State school in Russian historiography briefly. Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin: works, political views, photos, biography

Introduction

2. Chicherin’s doctrine of the state

2.1 The essence of the state

2.2 Evaluation of forms of government

2.3 State and institution of property

2.4 State and church

3. Evolution of B.N.’s views Chicherina

4. Correlation of political views of K.D. Kavelin and B.N. Chicherina

Conclusion

List of used literature and other sources

Introduction

Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin is one of the most powerful and multifaceted Russian thinkers of the second half of the 19th century. He can rightfully be considered the founder of political science in Russia. His “History of Political Doctrines” still remains the most profound study of this issue not only in Russian, but, perhaps, in world science. Chicherin devoted his main works to the development of key ideas of political and philosophical teaching, such as: “On People's Representation”, “Property and the State” in two volumes, and the three-volume “Course of State Science”. Political and philosophical teaching also develops in his research on the history and law of Russia, and it also develops in numerous detailed articles by Chicherin on various issues of current Russian politics.

Both during his life and after his death, the influence of Chicherin’s ideas on Russian society was quite significant, while increased interest in Chicherin and his theoretical legacy invariably arose precisely at turning points in Russian history: this was the case during the era of the Great Reforms of Alexander II, and this was the case on the eve of the 1905 revolution. years, and so it was after the revolutionary events of 1917.

Legacy of B.N. Chicherin is in demand and relevant. This heritage is multifaceted; it becomes the subject of research by specialists from a number of disciplines: history, law, sociology, philosophy, political science and economics. Moreover, even within the same discipline, specialists of very different specializations find their own subject of research. Now Chicherin has begun to be perceived as one of the largest Russian theorists of liberalism, developing the idea of ​​“deep” liberalism, not “superficial”, having very simplified ideas about the nature of society and the state, mainly “economic” with very narrow-minded ideas about man, his values ​​and meanings being.

The basis of the political and philosophical teachings of Boris Chicherin is the idea of ​​the individual, his dignity and his freedom. The entire complex edifice of social sciences, the doctrine of the state, believes Chicherin, should be built on this foundation. The study of his doctrine of the state from this angle today seems extremely important and relevant for both political theory and political practice.

Among the best pre-revolutionary researchers of Chicherin’s work, one should first of all include his closest student and follower I.V. Mikhailovsky. It should also be noted the works of E.N. Trubetskoy, P.I. Novgorodtseva, P.N. Milyukova, B.P. Vysheslavtsev, and after the revolution in emigration, the works of P.B. Struve, G.D. Gurvich, N.O. Lossky, V.V. Zenkovsky. Among domestic researchers, Soviet and Russian, it should be noted V.D. Zorkina, V.A. Kitaeva, R.A. Kireev, G.B. Kieselshteina, V.I. Prilensky, S.S. Sekirinsky, A.N. Medushevsky, V.F. Pustarnakova, V.S. Nersesyants, L.I. Novikov, I.N. Sizemskaya, L.M. Iskra, A.N. Erygina, A.I. Narezhny, A.V. Zakharova, A.V. Polyakova, A.S. Kokoreva, G.S. Krinitsk.

1. The doctrine of “protective liberalism”

Activities of B.N. Chicherin unfolded in the romantic era of the history of Russian liberalism, which he perceived, like many other representatives of the intellectual elite, with great enthusiasm, with faith and hope for deep and radical transformations of the socio-political system of Russia, begun after the Crimean War on the initiative “from above” by the tsar -reformer Alexander II.

Chicherin devoted his entire life to the theoretical justification of the problems of the formation of freedom, the personal principle on Russian soil, in their combination with other eternal principles of social life, with order, with property, with law, with morality, with the state. He played the role of the founder of the concept of “protective liberalism”, or liberal conservatism, which, in the words of P. Struve, “immediately took on some kind of strong and solid form, harmoniously combining in one person the ideological motives of liberalism and conservatism.”

Freed from the extremes and one-sidedness of liberalism, conservatism and all kinds of socio-political radicalism, “protective liberalism” as a socio-philosophical and political theory should become, according to Chicherin, a banner capable of “uniting around itself people of all spheres, all classes, all directions in solving public problems for the reasonable reform of Russia.”

In almost all his works, Chicherin adheres to the concept of “protective liberalism,” which he never changed, despite a certain evolution of his socio-political views. This concept clearly took shape by the early 60s. He outlined its essence in his work “Different Types of Liberalism” (1862), considering “protective liberalism” in comparison with other varieties of liberalism - street and opposition.

The characteristic features of street liberalism are: unbridled impulses, self-will, intolerance of other people's opinions, personal freedom, indiscriminateness in the choice of means in the fight against one's opponent (lies, slander, violence), irreconcilable hatred of everything that rises above the crowd, intolerance of authorities, equalizing everyone in their ignorance, baseness, vulgarity, etc.

Oppositional liberalism views freedom from purely negative aspects. The pinnacle of his well-being is the abolition of all laws, liberation from all constraints. By denying modernity, he denies the past that produced it. Chicherin considers the main tactical means of oppositional liberalism to be his use of criticism of centralization, bureaucracy, the state, conducting a “smart” argument for the sake of argument, the fight against aristocratic prejudices, a strict division of public life into irreconcilable opposites (poles), preaching - not the slightest contact with power.

Protective liberalism (or liberal conservatism) excludes the extremes of both types of liberalism and represents a synthesis of the principles of freedom with the principles of power and law. In political life his slogan is: “liberal measures and strong power.” The liberal direction, Chicherin explains, “must act by understanding the conditions of power, without becoming systematically hostile towards it, without making unreasonable demands, but preserving and delaying where necessary, and trying to explore the truth through a cool-blooded discussion of issues.”

Chicherin’s doctrine of “protective” liberalism was born not only under the influence of the socio-philosophical thought of D. St. Mill (as V.I. Prilensky points out in his studies), E. Burke, A. Tocqueville and other great liberals and conservatives. The main thing is that it was formed on the basis of his ideas early works: “On serfdom” (1856), “On the aristocracy, especially Russian” (1857), “Modern tasks of Russian life” (1857), published in the collections of articles “Voices from Russia”, published by A.I. Herzen and P.P. Ogarev in London, as well as in the essay “Essays on England and France” (1858). In them, Chicherin not only outlined the essence of his understanding of the program of the new reign, but also substantiated the inseparability of the combination of liberal and conservative principles in it, “understanding the impossibility of changing the image of government in the present, recognizing its goal in the future.”

The liberal principle found its concrete expression in the demands: the abolition of serfdom (the liberation of peasants for a ransom with the land and the establishment of individual rather than communal land ownership); recognition of freedom of human conscience, freedom of individual rights; establishing publicity as a necessary condition for proper development; recognition of public opinion as a spokesman for social needs; non-interference of the state in the economic sphere and free private enterprise; introduction of public proceedings; transition in the future to a limited, representative monarchy.

Chicherin's introduction of the conservative principle into the liberal program was essentially dictated by the conditions of Russian reality itself, the peculiarity of the autocratic system. Since, unlike Western Europe, in Russia there was no strong social base of liberalism, a sufficiently educated society, but the traditional belief in a strong stronghold of state order and enlightened absolutism, capable of leading the people on the path of citizenship and enlightenment, remained, for this reason freedom “cannot be given absolute significance and set as an indispensable condition for any civil development." In other words, in order not to fall into radicalism and resist destructive tendencies that forcefully introduce freedom and new orders, it is necessary, according to Chicherin, to prevent the useless and harmful breakdown of the state and social order, to separate from the narrow reaction that is trying to stop the natural course of things, from striving forward . At the same time, one cannot stubbornly retain what has lost its vitality, but it is necessary to preserve what is a useful element of the social system, for example, religious, moral values ​​or social, political, economic institutions, etc.

In a word, Chicherin, like representatives of the Western European conservative tradition of modern times, starting with E. Burke, de Maistre, A. Tocqueville, considered the “protective” conservative principle to be a serious basis for a social building, especially on Russian soil, which cannot be ignored and destroyed, without falling into “zealous liberalism,” like Herzen’s, “throwing to extremes, furiously pursuing every manifestation of despotism.” Kavelin warned about the need to take into account the importance of the conservative mentality of the Russian public when reforming Russia: “Not being a doctrine,” he wrote, “conservatism is a great force that has to be reckoned with at every step. Our public and people are the greatest inexorable conservatives.”

The main historical sources on this topic are the original works of leading theorists of Russian liberalism of the 19th century A.D. Gradovsky, K.D. Kavelin and B.N. Chicherina.

From the scientific works of A.D. Gradovsky’s following articles are of interest to us: “On the modern direction of state sciences”, “Society and state”, “State and progress”, “History of local government in Russia”

In the work “On the modern direction of state sciences,” the author provides an analysis of the reasons for the gap between political science and political practice, notes Negative influence this gap. He notes that “science, which does not have access to practical issues of state life, rushes into the realm of utopia; from a useful social force it becomes a destructive element”, “a society that does not participate in state life is unable to restrain utopian aspirations and becomes their victim”, “when we say from the same point of view that society should participate in state affairs, this means “that the state must renounce some of its rights in favor of society, which, as it were, conquers them from the state.” This source is of interest to us because it provides a theoretical justification for the possibility of public participation in government affairs under an absolute monarchy.

In the work “Society and State” A.D. Gradovsky criticizes the contractual theory of the origin of the state, gives an analysis of other issues in the theory of state and law, but for us one of the chapters of this work is important, namely “Liberalism and Socialism”. Half of this extensive chapter is devoted to a detailed analysis of liberal doctrine in its historical development. The historical roots of liberalism are shown, mainly using the example of French history, it is noted that liberalism was the doctrine of the enlightened middle classes of European society, who wanted to throw off the burden of absolutism from themselves and the people. HELL. Gradovsky writes about the cosmopolitan nature of liberalism. “Not only marquises, dukes, counts, barons, prelates, peasants, masters and apprentices, but also the French, Germans, Turks, Indians, Negroes and Gothengots were lost in the concept of the universal human.” According to A.D. Gradovsky, the task of liberalism is to recall the natural rights of man, to present them in precise formulas. “Everything that violates or restricts human freedom is contrary to human nature, tramples on the rights of reason and nature. The freedom of one is protected only by the freedom of another; beyond this border it turns into arbitrariness and violence” Gradovsky, A.D. Society and state / A.D. Gradovsky // Gradovsky, A.D. Works / A.D. Gradovsky. - St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2001. - P. 31-56.. From a conservative position, the flip side of liberalism is criticized - the atomization of society. The work also provides a detailed analysis of the socialist doctrine, which is subject to criticism. Of course, this work by A.D. Gradovsky helps to understand the idea of ​​Russian liberals about their own ideology, and other ideological trends of the time in question.

In the article “State and Progress” A.D. Gradovsky analyzes the views of the famous figure of the Great French Revolution, Philippe Buchet. Presenting in detail the works of Buchet, the author shares his thoughts with the reader. These are the ones that are of scientific interest to us. In his work, the famous liberal professor appears before us as a conservative, defender and champion of traditions. He writes that “protecting one’s historically developed ideas, passing on great national goals from generation to generation is the true purpose of society.” He considers government, not society, to be the engine of progress. All these and other thoughts of A.D. Gradovsky, expressed in this article, are very important for understanding the essence of conservative liberalism.

“History of local government in Russia” is a famous scientific work by A.D. Gradovsky, consisting of three chapters: “state and province”, “social classes in Russia in the 16th and 17th centuries”, “administrative division and local government in Russia in the 16th and 17th centuries”. Based on the subject and object of this study, only the chapter “State and Province” is of interest to us, which proves the need for local self-government for better management of the state as a whole. The work helps to understand the attitude of A.D. Gradovsky to the institution of local self-government in post-reform Russia.

From the journalistic works of A.D. Gradovsky we will single out only two: “Hopes and Disappointments” and “Reforms and Nationality”.

In the article “Hope and Disappointment” by A.D. Gradovsky polemicizes with opponents of the continuation and deepening of the Great Reforms of the 60-70s of the 19th century. This article is important for us in that it allows us to understand not only the attitude of liberals to the consequences of the Great Reforms, but also their arguments that they put forward in defense of their demand to continue the reforms.

In the article “Reforms and Nationality” A.D. Gradovsky argues that the government should seek support in the zemstvos and encourage the zemstvos in every possible way in order to resist the socialist revolutionaries. HELL. In his article, Gradovsky defends liberals from attacks by conservative publicists who accused the former of being anti-people and supporting revolutionaries. The article is important because it shows the attitude of liberals towards conservatives and revolutionaries.

Other sources on this topic are the works of B.N. Chicherina.

In his article “Different Types of Liberalism” B.N. Chicherin emphasizes that one cannot do without freedom in a “well-ordered state” and that “a person is not a means for other people’s goals, he is an absolute goal himself.” The author identifies three types of liberalism: street liberalism, whose representatives are characterized by intolerance of different opinions and populism, oppositional liberalism, characterized by one-sided assessments, and protective liberalism, the essence of which is the reconciliation of the principles of freedom with the principles of power. The liberal author's sympathies are entirely on the side of protective liberalism. It is interesting to note that it was in this article of his that B.N. Chicherin put forward his famous slogan “liberal measures - strong power”, giving him a detailed justification. This work by B.N. Chicherina is undoubtedly important for understanding the essence of conservative liberalism.

Another important work for us by B.N. Chicherin is the article “The Constitutional Question in Russia,” written after the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the subsequent decrease in tax revenues. In his work, he opposes the ideas of democratic Caesarism (“equality without rights is the worst of all possible social orders”) and advocates for the beginning of the introduction of constitutional forms of government (“autocracy, which everywhere plays the role of educator of young nations, no longer corresponds to the era of their maturity”). . The work is important for us because, firstly, it shows the evolution of B.N.’s views. Chicherin on the constitutional issue, secondly, shows the attitude of B.N. Chicherin to the class privileges of the nobility.

Of course, the fundamental work is the scientific work of B.N. Chicherin "Property and the State". Here Chicherin refutes those extreme points of view on the role of the state in the life of society and the individual, which were especially popular in his era. In his work devoted to criticism of the concepts of socialism and Marxism, Chicherin addresses, first of all, the economic side of social life and the concept of “property”. Contrary to all demands that boil down to the belief in the need for radical government intervention in the structure of property relations, the liberal author defends the idea of ​​complete freedom of economic relations, subject to restriction to the very minimum extent (from modern positions, it can be stated that the author stands on the radical positions of economic liberalism). It can also be said that the book “Property and the State” became the first major refutation of the philosophical and economic theories socialism and communism in the Russian philosophical tradition.

An important historical source is the jointly written work by K.D. Kavelin and B.N. Chicherin “Letter to the Publisher” (A.I. Herzen). In this letter, two famous Russian liberals try to prove A.I. Herzen that in Russia there is no basis for revolution, as well as the need for it: “Russian people still will not rebel, because we have no rebels.” The letter, written before the abolition of serfdom, proposed a minimum program for Russian liberalism at that time: “we are thinking about how to free the peasants without shaking the entire social organism, we dream about introducing freedom of conscience in the state, about abolishing or at least least, about weakening censorship." Much attention in the letter is paid to criticism of the socialist ideas that A.I. adhered to. Herzen. This source makes it possible to clarify the attitude of liberals towards the social democratic camp.

From the creative heritage of K.D. Kavelin’s work “The Nobility and the Liberation of the Peasants,” written after the peasant reform, is of greatest interest. K.D. Kavelin notes that both peasants and nobles were dissatisfied with the peasant reform, but believes that this discontent must pass. Realizing the critical situation of the nobility after the abolition of serfdom, the author tries to give his answer to the question: what will happen to the nobility now? The liberal ideologist’s forecast was as follows: the nobility will transform into a class of farmers and will gradually become equal in all civil rights with other classes. The sign of belonging to the higher class will not be birth and award, but the presence of large landholdings, thus “the higher class will be the continuation and completion of the lower, and the lower will serve as a nursery, foundation and starting point for the higher.” K.D. Kavelin warns the nobles about the inadmissibility of class egoism: “exclusivity, privileges, narrow, myopic egoism - these are the pitfalls about which the upper classes crashed and collapsed in most states.” In his work, K.D. Kavelin also writes about the inadmissibility of adopting a “noble constitution”, at the same time, believing that a non-noble constitution is simply impossible due to the low level of education of the majority of the population. This historical source allows us to clarify the position of K.D. Kavelin on the class and constitutional issue.

Historical views of K.D. Kavelin can be traced through three of his works: “A Look at the Legal Life of Ancient Russia”, “A Brief Look at Russian History”, “Thoughts and Notes on Russian History”. These works can be characterized all at once, since the thoughts expressed in them are identical. K.D. Kavelin compares the historical paths of Europe and Russia, notes the uniqueness of Russian history, but makes a conclusion about the belonging of the Russian people to the European family. The goal of Russian and European history is common - unconditional recognition of human rights and dignity. The works examine all historical periods and paint a picture of the enslavement and emancipation of classes. The main attention in the works is paid to the figure of Peter I, who expressed the aspirations of the progressive minority, which was burdened by the life of that time, and stood at its head. But the era of Peter’s reforms did not come suddenly, according to Kavelin; it was prepared by the entire previous history. We can say that Kavelin admires Peter I and his contribution to Russian history.

In Soviet times, for obvious reasons, liberal thought in Russian Empire the second half of the 19th century has not been fully explored, or even sufficiently. A huge amount of monographic literature devoted to socialist thought (the so-called revolutionary-democratic camp) was written, and monographs related to liberal issues can be counted on two hands. Unfortunately, in the post-Soviet period, the number of monographs published did not change the situation radically.

General theoretical works devoted to Russian liberalism of the 19th century include the monograph by V.V. Vedernikova, V.A. Kitaeva, A.V. Lunochkina “The constitutional question in Russian liberal journalism of the 60-80s. XIX century". The monograph characterizes the views of the largest ideologists of Russian liberalism of the 1860-1880s on issues of constitutional reforms, and traces the changes that have occurred in the liberals’ understanding of the problem of limiting autocracy in Russia. The authors emphasize that while liberals saw an unlimited monarchy as a reliable tool for resolving social contradictions, the policy of limiting the reforms already carried out and the government’s distrust of public initiative destroyed the hope for the possibility of liberal reforms under the rule of an authoritarian regime. According to the authors, this could not but lead to the elimination of illusions in the liberal environment regarding the reform capabilities of bureaucratic autocracy and to overcoming skepticism regarding the idea of ​​representation.

Another general theoretical work is the monograph by V.A. Kitaev “From front to security. From the history of Russian liberal thought of the 50-60s of the 19th century,” published by the Mysl publishing house in 1972. This monograph highlights the following key problems: “Westerners in the liberal movement of the mid-50s of the 19th century”, “the state and government structure in the system of historical and political views of Westerners”, the problem of class-class relations and the peasant question in the views of liberals, “Westerners” and revolutionary democracy." Preference is given to revolutionary democracy.

Liberalism and its role in the political life of the 19th century are illuminated in a new way in the work of A.V. Obolonsky "The drama of Russian political history: the system against the individual." (Moscow. Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 1994) This work emphasizes the person-centrism of liberal ideology, in contrast to the system-centrism of socialist doctrine and Russian conservatism. The liberal course is seen as an unrealized alternative to the imperial and Soviet systems of power. According to the author, the consistent implementation of the liberal program in reality was supposed to erode the very basis of the existing order, radically change the principles of relationships in Russian society, since its main components were changing: in public morality, various modifications of traditionalism were gradually supposed to give way to the ethics of individualism, and would begin to develop a new type of political culture, in which different, not despotic, but liberal stereotypes of political behavior would develop, and finally, the scale of social values ​​would be modernized. However, the regime did not show sufficient flexibility, and the pressure on it from liberal circles of society turned out to be too weak.

General theoretical problems are also touched upon in the monograph by A.N. Vereshchagin “The Zemstvo Question in Russia: Political and Legal Relations” The work was published by the publishing house “International Relations” in 2002. The author covers in detail the views of liberal theorists Kavelin, Chicherin, Gradovsky on a number of key topics: on the issue of local self-government, on the constitutional issue, on the issue of human rights, on the issue of class relations. A.N. Vereshchagin emphasizes that the main point of support for liberalism was the supreme power itself, to which liberal theorists appealed, according to whose idea the unity of government and society should occur in the sphere of local self-government. The author not only covers the concepts of local self-government, but also analyzes them, indicating strengths and weaknesses.

General theoretical works can also include the monograph by V.D. Zorkin “Chicherin: from the history of political and legal thought” (Moscow, “Legal Literature”, 1984). Briefly characterizing the life and creative path of B.N. Chicherin (in the first chapter), the author focuses on analyzing the theoretical concepts of the liberal-minded professor. Two such concepts are considered: the teaching of B.N. Chicherin on law and state (Chapter II). It is noted that B.N. Chicherin sharply criticized the positivist theory of state and law and built his political and legal philosophy on the basis of neo-Hegelianism. The difference between the approaches of Hegel and Chicherin is pointed out, the views of B.N. are considered. Chicherin on a variety of issues of the theory of state and law (development of statehood, historical paths of Russia and the West, forms of government). In the last chapter V.D. Zorkin considers the applicability of the political ideals of B.N. Chicherin to Russian reality.

Among the works that consider liberalism not from a general theoretical position, but in the context of the era, the “spirit of the times”, in the system of interaction between people of different views, one can highlight the monograph by S.S. Sekirinsky and V.V. Shelokhaev “Liberalism in Russia: essays on history (mid-19th century - early 20th century)”, published in 1995. The authors sought to trace the evolution of the relationship of liberalism with the authorities and society in the dynamics of generations and the destinies of prominent liberal figures, to reveal the nature of the interaction of various components of the liberal tradition at the stage of its formation in the second half of the 19th century, and to show liberalism as a relatively holistic phenomenon of oppositional culture at the beginning of the 20th century. The work makes an attempt to reveal the logic of the interaction of the liberal idea with the socio-political reality of imperial Russia. The monograph is a series of essays on history. The first section is dedicated to 19th century, consists of three chapters: “Noble liberty and royal service: the legacy of Peter against the teachings of Montesquieu and Constant”, “Liberal autocracy: from idea to implementation”, “Autocracy and liberals after liberation”.

Approximately the same approach, only poorly executed, can be seen in the monograph edited by B.S. Itenberg "Revolutionaries and Liberals". The work was published by the Nauka publishing house on the occasion of the centenary of the birth of historian B.P. Kozmin and is presented in the official ideological perspective of the Soviet era. This is somewhat striking, since the work was written in 1990, that is, a year before the collapse of the Soviet system. The winds of change did not affect this monograph, and this is clearly seen in the editorial article by B.I. Itenberg “Revolutionaries and Liberals in Post-Reform Russia”, where the author denies liberalism the right to have an independent sound, considers it as a pathetic imitation of either revolutionaries - socialists, or conservatives. The work is dedicated to both revolutionaries and liberals and mainly touches on specific issues, for example, the article by E.A. Dudzinskaya is dedicated to the socio-political activities of A.I. Koshelev in post-reform times, A.S. Nifontova examines letters from the Russian ambassador N.A. Orlova in 1959-1865, and V.Ya. Grosul writes about how the newspaper “Common Cause” looks at events in southeastern Europe in the 80s of the 19th century.

Of course, an interesting work is the monograph of the emigrant historian V.V. Leontovich “History of liberalism in Russia (1762-1924).” In his monograph, the author focuses on the analysis of how the liberal idea was expressed, refracted in the activities of the Russian emperors. Thus, the author draws our attention not so much to the system of ideas itself, but rather to how these ideas are expressed in specific policies. The peculiarity of the author’s position is that he considers only conservative liberalism to be true liberalism. V.V. Leontovich believes that liberalism must decisively prefer enlightened absolutism to revolutionary dictatorship.

Among the works devoted to personalities, I would like to highlight the monograph “Russian Liberals” edited by B.S. Iteberg and V.V. Shelkhaev, published in 2001 by the Rosspen publishing house. The work presents a gallery of Russian liberals of the 19th and early 20th centuries. In general, this scientific work places emphasis not on the ideological views of this or that liberal author (although these views are covered), but on his biography and activities. The work highlights the life and work of such liberals as Alexander Ivanovich Turgenev, Konstantin Dmitrievich Kavelin, Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin, Alexander Dmitrievich Gradovsky, Vladimir Alexandrovich Cherkassky, Andrei Nikolaevich Beketov, Nikolai Andreevich Belogolovy. In the sections dedicated to K.D. Kavelin, B.N. Chicherin, A.D. Gradovsky sets out in detail their ideological views and their assessments of the political situation in the Russian Empire. The monograph also covers liberal figures of the first quarter of the 20th century.

In 2004, the New Publishing House, as part of the “Liberal Mission” project, published a monograph similar to the previous one, “Russian Liberalism: Ideas and People.” Its compiler is the famous political scientist Alexey Kara-Murza. The monograph covers the biographies and views of M.M. Speransky, A.I. Turgeneva, T.N. Granovsky, A.A. Kraevsky, I.S. Aksakova, A.I. Kosheleva, K.D. Kavelina, B.N. Chicherina, K.N. Romanova, A.V. Golovnina, D.N. Zamyatnina, A.I. Vasilchikova, A.V. Nikitenko, N.A. Belogova, V.A. Goltseva, M.I. Venyukova, M.M. Stasyulevich, V.O. Klyuchevsky, as well as liberal figures of the first quarter of the 20th century. As is easy to see, the list of liberals includes Slavophiles and representatives of the liberal bureaucracy, including Prince Konstantin Nikolaevich Romanov.

) made a significant step forward compared to the historiography of the nobility. The range of historical sources has expanded. New scientific institutions emerged that published documentary material. Bourgeois historians tried to reveal the pattern of the historical process, understanding it idealistically. However, despite the forward movement of bourgeois historical science during the period of development of capitalist relations, its class limitations were already evident at that time.

Development of Russian historiography in the 19th century. took place in the struggle of currents: noble-serfdom and bourgeois-liberal, on the one hand, and revolutionary-democratic, on the other. At the same time, in connection with the growth of the revolutionary movement, the reactionary nature of bourgeois liberalism became more and more apparent. V.I. Lenin, in his article “On the Jubilee” (1911), contrasted the liberal and democratic trends in Russian social thought and in this regard pointed out “... the difference in the ideological and political directions of, say, Kavelin, on the one hand, and Chernyshevsky , with another" .

Lenin gives the same opposition of the revolutionary-democratic trend to bourgeois liberalism in the article “In Memory of Herzen” (1912), in which he speaks of the diametrical opposition of two directions: on the one hand, the revolutionary Herzen, Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov, “representing a new generation of revolutionaries-raznochintsy ", on the other hand, - "a vile liberal", "one of the most disgusting types of liberal rudeness" Kavelin. The class essence of Russian bourgeois liberalism was revealed especially clearly by Lenin in his work “Another March on Democracy” (1912): in the attitude of the liberal Kavelin to the democrat Chernyshevsky, Lenin points out, “one can see ... the exact prototype of the attitude of the Cadet party of the liberal bourgeois to the Russian democratic mass movement ".

Ideologists of the bourgeois monarchy S. M. Solovyov, K. D. Kavelin, B. N. Chicherin The basis for the periodization of the Russian historical process was seen in the replacement of clan relations with state ones. They viewed the state as a supra-class force that acted in the interests of the “common good.” At the same time, the majority of representatives of bourgeois-liberal historiography defended the Norman “theory”. Thus, Solovyov outlined the following periods in the historical development of Russia: “from Rurik” to Andrei Boyulubek; from Andrey Bogolyubeky to Ivan Kalita; from Ivan Kalita to Ivan III; from Ivan III to the “suppression of the Rurik dynasty” at the end of the 16th century. In the first period, “princely relations were purely tribal in nature.” The second period is characterized by the struggle of tribal principles with state ones. The third period is the time when “Moscow rulers are increasingly giving strength to state relations over clan relations.” The fourth period marks the triumph of state forces, “purchased by a terrible bloody struggle against the dying order of things.” Solovyov’s concept of “clan” is devoid of social content; it is of a formal legal nature. Considering ancient Rus' as an era of dominance of tribal relations, Soloviev at the same time considered the “calling” of the Varangians to be the initial moment in the history of the state, giving this event exclusively great importance.

In the positions of the state school there were also Kavelin , whose works Lenin regarded as “an example of professorial-lackey profundity,” and Chicherin, reactionary Political Views whom Lenin criticized in his work “Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Annibals of Liberalism,” and other so-called “Westerners.”

Considering the “natural continuity of legal life after the tribal one,” Kavelin drew the following diagram of historical development. “At first, the princes constitute a whole clan, owning together the entire Russian land.” Then, as a result of the settling of the princes on the land, “territorial, proprietary interests had to prevail over personal ones.” “Through this, the princely family turned into many separate, independent owners.”

The collection of lands led to the formation of a “huge fiefdom” - the “Moscow State”. At the beginning of the 18th century. this “patrimony” turned into “a political state body and became a power in the real meaning of the word.” Chicherin stood in the same positions, speaking about three stages of the historical development of Russia: “In the first era, at the dawn of history, we see a blood union; then there is a civil union, and finally a state union.”

The reactionary class meaning of such schemes was an apology for the bourgeois monarchy, which represented the most perfect, from the point of view of Kavelin and Chicherin, political form of government. V.I. Lenin revealed the class essence of such liberal concepts, pointing out that “liberals were and remain the ideologists of the bourgeoisie, which cannot put up with serfdom, but which is afraid of revolution, afraid of a mass movement capable of overthrowing the monarchy and destroying the power of the landowners.”

Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin is an outstanding Russian lawyer, publicist, historian, philosopher, public figure, who left a noticeable mark on Russian legal science. Coming from a noble family, Boris Chicherin was born on the Karaul family estate in the Tambov province, where he received his primary education at home. Possessing phenomenal abilities and an amazing memory, young Chicherin easily entered the law faculty of Moscow University in 1844.

At the university, Boris Chicherin became close to the then luminaries of Russian legal thought and established close contacts with them. The spiritual mentors of the future statesman are P.G. Redkin, N.I. Krylov, V.N. Leshkov, K.D. Kavelin, T.N. Granovsky. Under the powerful influence of the latter, student Chicherin, who had previously been occasionally interested in Slavophilism, becomes a Westernizer.

It was the university years that had the greatest influence on the emerging mind and value system of Boris Nikolaevich. At this time, his religious and moral ideals, views on the history of Russian law and statehood, and patriotism took shape, which became the starting point for the transformation of a student of law courses at Moscow University into a prominent figure in the Russian liberal movement.

For his pro-Hegelian views, which were fashionable at the time, Boris Chicherin was nicknamed “Hegel” among students. Having taken into consideration the fruits of Georg Hegel's creativity, Chicherin's inquisitive mind passed through the famous Hegelian triad - synthesis, thesis and antithesis, replacing it with his own four-link system - unity, relationship, combination, plurality. With the exception of this moment, Boris Chicherin was faithful in everything to the ideals of his spiritual teacher from Germany, and admitted that as he grew older and accumulated worldly wisdom, he more and more clearly understood the “killer truth of Hegelian philosophy.”

Soon after graduating from university, Chicherin returned to his native estate and worked on his master's thesis. Despite the high appreciation of the work by the scientific community, it was not allowed to be defended due to censorship requirements. The successful defense of the master's thesis took place only four years later - in 1857, when state censorship was somewhat relaxed.

Chicherin travels a lot, meets outstanding lawyers and philosophers from England, France and Germany, and in between trips visits his native village; in the capital rarely, on short visits.

Despite the tough schedule and work schedule, in the early 1860s Boris Chicherin defended his doctoral dissertation on the problems of popular representation and became a professor at Moscow University at the Department of State Law. In parallel with this, Boris Nikolaevich was authorized to perform an important function - he, who was known as an ardent opponent of the revolution and a moderate liberal, was invited to participate in legal education and give lectures on state law to Tsarevich Nikolai Alexandrovich. However, soon the precocious and promising heir to the throne died suddenly.

Chicherin, having enormous popularity and high authority in the scientific societies of both capitals, as well as for his eloquence and clarity of judgment, was elected an honorary citizen of Moscow, the Russian Physical and Chemical Society and received the post of Moscow mayor in 1882. In this position, Chicherin took measures that were very popular among the people, showing himself to be a talented manager and administrator. In particular, he achieved an improvement in the quality of drinking water by introducing water from the suburbs into the Moscow city water supply system.

In the last years of his life, Boris Chicherin published a number of works that became significant and key in the field of philosophy of law and state science. In particular, he prepared a two-volume book “Property and the State”, a three-volume book “Course of State Science”, a course in the philosophy of law, and a fundamental work “History of Political Doctrines”, work on which was carried out for more than thirty years. In addition, the outstanding lawyer and philosopher left valuable memories of his European travels and years spent at Moscow University...

Key Ideas

The central attention in Chicherin’s works is occupied by the problem of the individual, the protection of his rights and freedoms. Chicherin divided freedom as such into negative and positive according to the degree of independence from the will of others. He considered law to be a mutual restriction of freedom under general law. From his point of view, law is a bearer of a unique independent nature, and it cannot be seen as a lower level of morality, as his foreign colleagues, for example, Georg Jellinek, believed.

Boris Chicherin considered property an integral element of personal freedom: restriction of the rights of the owner and owner, as well as any government intervention in the area of ​​private property, according to Chicherin, was unconditionally evil. The state, Chicherin believed, is obliged to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens.

It is noteworthy that, while advocating the moral and legal equality of all citizens, the researcher rejected the possibility of material equality, considering this a fundamentally unfeasible situation.

B.N. Chicherin advocated the idea of ​​peaceful coexistence of people and human coexistence, and believed the structure of civil society to be more stable than any state mechanism.

Boris Nikolayevich considered the constitutional monarchy to be the highest stage of development of statehood and the most perfect form of government; he fundamentally rejected autocracy for oppression and reactionary nature. However, Chicherin revered the strong power of the monarch as necessary and perfectly suitable for the peculiarities of the Russian territorial structure and national mentality.

A contemporary of the Great Reforms of Alexander II and the counter-reform activity of Alexander III, inspired by former like-minded people of Chicherin, yesterday's liberals Katkov and Pobedonostsev, Boris Nikolayevich strongly substantiated the urgent need for reforms. But his ideas and projects did not see the light of day - having fallen into disgrace, the founder of the science of Russian state law was deprived of the opportunity to participate in public administration affairs.

The fruitful activity and creativity of Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin serves as an example and example of the outstanding merits of a bright analytical mind and a thorough understanding of the deep-seated problems of Russia.

Imaginary criticism.

(Response to V.N. Chicherin *.)

1897.

In the preface to the essay “Law and Morality,” speaking about internal connections between these two areas, I pointed out two. extreme views that deny this connection from two opposing points of view. It is denied either in the name of a one-sidedly understood moral principle, which certainly excludes the very concept of “Right and the entire sphere of legal relations, as a disguised evil,” or, on the contrary, in the name of law, as an absolute, self-sufficient principle that does not need any moral justification I named Count L. N. Tolstoy as a representative of one extreme, and B. N. Chicherin as a representative of the other. The second of the named writers expresses his displeasure at this comparison: Leo Tolstoy is not a lawyer, and therefore. cannot judge the relationship of morality to law! That he is not a lawyer is completely fair, but then that is why and one could point to him as a representative of that extreme view, which fundamentally denies any right, or, as Mr. Chicherin puts it, does not want to know about law. This view in its essence has nothing personally Tolstoyan; it is a very long-standing and fairly constant phenomenon in the history of human thought; in the early era of Christianity, the most famous representative of this view was the Gnostic Marcion, and in your days - undoubtedly L. Tolstoy, and it would be strange to name someone on this occasion

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* The article by B. N. Chicherin: “On the principles of ethics” was published in “Questions of Philosophy and Psychology” for 1897. G.R.

another one instead. But if I, to satisfy Mr. Chicherin, suggested that he himself find between lawyers a typical representative of this undoubtedly anti-legal or antinomian view, then, of course, such a legal demand would put my venerable opponent in a hopeless and... somewhat comical position.

Invisibly, Mr. Chicherin thinks that gr. Tolstoy denies law only because he is unfamiliar with it. But this is clearly a mistake. Without a doubt, gr. Tolstoy is even less aware of the laws of the Iroquois language, or ancient history Annam and Burma, however, he will not deny these subjects unknown to him. The venerable scientist is misled by the ambiguity of the word “knowledge,” which means, firstly, a special scientific acquaintance with the subject in its parts, and secondly, the general concept of the subject in its essential distinctive features 1 . If Mr. Chicherin posed the question this way: does Mr. Tolstoy, what is law, isn't he confusing it with something else that is not really similar? - then he would hardly have dared to attribute the name of law to the famous novelist this sense. It is obvious that gr. Tolstoy knows enough about what law is to be able to meaningfully deny it, without the risk of his denial getting into something else, for example, into cosmetic art or shipbuilding. G. Chicherin, demanding that the opponent of his point of view on law must be a lawyer, surprisingly forgets what he is actually talking about. If she were talking about two extreme views on some legal question, then naturally lawyers should be representatives of both views; but is the question of the relationship between morality and law at all Do you have a legal question? And when it comes to an extreme view that fundamentally denies the law, are legal grounds necessary and possible for such a denial? Since when is it required that in a lawsuit between two parties, the attorneys of both belong to one of them - is not this an obvious absurdity, logical and legal together?

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1 This ambiguity was indicated by Plato (in Euthydemus) and Aristotle (in both Analytics). The error into which Mr. Chicherin fell has long been known in elementary logic as a false conclusion a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.

Obviously, objecting to Leo Tolstoy’s competence as a moralist to represent the point of view on which he, Tolstoy, stands, Mr. Chicherin simply did not think through his objection, and therefore fell into a completely elementary mistake.

What a menacing philippic I would have to burst out on this occasion if undoubted The logical mistakes of my critics aroused in me the same indignation that the imaginary or dubious errors of the authors he criticizes arouse in Mr. Chicherin! But I believe that one should be indignant in the literary and philosophical field not at mistakes and delusions, but only at conscious and intentional lies, and since from this side B. N. Chicherin is above all suspicion, then many oddities in his imaginary criticism of my moral philosophy - oddities much more significant than the above awaken in me, albeit a sad, but quiet feeling.

This is not the first time that B. N. Chicherin honors me with his serious attention to my works. Soon after the appearance of my doctoral dissertation: “Critique of Abstract Principles,” he published an extensive analysis of it in the form of a whole book (B. Chicherin, “Mysticism in Science,” Moscow 1881), and kindly invited me to discuss controversial philosophical issues together.

Despite the inner satisfaction brought to me by such attentiveness to my not entirely mature work on the part of the honored scientist, I decided not to accept his proposal and did not respond to his analysis. Although the main reason for this decision remains valid in the present case, I believe that my secondary lack of response could be falsely interpreted to the detriment of not only justice in general, but also the critic’s own moral interests, and therefore I consider it necessary this time to evaluate the frankly extensive critical work of Mr. Chicherin and provide sufficient grounds for your assessment.

As I already had to state in print (in the above-mentioned preface), B. N. Chicherin seems to me to be the most versatile and knowledgeable of all Russian, and perhaps European scientists of the present time. This is an advantage for a dogmatic mind, not so much an inquisitive one.

and reflecting, how much systematizing and distributing, so to speak administrative, with a decisive and self-confident character, had the inevitable consequence of a gradual atrophy of the critical ability. I'm talking about the ability to doubt your own thoughts and understand other people's. When the mental horizon is sharply outlined on all sides, when certain and final decisions on all matters, when for every question there is a ready-made answer at hand in the form of a predetermined and, so to speak, frozen formula, then how is serious criticism possible, what interest can there be in entering the circle of other people’s pre-condemned thoughts, delving into their internal connections and relative value? For Mr. Chicherin there is no overflow of thinking, no living movement of ideas; we will not find in him any shades of judgment, no degrees of approval and censure; all real and possible thoughts and views are divided only into two unconditionally opposite and immovable categories: those that coincide with the formulas and schemes of Mr. Chicherin and therefore are approved without any further consideration, and those that do not coincide and thereby are sentenced to shameful condemnation, varied in forms of expression, but always the same in determination and unfoundedness.

I will not compare Mr. Chicherin with Omar, because that would be an exaggeration. Although, of course, Mr. Chicherin is as confident in the infallibility of his system as Omar is in the infallibility of the Koran, but natural love for mankind and broad humane education would never allow the venerable scientist to utter the famous phrase attributed (with dubious reliability) to the third caliph: burn all the books - those who agree with the Koran as unnecessary, and those who disagree as harmful. On the contrary, Mr. Chicherin would react with sincere favor and warmth to the appearance and dissemination of philosophical books that completely agree with his views, and he is only upset that such books do not appear at all.

By the dogmatism of his mind, by the systematicity of his views and by the encyclopedic nature of his knowledge, B. N. Chicherin was created for teaching, and as far as I know, he really was an excellent professor. Much to the detriment of Russian education, he had to leave very early

department I think that he has remained unreplaced and irreplaceable in our university environment. You can, of course, be a mentor outside of it; you can become the head of a school, a center of mental movement for the elect. But, in addition to other obstacles, Mr. Chicherin by nature could be content with only a circle unconditional adherents, steady followers for whom αὐῖὸς ἔ φα (he said it himself) would be the decisive argument in all matters. B. N. Chicherin could not change himself, and he remained Pythagoras - without the Pythagoreans. This circumstance introduced a new element of irritation and indignation into his attitude towards the world of other people's ideas. Is it possible to be indifferent to the behavior of those people who, being reasonable and educated enough to agree with Mr. Chicherin on some points, instead of taking advantage of his ready-made truth, absolute and infallible, in everything else, prefer to wander wildly in areas of fantastic and mystical dreams, once and for all left beyond the boundaries of the one-saving doctrine?

I’ll say again, in such a mood and with such a mentality, is it possible to be a critic? With the most sincere desire to correctly understand and convey someone else’s thought, Mr. Chicherin allows constant and sometimes monstrous her perversion. Having uttered this word, which the academic dictionary has not yet reached and which I borrowed from Mr. Chicherin’s critical glossary, I feel obliged to quickly justify it with a suitable example.

There is a short chapter in my moral philosophy called “Moral Subjectivism”; its task is to illustrate with a few historical indications one general idea, the presentation and explanation of which is devoted to at least half of the entire work. In its simplest expression, this idea is that real moral improvement of people occurs only when the good feelings of an individual person are not limited to the subjective sphere of his personal life, but are intercepted beyond its limits, merging with the life of a collective person, creating social morality, objectively implemented through institutions, laws and the public activities of individuals and groups. In short, personal moral feeling should become a common matter, requiring the organization of a service

the strength pressing on him. It is clear that such an organization of collective good in the process of its historical growth is associated with greater or lesser restrictions and constraints on individual freedom in those manifestations that violate the conditions of human coexistence, and, consequently, abolish the moral task. The question of the limits of such a compulsory organization of good, the active body of which the normal state is called upon for me, is resolved in the immediately following chapter in the sense that this organization, as serving the good, cannot have any other interests above the moral, and, therefore, its compulsory action must always and in everything submit to the requirement of the moral principle - to recognize for each person the unconditional inner significance and the unconditional right to exist and to the free development of his positive forces. On this basis, I most resolutely condemn the death penalty, life imprisonment and other criminal tortures, “contrary to the very principle of love of humanity; in the same way, from this point of view, not only personal, but also economic slavery, which degrades the dignity of a person, making his whole life a means to satisfy material needs. It goes without saying that a real organization of good, which must take care of the bodily integrity and material economic freedom of all people, must all the more protect the spiritual freedom of man from all attacks, without which his life is devoid of inner dignity. What is real, and not. a self-proclaimed organization of good cannot, for its part, encroach on a person’s spiritual freedom, that it cannot restrict the manifestation of someone’s conscience, the expression of someone’s convictions - this is too obvious from this point of view, and I did not need to expand on this.

What did Mr. Chicherin do now from a simple and clear thought about the need for collective or social good, without the implementation of which real, moral perfection is impossible for an individual person? In an amazing way, in place of the organization of good, which is spoken of as necessary and obligatory, he substitutes the organization of evil, which can only be spoken of as subject to destruction, and begins to assert indignantly that I am preaching an inquisition that burns

heretics, that according to my “theory” Christianity conquered the world precisely by these murderous means. Twice Mr. Chicherin puts me in direct contact with Torquemada: once as his follower, and another time even as his teacher (p. 644). And with sufficient familiarity with some of the characteristics of the venerable scientist, his outburst comes as a surprise. It is surprising, firstly, by the absence of any reason or pretext for it, and secondly, by the presence of such circumstances that, it would seem, made it morally and logically impossible.

G. Chicherin is very disapproving of my journalism, or, as he puts it, “writing magazine articles.” I believe that if any articles deserve reproach, it is not as magazine articles, but as bad articles. I even rate some newspaper articles significantly higher than some books. I cannot judge to what extent my journalism is bad; I only know that the main task of this journalism was not bad, even from the point of view of Mr. Chicherin, for it was to protect freedom of conscience. The attacks on the Spanish Inquisition itself were not, despite its fires, a burning intern, due to the long-standing abolition of this institution even in its homeland, but some remnants of similar institutions in other countries made themselves felt, very sensitively limiting freedom of conscience. I became a publicist precisely at a time when special reasons arose in our public life to stand up for this elementary principle, without the strengthening of which real progress of either the Christian community, or Christian science, or a worthy human existence in general is impossible. And isn’t it strange that the defender of this principle turned out to be the newest Torquemada, and not his current denouncer, who, on the contrary, was at that time engaged in completely different, although even better, things - chemistry and the classification of sciences? These peaceful pursuits, without a doubt, do honor to Mr. Chicherin’s extensive scholarship, but they do not give him any right to invent fables about people of a different temperament, turning them into supporters and representatives of those principles and institutions with which they actually fought to the fullest. their capabilities and not without some donations.

I meant and mean freedom of conscience without any restrictions.

ny. We are talking about the unconditional and sacred right of everyone to freely have, profess and preach in every possible way - orally, in writing, in print - whatever their beliefs are, religious, philosophical, scientific. I don’t know whether such an unconditional understanding of freedom of belief fits within the framework of Chicherin’s doctrine, but I know that no other understanding of it fits within the framework of my conscience.

On what basis does Mr. Chicherin characterize my views with features that are so clearly contrary to reality? Yes, on the basis of my own confessions, which I, however, have never made and do not agree to do. “You yourself admit,” Mr. Chicherin shouts at me, “that the only one your interest lies not that 2 that goodness should reign in hearts, but that it should be organized as a compulsory structure of human societies” (p. 646). However, I never admitted this. If I had admitted this, I would certainly have said so, and if I had said this, then Mr. Chicherin would have no need to shout at me - it would have been enough to simply quote my original words, whereas now, having attributed absurdity to me, As if recognized by me, he immediately refutes his invention, citing my actual thesis: “organized good must be unconditional and comprehensive. If so, then it is clear that it must embrace the inner side of morality, must reign in hearts no less than outside them, and, therefore, I cannot admit in any way that my life lies in the real conditions of moral organization. the only one interest. On the other hand, I think that not only Mr. Chicherin, but Hegel himself would not have come up with such a dialectical trick through which the concept of unconditional and comprehensive good could be reduced to the concept exclusively subjective, that is, one-sided and powerless good. It is precisely this absurdity of moral subjectivism(and not human freedom and moral conscience) and constitutes the real subject of refutation in the chapter that angered Mr. Chicherin, as can be seen from its very title. However, Mr. Chicherin, following his own stream of thoughts, which is very far from my views, refers to the unconditional and universal

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2 Italics are mine.

taking on the meaning of good only to reinforce the absurdity he attributed to me. “And to these (coercive) actions of the authorities,” he continues, “you do not set any boundaries: organized good must be unconditional and comprehensive.” However, according to sound logic, from the unconditional and comprehensive property of good one can only conclude that him, good, there are no limits in its implementation, but how did this limitlessness of good suddenly turn into the limitless action of coercive power, which after all may not be good at all, but evil? Where did Mr. Chicherin come from this monstrous identification of absolute good with coercive power? Maybe he came across the statement somewhere that such power is unconditionally good by itself and that, therefore, the more there is, the better; but he must agree that such a statement did not come from me, but from other people who bear little resemblance to me, and for whom I am also not responsible, like him. But in my basic view, it turns out just the opposite: the compulsory action of the organization of good must always be minimal; it can only be good when it is limited on all sides and determined by the purely moral interest that it should serve. From this point of view, and regardless of my personal feelings, I logically is obliged to reject certain methods of coercion that go beyond the minimum limit and therefore violate the moral principle: this is the institution of the death penalty, so dear to some hearts in which “good reigns.”

If, instead of good, I spoke about truth and mentioned its unconditional and comprehensive character, which should be expressed in objective facts, then Mr. Chicherin, according to his critical method, would certainly attribute to me the following reasoning: comprehensive truth must have limitless distribution, for This requires a universal organization of the book trade, and hence, bookstore clerks should be given unlimited power so that they can invade private homes, impose their books on ordinary people in an endless number of copies, stuff book pages into “the mouths of babes and pissing women,” and the like. I would seriously like to be shown even a small difference in logical construction between this deliberate absurdity and, hopefully, that.

an accidental and unconscious train of thought that forced Mr. Chicherin from the unconditionality and universality of good that I recognized to deduce the boundlessness of coercive power and my like-mindedness with the Spanish Inquisition.

True, Mr. Chicherin has one common basis for such an opinion: “your morality, he tells me, is based on religion.” On Which, however, religion, and in which sense founded? If we leave this undefined, then Mr. Chicherin’s statement is a set of nothing meaningful words. Recognizing only an internal connection between religion and morality, in essence, one can say with equal right that morality is based on religion and that religion is based on morality. After all, moral norms arising from feelings of shame, pity and piety are unconditional expressions of goodness itself, and their meaning is completely independent of any external authority. History knows religions and religious institutions that are shameless, inhuman, and thereby wicked. All this, from my point of view, is certainly condemned by virtue of unconditional moral norms. Where is there any opportunity here for those horrors that frighten Mr. Chicherin, or with which he frightens his readers? For his diatribes to have any meaning, he would first of all have to prove that Christianity cannot be understood differently than Torquemada and Co. understood it.

For the most part, Mr. Chicherin prefaces his objections with exact or almost exact quotes, conveying the thoughts he condemns not only in his own words, but also in the author’s original words. Therefore, the incredible distortion of other people’s thoughts in his further “criticism” can mislead only very inattentive or very “prejudiced readers. This does honor to the literary conscientiousness of Mr. Chicherin, which, however, is beyond question; but with greater pessimism one has to look at the venerable writer , as a critic. Mr. Chicherin begins his analysis of the chapter on moral subjectivism by conveying its main idea, half in my words. I think that in this case it would, perhaps, be even better if Mr. Chicherin reproduced my reasoning. without abbreviations or omissions. Let me give the passage quoted by Mr. Chicherin in its entirety, emphasizing what is omitted or abbreviated in his quotation.

“Christianity appears with the gospel of the kingdom, with an unconditionally high ideal, with the demand for absolute morality. Should this morality be only subjective, limited only to the internal states and individual actions of the subject? The answer is already contained in the question itself; but in order to bring the matter clean, let us first admit what is true among the supporters of subjective Christianity. There is no doubt that a perfect or absolute moral state must be internally fully experienced, felt and assimilated by an individual person - must become his own state, the content of his life. If perfect morality were recognized as subjective in this sense, then it would be possible to argue only about names. But the matter concerns another question: how is this moral perfection achieved by individuals, whether exclusively through the internal work of each on himself and the proclamation of its results, or with the help of a certain social process, acting not only personally, but also collectively? Supporters of the first view, which reduces everything to individual moral work, do not reject, of course, either community life or the moral improvement of its forms, but they believe that this is only a simple inevitable consequence of personal moral success: as a person is, so is society - you only stand everyone understands and reveals their true essence, arouses good feelings in their souls, and paradise will be established on earth. That without good feelings and thoughts there can be neither personal nor social morality is indisputable.. But to think that kindness alone is enough 4 to create a perfect social environment means moving into the region where babies are born in rose bushes and where beggars, for lack of bread, eat sweet pies (“The Justification of Good,” pp. 279-280 ).

Even with those omissions that were needlessly made by Mr. Chicherins in this place, its meaning logically does not allow for two interpretations. It is clear that it is about the goal and the path to achieving it.

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3 In Mr. Chicherin’s article, the word “only” is replaced by the word “purely”.

4 This word appears in italics in the text of the book. Mr. Chicherin did not miss a word, but only italics. I note this only for the sake of complete accuracy.

achievement. The moral perfection of man is indicated as the ultimate goal for which subjective good states and efforts although necessary, they are not sufficient on their own and are replenished by a collective historical process that creates in society an external objective-moral environment and support for improving units; It is clear at the same time that the path cannot be put in place of the goal for which it exists and from which it has all its meaning. But Mr. Chicherin, having read and partially written out the given instructions, as if nothing had happened, attacks me for the fact that my the only one the interest, by my own admission, lies in the forced organization of external relations. With equal right, I could argue that the only point of interest for Mr. Chicherin in his writings is the road connecting the village of Karaul with Kushnerev’s printing house in Moscow.

Too often one has to regret the extreme extravagance Chicherina; He exhausts his entire supply of logical rigor to censure others, leaving absolutely nothing for his own use; and yet even a thousandth part of this rigor, applied to his own reasoning, would perhaps be sufficient to transform it from imaginary criticism into real one.

Those historical illustrations of my thought, which comprise almost the entire small chapter on moral subjectivism, which so outraged Mr. Chicherin, would seem to directly exclude his conclusions. The issue is about slavery and serfdom; their long-term existence among peoples who adopted Christianity serves as proof for me that the moral truth of the new religion has not entered public life in all these long centuries, and in the abolition of such institutions I see the first steps of real Christian progress in collective man; If, in my opinion, certain institutions that disappeared before our eyes were an obstacle to the real implementation of Christianity in the world, then by what right does Mr. Chicherin attribute to me the directly opposite idea, which I always dispute, that Christianity has long been realized, that it has already conquered the world long ago and, moreover, with the help of institutions much worse than those I indicated? We know the fundamental victory of Christianity over

peace in the death and resurrection of Him who said: “I have overcome the world.” We also know that this fundamental victory is acquired by true Christians through an act of preliminary faith, as one of them said: “and this is the victory that has conquered the world—our faith.” But practical committing this victory in our visible reality must obviously coincide with the end historical process, when, in addition to the few already abolished organizations of evil, many others will be abolished and, like “the last enemy, death will be destroyed.”

As for the methods of the real victory of Christianity in the collective life of mankind, my view is sufficiently determined by the fundamental condemnation of such institutions as the death penalty and serfdom, precisely for their violation of the moral requirement to respect in every person a free personality with all its inherent rights; After this, Mr. Chicherin had no right to point out my solidarity with the Inquisition, even if he did not know what I wrote about freedom of conscience. Meanwhile, he knows it, and he makes some reservations in this sense - and nevertheless, I still remain in his eyes a follower and teacher of Torquemada!

« Before(?) Mr. Soloviev admitted that the consent of the collective will in humanity to reunite with the deity must be free. He claimed even that Christ departed from the earth precisely so that it (consent to reunification) would not be a matter of overwhelming power, but a real moral act, or the fulfillment of inner truth” (225). The reader, who only by the indication of the pages can guess that this is “before”, this is “recognized shaft" and this is " asserted gave“refer not to times long past, but only to another chapter of the same book, with curiosity waiting to see what will happen “now”: in what words did I renounce what I immediately recognized and affirmed. But Mr. Chicherin prefaces further quotations with the formula of my renunciation for some reason not in mine, but in his own expressions. “Now it appears that He (Christ) withdrew to leave it to the rulers of the world to carry out His will through governmental measures.” With these words of his, Mr. Chicherin conveys my thought about the moral meaning of history, as a process of collective organization of good through the efforts of humanity itself. I'm not an enemy at all

irony and caricature even in philosophical works, but accusing a person of solidarity with the Inquisition must have precise grounds, and a caricature here is as inappropriate as in a prosecutor’s speech in a case of parricide. However, even in Mr. Chicherin’s cartoon, my thought, instead of renouncing the principle of freedom, contains only an indication of the practical conditions for the implementation of this very principle. After all, the point is only about government measures liberation character, both from the side of their subject matter and from the side of their internal engines. After all, that “authoritative measure” by which serfdom was abolished was not only a liberation act, but also a free act, both on the part of Emperor Alexander II and on the part of the entire Russian nation, which, not without reason, had in it a representative of its good will. Of course, in order to free a slave, it is necessary to limit the freedom of the slave owner - to take away from him the right that he previously freely enjoyed. Is it really in recognition? this necessity does Mr. Chicherin see a denial of the principle of freedom? But in this sense, I have always denied it, even believing that freedom, separated from the necessary means of its implementation, is not a principle, but an empty word that serves as a distraction.

Further, Mr. Chicherin writes out my original words, which, however, instead of the Inquisition, only say that the principle of absolute goodness requires that human society become organized morality, and not only at the lowest levels, but at the highest, which differ not because the implementation of good on them is less real, but because it becomes all-encompassing. “Consequently,” Mr. Chicherin adds on his own behalf, “the difference between the lower levels and the higher ones is that at the first something is given to freedom, and at the latter nothing. It would be desirable to know whether the resurrection of the dead itself should be accomplished by government orders.” I am very glad that I can satisfy Mr. Chicherin’s desire. The resurrection of the dead will take place at the second coming of Christ, when all other governments will be abolished, and, consequently, there will be no government orders. Until then, the historical changes and reforms that unconsciously or half-consciously prepare the world for this final act take place with the participation of mankind’s own forces.

of humanity, collectively acting through various governments.

As for the supposed disappearance of freedom at the highest levels of moral development, here Mr. Chicherin falls (probably accidentally) into an impermissible play with words. What exactly does he want to say: either, as if, in my opinion, at the highest stages of the realization of good, it is created only by external compulsion, i.e., that morality at the highest stages of its development is completely absent, so that the realization of good occurs without good itself, or the realization empty space? Does Mr. Chicherin really think that anyone will believe him that I can assert such an absurdity, that I can believe that the moral perfection of humanity lies in the fact that there are no good people at all, but only forced good behavior? But the word “freedom” has a different meaning when it means the ability to arbitrarily choose between good and evil; in this sense, the concept of “freedom” is opposed not to the concept of “coercion”, but to the concept of “internal necessity”. Such freedom is incompatible with absolute moral perfection. That being who possesses good unconditionally, or is goodness itself, obviously cannot have any freedom of evil, for this would be a direct violation of the logical law of identity. I think that Mr. Chicherin, with all his courage, will not dare to assert that God has freedom of choice between good and evil, that he can be one or the other at will. And if this is impossible for him, then it is clear that man (both individual and collective), to the extent of his actual assimilation to the deity, or his deification (θέωσις ), as the saints say. fathers, more and more lose the freedom of choice between good and evil, becoming good according to the inner necessity of their spiritually reborn nature. Here, for example, is Mr. Chicherin, although it cannot be said from the outside that he has already achieved complete likeness to God, but that is relatively high degree moral dignity, at which he is already located, makes him much less free in the choice of good and evil compared to people of lower moral development. Some types of good have become a necessity for him, and some types of evil have become an impossibility, and are familiar to him not from his own current situation, but only from the criminal code.

He is still free to produce false arguments and reasoning in a dispute, but the production of false two-kopeck notes and forged wills has probably been removed from the scope of his free actions. Due to the vague use of words by Mr. Chicherin, which he points out as my opinion, the reduction of freedom at the highest levels of morality is either an obvious absurdity, which no one has ever asserted, or an obvious truth, which no one can dispute. It is clear to everyone that with the moral improvement of man, both individual and collective, the internal necessity of good and the impossibility of evil increases more and more, limiting the freedom of choice between them, and at the same time, the inevitable minimum of external coercion falls lower and lower. until it completely loses all meaning: who will force a righteous person to do the good that he already does according to the desire of his own heart? And not to mention the righteous, who would think of using coercive measures, even the mildest ones, to keep, for example, Mr. Chicherin from murders, robberies and forgeries?

But the venerable writer argues, or, better said, worries and shouts under the influence of some kind of self-hypnosis evoked in him by the words “moral organization,” “organization of good.” The matter appears to the hypnotized critic approximately as follows. There are gloomy people, in the old days called Torquemadas, and in modern times, by the way, the Solovyovs,” who want to organize unconditional and comprehensive good at all costs. Here's how it's done: the persons mentioned keep metal collars, on which are indicated: the common good, absolute good, or something like that; the whole point is to put such collars on all people without exception. Meanwhile, many ordinary people led by Mr. Chicherin, rightly seeing the collar as belonging more to a dog than to a human, resolutely refuse this decoration. Then the old and new Torquemadas begin the horrors of the Inquisition and not only forcefully put their metal collars on those who resist, but for greater strength they burn the rebels themselves at the stake. The result... metal and bogeyman! That this is, in essence, Mr. Chicherin’s idea of ​​the compulsory organization of good that I affirm—he himself, of course,

will not dispute. I have only one objection to this idea. I completely agree that putting metal collars on and burning people at the stake is a thing forced, but I just can’t recognize the forced of good, for everyone sees, on the contrary, that this is a forced evil; not to produce or allow, or even just tolerate such evil, but to make it completely impossible - this, in my opinion, is the direct task for any organization of good, and forced action is also inevitable. After all, Mr. Chicherin does not imagine, of course, that the notorious Inquisition could be destroyed by one purely moral influence on Torquemada and Co.; I hope, and my opponent agrees, that to destroy it a fairly strong state fist with all its accessories was required, and if thanks to some of these accessories the state fist sometimes appears to be evil, then in any case less evil than that. that he is called to destroy.

The compulsory collective organization of the minimal good (for only the minimal good can be coercively organized) constitutes the domain of law; the embodiment of law is the state. Compulsory good is the limit and support of free or purely moral good. Just as in a certain territory there are areas that are remote from the border and do not have any direct relations with it, and, nevertheless, all the territory as a whole cannot be separated from its borders - so in the moral sphere there is good in itself, independent of law, not connected with anything legal and not in need of any state action, and yet the entire area of ​​good in the aggregate , whole the morality of humanity in its historical process cannot in any way be separated from law and from its collective embodiment in the state.

As an organization of limited human forces, the state is only a relative and gradually improving implementation of good and often in certain particulars may seem more evil than good. One should not turn a blind eye to this dark side of historical life, but one should not base a general assessment on it. The state, like everything human, can, even with the greatest fidelity to its purpose, carry out good

only in parts, and therefore, as we see in history, by abolishing one evil or disaster, the state power of a given country and a given era forgets about other disasters or even supports them; doing good in one direction, she is inactive, or acts badly in another. In addition, the very requirements of the common good change according to temporary conditions, and we see that sometimes the state establishes, as useful, the very institutions that it is subsequently called upon to destroy as harmful. G. Chicherin argues against my pointing out the merit of state power in the abolition of serfdom by the fact that the same government introduced serfdom two centuries earlier. The venerable scholar will be convinced of my familiarity with such objections, as well as of my generosity, when I suggest to him against my view of the state a historical argument much stronger than all those he uses. The Inquisition for Faith, equipped with coercive criminal power up to the law, qualified death penalty inclusive, is, from my point of view, an institution definitely evil, which does not allow for those justificatory considerations that can be cited in favor of serfdom in the 17th and 18th centuries. And yet, this hellish invention in its industry, the most harmful in terms of volume and ruthlessness, belongs to the state. Precisely the notorious Spanish the Inquisition (unlike the Roman) was a royal institution, not a papal one, and often entered into a decisive struggle against the papacy, subjecting it to anathemas 5 . The founding of the Inquisition under Ferdinand the Catholic and its strengthening under Philip II is, of course, one of the darkest pages in the history of the state, which this time undoubtedly betrayed its true purpose. We find a lesser degree of the same anomaly in all other cases of religious persecution, old and recent. But since when does violating a norm contradict it?

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5 In his comic diatribe against me as Torquemada, Mr. Chicherin, according to the custom of ignorant people with whom he would be ashamed to join, lumps together the Jesuits with the Inquisition, whereas from the founding of the order until its expulsion from Spain between him and the Inquisition There was constant bitter antagonism, to the point that many Jesuits were burned at the stake. G. Chicherin does not care about such facts: for him, everything here is one metal and one bogeyman.

Version? If the digestive organs, instead of serving to convert nutrients into the blood, under certain conditions secrete poisonous ptomaines that poison the blood, then this does not in any way change the true concept of the normal function of digestion.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Chicherin, together with me, recognizes the need for forced good. He places it entirely in the realm of law, and with this I can only agree, because from my point of view I do not recognize and never have recognized any forced good outside the legal and state sphere. The entire contrast between us on this point and all of Mr. Chicherin’s pathetic diatribes on this issue arose only from the critic’s amazing inattention to the essence of the thoughts he presented and analyzed. G. Chicherin did not want or was unable to understand that, defining law in its general relation to morality, as its compulsory minimum, I could no longer extend the element of coercion beyond the legal sphere into that subjective sphere, which for Mr. Chicherin represents all morality or goodness in general, but for me constitutes goodness and morality only in a narrow, or proper sense. When I talk about forced good or its forced organization, then from my point of view I can only mean that outskirts of good that is subject to legal definition and state protection, which allows and requires coercion - in a word, those minimal requirements of good behavior and respect for other people's rights and interests, without the mandatory fulfillment of which the life of society, and, consequently, no human life, is impossible. The matter seems simple, but Mr. Chicherin, in a funny way, taking me for himself, understands my words about good not in the sense that they can really have for me, but in the sense that they would have if he had uttered them not me, but Mr. Chicherin himself, or if I stood not on my own, but on his point of view. From this point of view, which has become inseparably fused with the mind of the venerable scientist, good is only internal subjective state, or, what is called virtue. In this sense, talk about forced good means really saying terrible things - both senseless and immoral. Even Mr. Chicherin, with all his courage, does not dare to attribute to me

the thought of forced chastity, forced meekness, forced selflessness. However, I'm talking about forced good, - therefore, concludes Mr. Chicherin, forgetting that we're talking about O my words and that I am not he, therefore, coercion to something internal, purely subjective is required. Why exactly? Here Mr. Chicherin remembers the significance of the religious principle in my moral philosophy - and directly, with complete determination, without looking at anything and stopping at nothing, he declares that the forced good that I demand is the forced conversion of everyone to one faith , and that I am a like-minded person of Torquemada. And I, meanwhile, not suspecting anything about such horrors, had in mind only that forced good, which consists in the state protection of individuals and society from famine, destruction, sword, invasion of foreigners and internecine warfare!

Having extracted from one of my chapters the sermon of the Inquisition, Mr. Chicherin from the immediately following one extracts the sermon of anarchism and the demand liberum veto as the only principle for social life. The fact is that, having pointed out the need for a coercive element in the organization of good, I dwell in more detail on that absolute limit beyond which no coercion should go: the inviolability of the human person in its natural right to life and to the free development of all its positive forces . G. Chicherin, who defends the death penalty, does not recognize the specified limit, and this is a sufficient reason for which Mr. Solovyov “is a pure anarchist.” This conclusion is made easier by the fact that the idea of ​​the natural right of the individual, as the unconditional limit for any social coercion, that is, of the unconditional impermissibility of such institutions and measures that violate the natural rights of the individual, when translated into the critical language of Mr. Chicherin, turns into the statement that “Not a single measure can be carried out without the consent of everyone.” With this understanding, it is not surprising that, having appeared in one chapter as a supporter of the Inquisition, in another I turn out to be a pure anarchist, and in the third I discover my undoubted affiliation with Katheder-Sociadism.

Pointing out the monstrous distortions of my thought by Mr. Chicherin, I do not assume on the part of the venerable scientist the slightest

malicious intent. That’s why I don’t consider Mr. Chicherin unscrupulous a critic, that I cannot consider him a critic at all.

To justify in the eyes of readers such an opinion, which has long been formed, a few examples, even striking ones, are not enough. Let us consider in order all the main points “refuted” by Mr. Chicherin. They concern the following issues: the independence of moral philosophy from metaphysics, three moral foundations: shame, pity and religious feeling, and two issues of applied ethics - criminal and economic.

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The “Introduction” to my moral philosophy is devoted to protecting its formal independence in relation to positive religion, on the one hand, and theoretical philosophy, on the other. Without understanding it at all, oh Which independence are we talking about and in what sense it can be protected - in a word, without paying any attention to the essence of the matter, Mr. Chicherin directly uses his elementary naive and too easy method sorting the author's thoughts, like the clean and unclean animals in the Law of Moses, or the lambs and goats of the Last Judgment - into thoughts that lead to the critic's preconceived notions and therefore are obviously true, and to thoughts that do not fit them and, therefore, are certainly false and ridiculous. For the first time, I had more lambs than goats - Mr. Chicherin puts his “ approbatur "at three quarters of my introduction: he approves of its first half, which talks about the relationship of morality to positive religion (my closeness to Torquemada has not yet occurred to him), and of the second half he approves of what I say about the independence of moral feelings and principles from the epistemological question of reality and knowability of the external world. But the question of the relation of ethics to theoretical philosophy in general instantly turns me from a lamb into a goat and forces my hitherto lenient judge to offer mercy over anger.

Blinding by this passion does not lead the critic to good. Against the independence of moral philosophy from theoretical philosophy, which I assert, he refers to... Kant! When Kant developed his theory of practical reason, he supposedly prefaced it with

tic of pure reason, without which the first would have neither foundation nor meaning (!!). G. Chicherin remembers that the “Critique of Pure Reason” appeared several years earlier than the “Critique of Practical Reason”, but he completely forgot what was actually written in both books - he forgot that in one the possibility of metaphysics is refuted, and in the other an ethics is created, independent of either from what theoretical ideas. What significance can this fact have? chronological championship of the Critique of Pure Reason? Much earlier than both of them, Kant published his astronomical theory. Would Mr. Chicherin find it possible to assert on this basis that Kant made philosophy dependent on astronomy?

Kant's divorce, or at least separation de corps between theoretical philosophy and moral philosophy, I consider this thinker’s main error; but what should we think about Mr. Chicherin, who, while asserting the complete dependence of ethics on metaphysics, refers to Kant, who not only built his ethics independently of any metaphysics, but also destroyed all sorts of metaphysics!

In addition to this incredible reference to Kant, Mr. Chicherin’s own argument in favor of the primacy of theoretical philosophy over moral philosophy boils down to the fact that before using reason in the ethical field, one must know what this reason is, what its properties and laws are. Of course, you need to know, but they have known for a long time - more than 2000 years, since the time of Aristotle, who left us all formal logic in several works, to which no one has been able to add anything significant since then. And is it really plausible that the enormous development of philosophy and all sciences from Aristotle to the present day occurred in ignorance of what reason is, what properties and laws it has? But is reason capable of revealing to us any absolute principles and making absolute demands on the will as a guide to activity? To this I have an answer, which Mr. Chicherin overstepped. “Creating moral philosophy, reason only develops on the basis of experience, from the beginning the idea of ​​good inherent in it (or, what is the same, the initial fact of moral consciousness) and to that extent does not go beyond the limits of its internal area, or, in school language, its use Here immanently and, therefore, is not due to the fact

or another solution to the question of (transcendent) knowledge of things in themselves. To put it simply, in moral philosophy we study only our internal attitude to our own actions, i.e. something undoubtedly accessible to our knowledge, since we ourselves produce it, which leaves aside the controversial question of whether we can or cannot cognize what is in some other spheres of existence independent of us” (“Justification of the Good,” p. 32-33). And further: “Without a claim to theoretical knowledge whatever metaphysical essences, ethics itself remains indifferent to the dispute between dogmatic and critical philosophy, of which the first affirms reality, and therefore the possibility of such knowledge, and the second, on the contrary, denies its possibility, and therefore reality” ( "Justification of the Good", 33).

G. Chicherin points to empiricists who supposedly reject everything; no empiricists, however, deny the unconditional obligatory nature of logical norms for our thinking and ethical norms for our activities. Such an extreme empiricist as Mill does not go further than the assertion that perhaps in other worlds other beings think according to different laws than we do and have different mathematical axioms. I think he is mistaken, but what does moral philosophy have to do with geometry textbooks on the planet Jupiter? That's not what she's doing at all. And empiricists, in turn, are not at all concerned with challenging logical and moral norms, but with the question of their psychological genesis, and from this side they often come closer to the truth than their apriorist opponents. Thus, the “currently dominant empirical school” is not a hindrance to any moral philosophy—let it rule for its own sake!

G. Chicherin thinks that most of our disputes stem from the fact that everyone understands logic and psychology in their own way, and therefore a “solid foundation” of theoretical philosophy is necessary. But this very solid foundation - on what will it be based in the absence of a common understanding of even elementary logic? If it is impossible to assume agreement in the simplest axioms of thinking, then in what way can one come to an understanding regarding the most difficult questions of theoretical philosophy, and if everyone understands formal logic in their own way, then won’t it turn out that

that no one understands anything about metaphysics? The current state of affairs is not so sad. For the most part, disputes (from the logical side) arise not from the fact that people understand logical norms differently, but from the fact that they do not apply them equally firmly and correctly - just as life collisions usually occur not from disagreement in understanding moral requirements, but from accidental or malicious violation.

To expound moral philosophy before metaphysics does it mean to deny the internal connection between them? G. Chicherin goes further and directly announces that I rejected metaphysics(p. 638). This strange and obviously false conclusion does not force me, however, to assume that Mr. Chicherin has his own understanding of logic in general and the doctrine of inference in particular. I just see a gross logical error here and point it out.

Mr. Chicherin’s argument about free will is very wrong on this side. First of all, Mr. Chicherin should give himself and the readers an account of what kind of freedom we are talking about, especially since I, for my part, presented such an account. Free will can be understood in its own or unconditional sense, as pure arbitrariness or absolute self-determination ( nihil aliud a voluntate causat actum volendi in voluntate ). Without denying such freedom, but considering the question of it to be purely metaphysical, I do not introduce it into my moral philosophy, which deals only with relative freedom, which does not exclude necessity in general, but only one or another type of necessity. Everything higher or more perfect by its very existence presupposes some liberation from the lower, or, more precisely, from the exclusive domination of the lower. Thus, the ability inherent in living or animate creatures to be determined to act through ideas or motives is liberation from exclusive subordination to material shocks and impacts, that is, psychological necessity is freedom from mechanical necessity. In the same sense, moral necessity, by virtue of which a rational person is determined to act by the pure idea of ​​what is proper or good, is freedom from lower psychological necessity. But it is clear that with all the significant differences between the mechanical, psychological and moral grounds, the very need to act on the corresponding basis, since it

defined as sufficient, remains in any case a necessity. If my action is free from mechanical reasons and from psychological motives that paralyze the grace-filled power of good, it thereby enters the realm of a sufficient moral foundation, which acts in its sphere (when it acts) with the same necessity or inevitability as those in theirs. Here Mr. Chicherin becomes very angry. “To compare a person’s desire for good with the sensitivity of a cow to lush grass, or a billiard ball to the blows of a stick, is truly something monstrous.”

What did Mr. Chicherin see as monstrous? Does anyone doubt that human virtue is incomparably superior to the appetite of a cow and the hardness of a wooden cue? After all, these objects are not compared in terms of their dignity, but it is only indicated that in their actions the law of sufficient reason, despite the enormous difference in the ways of its manifestation (I have clearly noted this difference), manifests itself with the same necessity, which is required by its very concept. When we say that a righteous person necessary strives for good (or do we not have the right to say this?) that a healthy horse necessary is attracted to oats, and a healthy bullet necessary punches a wooden board, then surely the word “necessary” has some specific meaning that distinguishes it from other words and is the same in all cases? There is a general concept of necessity, and it must always and everywhere be equal to itself? Where does monstrosity lie - in the logical law of identity? Or does Mr. Chicherin find the very application of the concept of necessity, causality, and the law of sufficient reason to human moral actions monstrous? But in this case, his anger falls not on me, but on determinism in general, i.e. to a belief professed in one form or another by the vast majority of philosophers. The laws of logic are objects, although very important, but inanimate, and Mr. Chicherin’s insult to them with the epithet “monstrous” can, perhaps, be considered an action of moral indifference. But to scold a great many thinkers, living and dead, out of the blue, is hardly an excusable offense. It is possible, however, and even very likely, that there is a third, more favorable explanation for the prank

Chicherina. As I have had too many occasions to notice, he does not follow the thoughts of the author being analyzed, not their logical content, but only those specific images that are associated with these thoughts in his mind, with or without the participation of the author. Thus, we saw that instead of thinking about the organization of good, Mr. Chicherin, by unknown association of ideas (perhaps according to the law of contrast?), became attached to the image of Torquemada burning heretics, and this extraneous image caused all that incongruous warfare that replaces his criticism of my actual thoughts. In the present case, Torquemada's place was taken by a cow chewing juicy grass. Regarding Torquemada, my conscience is clear; but as for the cow, I confess, I’m guilty! I mentioned it myself. And it was completely in vain to mention it. It would be much better, when comparing the moral necessity of man with the psychophysiological necessity of animals, to use the elegant image in the psalter, where it is said that a pious soul strives for God, like a deer for springs of water. This comparison could not have seemed monstrous to G. Chicherin, and he would not have added one more extra to his many critical sins. True, in addition to the cow, I also mention the cat - a graceful and delicate animal - but the massive beast displaced the small animal from the critic’s imagination - and the result is monstrosity! I give my word to Mr. Chicherin that this ridiculous cow will not wander into the new edition of my book, and that only eagles will soar there and slender antelopes will flash there.

Regarding the same free will, Mr. Chicherin gives another vivid example of how his “objections” go past their actual subject. Not noticing or forgetting the distinction I made between the metaphysical question about free will - in the sense of absolutely arbitrary choice - and ethical fact moral freedom, which elevates a person above all physiological and psychological motivation - Mr. Chicherin copies out several passages from my book where human freedom is spoken of, and assures that I had no right to mention it, since I allegedly expelled it from ethics ! Meanwhile, these passages speak precisely of that moral freedom of man, which I never expelled, but, on the contrary, from the very beginning, recognized and explained in

his introduction. But for some reason it seems to Mr. Chicherin that if I have moved the devil into metaphysics, then I have no right to talk about God in moral philosophy. Is this really criticism?

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Since the idea that the feeling of shame is the fundamental basis of all morality had not been expressed by anyone in moral philosophy before me, I could not count on the agreement of many with this, although clear in essence, but at a superficial glance paradoxical thought.

However, Mr. Chicherin’s objections begin with four distortions of my thought. The subject of shame, and therefore the subject of struggle for the asceticism that develops from here, is the passive subordination of the human spirit to the abnormal predominance of material nature, or the carnal principle. Anticipating that minds unskilled in dialectics, to which I, of course, did not include Mr. Chicherin, would take what was said about the anomalies of carnal life as a condemnation of nature itself, I stopped at this point. The object of a negative attitude in shame and asceticism is neither material nature in general, taken in itself, nor our own body, - this is the position explained and confirmed on many pages (especially 66-76). Alas, a vain precaution! G. Chicherin directly attributes to me the opinion that I diligently refute - namely, that “the feeling of shame expresses a person’s attitude towards his own material nature, and at the same time towards material nature in general, as something else, alien and undue " Here is the first perversion. Secondly, Mr. Chicherin, attributing to me the vagueness of his own concepts, forces me to identify sexual shame or modesty with shame in general, although precautions were taken against this perversion, for example, in the following remark: “craven attachment to mortal life is also shameful, as well as giving oneself to sexual desire.” But Mr. Chicherin goes further on his perverse path and forces me to identify with sexual modesty not only shame in general, but also conscience (the third perversion). From the internal logical connection of facts representing different degrees and types of manifestation of the same idea, Mr. Chicherin concludes that these facts themselves are identical.

tov, mi phenomena, and attributes such confusion to me. But what is my fault that the venerable scientist has so radically forgotten the meaning of “process,” “being,” or “becoming,” which he once learned from Hegel, what is my fault that his thinking has become so external and lifeless? But, besides this, why insult the simplest logic? Suppose I happen to say that oaks grow from acorns, and coffins for soldiers are made from oaks, and then Mr. Chicherin, with an important, angry look, will begin to denounce me: how? are you saying that acorns can be coffins for deceased people? but an acorn is an extremely small thing, while dead people, like living people, are of great stature; and even the smallest dead person, even a dwarf, cannot possibly fit into the acorn - and then pathetic exclamations about my monstrous thoughts. Quite a lot, I think more than half, of the objections to Mr. Chicherin’s article are constructed precisely according to this type.

A clear example of how Mr. Chicherin, chasing imaginary other people's knitting needles, is careless about his actual logs, represents the fourth perversion to which he subjects my thought. “But does sexual shame really,” he asks, “express something improper? Where did this come from? Seems, to me one must ask the rash critic: where did this come from? Where did he actually get the idea that, in my opinion, sexual and any other shame expresses something improper? Quite the contrary, I believe that shame not only expresses what should be, but that it is the first basis of everything that should be. Although Mr. Chicherin continues (p. 600) assures that “Mr. For some reason, Solovyov decided to recognize shame as an expression of what is not proper,” but I am ready to admit that only Mr. Chicherin’s careless presentation is to blame for this perversion; I believe, however, that negligence of language, even if it is considered generally permissible, must have its limits, which are undoubtedly violated in the present case.

Even better are Mr. Chicherin’s own instructions on this matter. “Marriage,” he instructs me, “is sanctified by both law and religion.” This is the information I really needed! Although I myself was born from a marriage sanctified by both law and religion, due to an insufficiently detailed study of the sciences, I knew nothing about this fact. “The Apostle,” we read further, “declares from

name (?) of Christ and the church, that this is a great mystery: and the two will become one flesh. Although some readers will think that these words belong to the apostle himself, this is not important, since he really refers to them. But the question arises: what does Mr. Chicherin actually want to say: is it that marriage, according to Christian teaching, is an absolutely proper state? But this is not true! Blessing marriage from the real side, as the best remedy against the evil of carnal lust, and from the mystical side, as the best symbol of normal relations between deity and humanity 6, Christianity highly exalts the state of celibacy over it. I will spare the reader from reproducing too well-known evangelical and apostolic texts, but since this is a question of shame, I will allow myself to ask Mr. Chicherin: isn’t he ashamed, in his presence? half agreement with the Apostle Paul, refer to him against me, entirely agrees with this apostle and with Christian teaching in general?

But I really like Mr. Chicherin’s remark that in proper marital relationships, a woman’s modesty manifests itself, perhaps, to a greater extent than in extramarital (inappropriate) ones, when physical attraction drowns out all other feelings. I myself have always thought so - of course, apart from many exceptions, because marriage is different from marriage. I like the above remark as an excellent illustration of the true view of the matter. After all, if moral female persons, even in the most legalized and from all sides justifiable form of known relationships, experience a feeling of shame, There is does the very fact of this relationship mean something shameful, abnormal for a human being! At the same time, it goes without saying that in those cases when physical attraction drowns out all other feelings, it thereby drowns out the feeling of shame, and it would be too strange to expect modesty from persons so selflessly devoted to their immoral instinct.

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6 Referring to the famous text from the last. to the Ephesians, Mr. Chicherin words: “ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω εἰς Χριστὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν "(I speak in relation to Christ and the church) unceremoniously conveys so that the apostle declares from name Christ and the Church. Such a translation, even if it were possible, would be pointless, since in addition to these words, the same chapter definitely speaks of marriage as a mysterious symbol of the union of Christ with the church.

But Mr. Chicherin tilts his fair remark in the other direction: his managerial mind wants to manage basic moral phenomena in such a way that modesty is given entirely to women, and only shamelessness is left to the lot of men. He assures that “men, one might say, almost without exception, with the possible exception of some fanatics, are not ashamed of an excess of material strength, but are ashamed of its lack. It is not victories, but failures that constitute the subject of shame. Deprivation of ability is considered a disgrace for a man. Whether such a view is good or bad is another question; we are dealing with a fact here, and the facts show that a person (read: a man) is not at all ashamed of being an animal, but, on the contrary, is proud of it. Ascetics, from the point of view of abstract moral principles, can say whatever they want - the psychological fact remains unshakable.” Words such as “one might say,” “almost,” “fanatics” show that Mr. Chicherin himself is not very firm in his apology for sexual shamelessness, but the mention of “ascetics” reduces this weak argument to zero. No one will believe Mr. Chicherin’s unfounded assertion that these ascetics condemn the triumph of animality in man only because of some abstract principles that came from nowhere; everyone understands that these “ascetics” are, first of all, are ashamed something they should be proud of, but in the opinion of Mr. Chicherin. And if so, if these ascetics, being men and not being “fanatics,” experience a feeling of shame and a desire for chastity, then what is the important fact discovered by the venerable scientist through the “experimental method”? Isn't it that bashful men (as well as women) are ashamed of their animality, and shameless Not are they ashamed? To avoid such a tautology and justify his view, Mr. Chicherin would have to first of all prove that there are no men who are bashful by nature. Let him try to prove it!

The abyss of misunderstanding of the very essence of the matter revealed in this unprecedented passage, which I deliberately wrote out in its entirety, is amazing. Speaking about the imaginary shamelessness of “almost all” men, Mr. Chicherin notes: whether such a view is good or bad is another question; we are dealing here with fact, etc. How another question is when except this no other question can exist for moral philosophy, unless one mixes

should we combine it with empirical anthropology or something like that? Self-confidently speaking as a critic in the field of moral philosophy, Mr. Chicherin does not even understand that every psychological or physiological fact can have some significance for morality and, therefore, cannot be the subject of moral philosophy in itself, but only because it embodies or the unconditional norms of goodness are violated, which include the only one interest of ethics. And besides this, psychological facts have just as little relevance to the moral field as do the facts of botany, mineralogy or geography. There is only one strictly ethical fact in the world, without which there would be no morality and no moral philosophy - namely, the fact that of human states and actions, some are approved as worthy, while others are condemned as unworthy according to their own internal attitude. to good and evil, regardless of any other properties and relationships. Not to recognize the independent specific character of purely moral approval and blame, as opposed to any other, means to reject the very possibility of morality, or the moral element in human life. Only by allowing a grossly sophistical play on words can one, like Mr. Chicherin, argue against the demand for chastity by the fact that people are proud of their excess sexual power. Of course, this excess is a great good when it increases the merit of abstinence and the fruitfulness of moral victory; after all, in the absence of the aforementioned power, chastity would be an empty word. On the other hand, bestial people can receive satisfaction and praise even with the most immoral application of their abilities, as, for example, from the point of view of muscular strength and dexterity, they will probably call the man who with one blow of a well-sharpened knife the head of his benefactor a fine fellow . But what can such approval have in common with good in the ethical sense, and what moral norm can be extracted from this or refuted?

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Against chastity, Mr. Chicherin refers to those chosen by Priapus who are proud of their advantage. Against fasting, he points out, for example, a rich gastronome who “co-

invites friends and acquaintances and arranges fat feasts with many dishes and the same amount of wine. This is a universal fact (?!).” Mr. Chicherin mentioned the invitation of friends and acquaintances in order to show that this Lucullus is not ashamed of his excesses in food and drink, and yet in fact he is not ashamed only because he shares them with others, atonement for his violation of one moral requirement (abstinence) by the brilliant fulfillment of another (sympathy) 7. Let us imagine the same Lucullus, alone devouring a lot of fatty dishes and the same amount of wine - I hope that Mr. Chicherin will admit that this is shameful, and that if Lucullus himself is not ashamed of this, then he should be recognized as a shameless animal.

A very characteristic weakness of a critic, or, as clergy say, the “stupidity” of argumentation; we are talking about the normality of nutrition in general, which is a question for ascetic ethics, and he dwells on the fact of gluttony, judged and condemned by the most elementary, commonplace morality, which long ago decided that “excess is harmful.” However, Mr. Chicherin touches in passing on a fundamental question, although from a different end. Man is supposedly “not ashamed of filling himself with matter, but he is ashamed of being freed from excess matter. Well, this liberation from unnecessary food is also improper? G. Chicherin “would be curious to know” how I resolve this issue. The question itself has the deceptive appearance of some wit (in any case, but of a high grade), only thanks to the ambiguity of the word “ought” in the Russian language. In German, the two meanings here differ in words Müssen and Sollen . However, I am willing to satisfy Mr. Chicherin’s curiosity. The physiological fact he indicated is only a partial and, so to speak, chronic manifestation of that anomaly, the acute detection of which is given in the death and decay of the body. In both cases, the anomaly consists in the predominance of matter over form, and that biological regression, due to which the creativity of life gives way to phenomena of a lower order, passes

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7 Even extreme ascetics place altruism above asceticism and believe that in cases of conflict the demands of the former should take precedence. Thus, according to some rules of ancient monasticism, a hermit, to whom visitors will come from afar, is obliged to eat and drink with them without any restrictions.

into chemical decomposition processes. It is clear that if a person showed enough vital force to transform into himself or animate everything with which the external environment feeds him, then the unpleasant phenomenon indicated by Mr. Chicherin would be impossible, just as death itself would be impossible.

For a person who has eaten too much and drunk, painful and disgusting vomiting is both a necessity and a blessing; in the same way, for all human nature, radically spoiled by bad heredity and continuously worsened by personal and social sins, death and all the anomalies of mortal life are both necessary and beneficial, and, at the same time, the unconditional norm or true ideal for man is immortality. A complete inability to take such a point of view, even just hypothetically, truly takes away the right to talk about higher moral tasks.

Returning from nutrition to sexual relations, in which “we have a real law of nature, extending to the entire (?!) organic world,” Mr. Chicherin announces in a doctoral tone: “Immortals may not reproduce; but earthly creatures that are born and die cannot help but be fruitful, otherwise the race will cease.” Although I am struck by the deep originality and novelty of this idea, I cannot agree with it. G. Chicherin assures me that I I can't help but multiply, but personal experience irrefutably testifies to the contrary. If the strict manager of our destinies sinned here only by inaccuracy of expression, if he had in mind not a physical, but a moral necessity, according to which every person must, or according to his conscience, is obliged to be fruitful, then instead of the dubious law of nature, he should have directly referred to the moral law. But such a law obliging all people to bear children does not exist, and Mr. Chicherin himself did not dare in this case to directly appropriate legislative power to himself. He is only trying to indirectly obtain a surrogate for such a law, allegedly deducing from my own words that if every necessity is an expression of God’s will, then the law of physical reproduction of earthly creatures is also an expression of this higher will. The conclusion would be correct if only we could first prove that for every human being, as such, necessary be a parent. And since such obvious absurdity can never be proven, the argument

Mr. Chicherin is forever condemned to remain one of the countless examples of the mistake that, under the name petition principle has long been branded by formal logic, constantly violated, but not yet abolished by our guardian of the laws of nature.

You cannot limit the highest will to the straight and broken lines of your own doctrinaire mind, especially in the present case, when the exact law of this will can and should be known to Mr. Chicherin just as it is to me: he must know that this law contains in no way an unconditional order marriage, but on the contrary conditional order of celibacy: “He who is able to contain, let him contain.”

Vaguely feeling the weakness of his position, Mr. Chicherin multiplies his arguments ad hominem in defense of his anti-ascetic view. If, in my opinion, the first manifestation of religious feeling is honoring parents, then I supposedly have no right to defend celibacy. “From the same fact of sexual relations, according to Mr. Solovyov’s theory, finally follows the very reverence for God, which begins with the veneration of parents: if there are no parents, then obviously there is no reverence.” Really? If this argument had not been an unconscious mockery of logic on the part of Mr. Chicherin, then my situation would have turned out to be truly sad: after all, I would then have to admit that people who were orphaned in early infancy and therefore did not have the opportunity to practice honoring their parents were forever condemned to remain without any religion. However, this is not the case. All people, not excluding orphans, are forever provided with a sufficient supply of “ascending” ones, through which, developing their religious feeling, they can ascend to the veneration of the one Heavenly Father in spirit and truth. The natural foundation of religion has already been laid, and laid firmly. Millions and billions of ancestors, physical and spiritual, who existed from Adam to our times, constitute a universal and always open “school of piety” for humanity. Whatever the future of our race, its past does not even depend on the deity himself, who cannot prevent us from being the descendants of our ancestors. Consequently, the necessary material for the formation of religious feelings has long been provided with inviolable capital. The only question is whether and to what extent further increment is needed

this ancestral capital through the new and new birth of children, who then turn into parents? G. Chicherin demands that this accumulation continue indefinitely. It would be necessary to give this requirement some kind of principled justification - after all, someone’s commitment to “bad infinity”, to routine, in itself is not obligatory for anyone.

In a long and incoherent argument, Mr. Chicherin tries to prove that the moral requirements and norms of asceticism are my arbitrary invention, that they appeared only because “for some reason Mr. Solovyov decided to recognize shame as an expression (?!) of the improper.” All the attempts of the “critic” to prove such obvious nonsense in reality only prove the truth that even with a lot of learning in mechanics, chemistry, state law and political economy, one can remain in deep ignorance about the moral nature of man and its highest demands.

Having begun his strange arguments about shame and asceticism with the “fourfold” distortion of my view, Mr. Chicherin ends them with a factually false reproach: he assures that conscience(which I seem to confuse with sexual shame, see above) I devote a small page, and then there is no more talk about it. It is not true. Everything that can be rationally extracted from the fact of conscience for moral philosophy was extracted by the founder of this science, Kant, and conveyed by me on thirty “large” pages in a special appendix. Does Mr. Chicherin really suspect nothing about the intimate relationship between the categorical imperative and conscience, when Kant himself openly admitted it? However, the foundation of Kantian ethics, although strong, was narrow: all morality is reduced here exclusively to the formal essence of conscience, that is, to the idea of ​​unconditional obligation. The middle of Chapter VII (pp. 182-188) is devoted to the analysis of this one-sidedness, where we speak directly about conscience. Maybe this is not enough, I don’t argue, but in any case, a “small page” about conscience remains on the conscience of a careless critic.

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An extensive refutation by Mr. Chicherin of my chapter on pity strikes first truly with one feature: making a new objection-

However, the critic completely forgets the previous ones and says the exact opposite of what he just asserted. First, he attacks Melya for allegedly limiting (?) all morality (i.e., all moral relations between a person and others like him) to one feeling of pity, and also because I recognize the basis of this feeling as a natural organic connection all living beings among themselves. I had just mentally prepared to repel this attack, when suddenly I recognized a completely different guilt, incompatible with the first: it turns out (619) that, reducing mercy to justice, I base it on the expectation (!) of reciprocity, that is, I reduce it to degree of selfish motive and calculation. To clearly refute me, it is told about how one janitor, seeing an unfortunate cat tormented in agony, took her in his arms and carried her to the veterinarian with a request to treat her. G. Chicherin thinks that from my point of view, to explain this act, it is necessary to assume the janitor’s expectation that this cat, if necessary, will pick him up and take him to the doctor for treatment. Why, however, recognizing the feeling of pity as the basis of all our moral relations towards living beings, should I forget about this feeling in the present case? After all, the janitor’s act is a simple manifestation of precisely this feeling; Why would I resort to such explanations for which, regardless of their absurdity in this example in general, there is no place in my ethics? G. Chicherin is apparently confused by the dialectical connection I have indicated between general rule mercy in his objective expression and the same rule of justice; but both rules have their living basis in the feeling of pity, and how can an objective formula, abstracted by reason, abolish or replace the internal cause of action in the subject? It is sad to explain to a learned man, and a former Hegelian at that, such things that are clear to any commoner. I heard another say about one man who forgave his guilty wife: you see, you had pity on her - he is a man fair. Everyone will say the same thing with even greater justification about the janitor who took pity on the innocently injured cat. But before I had time to come to my senses from this passage, where Mr. Chicherin instructs me that everything cannot be reduced to justice and to selfish calculations, that there is

also mercy and the sacred spark of love for all creatures - before I had time to come to my senses from these teachings, the mental wheel of this amazing criticism turned around, and instead of forgetting mercy, I again find myself guilty of having, remembering my old attachment to Schopenhauer, thought up everything to build moral relations towards other beings on compassion, to which, at worst, justice was added (620). Although this is not entirely true, I will not argue; I am also pleased that I come out justified in the eyes of the shot cats and other suffering creatures: although Mr. Chicherin took it away, he is the same. and returned to me the right to demand pity for them first of all, and then add justice.

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Not wanting to know either shame or pity, Mr. Chicherin also does not want to hear that filial feeling ( pietas erga parents ) is the natural basis of religion. “The general fact is,” he says (621), “that children have those religious concepts that are instilled in them by their parents. Parents cannot consider themselves deities and have reverence for themselves; and therefore this thought cannot be born in children. As Mr. Solovyov himself notes, this is already hampered by everyday proximity and interaction.” If I notice it myself, then why should I point it out? But from what the relationship between children and parents cannot produce concepts about the deity in the absolute sense, it does not follow that children do not have direct feelings To parents, as relatively higher beings, go to your living providence. Mr. Chicherin’s argument that parents, not having reverence for themselves, cannot instill this feeling in their children, is truly amazing. With no less logical right, one could argue that since children imitate their parents in everything, and parents do not breastfeed, then infants cannot feed in this way! After all, it begins not with thoughts and concepts that can be learned, but with feelings experienced by nature. Do parents teach their children the feelings of hunger, thirst or pain? G. Chicherin, with his reasoning, reminds me of an ancient Chinese chronicle, which is about one great emperor

reports, among other things, that he was the first to teach his subjects how to eat and drink.

From religious feeling in its consistent development I deduce the unconditional principle of morality. “We are here,” says Mr. Chicherin, “in complete mysticism.” With this word he means everything that is incomprehensible to him. Without disputing his right to such a point of view and such use of words, I will only note that reason talking about what you don’t understand is an activity that is, firstly, useless, and secondly, not entirely commendable in a moral sense. However, from this side, Mr. Chicherin has the excuse that he fundamentally and a priori identifies with the boundaries of the mind in general and, therefore, when encountering things incomprehensible to him, he can only call them out for absurdity and nonsense. This is precisely the meaning of the word “mysticism” for him. You can imagine the criticism that comes out of this!

Abnormal phenomena are detected already at the borders of “mysticism”. Speaking about the kingdoms of nature, as stages of the divine-material process, I mention stone, as the “most typical embodiment” of pure being or inert existence. From here Mr. Chicherin concludes about my ignorance that in stone, in addition to pure being, there is much more: extension, impenetrability, mechanical and chemical forces (632). This is too much! - in the words of Mr. Chicherin. We have to remind him that when some specific betrayal is recognized as a typical embodiment of some general abstract category, this does not mean that it is unconditionally equated with the abolition of its real properties. While, for example, in Hegel’s philosophy of history, the Roman nation is recognized as a typical embodiment of practical reason or purposeful will, this does not mean that Hegel was not aware of the presence among the Romans, in addition to practical reason, of many specific properties - physical, zoological, anthropological, ethnographic, etc. e. Just as the Roman nation, with all its complexity, represents a single beginning of purposeful will, so a stone, with less complexity, can represent the beginning of pure being. In any case, such a meaning is more appropriate for a stone than for that billiard ball, which for Mr. Chicherin in his dispute with Prince. S. Trubetskoy was

representative of unconditional reality. Since the venerable critic reproaches me on every occasion for unfounded and arbitrary statements (my entire book is obviously filled with such statements), I must prove in detail that to represent the category of being, a stone deserves decisive preference over a billiard ball. Firstly, in the temporal-genetic order, a stone is a natural thing that existed in prehistoric times, while a billiard ball is a later invention of idle minds. Secondly, in the spatial order, stones are found everywhere, while the existence of billiard balls is limited to a few private dwellings and tavern establishments. Thirdly, a stone, by its nature, serves as the basis for all kinds of buildings, just as the category of pure being is the basis for other more complex ones, while nothing can be founded on a billiard ball that lacks stable equilibrium; fourthly, the significance of the stone is evidenced by its symbolic use even more than its everyday use; Thus, it is known that the Metropolitan of Ryazan and locum tenens of the patriarchal throne, Stefan Yavorsky, called his main work “The Stone of Faith,” while Mr. Chicherin himself would hardly dare to call any of his work “Billiard Ball of Knowledge.” Although at first superficial glance it might seem that, thanks to its round shape, a billiard ball is convenient for depicting eternity, it is not without reason that other objects are used for this, such as a ring, an apple, a snake biting its own tail - but by no means a billiard ball ball.

The following misunderstanding seemed to me more sad than funny. G. Chicherin imagined (without the slightest reason on my part) that by the Kingdom of God I mean “a society of believers.” Which However, there are so many of them and they are so hostilely divided among themselves? This fact, which makes his assumption patently absurd, does not stop the determined critic. To appear as if all people called Christians or externally ranked among the Christian confessions form the Kingdom of God completely regardless of what they are in their own way internal state and dignity. Why, however, does Mr. Chicherin not include wooden horses and

lambs to the animal kingdom? Why doesn’t he include those flowers that the frost paints on the window panes into the plant kingdom? Therefore, one must think that only that which actually possesses the essential features of this kingdom belongs to each kingdom. Why does he assume that I should include in the Kingdom of God people who undoubtedly lack the essential properties of spiritual humanity or God-manhood that I have indicated? The great majority of outward or nominal Christians, at best, relate to the real “children of God” as cardboard rocks do to real ones, or as toy animals do to real ones.

Mr. Chicherin did not understand my comparison of the Roman Caesar with Christ at all; he did not even guess that it was about the establishment of Caesar apotheoses. With amazing naivety, Mr. Chicherin asks why I am comparing these particular individuals, and not some others! Yes, because I compare them in a way that no one but them can imagine. Apart from Caesar, were there any other pagans who were alive the subject of obligatory and universal religious worship? And to whom, besides Christ, could I assign the significance of the true God-man, the natural ancestor of the sons of God? For some reason G. Chicherin imagined that I should consider all pagans to be monkeys in relation to all Christians. But for what? Did I undertake to think as unconsciously as Mr. Chicherin “criticizes” my thoughts? Caesar is likened to a monkey not because he is a pagan - such a comparison would be meaningless - but only because he, not being a god, pretended to be a deity, just as a monkey, not being a man, makes or appears to be making of himself as a human being. As for pagans in general, i.e., natural humanity, their relationship to spiritual humanity or the kingdom of God (and not to “Christians,” who by their name alone do not form any special kingdom) can be compared in general with the relationship of any lower kingdom to the highest, the monkeys have absolutely nothing to do with it.

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Mr. Chicherin’s lack of understanding of everything that has anything to do with “mysticism” is quite natural, and one can only be surprised degrees this misunderstanding. I expected better from his criticism of the applied section of my moral philosophy, especially the chapter on the criminal question. Although I was completely wrong about this, I still have to start with praise. I praise involuntarily modesty Chicherina. The venerable scientist has always been and will remain a resolute defender death penalty, but he began to feel ashamed of this opinion. The question of the death penalty is of paramount importance in my applied ethics, and is the subject of a special chapter 8. Disputing me, Mr. Chicherin could not avoid this issue, and he really talks about it, but only secretly without calling things by name; refuting my arguments against death penalty, he does not expose his behind it, but reduces the speech to the general question of retribution or retribution, although there is no necessary logical connection here: one can recognize the principle of retribution in general and reject the death penalty as unjust retribution, and on the other hand, one can deny the theory of retribution and allow the death penalty as a measure intimidation(which is done, for example, by other representatives of the “anthropological” school). But Mr. Chicherin bashfully shrouds the shameful subject in general reasoning; but the reader only has to compare his objections with the places against which they are directed to see that the matter is specifically about the death penalty. I attach too much importance to shame in general not to appreciate this case of modesty. It would, of course, be better if Mr. Chicherin directly admitted that his previous opinion in favor of the death penalty was a mistake, but you can demand this only without knowing who you are dealing with. Mr. Chicherin’s shyness is only a vague, unaccountable feeling of his (at its core) noble nature, but clear consciousness, and therefore recognition of his mistake, is hardly possible for him.

Apart from a bashful attitude towards the death penalty, I, unfortunately, cannot praise anything in Mr. Chicherin’s critical exercises on the criminal issue. In one place he impressively confronts me with my amateurism in the field of legal

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8 In Op. "Law and Morality".

sciences; however, it is impossible for me to be an amateur in these sciences for the simple reason that I am a complete layman here. Following the basic rule of sound philosophy - γνῶθι σεαυτόν (know yourself) and having recognized myself, among other things, as a complete ignoramus in the science of criminal law, I acted accordingly. Namely, when I had to judge from the point of view of moral philosophy about the necessary application of moral norms to the fact of a crime and to the social impact on the criminal, I took care, in order to verify my own conclusions, to find out how the most famous criminologists looked at this matter. With great joy I became convinced that on some points my conviction could be supported by the unanimous decision of all modern authorities, and on others by a significant majority. Of course, moral truth in itself does not need justification from the private sciences, but when it comes to its application to life issues, it receives all its practical force from the agreement of scientific specialists and professional figures with it. This agreement can already be considered ensured for moral truth in the field of criminal law, and, mourning the extreme poverty of my knowledge, I am consoled by the fact that my conviction expresses not only a subjective request, but the truth entering into life.

For this consolation I did not have to turn to Mr. Chicherin. A highly respected specialist in state law and its history, my critic is not at all known as a criminologist. This, of course, is not a problem: you cannot be equally strong in everything, and Mr. Chicherin’s knowledge of criminal law should still be recognized as “much learning” in comparison with the abyss of ignorance of such a layman as, for example, me. But the trouble is that Mr. Chicherin does not want to know the progress of science, that he has stubbornly stopped at a stage that has long been experienced and is only angry at the scientific figures who were ahead of him. G. Chicherin does not want to see anything further than the wild, blood-smelling theory of retribution, which Hegel, with his bad dialectical tricks, managed to turn from monstrous into ridiculous. And with this forgotten nonsense, Mr. Chicherin bravely opposes the modern science of criminal law. Even if his arguments were at all plausible, the very fact of defending the Hegelian theory of retribution,

as the single and unconditional truth on this issue, there is already a solemn testimonium paupertatis in the eyes of every criminologist.

G. Chicherin is not devoid of observation. He noted (667) that in my discussions about the criminal issue I reveal a special, surpassing all measure, self-confidence. He explains this further (673) by my lack of humility. The explanation is obviously erroneous, for it is impossible to understand why criminal law should have the specific property of increasing self-confidence in laymen lacking humility. Meanwhile, the real explanation is very simple. It is not a matter of absence, but of the presence of some humility. When in purely philosophical questions, or in what Mr. Chicherin calls “mysticism,” I speak to myself, then, with all my confidence in the main thing, I often doubt and hesitate in particulars; whereas, in a criminal matter, the consciousness of my unanimity with the luminaries of criminal science, removing personal responsibility from me, gives me unlimited boldness of statement, and what Mr. Chicherin takes for self-confidence is only a humble confidence in the provisions of science befitting a layman. When I, for example, feel the broad shoulders of Professor Tagantsev behind me, I am filled with immeasurable courage and am not afraid even of Mr. Chicherin himself, who, therefore, in vain claims that I have humility only before God; Besides God, I also experience this feeling before human science and its true representatives. If questions of state law were of the same interest for moral philosophy as criminal law, and I had to deal with them, then Mr. Chicherin would probably get a better idea of ​​my humility before scientific authorities.

But is there any possibility of submitting to arguments such as the following? I say, for example, that unconditional and irreparable criminal sentences, presupposing in the judges an unconditional knowledge peculiar only to a deity, must be recognized as wicked and insane. In response to this, Mr. Chicherin names such sentences likeness divine justice and imitation divine perfection, while referring to the commandment: be perfect, etc. (p. 673). It turns out, therefore, that sending an innocent person to the gallows due to a judicial error is a semblance of divine justice and an imitation of fellow human beings.

to the excellence of the Heavenly Father! If this is a joke, then what's the point? But, apparently, Mr. Chicherin speaks seriously, and, therefore, we have to seriously explain to him that appropriating to oneself such advantages that one really does not have is lie And usurpation, and in no way a semblance of divine perfection; that to imitate someone means to act like him, and, therefore, the false appropriation of properties that do not belong to oneself is imitation not of a deity who cannot lie, but of the one who is “lies and the father of lies”; that if the usurpation of a divine property is justified as imitation, then all forged documents must also be justified as imitation of the real ones, impostors must be praised as imitators of the supreme power, and every robber of other people's property must be approved as a successful imitator of the rightful owners. Due to the incredible crudeness of the paralogism, Mr. Chicherin’s reasoning can only be compared with the famous argument in favor of the death penalty, which was seriously repeated by one fossil professor of criminal law at Moscow University: “If our Lord, being righteous and sinless, was subjected to a painful and shameful execution, then how come after that Shouldn’t we hang some swindler and scoundrel on the gallows?”

Even closer to this classic example is another theological excursion by Mr. Chicherin (674). In defense of criminal retribution, the Gospel words are cited about fiery hell, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth. G. Chicherin, without leaving the Tambov province, I would see the sad consequences of a literal understanding of individual texts. This “understanding of the well-known words in the Gospel of Matthew about eunuchs who castrated themselves for the sake of an unknown kingdom served as the basis of a sect that Mr. Chicherin rightly calls fanatical. Why did he, condemning these fanatics for their crude asceticism, adopt their no less crude literalism in his interpretation another text, also taken separately and without regard to the spirit of the gospel? In view of such an attempt on theology by Mr. Chicherin, let a professional theologian answer him instead of me. In the dissertation of the most reverend Father Archimandrite Sergius: “ Orthodox teaching about salvation" (Sergiev Posad, 1895), on page 121 we find, as a conclusion from the previous study, a direct statement that the legal concept of retribution "has an accidental origin in Christianity

Christian worldview, and, therefore, if we are talking about Christianity in essence, such a concept of retribution in the direct and strict sense cannot be allowed.”

To this I will add that Mr. Chicherin, who defends the death penalty, who sees unconditional criminal sentences as an imitation of divine perfection and who cannot imagine the afterlife of sinners otherwise than in the form of burning them over a slow fire, in the general character of his worldview, represents a significant closeness to Torquemada and To about, and, therefore, to his diatribes “Against me, completely alien to such concepts, I would have every right to answer: from a sore head to a healthy one!

Political economy belongs to the subjects of special studies of Mr. Chicherin, who published a two-volume essay: “Property and the State,” testifying to the author’s very extensive reading in this field. As for me, although I once enthusiastically read the old socialists from Saint-Simon to Lassalle, I actually know even less in political economy than in criminal law, where I know almost nothing. Yes, there is no reason for me to be interested in the “science of wealth.” I became disillusioned with socialism and quit pursuing it when it said its last word, which is economic materialism; but in orthodox political economy there has never been anything fundamental except this materialism. I mean materialism in the moral sense, that is, raising the material passion of self-interest to a practical norm. Study of the economic life of mankind from this point of view is as alien to moral philosophy as the study of pornography. And that side of economic relations that is of ethical interest does not require any special study at all. Everyone is already familiar with the blatant anomalies of pauperism and plutocracy, and the task of ethics here is to contrast these anomalies with moral and economic norms, derived logically through the application of the basic principles of goodness to the general facts of the economic order.

G. Chicherin this time almost understood my point of view, but clearly revealed the inconsistency of his own by the objections that he makes to me. He calls it well-meaning

a new, but unrealizable fantasy in reality, the very thing that has begun to come true, what serious political parties and the governments themselves are working on in all countries. According to Mr. Chicherin, normalizing working hours, for example, is one of those impossibilities that I can talk about only because I set myself the task of organizing perpetuum mobile , - and yet this impossible fantastic normalization already exists! I am accused of eliminating questions of execution from myself. But why should I take on this unbearable burden when people who are more called and prepared than me are engaged not only questions execution, but have already started execution? What turns out to be? Such a dreamer, ignorant of political economy, as I am, goes in the direction of actual history, ahead of him only a few steps: the norms of economic relations, affirmed by him, are partly implemented, and partly are on the way to implementation, and such a knowledgeable scientist, alien to all fantasies, like Mr. Chicherin, for the sake of his preconceived idea, he is forced to close his eyes to reality and declare impossible what actually exists. Isn’t my strict abstinence from studying the “science” of political economy justified when I see in Mr. Chicherin what hallucinations, what a loss of all sensitivity to real events the diligent and naively trusting study of this “science” leads to? Disgust from imaginary fantasies made the venerable scientist a real utopian, for, as someone said, it is not the real utopian who wants to transform society, but the one who dreams of stopping the course of history.

It must be admitted that Mr. Chicherin’s utopias are not pink, but rather gray and even completely black in color, for the main ones, those about which he speaks with particular fervor, consist in preserving, against the evil of history, two rights: the right of a criminal to be hanged and the right of a beggar to starve or to work 25 hours a day.

When it comes to moral and social norms that are simple, close and not only feasible, but already implemented, what is the mitigation of criminal repression and the relief of pauperism, the utopian critic closes his eyes to reality and protests against the inevitable in the name of principles such as law

to the gallows and to death by starvation. And when we are talking about complex and distant norms, for the implementation of which no one can vouch for under given conditions, this critic objects as if before him was not an exposition of moral philosophy, but a recipe for current politics. At the end of my book the absolute standard or ideal of government is briefly indicated as the complete internal consent of the three supreme powers or offices: the high priest, the king, and the prophet. I'm talking about agreement of three, as the norm, and Mr. Chicherin objects: what if the first two agree to destroy the third in order to oppress peoples without hindrance? I believe that this possible and, as Mr. Chicherin rightly noted, historical fact also applies to theocratic normal, as a fact of simple murder - to the norm “thou shalt not kill”! What is curious about this is Mr. Chicherin’s complete oblivion that from the point of view on which I stand, the historical process has a definite end, conditions in this regard are that after the great usurpation of all authorities by the “man of lawlessness” they will be united together in one person. , To whom they belong both by birth and by merit. Criticism that leaves aside the actual point of view of the author being analyzed and his actual conclusions from it is criticism imaginary. This is Mr. Chicherin’s criticism of my moral philosophy from beginning to end.

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But I cannot ignore the final words of his article, which make a touching impression. The critic becomes motivated by personal feelings, and this gives me the right and even the obligation to say a few words to him “to my liking.”

About twenty years ago, B. N. Chicherin’s great work “Science and Religion” was published. The book, in addition to its dual theme, has a dual character on the inside. Along with this writer’s usual distribution of facts and ideas into motionless cells, there are many beautiful and lively pages in which the echo of something completely different seems to be heard. There seemed to be a moment in the spiritual development of B. N. Chicherin - before the writing of this book - when the essence and meaning of life were revealed to him beyond abstract forms.

the mule of school doctrine, and when he himself seemed to have joined what he now calls mysticism, that is, nonsense. With his book, Mr. Chicherin dealt with this moment of his spiritual life. He also planted religious truth in a certain corner of his mental building and, cutting it into pieces, placed them in several adjacent cells in this corner. Everything is in order. Mr. Chicherin’s worldview remained, as before, without a real and living center, but he himself found that “all good is green” and calmed down. Is it really forever?

Everything allows us to hope that the prolific and in many respects highly worthy life of Mr. Chicherin has not yet come to its end. He apparently does not have sufficient grounds to say that he is going to his grave. But it is always useful to think about this critical event, and since he mentioned it, this is what I will tell him. I know a great way to evaluate the true meaning of our thoughts, feelings and aspirations. I offer this method to Mr. Chicherin as the only opportunity I have to reward him for the great grief that, in his words, I caused him.

Let B. N. Chicherin imagine himself really on the edge of the grave with full and clear consciousness. Which of his thoughts, feelings and interests remain meaningful to him? I am sure that he will then discover the complete emptiness of what especially occupies him now, and I am also sure that he will not then find his present satisfaction in the thought that everything beyond is nonsense, and that we know absolutely nothing about the future life.

I am deeply touched by B. N. Chicherin’s sincere sorrow that I am lost to Russian science. But there are much more important things in time and eternity, especially “Russian science,” and I firmly hope that my critic is not lost on them.

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