of the mind. “We,” says Aristotle, “must keep an eye on what we ourselves are susceptible to, for by nature everyone is inclined to different things, and we can find out what we are towards by the pleasure and pain that arises in us, and we must draw ourselves in the opposite direction, because, taking ourselves far away from the offense, we will come to the middle, which is what they do, for example, correcting the crookedness of trees. Most of all, we must beware of pleasure and what gives it, because we judge these things extremely biasedly.”*

* Aristotle. Works: In 4 volumes - T. 4. - M., 1984. - P. 93.

Consequently, in Aristotle’s ethical concept, only moderate emotions play a positive role. But we know that in reality, humanity owes many of its achievements precisely to passions; without them there can be no creative burning, no painful search for truth, there can be no self-sacrifice.

Aristotle generally proceeds in his ethical concept from the eudaimonic thesis. He believes that the desire for happiness is the simplest and most understandable desire of a person. But ethics shows the way to happiness. “...Human good is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, then in accordance with the best and most complete [and perfect]”*. Happiness is living in accordance with virtue.

* Aristotle. Decree. Op. - P. 64.

At the lower levels of existence, happiness comes from the consciousness of perfection. Here a person realizes his social purpose. To be a perfect shoemaker or shipbuilder, that is, to fully embody your idea, your form, in your individual existence, means to be happy. This level of being is mainly governed by ethical virtues. But man also has intelligence. Its highest purpose, according to the dominant tradition in ancient ethics, should be associated with the mind itself, not considered simply as an apparatus for the production of some things. But such a mind, according to the logic of things, cannot be anything other than a contemplating mind. This conclusion, in fact, ends the ethical teaching of Aristotle.

conclusions

¨ Ancient ethics of the classical period begins with the idea that universal principles must be expressed in individual existence. Therefore, it is necessary to subordinate it to the universal cosmic law “logos” (Heraclitus). It is also necessary to comply with the laws of the state, since they also express the universal principles of existence.

¨ Then, in the ethics of the Sophists, morality is relativized. Man is freed from the burden of cosmic law and takes responsibility upon himself. Morality is understood here as a set of requirements that a person himself forms for ordering public life and protecting your rights. Virtues are seen as being taught, and the means of education is punishment. A person is understood as an individual subject, forced to follow certain rules of behavior due to living together, although the main motive for behavior is the desire to realize one’s own interest, including the desire for pleasure. The sophists' method - conducting a dispute in which it is believed possible to prove opposing theses with equal conviction - is aimed at demonstrating the practical consequences of accepting one or another theoretical position. This may ultimately contribute to the decision as to whether the provision can be used as some kind of vital principle.

¨ The search for individual criteria of morality, which can be contained in the individual himself, continues in the ethics of Democritus, as well as in the teachings of some philosophers who considered Socrates students (Antisthenes, Diogenes, Aristippus). On this path, various logical possibilities for implementing a certain theoretical idea in the organization of individual life are worked out. Thus, Democritus says that we must strive for peace of mind and moderate pleasures. His basic moral imperative: avoid excessive passions and actions beyond your strength. The Cynics (Antisthenes, Diogenes) believed that it is necessary, if possible, to abandon all pleasures, since they all lead to subsequent suffering, at least to anxiety, which is also suffering. The Cyrenaics (Aristippus), on the contrary, believed that one should strive for strong sensual pleasures in the present, since this is where happiness lies.

¨ Personal criteria, the reduction of morality exclusively to the question of what is needed in order to live more happily, seem, however, too vague due to the fact that the pleasures themselves, with which happiness is in one way or another associated, are not something for a person it's completely obvious. What seems valuable and desirable to us, in to a certain extent is set by the normative criteria of society. In addition, a person has social duties, the fulfillment of which is not always associated with pleasure. Therefore, individual, psychological approaches to understanding morality are insufficient. An attempt to overcome them begins in the ethics of Socrates and Plato, who question the general intersubjective meaning of moral requirements. Both Socrates and Plato believe that one virtue is enough for happiness. This thesis contains a call to confront oneself with an imperfect world, to escape from it. Both thinkers believe that common principles should be maximally expressed in individual existence. Plato recommends abstaining from sensual pleasures so that the soul does not get used to the body. Then it is easier to release. Sensual pleasures, from his point of view, can only indicate the restoration of a previously disturbed harmony, so that one who consciously strives for them actually intentionally strives for destruction (as precondition acquisition of sensual pleasures). The means of knowledge, according to Plato, is self-concentration, which at the same time is moral purification. Concentrating, distracted from everything earthly, the soul recalls what it saw in the world of ideas. Plato's ideal state reflects the idea of the need to assign certain social functions to everyone in accordance with the innate abilities of the soul.

¨ The pinnacle of ancient ethics of the classical period is Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Aristotle believes that happiness is living in accordance with virtue. Virtue is active; a virtuous person, participating in public affairs, strives to perfectly fulfill his function and feels happy. This is possible because he freely develops towards perfection, strives for his form. Such development, however, requires certain efforts; it must be within the boundaries that are precisely set by ethical virtues. The latter are defined as the measure between two vices. A person, according to Aristotle, must control his sensuality, strive to avoid strong passions, since they most easily lead away from the necessary measure and bring him closer to vice, that is, to extremes. However, without a certain kind of emotion one cannot be moral either. The effectiveness of virtue is determined precisely by affect brought under the control of reason.

¨ The highest, intellectual virtues (wisdom, prudence, intelligence) are no longer understood by Aristotle as a measure between two vices. The principle of perfection in them refers not to the fulfillment of a social function, but to the characteristics of the human mind itself. The highest criterion of such perfection is the simultaneous vision of all forms, contemplation in which a person is likened to the gods and which is the highest good. Contemplation, according to Aristotle, is an activity that contains a goal in itself. This is an active state towards which intellectual virtues are oriented. The latter are not isolated from the ethical virtues, since prudence, which represents wisdom applied to practical matters, is present in all other virtues.

¨ The ethics of Plato and Aristotle are also called the ethics of civil service, since these philosophers, unlike the psychological direction in the understanding of morality, do not think of human existence outside such a connection with the whole, in which concern for the latter, for the common good, becomes one of the important moral motives of individual behavior .

¨ The desire to separate the rational principle of a person from the sensory, to consider it as independent and the most important, and therefore in need of supporting it, freeing it from everything that interferes, was the dominant tradition of ancient ethics. On this path, man's moral self-awareness has made a big step forward from the point of view of considering the question of how reason should control feelings, what goals in life a person can and should set for himself with the help of reason. But these same achievements turn into weaknesses of all ancient ethics.

¨ First of all, this occurs due to a misunderstanding of the meaning of human subjective existence, a misunderstanding of the fact that a person possessing a universal (divine) mind, the achievement of which philosophers so often longed for, would no longer be a person. Moreover, he would not be a subject at all, since the meaning of subjective existence is that the subject is oriented in some situation that is not fully defined. He does not know which sides reality will turn towards him at the next moment in time and is preparing for this uncertainty. Our emotions are one of the means of such preparation; they mobilize all systems of the body, preparing it for possible action at the next moment, for example, having to run, fight, love, etc. Ancient philosophers could not understand this. They attributed sensations and emotional manifestations of human life to the lower part of the human soul and nowhere did they say that sensations can be considered as a connection between consciousness and the world, that this connection is mobile, changeable due to various types of activity, various types of activities, which carried out by a person. A certain tension in this connection, a balance of positive and negative pleasures, which generally contributes to the fact that positive emotional tension does not disappear, is what can be called the psychological basis of a person’s happiness.

In the historical, philosophical and general cultural tradition, Aristotle’s ethics is associated mainly with the work “Nicomachean Ethics”. "Nicomachean Ethics" consists of ten books (chapters):

I - the highest good, happiness, division of virtues;

II, III (1-8) - general characteristics of virtues, the concepts of involuntary, voluntary, intentional;

III (9-15), IV - characteristics of individual ethical virtues;

V - justice;

VI - dianoetic virtues;

VII - pleasure and suffering;

VIII, IX - friendship;

X - pleasures and bliss, types of happiness.

To understand the structure of the Nicomachean Ethics, one should keep in mind two significant circumstances: first, the structure of Aristotle’s ethical theory, consisting of three parts: the doctrine of the highest good, or happiness; the doctrine of virtues; the doctrine of individual virtues (it is reflected in the first four books); secondly, the general ancient idea of three ways of life shared by Aristotle: sensual, practical-active (political) and contemplative, which left its mark on the order and problematics of the next six books.

The highest good, or happiness. The first striking and at the same time the most significant feature of human existence, which Aristotle records, is that it has the form of purposeful activity and is characterized by a variety of goals. Every activity is undertaken for some purpose. In medicine it is health, in shipbuilding it is a ship, in strategy it is victory, etc. The purpose for which the activity is undertaken is good.

Various purposes associated with various types activities are interconnected and form a single hierarchically organized chain. What is an end in one respect may be a means in another. The goal that completes this hierarchy, which means it is final in it, and to which all other goals are subordinated, will be called the highest good: “If what we do ... has a certain goal that we desire in itself , and the rest of the goals are desired for its sake and we do not choose all goals... for the sake of another goal (for in this way we will go into infinity, which means our desire is meaningless and vain), then it is clear that this goal is actually good... t that is, the highest good" (I, 1, 1094a).

In relation to the highest good, all other ends are means. It itself always remains the goal and can never become a means. The highest good is a kind of goal of ends. Further, the highest good is something complete and self-sufficient. This is not the sum of goods, it in itself makes life desirable. It cannot be more or less, it is identical to itself. People strive for him for his own sake. Another characteristic of the highest good is that it cannot be the subject of praise, because praise presupposes evaluation in terms of a higher criterion. It deserves unconditional respect and does not need anything else to justify it. The highest good is valuable in itself.

Aristotle, in agreement with his philosophical predecessors and most of his contemporaries, calls the highest good happiness, bliss. At the same time, he uses two different words: “eudaimonia” and “makarhiotes”, the differences between which generally correspond to the semantic shades of the Russian words “happiness” and “bliss”. In ancient Greek it was customary to call the human state happiness, and bliss the divine state. As the researchers noted, "Aristotle does not adhere firmly to this linguistic tradition. He may call a city or a person 'blessed' and a god 'happy'."

Is the highest good, happiness, bliss, the possession or practice of virtue? How on Olympic Games It is not the strongest and most beautiful who are rewarded, but the strongest and most beautiful of those who took part in the competition, and so the highest good reveals itself in activity, in the course of application. “Those who do the right things achieve the beautiful and the good” (I, 1, 1099a). Moreover, good is not what lies behind these actions at the end, which is acquired only after their completion. It is present in the actions themselves. Virtuous actions, since they lead to happiness, are its integral and most important element, are themselves the greatest pleasure. And whoever does not rejoice in such actions, does not experience pleasure when performing them, cannot be considered happy. Happiness is “the highest and most beautiful (good), giving the greatest pleasure” (I, 9, 1099a).

Bliss, being the state of a living, active individual realizing his own purpose, also requires some external prerequisites. Such prerequisites, according to Aristotle, include nobility of birth, luck, wealth, public honor, beauty, having friends and other factors that contribute to good deeds. It is not so easy for vicissitudes of fate and other external circumstances to interfere with human happiness. After all, a virtuous person is one who acts in the best way, not in general, but taking into account the prevailing circumstances. A happy person will never be unhappy, because even with failures he remains himself. Only large and constant blows of fate, great and numerous misfortunes, such as those that befell the Trojan king Priam, can become an insurmountable obstacle to bliss.

Since happiness still depends on fate, doubt arises whether a person can be considered happy while he is still alive - after all, everything can change. But on the other hand, it would be absurd to consider someone who died happy, although, of course, a person thinks about what kind of memory he will leave of himself and what will happen to people close to him after death. For happiness, Aristotle believes, one needs both the fullness of virtue and the fullness of life. One swallow, says Aristotle, does not make spring, in the same way we will not call a person happy if he lived happily for only one day or another short time. Aristotle asks a question that contains his definition of happiness (bliss): “What prevents someone from being called happy who acts in the fullness of virtue and who is sufficiently provided with external goods, not for a random period of time, but throughout a full life?” (I, 11, 1101a).

Separation of virtues and two levels of happiness. The highest good (bliss), being an activity, is associated with human nature. To determine its essence, one must “take into account the purpose of man” (I, 5, 1097c). For Aristotle, in essence, activity is nothing more than the revealed, revealed nature of a living being; By practice, activity, he understands precisely the actual existence of a living being, the process of transition of its capabilities into reality. Therefore, in order to more specifically define bliss, to establish which activity is more perfect, what virtue consists of, we need to turn to human nature, namely, to identify its specificity, in contrast to the nature of other living beings. Life, considered in the aspect of nutrition and growth, makes humans similar to plants. Life, considered in the aspect of feelings, makes him similar to animals. And only an active life, insofar as it depends on correct judgments, is characteristic of one person. Man is not just active, he is intelligently active. This is its specificity, its difference from other living beings. “The purpose of man is the activity of the soul, coordinated with judgment or not without the participation of judgment” (I, 6, 1098a).

Emphasizing the uniqueness of reason as the basis of ethical virtues, Aristotle introduces one important clarification. Virtue is not just a disposition of the soul consistent with correct judgment. It is a disposition of the soul involved in correct judgment. Agreement with a correct judgment can also be external, automatic, mechanically habitual. Involvement presupposes an internal attitude. Mental (dianoetic) virtues form the first eudaimonia, the highest, most valuable human bliss, which Aristotle also calls the manifestation of the divine in man. Moral virtues form the second, actually human eudaimonia.

The connection between virtues and happiness is a central theme in ethics. Each ethical system offers its own way of solving it. For Aristotle, virtues are the path to happiness and at the same time its most important element. Human virtue is possible only in the perspective of his striving for the highest good, happiness. And in this sense it is a means. And happiness is the goal. However, happiness cannot be seen as the result of virtuous behavior following that behavior. It is present in virtue itself, or, to put it another way, virtue has a special pleasure of self-sufficiency, which is a specific sign of happiness. And in this sense, virtue is a goal; it turns out to be identical to happiness.

In Aristotle's ethics, virtue and happiness form a single complex, which was a form of idealization of polis life. In subsequent history, these two essential aspects of human existence have become torn apart and opposed to each other, with the result that ethical theories have taken one-sided positions on this issue. The Stoics subordinated happiness to virtue, believing that “virtue is enough to be happy”1. Epicurus, on the contrary, subordinated virtue to happiness; he saw in it nothing more than a means on the path to serenity. Thus, two polar, polarizing trends in European ethics emerged, which can be traced right up to the present day, interrupted from time to time by a reviving interest in the tradition of Aristotle, which in this issue of the relationship between virtue and happiness, as in many others, is characterized by the fact that it devoid of one-sidedness, offers a “middle”, synthetic solution to the problem. The immediate and primary subject of ethics, as is clear from the title of Aristotle’s work, is ethical virtues.

Ethical (moral) virtues. Moral virtues arise as a result of the interaction of the rational and unreasonable parts of the soul. Even more precisely: we are talking about the field of their interaction, which covers not the entire mind, but only the obedient mind, and not the entire unreasonable part of the soul, but only its striving (sensual) subpart. In this sense, virtues are a specific measure of human existence. Animals and gods are not involved in them, since the former lack reason for this, and the latter are devoid of affects, irrational passions. Animals are lower than virtues, gods are higher than them.

Aristotle believes that the unreasonable part (more precisely, its animal subpart) is involved in virtue. The most essential characteristic of moral virtue is the following: “Virtue is the ability to do the best in everything that concerns pleasure and pain, and depravity is its opposite” (II, 2, 1104c). Inclinations and affects constitute the subject, the substance of ethical virtues, and reason is their governing principle. At the same time, inclinations cannot be interpreted as something passive and insignificant; in a sense they are even more important structural element virtues.

Virtue, writes Aristotle, arises when a correctly directed mind is consistent with the movement of the senses, and the movement of the senses is consistent with reason. Movements of feelings have relative independence, they are characterized by their own virtue. Moreover, feelings in this matter take precedence over reason. If, say, feelings are directed correctly, then the mind, as a rule, also follows them and helps to accomplish wonderful things. If, on the contrary, the source of virtuous behavior is reason, then feelings do not always willingly follow it, and often completely resist it. In a word, it is easier to come to virtue from feelings and inclinations than from reason.

Thus, the internal division of the soul into rational and unreasonable parts, the hierarchy of these parts, in which the dominant role belongs to reason, are extremely important for understanding the uniqueness of moral virtues. Moreover, the moral task itself arises only because human nature is not realized spontaneously, not spontaneously, that the transition of the individual’s natural capabilities into the reality of being is mediated by knowledge, conscious goals, intentions, i.e. mind. Actualization of one's purpose becomes a conscious and controlled act for the individual. Ethical virtues are precisely intended to give this process an optimal, most perfect form.

Virtues are the lifetime acquisitions of a human individual, his personal achievements. According to Aristotle, mental movements and forces are of three types:

a) passions, movements of feelings (anger, fear, joy, envy, etc.) - everything that is accompanied by pleasure and suffering;

b) the reason for the existence of feelings, passions;

c) acquired properties, foundations of the soul, or that by virtue of which we have a right or wrong attitude towards feelings and passions.

Virtues do not fit either the concept of feelings or the concept of their cause; they are acquired states of the soul. “Virtues exist in us neither by nature nor in spite of nature” (II, 1, 1103a). They do not arise from nature, since they are acquired states, but also not apart from nature. After all, in order for it to be possible to give the correct direction to certain inclinations, the inclinations themselves must first exist. If there were no such affects as fear and anger, then such a virtue as courage could not exist. In the same way, if there were no passion and desire, it would be impossible to talk about moderation. In a word, nature provides certain material for virtues in the form of feelings and passions. In addition, the qualitative state of the natural passions of a particular individual also relates to his virtue.

Ethical virtues are formed through habits. These are habitual states of mind. It was from them that it received its name; we are talking about the fact that in the ancient Greek language the words “character” and “habit” differed from each other by one initial letter, different in spelling and similar in sound - the word “ethos - disposition” begins with this, the seventh letter of the alphabet, and the word “ ethos - habit" from epsilon, the fifth letter of the alphabet. In this sense, virtue is a property and result of behavior and practical experience of communication. It is a kind of skill. People become just by actually acting justly, courageously, by acting courageously - they learn to be just, courageous. The foundations of the soul, its acquired states depend on the character and moral quality of the activity. In this case, what people are accustomed to from the very beginning, what habits are instilled in them from childhood, is of decisive importance. Virtues require a skill, a habit, especially formed in the living experience of communication, tact.

When Aristotle says that virtues are made up of habits, he means behavioral patterns accepted in the polis, socially sanctioned mores. Virtues as perfect states of the soul are correlated with the customary standards of decent behavior accepted in the polis. This unity of morality in its subjective-personal states and objectified forms, enshrined in law and custom, is specific and exclusively important point Aristotelian ethics in general, his doctrine of virtues in particular. Virtue is the middle. Each time there are, as it were, three states of mind, two of which are vicious: one due to excess, the other due to deficiency. And only the third, located between these two extreme points, is commendable. “Both in passions and in actions, vices exceed what is due either towards excess or towards deficiency, but virtue knows how to find the middle and chooses it” (II, 6, 1107a). Courage is the middle ground in relation to two extremes: cowardice and insane courage; generosity is between stinginess and extravagance, extravagance, etc. “Virtue, therefore, is a certain possession of the mean; in any case, it exists insofar as it reaches it” (II, 5, 1106).

The middle consists in achieving in each individual action that unique, in this sense extreme, ultimate perfection that is characteristic of this action. If ethical virtues exist at the right time and under the right circumstances, are directed towards those who deserve them, arise from causes and appear in the form in which they should, then this will mean the middle, and at the same time perfection.

In all likelihood, the definition of virtues as a mean in relation to two extremes is a theoretical generalization of the principle of measure, dating back to the Seven Sages, typical of the moral consciousness and ethical thought of antiquity. Doesn’t the following statement of Democritus, for example, sound Aristotelian: “Proper measure in everything is beautiful. I don’t like excess and deficiency.”

The middle in general, in the arithmetic sense of the word, is equidistant from both edges, and it represents each time an objective, identical value for everyone. If ten is too much and two is not enough, then the middle will be equal to six. But this does not mean that if, for example, there is a lot of food for 10 minutes, and not enough for 2 minutes, then you need to eat for 6 minutes. For others, says Aristotle, this will be a lot, but for others it will be little. Virtue as a mean cannot be understood as an objective property of actions in general that can be strictly calculated; it is a property of the person who performs the actions. Therefore, it cannot be considered in isolation from the acting subject. The middle in this sense is always subjective.

Further, the mean is often closer to one extreme than the other. Thus, courage is closer to insane courage than to cowardice, moderation is closer to dispassion than to excess, i.e. intemperance. In a word, the middle must be determined anew each time, it must be sought. Finding the middle in anything, says Aristotle, is very difficult. It would be a gross mistake to see in the Aristotelian principle of the mean a certain template external to the individual and his actions, on the basis of which the measure of their virtue is established. The question of the role of the principle of the right mean in Aristotle's ethical theory is far from obvious. Various opinions were expressed on this matter. Some thought this principle decisive for understanding not only ethics, but even the entire Aristotelian philosophy; others, on the contrary, denied it had any significant significance. In our opinion, it is indisputable that the so-called " golden mean"Aristotle is a moral rule, which presupposes, as a condition for its application, independent reflection and specification in relation to each individual case. It, in essence, is limited to the fact that it requires in every mental disposition to achieve measure, perfection. To be virtuous, an action must be intentional, consciously balanced - one for which the acting individual is a sufficient cause and for which he can take full responsibility.What kind of actions are they when they acquire this quality?

First of all, Aristotle distinguishes involuntary actions from voluntary ones. The terms used here by Aristotle - hekusios and akusios - are primarily of an ethical-psychological nature and in the exact sense of the word mean: “volitional” and “non-volitional”.

By involuntary he actually understands an act committed against the will of the individual, the cause of which is outside actor. These are forced acts and acts of ignorance. Compulsory actions are those that are performed without the participation of the will of the actor or the suffering person.

A special problem is related to the so-called mixed actions. These are actions that are performed by the individual himself, but in extremely limited choice. Such, for example, are the actions of a person who commits a shameful act in order to save parents or children who are in the hands of a villain. Aristotle also refers in this regard to the situation when property is thrown overboard during a storm. These actions in specific circumstances are voluntary, because they are directly committed by the actor himself, but, considered in themselves, they are still involuntary, for a person on his own, if it were solely his will, would not do anything like that. He also includes actions committed in conditions exceeding human capabilities (strong thunderstorm, fire, etc.), in relation to which sympathy rather than condemnation is also appropriate. Having separated mixed actions from forced ones, Aristotle emphasizes that, nevertheless, there are actions that cannot be performed under any circumstances. They always cause condemnation. Aristotle considers the circumstances under which Alcmaeon kills his mother in Euripides to be ridiculous.

Acts of ignorance are actions that lead to results that a person could not know about and which he could not desire. Aristotle distinguishes actions "out of ignorance" from actions "in ignorance." Thus, a drunk person commits bad deeds in ignorance, i.e. without directly being aware of what he is doing. But this is a deliberately chosen failure. By abusing alcohol, he knew (was aware) of the dangers this could pose, and in this case we are talking about arbitrary and vicious behavior, for which the individual bears full responsibility. An act of ignorance occurs when some private or random circumstances remain unknown, which, in addition to the will of the actor, change the consciously set meaning of the act. In practice, it can be difficult to determine whether an act was committed out of ignorance or whether it was deliberately intended, and even if it was not intended, whether it does not correspond to the innermost desires of the individual. The criterion is the individual’s subsequent attitude towards the act he himself committed. Acts out of ignorance cause sincere regret, suffering and repentance.

Voluntary, according to Aristotle, are actions performed of one's own free will. “If the involuntary is done unwillingly and out of ignorance, then the voluntary is, apparently, the source of which is in the actor himself, who knows the particular circumstances under which the action takes place” (III, 3, 1111a). Aristotle also classifies as voluntary actions those committed in rage or out of desire. Virtuous behavior is associated with voluntariness; it assumes that the will is the proximate cause of action. However, this does not mean that all voluntary actions are virtuous, for the former are characteristic of both children and animals. Aristotle introduces a further clarification related to the concept of conscious choice, intentionality. So, for example, sudden actions performed out of impulse or in a violent impulse are voluntary, but they cannot be called consciously chosen. He distinguishes intentionality from desire. Intention does not deal with the impossible, desire does; intentionality is directed towards what is in our control, and desire is not always; intentionality is about means, and desire is about ends. Consequently, although intentionality is always arbitrary, nevertheless, arbitrary intentionality is not identical.

To understand the content of the concept of intentionality, it is important to compare it also with opinion. Here, as in the comparison with desire, the distinguishing mark of intentionality is seen in the fact that it is directed towards what is in our power and what we know, while opinion can extend to everything - both to the impossible and to what unknown. By the way, Aristotle notes that the best intentions and the best opinions are not found in the same people. Some people have the best opinions but make very poor choices.

Intentionality is, therefore, the internal, subjective psychological basis of moral behavior, and its essential feature is that it is preceded by a preliminary weighing of motives, a choice, a previously made decision. The subject of a conscious decision is not everything in general and not all the circumstances of human life, but only what depends on such a decision. Even more precisely, something that is not always done in the same way, the outcome of which is not clear in itself and directly depends on the choice of the individual. Making a distinction in the sphere of causality, Aristotle singles out “nature, necessity, chance, and in addition, the mind and everything that comes from man” (III, 5, 1111a). Only the last sphere of causal relations, where the cause is the conscious will of man itself, is the area of morally responsible decisions and actions. Intentionality is what is chosen by an individual as a result of a consciously made decision. Intentionality is the result of a rational weighing of motives. From this position, however, it does not follow that Aristotle recognizes only rational mechanisms of moral behavior. Intention, according to Aristotle, is only one of the moments (albeit a very important one) in the subjective psychological determination of moral action. It concerns only means. But actions, as we know, cannot consist of means alone; they must also contain goals. Goals are embedded in his will and desires. The general goal of moral action is the pursuit of happiness, the highest good. The intentionality of actions realized through conscious choice is a way to achieve this moral goal.

The concept of voluntary action captures the fact that the source of action is in the will of the acting individual and allows us to talk about psychological sanity. The concept of intentionality captures the comparison, weighing of reason and affects, as a result of which imputation acquires ethical meaning. Only when the desire for pleasure receives the sanction of reason, when it is reason that becomes the guiding principle, does behavior acquire an ethical character. Let us emphasize once again: for Aristotle, dominating the passions does not at all mean suppressing them. Here we are not talking about curbing passions; the pathos of the philosopher’s reasoning is different: only by becoming rational and meaningful does an action become perfect and virtuous.

Concluding his general analysis of the ethical virtues, Aristotle gives the following definition: “So, in connection with the virtues, we said in general outline about their generic concept, namely that they consist in the possession of the middle and that these are moral foundations or dispositions of the soul; also that by what they are generated, they themselves are active; that virtues depend on us and that they are arbitrary and, finally, that they act as prescribed by correct judgment" (III, 8, 1111c).

The highest bliss of contemplation. Ethical virtues lead to happiness and are its most important part. By becoming morally virtuous, a person simultaneously becomes happy. However, ethical virtues are not the last stage of happiness available to a person. Higher and more ultimate is happiness associated with the virtues of reason. Unlike practical reason, which has as its subject ethos, the alternative nature of affective life, theoretical (commanding, wise) reason is self-sufficient and exists in its own element. It is the autonomy of dianoetic virtues that is the decisive argument in favor of the fact that the eudaimonia associated with them is eudaimonia of the highest order.

For Aristotle, happiness is identical to the free flowering of human powers; it is the more complete the less dependent it is on external circumstances lying outside the individual. It is precisely from this point of view that contemplative activity is most preferable. The sensual type of life activity, in which the goal is pleasure, involves the individual in a continuous pursuit of external benefits (wealth, honors, etc.), depriving him of independence. Political activity also turns out to be largely a sphere of necessity; government and military activities deprive one of leisure; moreover, they exist for purposes other than the activity itself. Contemplative activity is a completely different matter: it is complete in itself, it is loved for its own sake; it is the longest, continuous; it is self-sufficient in the sense that the wise man himself, without associates, can go about his business; it is least dependent on external goods. Aristotle emphasizes the point that, from the point of view of individual freedom of creativity, science provides qualitatively more ample opportunities than other types of socially useful activity, although, of course, it does not take place in airless space.

Aristotle summarizes his conclusions, by virtue of which the first eudaimonia consists of contemplative activity, in the following formulation: “So, since from actions in accordance with virtue, statesmen and soldiers are distinguished by beauty and greatness, but they themselves are deprived of leisure and set goals for themselves, and are not elected for the sake of themselves; and since, on the other hand, it is believed that the activity of the mind as a contemplative activity is characterized by concentration and does not set any goal apart from itself, and besides gives its inherent pleasure; therefore, finally, self-sufficiency, the presence of leisure and tirelessness and everything else , which is recognized as a blessed person - all this clearly takes place during this activity, to the extent that it will be a person’s complete and perfect happiness if it covers the full duration of life, for with happiness there is nothing incomplete” (X, 7, 1177c).

“Whoever is about to present a proper inquiry into the best system of government must first of all ascertain precisely which life deserves the greatest preference. If this remains unclear, then, of course, it will also be unknown which political system should be recognized as the best. After all, it is clear that those who enjoy the best political system should, under the influence of their surroundings, live most happily, if this is not prevented by any unexpected accidents.

-... come to an agreement as to what way of life, generally speaking, is the most preferable, and then decide whether it will be the same or different for everyone in general and for individual people.

What are the three goods according to Aristotle?

There are three types of benefits: external, physical and spiritual.

Happy people should have all these benefits.

What is common and special between these goods?

Believing that our exoteric reasoning sets out the question of the best life with sufficient completeness, we use them now. In fact, based on the division indicated in them, hardly anyone would doubt that there are three types of goods: external, physical and spiritual; Happy people should have all these benefits. After all, no one will call someone happy who does not possess, even to a small extent, courage, temperance, justice, prudence, who is afraid of a passing fly, who does not stop at any, even the most extreme, means to quench hunger and thirst, who is ready to sacrifice his closest friends for the sake of half a coin, who is so unreasonable and prone to delusion that he is likened to a child or a madman. But while almost everyone has come to complete agreement on this score, there is disagreement about the size and relative value of these goods. And if people recognize the possession of virtue, even to an insignificant degree, as sufficient, then in their desire for wealth, property, power, fame and the like, they know no limits. We will tell them that it is easy to verify how things stand here with the help of facts; one has only to pay attention to the fact that it is not virtues that are acquired and protected by external goods, but, on the contrary, external goods are acquired and protected by virtues; that happiness in life, whether it will be expressed for people in pleasures, or in virtue, or in both, accompanies those people who are abundantly adorned with good morals and intelligence and who show moderation in the acquisition of external goods, to a much greater extent, rather than those who have acquired more external goods than necessary, but are poor in internal goods.

However, theoretical reasoning obviously leads to the same conclusions. External goods, as a kind of tool - and every tool is suitable for some specific purpose - have a limit; their excess inevitably brings harm to their owners or, in any case, does not bring any benefit; any of the spiritual goods, the more abundant they are, the more useful they turn out to be, if at all it can be assumed that they are not only beautiful, but also useful. In any case, we will say that, obviously, the highest perfection of objects compared in order to establish the superiority of one of them over another stands in direct relation to the difference between them that we establish when examining each of them taken separately. Thus, if the soul, both in itself and in relation to us humans, is more valuable than property and body, then, of course, their most perfect state should be in the same ratio. Further, all this is naturally desirable for the soul, and all right-thinking people should desire them precisely for the sake of the soul, and not vice versa - the soul for their sake. So, let us agree that everyone has the same amount of happiness as virtue and reason and the activity coordinated with them; We are assured of that deity who is happy and blissful not thanks to any external goods, but in itself and thanks to the properties inherent in its nature. This, of course, is the difference between happiness and luck: external goods, not spiritual ones, fall to our lot thanks to chance and happy fate, but there is no one who is fair and abstinent from fate and thanks to it. The consequence of this position, arising from the same reasons, is that best state At the same time, there is a happy and prosperous state, but it is impossible for those who do not perform wonderful deeds to prosper; Neither a person nor a state can accomplish any beautiful deed without virtue and reason. Courage, justice and reason have the same meaning and the same appearance in the state as they have in every individual person, who, thanks to his involvement in them, is called fair, reasonable and temperate.

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