In fact, the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War took place not in the summer of 1943 near Prokhorovka, but from June 23 to 30, 1941 in the Dubno-Brody-Lutsk area
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The myth about the supposedly largest tank battle of the last war at Prokhorovka station, which played a decisive role in the Battle of Kursk, which took place on July 12, 1943, is probably the most enduring of the legends about the Great Patriotic War. Its supporting points are three statements that are far from real historical events, but are firmly entrenched in literature and the media. Firstly, that in the clash that took place on July 12, 1943 on a tiny field cut by deep ravines southwest of Prokhorovka, according to various sources, from 1,200 to 2,000 tanks and self-propelled guns took part. Secondly, that it was a victorious event for the Red Army, turning the tide of the Battle of Kursk. Thirdly, that the SS corps operating there that day was completely defeated and quickly thrown back to their original positions towards Belgorod.

In fact, the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War did not take place in the summer of 1943 near Prokhorovka, but from June 23 to 30, 1941 in the Dubno-Brody-Lutsk area, 3128 Soviet and 728 German tanks took part in it. These two battles are similar in many ways. In both places, Soviet troops defended themselves and carried out front-line counterattacks (on the Southwestern Front in 1941 and on the Voronezh Front in 1943) with the participation of large tank groupings. Both battles lasted almost a week (Prokhorovskoye - seven days, Dubno - Brody - Lutsk - eight). In both cases, the initial plan of the Red Army command was not fully realized, and its formations suffered very heavy losses. However, the troops of the Voronezh Front held their lines (but not the Southwestern Front), and the losses of its armored vehicles in the station area were lower than on the Southwestern Front.

How did it happen that the events near Prokhorovka entered the history of the war as the largest tank battle? Operation Citadel (Wehrmacht attack on Kursk) began on July 5, 1943. After five days of heavy fighting, the troops of the Voronezh Front slowed down the pace of the advance of the German Army Group South (in the southern part of the Kursk Bulge) in two of the three directions and inflicted significant damage on it . On the third, Prokhorovsky, the enemy's strongest formation - the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (2 SS Tank Corps) - continued to advance. Therefore, on the evening of July 9, a decision was made: two days later, launch a powerful counterattack on it with the forces of the 5th Guards Army (5th Guards A) of General Alexei Zhadov and the 5th Guards Tank Army (5th Guards TA) of General Pavel Rotmistrov. According to Soviet documents declassified today and captured sources I discovered, on the morning of July 12, 5th Guards. The TA, to which all tank formations on the approaches to the station were subordinated, numbered 951 tanks and 54 self-propelled guns (self-propelled guns), but some of them were on the way and under repair. In total, during this day, in two areas near Prokhorovka, which were separated by about 18 km, the Soviet side brought 672 armored units into battle: on the famous tank field southwest of the station, 514 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns operated against 210 tanks and assault guns of the SS corps, and south of Prokhorovka - 158 tanks and self-propelled guns versus 119. In only two areas in combat operations in different time 1001 armored vehicles took part on both sides: 672 Soviet and 329 German.

During the fighting on July 12, 1943, the troops of the Voronezh Front failed to complete their assigned tasks - defeat the enemy and go on a counter-offensive, and its strike force, Rotmistrov’s army, lost more than 50% of the equipment brought into battle in about 10-11 hours. By the end of the defensive operation on July 16, 1943, it was drained of blood: only 334 armored units were listed as burned out, more than 200 were under repair. To find out the reasons for the large losses, a commission headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Georgy Malenkov arrived from Moscow.

The first document indicating the number of German armored vehicles opposing the 5th Guards. TA near Prokhorovka (in two areas where its troops operated), was a report from the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Voronezh Front, compiled at the end of July 12, 1943. The information included in it was scrupulously collected by front-line intelligence officers at the front line throughout the entire day of fighting. “The enemy,” the report noted, “up to three regiments of motorized infantry, with the support of up to 250 tanks of the tank divisions “Adolf Hitler”, “Reich” and “Totenkopf”, from the line Prelestnoye - Yamki and up to two motorized regiments with a group of tanks of up to 100 units from the Krivtsovo-Cossack line they launched an offensive in the general direction of Prokhorovka, trying to encircle and destroy units of the 69th Army.”

Real data on the number of German armored vehicles show that front-line reconnaissance in conditions of high battle dynamics and concentration of forces on small area worked great. If we rely on captured German documents that I discovered in the TsAMO of the Russian Federation, on the evening of July 11, the 2nd SS Tank Tank had 273 tanks and assault guns in service, and the 3rd Tank Tank had 100 tanks. But directly to repel the attack of the 5th Guards. The TA command of the SS Corps deployed all the armored vehicles of the motorized SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" (77 units) and "Das Reich" (95), and from the motorized SS division "Totenkopf" - only 34 units out of 122. The rest were in the neighboring zone 5 Guards army. On July 24, 1943, a member of the front’s military council, Lieutenant General Nikita Khrushchev, included the intelligence department’s data in his report addressed personally to Joseph Stalin, confirming its accuracy.

The investigation of the “Malenkov commission” lasted two weeks, then its conclusions went to Stalin’s desk. The question was raised about removing the army commander from his post and bringing him to trial. His fate hung in the balance until the end of July, when, through the efforts of the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky, the anger of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was extinguished, and at the end of August 1943, the general was awarded the Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree, for his contribution to the victory in the Battle of Kursk. Thus, the question of how to evaluate the events at Prokhorovka was actually resolved: consider the battle victorious, and not focus on losses.

This may seem surprising, but it was the large losses of Rotmistrov’s army that became the starting point for exaggerating the amount of equipment that took part in the events of July 12, 1943. In the fall of 1943, the command of the 5th Guards. TA tried to smooth out the negative impression of failure and emphasize the army’s merits to the higher command by creating the image of a grandiose battle in which its troops defeated a huge enemy tank group. For this purpose, in the “Report on the hostilities of the 5th Guards. TA for the period from July 7 to July 24, 1943." (“Report...”), approved by Rotmistrov, it was stated: at the Prokhorovka station “a tank battle, unusual in its scale, unfolded, in which more than 1,500 tanks took part on both sides...”. This figure is based on the version that the Germans concentrated near Prokhorovka only nine tank, four infantry and two motorized divisions, which had up to 1000 tanks, and directly against the 5th Guards. TA - six tank divisions, 700-800 combat vehicles. In reality this was not the case. Army headquarters included the 48th and 24th tank corps in the group “concentrated for an attack on Prokhorovka,” although the 48th was not advancing on Prokhorovka, but in a different direction, and the 24th was generally in reserve at that time. The same thing happened with the formations immediately before the 5th Guards. TA - for example, the army headquarters indicated the participation of the “Greater Germany” motorized division in the battle, although it was located 35 km from the station. These mistakes were made due to poor knowledge of the situation and deliberate distortion of facts: the work of Soviet army intelligence at that time was ineffective, the professional training of officers was low, and the leadership showed a tendency to overestimate the enemy’s forces. The intelligence department of the 5th Guards also suffered from this. TA.

But it was these figures that went down in the history of the Battle of Kursk and formed the basis of the myth about Prokhorovka. Based on this document and with these data, a large article about those events was published in 1944 in the “Collection of Generalization of War Experience” of the General Staff. Could the General Staff officers double-check the information from the “Report...” and prevent its dissemination? Undoubtedly. However, the reporting documents of the armies were a priori considered truthful and were immediately used in their work. The lack of a filter to filter out fables was one of the main reasons for the promotion of the myth of 1500 tanks in the scientific community and the media. In addition, after 1945, all documents of the Red Army were classified.

An important stage in the development of the legend was 1960, when Rotmistrov’s book of memoirs about the battles near Prokhorovka was published using data from the “Report...”. The authority of the former army commander in the country was high, so the book strengthened the myth of the “greatest tank battle” and stimulated its spread. However, a number of prominent commanders and military leaders did not like the imposition of the Prokhorovka legend on society and the outright exaggeration of the merits of the former army commander.

In 1963, Rotmistrov tried to correct the figures. In an interview with the Military Historical Journal, he claimed that southwest of Prokhorovka the enemy brought into battle a little more than 500, and the first echelon of the 5th Guards. TA had up to 700 tanks, so 1,200 combat vehicles took part in the oncoming battle. But at the same time, in order not to refute the established figure, he put forward a new legend: another 300 combat vehicles of his army were sent to eliminate the threat of an enemy breakthrough south of Prokhorovka. However, the “Report...” states that only 92 tanks went there. Where's the other 200? At this time, the military documents were in secret storage, and the former army commander needed to get out of a delicate situation while saving face, so he was not afraid that anyone would be able to refute him with facts.

After this, the estimate of 1200 cars began to be widely used in literature and the press, but paradoxically, no one officially refuted 1500. It was no longer possible to ignore the data conflict. Therefore, the ideological authorities decided to “modernize” the myth about Prokhorovka: without rejecting both figures, they should somehow explain them. Solve this not an easy task assigned to military historian Colonel Georgy Koltunov. In a book about the Battle of Kursk, written jointly with historian Boris Solovyov and published in 1970, he tried to find a compromise between the versions by dividing the enemy group of 700 tanks indicated by Rotmistrov into two areas. Allegedly, this was the total number of enemy tanks in the station area: up to 500 in the 2nd SS Tank Corps, southwest, and up to 200 in the 3rd SS Tank Corps, to the south. At the same time, Koltunov was forced to note that to the southwest of Prokhorovka, up to 1,200 armored units took part in the battles on both sides, and another 300 to the south, for a total of 1,500. This version received official approval, and thus an “updated” version of the myth about Prokhorovka arose, still living today.

As for the other two components of the myth, they are also incorrect. The events of July 12, 1943 at Prokhorovka did not have a key influence on the outcome of the Battle of Kursk as a whole; the counterattack was not initially planned to change the situation throughout the Kursk Bulge, but was intended to solve only the problems of the defensive operation of the Voronezh Front. And there was no longer any need for this. On July 11, 1943, the enemy's last attempt to break through the defenses of the Central Front, which held the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, failed. And on the second day, July 12, 1943, the second stage of the Red Army’s summer campaign began - the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive on the Oryol Bulge, and it became clear that Operation Citadel had failed. On July 13, Hitler admitted this, giving the order to curtail it.

Finally, about the defeat of the enemy group near Prokhorovka. The exact number of losses in armored vehicles of the German troops operating at the station on July 12, 1943 has not yet been established, but it is known that the SS corps, which repelled the main attack of the 5th Guards. TA and 5th Guards. And, not only retained combat effectiveness, but also together with the acting south of the station On the night of July 15, 3 Tank Corps surrounded four rifle divisions of the 69th Army in the area between the Seversky and Lipovy Donets rivers. And is it legitimate to raise the question of defeat, if before Prokhorovka fresh enemy troops broke through the powerful defense for seven days (from July 5 to July 11, 1943), and the supposedly defeated ones retreated to their original lines - 11 (from July 13 to July 23, 1943). )?

There are several reasons for the persistence of the myth about Prokhorovka. At the end of the twentieth century. It was not immediately possible to prepare new qualified specialists capable of moving forward, relying on the best traditions of their predecessors. The development of historical science implies the search and introduction of new sources into scientific circulation. But working in archives is a very labor-intensive and expensive task, so some authors comment on old data without using new materials, adjusting them to their vision of the problem. This is more convenient: there is less work and the danger of receiving from the authorities the unflattering title of a denigrator of the people’s feat. This is how new legends and myths of the Fire Arc are created.

Battle of Prokhorovka

Battle of Prokhorovka became the culmination of a grandiose strategic operation, which went down in history as one that was decisive in ensuring a radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War.

The events of those days unfolded in the following way. Hitler's command planned to carry out a major offensive in the summer of 1943, seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in its favor. For this purpose, a military operation was developed and approved in April 1943. code name"Citadel".
Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive in the Kursk salient and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces. Thereby it was planned to create favorable conditions to go Soviet troops into a counteroffensive, and then into a general strategic offensive.
July 12, 1943 near the railway station Prokhorovka(56 km north of Belgorod), the advancing German tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf) was stopped by a counterattack by Soviet troops (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards). Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo - Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, in position 6- On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the 1st and 7th Guards armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from railway Kursk - Belgorod by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchka region (northern) - Kalinin by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
To provide assistance to Katukov’s 1st Tank Army, which was waging heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 23:00 on July 7, front commander Nikolai Vatutin signed directive No. 0014/op on readiness to begin active operations from 10:30 on the 8th. However, the counterattack carried out by the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the 1st TA brigades, did not bring tangible results.
Having not achieved decisive success - by this time the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyan direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command, in accordance with its plans, shifted the spearhead of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka with the intention of reaching Kursk through the bend of the Psel River . The change in direction of the attack was due to the fact that, according to the plans of the German command, it was in the bend of the Psel River that it seemed most appropriate to meet the inevitable counterattack of the superior Soviet tank reserves. If the village of Prokhorovka was not occupied by German troops before the arrival of Soviet tank reserves, it was planned to suspend the offensive altogether and temporarily go on the defensive, in order to take advantage of the advantageous terrain, preventing the Soviet tank reserves from escaping from the narrow defile formed by the swampy floodplain. the Psel River and the railway embankment, and prevent them from realizing their numerical advantage by covering the flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

Destroyed German tank

By July 11, the Germans took their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. Probably having intelligence data about the presence of Soviet tank reserves, the German command took action to repel the inevitable counterattack of the Soviet troops. The 1st division of the Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler", better equipped than other divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, took a defile and on July 11 did not undertake attacks in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive positions. On the contrary, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" supporting its flanks waged active offensive battles outside the defile on July 11, trying to improve their position (in particular, the 3rd Panzer Division covering the left flank The SS Totenkopf expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel River, managing to transport a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, providing flanking fire on the expected Soviet tank reserves in the event of an attack through the defile). By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army was concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defense at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. The concentration area of ​​the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms Armies was chosen by the command of the Voronezh Front, taking into account the threat of a breakthrough by the 2nd SS Tank Corps of the Soviet defense in the Prokhorovsk direction. On the other hand, the choice of the indicated area for the concentration of two guards armies in the Prokhorovka area, in the event of their participation in a counterattack, inevitably led to a head-on collision with the strongest enemy group (2nd SS Panzer Corps), and given the nature of the defile, it excluded the possibility of covering the flanks of the defender in this direction of the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler". The frontal counterattack on July 12 was planned to be carried out by the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack; the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Opposing the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

Destroyed German tank

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the recollections of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o’clock he, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades.
At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18, 29, 2 and 2 Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, the Soviet tank crews gained some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles.
To the south of the main battle, the German tank group “Kempf” was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet group on the left flank. The threat of envelopment forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.
At about 13:00, the Germans withdrew the 11th Tank Division from reserve, which, together with the Death's Head division, struck the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed.
By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy westward. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

This day was the coldest in the history of weather observations. July, 12 was in 1887 year, when the average daily temperature in Moscow was +4.7 degrees Celsius, and the warmest was in 1903 year. That day the temperature rose to +34.5 degrees.

World War II became a war of engines. Relying on a temporary superiority in weapons production, Hitler and his generals based their “blitzkrieg” strategy on the active use of tanks and aircraft. Powerful German formations of armored vehicles, supported from the air by aviation, broke through the defenses and went deep into enemy rear. This was the case in Poland in 1939, on the Western Front in 1940, in the Balkans in the spring of 1941. This is how the military campaign began on Soviet territory on June 22, 1941.

"Attention, tanks!"

However, even during the Soviet retreat in 1941, Hitler's troops met resistance from the Red Army. At the same time, Soviet troops increasingly used in battles samples of military equipment that the Nazis did not have. Over the two years of the war, the Red Army managed to increase its military potential in quantitative and qualitative terms, and this contributed to the crushing defeat of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad. The desire to take revenge for Stalingrad forced Hitler to begin preparations for the third summer offensive on the Soviet-German front. In the upcoming battles of the summer of 1943, Hitler decided to place his main bet on armored forces, with the help of which he hoped to deal a crushing blow to the Red Army and return Germany to the initiative in the war. When the author of the book “Attention, Tanks!” was summoned from disgrace. - the former commander of the 2nd Panzer Army advancing on Moscow, General Heinz Guderian, arrived on February 20, 1943 at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander in Vinnitsa, he found his books about tanks on desk Hitler.

A month earlier, on January 22, 1943, Hitler published an address “To all workers in tank construction,” in which he called on workers, engineers and technicians to redouble their efforts to create the most powerful tanks in the world. According to Armaments Minister Albert Speer, even “when the Russian T-34 appeared, Hitler was delighted, since he claimed that he had long demanded the creation of a tank with a long-barreled gun.” Hitler constantly cited this example as proof that his judgments were correct. Now he demanded the creation of a tank with a long-barreled gun and heavy armor. The answer to the Soviet T-34 tank was supposed to be the Tiger tank.

A. Speer recalled: “Initially, the “tiger” was supposed to weigh 50 tons, but as a result of meeting Hitler’s requirements, its weight was increased to 75 tons. Then we decided to create a new tank weighing 30 tons, the name of which “panther” was supposed to mean greater mobility. Although this tank was lighter, its engine was the same as that of the Tiger, and therefore it could reach higher speeds. But within a year, Hitler again insisted on adding more armor to the tank, as well as putting more powerful guns. As a result, its weight reached 48 tons, and it began to weigh the same as the original version of the “tiger”. To compensate for this strange transformation from the fast Panther to the slow Tiger, we made another effort to create a series of small, light, mobile tanks. And in order to please Hitler, Porsche undertook efforts to create a super-heavy tank weighing 100 tons. It could only be produced in small batches. For reasons of secrecy, this monster was codenamed “mouse.”

The very first baptism of fire of the “tigers” was unsuccessful for the Germans. They were tested during a small military operation in a marshy area of ​​the Leningrad region in September 1942. According to Speer, Hitler anticipated in advance how the shells of Soviet anti-tank guns would bounce off the armor of the Tigers, and they would easily suppress artillery installations. Speer wrote: Hitler’s headquarters “indicated that the terrain chosen for testing was unsuitable, as it made tank maneuvers impossible due to swamps on both sides of the road. Hitler rejected these objections with an air of superiority."

Soon the results of the first battle of the “tigers” became known. As Speer wrote, “The Russians calmly allowed the tanks to pass the position of their anti-tank guns, and then struck at point-blank range on the first and last Tiger.” The remaining four tanks could not move forward, backward, or turn to the side because of the swamps. Soon they were finished off too.”

And yet Hitler and many of his entourage relied on new tanks big hopes. Guderian wrote that “the new powers to expand tank production given to Minister Speer indicated a growing alarm at the declining combat power of the German armored forces in the face of the ever-increasing production of the old but excellent Russian T-34 tank.”

In 1943, tank production in Germany doubled compared to 1942. By the beginning of the summer offensive, the Wehrmacht received new heavy Panther and Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. New aircraft, Focke-Wulf-190A and Henschel-129, also arrived at the front, which were supposed to pave the way for tank wedges. To carry out the operation, the Nazis intended to concentrate about 70% of their tank divisions, up to 30% of motorized divisions, and up to 60% of all their aircraft north and south of Kursk.

Guderian noted that the plan, developed on Hitler’s instructions by the Chief of the General Staff K. Zeitzler, provided for “using double flanking to destroy a number of Russian divisions near Kursk... The Chief of the General Staff wanted to use new Tiger and Panther tanks, which should were, in his opinion, to bring decisive success, to once again take the initiative into his own hands.”

At the same time, the policy to produce only “tigers” and “panthers” put the German armored forces in a difficult situation. Guderian wrote: “With the cessation of production of T-IV tanks, the German ground forces had to be limited to 25 Tiger tanks produced monthly. The consequence of this could be the complete destruction of the German ground forces in a very short time. The Russians would have won the war without the help of their Western allies and would have taken over all of Europe. No power on Earth could hold them back."

During meetings with Hitler on May 3-4, 1943, Guderian, in his words, “declared that the offensive was pointless; Our fresh forces, which have just been brought up to the Eastern Front, will be defeated again during the offensive according to the chief of staff’s plan, because we will certainly suffer heavy losses in tanks. We are not able to once again replenish the Eastern Front with fresh forces during 1943.... In addition, I pointed out that the Panther tank, on which the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces had high hopes, was found to have many shortcomings inherent in every new structures, and that it is difficult to hope for their elimination before the start of the offensive.” Armaments Minister Albert Speer supported Guderian. However, according to the general, “we two were the only participants in this meeting who clearly answered “no” to Zeitzler’s proposal.” Hitler, who was not yet completely convinced by the supporters of the offensive, did not come to a final decision that day.”

Meanwhile, at the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command they were preparing for the offensive of the Nazi troops. Based on the fact that the enemy will rely on powerful connections tanks, a plan was developed to create an unprecedented system of defense in depth and anti-tank defense measures. Therefore, the German offensive, which began on July 5, fizzled out.

However, the German command did not abandon attempts to break through to Kursk. Particularly powerful efforts were made by German troops in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station. By this time, as Zhukov wrote, “Headquarters... pulled up the 5th Guards Combined Arms and 5th Guards Tank Army from its reserve to the Prokhorovka area.” The first was commanded by Lieutenant General of the Armored Forces P.A. Rotmistrov, the second - Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov.

“You will never see such battles...”

The area near the Prokhorovka station is a hilly plain cut by ravines, sandwiched between the Psel River and the railway embankment. Here, on July 11, units of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps took up positions before the start of the offensive (the most well-armed 1st SS Division “Adolf Hitler”, 2nd SS Division “Das Reich” and 3rd SS Division “Totenkopf”).

The battle began with a German air raid on Soviet positions. P.A. Rotmistrov recalled: “At 6.30, Messers appeared in the sky to clear the airspace. And this meant that a bomb attack by enemy aircraft would soon follow. At about seven o'clock the monotonous hum of German planes was heard. And then dozens of Junkers appeared in the cloudless sky. Having chosen targets, they rearranged and, their cockpit windows flashing in the sun, heeled heavily onto the wing, going into a dive. Fascist aviation attacked mainly settlements and individual groves. Fountains of earth and clouds of smoke, cut through by crimson tongues of flashes, rose above the forest and villages. Bread in various places caught fire.”

Soviet fighters rushed towards the German planes. Behind them, according to Rotmistrov, bombers flew, “wave after wave, maintaining a clear alignment.”

Then Soviet artillery entered the battle. Rotmistrov recalled: “We did not have time to establish exactly where the enemy batteries were located and the tanks were concentrated, so it was not possible to determine the effectiveness of artillery fire. The barrage of our artillery fire had not yet ceased when volleys of guards mortar regiments were heard.”

And then the tanks of the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army moved towards the German positions. Although historians still cannot accurately determine the number of combat vehicles that fought in this unprecedented battle on a narrow piece of land, some of them believe that there were up to one and a half thousand of them. Rotmistrov wrote: “I look through binoculars and see our glorious “thirty-fours” coming out of cover on the right and left and, picking up speed, rushing forward. And then I discover a mass of enemy tanks. It turned out that the Germans and we went on the offensive at the same time. Two huge tank avalanches were moving towards us. A few minutes later, the tanks of the first echelon of our 29th and 18th corps, firing on the move, crashed head-on into the battle formations of the Nazi troops, and with a swift through attack literally pierced the enemy’s battle formation. The Nazis, obviously, did not expect to encounter such a large mass of our combat vehicles and such a decisive attack on them.”

The commander of the motorized rifle platoon of the 2nd SS Grenadier Regiment, Gurs, recalled: “The Russians launched an attack in the morning. They were around us, above us, among us. Hand-to-hand combat ensued. We jumped out of our individual trenches, set fire to enemy tanks with magnesium HEAT grenades, climbed onto our armored personnel carriers and shot at any tank or soldier we spotted. It was hell!

The control of German tank units was disrupted. Later, G. Guderian admitted that the tank battles on the Kursk Bulge revealed the shortcomings of German armored vehicles: “My fears about the lack of preparedness of the Panther tanks for combat operations at the front were confirmed. The 90 Porsche Tiger tanks used in Model's army also showed that they did not meet the requirements of close combat; these tanks, as it turned out, were not even sufficiently supplied with ammunition. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that they did not have machine guns and therefore, when they broke into the enemy’s defensive positions, they literally had to fire cannons at sparrows. They were unable to either destroy or suppress enemy infantry firing points and machine gun nests to allow the infantry to advance. They approached the Russian artillery positions alone, without infantry.” As noted in the History of the Great Patriotic War, the “tigers,” deprived of the advantage of their powerful artillery weapons and thick armor in close combat, were successfully shot at by T-34 tanks from short distances.”

Rotmistrov recalled: “The tanks ran at each other and, having grappled, could no longer separate, they fought to the death until one of them burst into flames or stopped with broken tracks. But even damaged tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.”

Hero Soviet Union Evgeny Shkurdalov recalled: “The battle formations were mixed up. From a direct hit from shells, the tanks exploded at full speed. The towers were torn off, the caterpillars flew to the sides. There was a continuous roar. There were moments when in the smoke we distinguished our own and German tanks only by silhouettes. Tankers jumped out of burning vehicles and rolled on the ground, trying to put out the flames.”

The 2nd Tank Battalion of the 181st Tank Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps encountered a group of Tigers. It was decided to force the enemy into close combat in order to deprive him of his advantage. By giving the command “Forward!” Follow me!”, battalion commander Captain P.A. Skripkin directed his tank into the center of the enemy defense. With the very first shell, the command tank pierced the side of one of the “tigers”, then, turning around, set fire to another heavy enemy tank with three shots. Several “tigers” opened fire on Skripkin’s car at once. An enemy shell broke through the side, and a second one wounded the commander. The driver and radio operator pulled him out of the tank and hid him in a shell crater. But one of the “tigers” was heading straight towards them. Then the driver-mechanic Alexander Nikolaev again jumped into his burning tank, started the engine and rushed towards the enemy. The “Tiger” backed away and began to turn around, but could not do it. At full speed, the burning KV crashed into a German tank and it exploded. The remaining Tigers turned away.

Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Golovanov, who fought near Prokhorovka as part of the 42nd Guards Division of the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army under the command of Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov, recalled: “I can’t find either words or colors to describe the tank battle that took place near Prokhorovka. Try to imagine how about 1000 tanks collided on small space(about two kilometers along the front), showering each other with a hail of shells, burning fires of already destroyed tanks... There was a continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, roar, explosions of shells, the wild grinding of iron, tanks were going against tanks. There was such a roar that it squeezed our eardrums... We lost the sense of time, we felt neither thirst nor heat on this hot sunny day. One thought, one desire - while you are alive, beat the enemy, help your wounded tankman get out of the burning tank. Our tankers, who got out of their broken cars, together with us, the infantrymen, we searched on the battlefield among the burning enemy tanks for their crews, who were also left without equipment, and beat them, some with a pistol, some with a machine gun, grappling hand-to-hand. Each of us did everything that was humanly possible on the Prokhorovsky field... All this lasted the whole day, which in the evening became dark from fires and smoke in the grain field.”

By mid-day, Soviet troops managed to somewhat push back the enemy and stop the strike force advancing on Prokhorovka. Rotmistrov wrote: “The tip of the enemy’s tank wedge... was broken.”

However, the battle continued. Rotmistrov wrote: “At the end of the day on July 12, the enemy, by introducing second echelons and reserves into battle, strengthened resistance, especially in the Prokhorovsky direction. One after another, reports from corps commanders began to arrive about powerful counterattacks by fresh enemy tank units. In conditions when the Nazis achieved clear superiority in tanks, it was inappropriate to attack. Having assessed the situation, with the permission of the Headquarters representative A.M. Vasilevsky ordered all corps to gain a foothold on the achieved lines, pull up artillery anti-tank regiments and repel enemy attacks with tank and artillery fire.”

“The offensive of our troops continues”

On the night of July 12-13, Rotmistrov slept for two hours. He was “awakened by the earth-shaking explosions of heavy aerial bombs. German air raid. This means that in 20-30 minutes we must expect the enemy to attack. I am contacting the corps commanders. They are all in place and reporting their readiness for battle. I recommend everyone to make more active use of anti-tank artillery, especially on the flanks.”

In the morning, 50 enemy tanks moved towards Soviet positions. Soviet tanks and anti-tank artillery opened fire on them. Several German tanks were knocked out. The rest continued to move forward, but fell on mines.

German motorized infantry followed the tanks. She was met with volleys of Katyusha rockets. The enemy turned back. Our tank corps immediately went on the offensive. Rotmistrov wrote: “Having suffered heavy losses, the enemy was forced to roll back, leaving burning tanks and the corpses of killed soldiers and officers.” During the battles, the 19th Panzer Division of the 3rd German Tank Corps was defeated, and its 73rd and 74th Mechanized Regiments were completely destroyed.

Returning to the command post, Rotmistrov met there the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukova. Rotmistrov recalled: “On the way, the marshal stopped the car several times and closely examined the sites of the last tank battle. A monstrous picture appeared before my eyes. Everywhere there are mangled or burned tanks, crushed guns, armored personnel carriers and vehicles, piles of shell casings, pieces of tracks. There is not a single green blade of grass on the blackened earth. In some places, fields, bushes, and copses were still smoking, not having had time to cool down after extensive fires... “This is what a through tank attack means,” Zhukov said quietly, as if to himself, looking at the broken “Panther” and crashing into it our T-70 tank. Here, at a distance of two tens of meters, the “tiger” and “thirty-four” reared up and seemed to grapple tightly. The Marshal shook his head, surprised by what he saw, and even took off his cap, apparently paying tribute to our fallen heroic tankmen who sacrificed their lives in order to stop and destroy the enemy.”

The greatest tank battle in world history near Prokhorovka has ended. Defensive battles on the Kursk Bulge ended in the defeat of German troops. A.M. Vasilevsky wrote: “The main result of the defensive battle should, in my opinion, be considered the defeat of the enemy’s tank formations, which resulted in a favorable balance of forces for us in this important branch of the military. This was greatly facilitated by our winning a large oncoming tank battle south of Prokhorovka, 30 km from Belgorod.”

A turning point occurred in the Battle of Kursk. Since then, the confident words: “The offensive of our troops continues” began to be constantly heard in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, right up to the end of the Great Patriotic War.

Exactly 70 years ago, in 1943, on the same days when this note is being written, one of the largest battles in the entire history of mankind took place in the area of ​​Kursk, Orel and Belgorod. The Kursk Bulge, which ended with the complete victory of the Soviet troops, became a turning point in the Second World War. But assessments of one of the most famous episodes of the battle - the tank battle of Prokhorovka - are so contradictory that it is very difficult to figure out who actually emerged victorious. They say that the real, objective history of any event is written no earlier than 50 years after it. The 70th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk is an excellent occasion to find out what really happened at Prokhorovka.

The “Kursk Bulge” was a protrusion on the front line about 200 km wide and up to 150 km deep, which was formed as a result of the winter campaign of 1942-1943. In mid-April, the German command developed an operation code-named “Citadel”: it was planned to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk region with simultaneous attacks from the north, in the Orel region, and from the south, from Belgorod. Next, the Germans had to advance east again.

It would seem that it is not so difficult to predict such plans: a strike from the north, a strike from the south, envelopment in pincers... In fact, the “Kursk Bulge” was not the only such protrusion on the front line. In order for the German plans to be confirmed, it was necessary to use all the forces of Soviet intelligence, which this time turned out to be on top (there is even a beautiful version that all the operational information was supplied to Moscow by Hitler’s personal photographer). The main details of the German operation near Kursk were known long before it began. The Soviet command knew exactly the day and hour appointed for the German offensive.

Battle of Kursk. Scheme of the battle.

They decided to greet the “guests” accordingly: for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army built a powerful, deeply echeloned defense in the expected directions of the enemy’s main attacks. It was necessary to wear down the enemy in defensive battles, and then go on a counter-offensive (marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky are considered the main authors of this idea). The Soviet defense, with an extensive network of trenches and minefields, consisted of eight lines with a total depth of up to 300 kilometers. Numerical superiority was also on the side of the USSR: more than 1,300 thousand personnel against 900 thousand of the Germans, 19 thousand guns and mortars against 10 thousand, 3,400 tanks against 2,700, 2,172 aircraft against 2,050. However, here we must take into account the fact that the German army received significant “technical” replenishment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf fighters of new modifications, Junkers-87 D5 bombers. But the Soviet command had a certain advantage due to the favorable location of the troops: the Central and Voronezh fronts were supposed to repel the offensive, if necessary, troops of the Western, Bryansk and Southwestern fronts could come to their aid, and another front was deployed in the rear - Stepnoy, the creation of which Hitler’s military leaders, as they later admitted in their memoirs, completely missed.

Bomber "Junkers 87" modificationD5- one of the examples of new German technology near Kursk. Our plane received the nickname “laptezhnik” for its non-retractable landing gear.

However, preparing to repel an attack is only half the battle. The second half is to prevent fatal miscalculations in combat conditions, when the situation is constantly changing and plans are being adjusted. To begin with, the Soviet command used a psychological technique. The Germans were scheduled to launch their offensive at 3 a.m. on July 5th. However, at exactly that hour, massive Soviet artillery fire fell on their positions. Thus, already at the very beginning of the battle, Hitler’s military leaders received a signal that their plans had been revealed.

The first three days of the battle, for all their magnitude, can be described quite briefly: German troops were bogged down in dense Soviet defense. On the northern front of the “Kursk Bulge”, at the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 kilometers in the direction of Olkhovatka. But on July 9 the situation changed. Deciding that it was enough to hit the wall head-on, the Germans (primarily the commander of Army Group South, E. von Manstein) tried to concentrate all their forces in one, southern direction. And here the German offensive was stopped after a large-scale tank battle at Prokhorovka, which I will consider in detail.

The battle is perhaps unique in its own way in that the points of view on it among modern historians differ literally in everything. From the recognition of the unconditional victory of the Red Army (the version enshrined in Soviet textbooks) to talk about the complete defeat of the 5th Guards Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov by the Germans. As evidence of the last thesis, the figures for the losses of Soviet tanks are usually cited, as well as the fact that the general himself almost ended up in court for these losses. However, the position of the “defeatists” cannot be accepted unconditionally for several reasons.

General Pavel Rotmistrov - commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

Firstly, the battle of Prokhorovka is often considered by supporters of the “defeatist” version outside the overall strategic situation. But the period from July 8 to July 12 was the time of the most intense fighting on the southern front of the “Kursk Bulge”. The main goal The German offensive was the city of Oboyan - this important strategic point made it possible to combine the forces of Army Group South and the 9th German Army advancing in the north. To prevent a breakthrough, the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. Vatutin concentrated a large tank group on the enemy’s right flank. If the Nazis had immediately tried to break through to Oboyan, Soviet tanks would have hit them from the Prokhorovka area to the flank and rear. Realizing this, the commander of the 4th German Tank Army, Hoth, decided to first take Prokhorovka and then continue moving north.

Secondly, the very name “battle of Prokhorovka” is not entirely correct. Fighting On July 12, they marched not only directly near this village, but also to the north and south of it. It is the clashes of tank armadas across the entire width of the front that make it possible to more or less objectively assess the results of the day. Tracing where the popular name “Prokhorovka” came from (in modern terms) is also not difficult. It began to appear on the pages of Russian historical literature in the 50s, when Nikita Khrushchev became the General Secretary of the CPSU, who - what a coincidence! — in July 1943, he was on the southern front of the Kursk salient as a member of the military council of the Voronezh Front. It is not surprising that Nikita Sergeevich needed vivid descriptions of the victories of Soviet troops in this sector.

Scheme of the tank battle near Prokhorovka. The three main German divisions are designated by abbreviations: "MG", "AG" and "R".

But let's return to the fighting on July 10-12. By the 12th, the operational situation at Prokhorovka was extremely tense. The Germans had no more than two kilometers to reach the village itself - it was just a matter of a decisive attack. If they managed to take Prokhorovka and gain a foothold in it, part of the tank corps could easily turn north and break through to Oboyan. In this case, a real threat of encirclement would hang over the two fronts - Central and Voronezh. Vatutin had at his disposal the last significant reserve - the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov, which numbered about 850 vehicles (tanks and self-propelled artillery guns). The Germans had three tank divisions, which included a total of 211 tanks and self-propelled guns. But when assessing the balance of forces, one must keep in mind that the Nazis were armed with the latest heavy Tigers, as well as modernized fourth Panzers (Pz-IV) with enhanced armor protection. The main strength of the Soviet tank corps was the legendary “thirty-four” (T-34) - excellent medium tanks, but for all their advantages, they could not compete on equal terms with heavy equipment. In addition, Hitler's tanks could fire over long distances and had better optics and, accordingly, shooting accuracy. Taking into account all these factors, Rotmistrov’s advantage was very insignificant.

The Tiger heavy tank is the main strike unit of the German tank forces near Kursk.

However, one cannot write off several mistakes made by Soviet generals. The first was done by Vatutin himself. Having set the task of attacking the Germans, at the last moment he moved the time of the offensive from 10 a.m. to 8.30 a.m. The question inevitably arises about the quality of reconnaissance: the Germans stood in positions in the morning and themselves waited for the order to attack (as it later became known, it was planned for 9.00), and their anti-tank artillery was deployed in battle formation in case of Soviet counterattacks. To launch a pre-emptive strike in such a situation was a suicidal decision, as the further course of the battle showed. Surely Vatutin, if he had been accurately informed about the German disposition, would have preferred to wait for the Nazis to attack.

The second mistake, made by P.A. Rotmistrov himself, concerns the use of T-70 light tanks (120 vehicles in two corps of the 5th Guards Army that launched the morning attack). Near Prokhorovka, the T-70s were in the front ranks and suffered especially hard from the fire of German tanks and artillery. The roots of this error are rather unexpectedly revealed in the Soviet military doctrine of the late 1930s: it was believed that light tanks were intended primarily for “reconnaissance in force,” and medium and heavy ones for the decisive blow. The Germans acted exactly the opposite: their heavy wedges broke through the defense, and light tanks and infantry followed, “cleaning up” the territory. Undoubtedly, by Kursk, Soviet generals were thoroughly familiar with the Nazi tactics. What made Rotmistrov make such a strange decision is a mystery. Perhaps he was counting on the effect of surprise and hoped to overwhelm the enemy with numbers, but, as I wrote above, the surprise attack did not work out.

What really happened near Prokhorovka, and why did Rotmistrov barely manage to escape the tribunal? At 8.30 am, Soviet tanks began to advance on the Germans, who were in good positions. At the same time, an air battle ensued, where, apparently, neither side gained the upper hand. The first ranks of Rotmistrov's two tank corps were shot by fascist tanks and artillery. Towards noon, during fierce attacks, some of the vehicles broke through to the Nazi positions, but they failed to push back the enemy. Having waited for the offensive impulse of Rotmistrov’s army to dry up, the Germans themselves went on the attack, and... It would seem that they should have easily won the battle, but no!

General form battlefield near Prokhorovka.

Speaking about the actions of Soviet military leaders, it should be noted that they wisely managed their reserves. On the southern sector of the front, the SS Reich division advanced only a couple of kilometers and was stopped mainly by anti-tank artillery fire with the support of attack aircraft. The Adolf Hitler division, exhausted by the attacks of Soviet troops, remained on same place. North of Prokhorovka, the “Dead Head” tank division operated, which, according to German reports, did not encounter Soviet troops at all that day, but for some reason only covered 5 kilometers! This is an unrealistically small figure, and we can rightfully assume that the delay of the “Dead Head” is on the “conscience” of Soviet tanks. Moreover, it was in this area that a reserve of 150 tanks of the 5th and 1st Guards Tank Armies remained.

And one more point: the failure in the morning clash near Prokhorovka does not in any way detract from the merits of the Soviet tank crews. The tank crews fought until the last shell, showing miracles of courage, and sometimes pure Russian ingenuity. Rotmistrov himself recalled (and it is unlikely that he invented such a vivid episode) how the commander of one of the platoons, Lieutenant Bondarenko, towards whom two “tigers” were moving, managed to hide his tank behind a burning German vehicle. The Germans decided that Bondarenko’s tank had been hit, turned around, and one of the “tigers” immediately received a shell on its side.

Attack of Soviet "thirty-fours" with infantry support.

The losses of the 5th Guards Army that day amounted to 343 tanks. The Germans, according to modern historians, lost up to 70 vehicles. However, here we are talking only about irrecoverable losses. Soviet troops could bring up reserves and send damaged tanks for repairs. The Germans, who had to attack at all costs, did not have such an opportunity.

How to evaluate the results of the battle at Prokhorovka? From a tactical point of view, and also taking into account the ratio of losses - a draw, or even a slight victory for the Germans. However, if you look at the strategic map, it is obvious that the Soviet tankers were able to complete their main task - to slow down the German offensive. July 12 was a turning point in the Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel failed, and on the same day the Red Army counteroffensive began north of Orel. The second stage of the battle (Operation Kutuzov, carried out primarily by the Bryansk and Western fronts) was successful for the Soviet troops: by the end of July the enemy was driven back to their original positions, and already in August the Red Army liberated Orel and Kharkov. The military power of Germany was finally broken, which predetermined the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.

Broken Nazi equipment near Kursk.

Interesting fact. It would be unfair not to give the floor to one of the initiators of the Soviet operation near Kursk, so I give the version of events of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov: “In his memoirs, the former commander of the 5th Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov writes that he played a decisive role in the defeat of the armored forces The “South” armies were played by the 5th Tank Army. This is immodest and not entirely true. The troops of the 6th and 7th Guards and 1st Tank armies, supported by the reserve artillery of the High Command and the air army, bled and exhausted the enemy during the fierce battles of July 4-12. The 5th Panzer Army was already dealing with an extremely weakened group of German troops, which had lost faith in the possibility of a successful fight against the Soviet troops.”

Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov.

Episode 2. Prokhorovka. Legend and Reality

The Battle of Kursk is often referred to as the turning point of the Second World War, effectively decided on July 12, 1943 in the largest tank battle in the Prokhorovka area. This thesis is found mainly in Soviet historiography. Supposedly, the leading edge of the entire course of World War II was the wide isthmus between the Psel River and the Prokhorovka railway station near Belgorod. In a truly titanic duel between two steel armadas on limited space At least 1,500 tanks collided. From the Soviet point of view, this represented a collision of two moving avalanches - 800 Soviet tanks against 750-800 German ones. On July 12, 400 German tanks were destroyed and units of the SS Panzer Corps suffered losses. Marshal Konev melodramatically called this battle "the swan song of the German tank forces."

The creator of the myth about Prokhorovka is Lieutenant General Rotmistrov, who commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army, which on July 12 suffered the heaviest losses of its entire existence. Since he needed to justify himself to Stalin, he composed a legend about the great victory over the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This myth was also adopted by Western historians and continues to this day.

Commander-5th Guards TA Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov

“By chance, just at the same time, German tanks launched an attack from the opposite side of the field. Huge masses of tanks rushed into a head-on collision. Taking advantage of the turmoil, the T-34 crews attacked the Tigers and Panthers, short distance fired at the sides or rear, where ammunition was stored. The failure of the German offensive at Prokhorovka marked the end of Operation Citadel. More than 300 German tanks were destroyed on July 12. The Battle of Kursk tore the heart out of the German army. The Soviet success at Kursk, in which so much was at stake, was the most important success in the entire war.”

In German historiography, the vision of this battle is even more dramatized. In “the largest tank battle in history,” “two armored formations with a very complex structure came together in open close combat in an area no more than 500 meters wide and 1000 meters deep.

What the Battle of Prokhorovka was like in reality.

Firstly, it should be noted that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on July 12, 1943 could not have lost 300 or (like Rotmistrov) 400 tanks;

In total, in the entire Operation Citadel, his total losses amounted to only 33 tanks and assault guns, which is clearly evident from German documents. He could not resist the Soviet troops on equal terms, even without losing the Panthers and Ferdinands, because they were not in his composition;

In addition, Rotmistrov’s statement about the destruction of 70 Tigers is a fiction. On that day, only 15 tanks of this type were ready for use, of which only five saw action in the Prokhorovka area. In total, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, by decree on July 12, had a total of 211 tanks, 58 assault guns, and 43 tank destroyers (self-propelled guns) in working order. However, since the SS Panzergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" was advancing to the north on that day - above the Psel River, the 5th Guards Tank Army had to be confronted by 117 serviceable and combat-ready tanks, 37 assault guns and 32 tank destroyers, as well as another 186 combat vehicles.

Rotmistrov had 838 combat vehicles ready for battle on the morning of July 12 and another 96 tanks were on the way. He thought about his five corps and withdrew the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps into reserve and gave it about 100 tanks to protect his left flank from the forces of the Wehrmacht 3rd Tank Corps advancing from the south. 186 tanks and self-propelled guns of the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions were involved in the battle against 672 Soviet ones. Rotmistrov’s operational plan can be characterized by two directions of the main attack:

The main blow was delivered frontally from the northeast against the SS panzergrenadier division Leibstandarte. It was applied from Prokhorovka between the railway embankment and the Psel River. However, since the river was swampy, there was only one section of 3 kilometers left for maneuver. In this area, to the right of Psel, the 18th Tank Corps was concentrated, and to the left of the railway embankment, the 29th Tank Corps. This meant that on the first day of the battle, more than 400 combat vehicles went to 56 tanks, 20 tank destroyers and 10 Leibstandarte assault guns. The Russian superiority was approximately fivefold.

At the same time, another blow was to be delivered to the German flank at the junction between the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions. Here the 2nd Guards Tank Corps advanced, supported by the 2nd Tank Corps. In total, about 200 Soviet tanks were ready to go against the German division, which consisted of 61 combat-ready tanks, 27 assault guns and twelve tank destroyers.

In addition, we should not forget about the formations of the Voronezh Front, especially the 69th Army, which fought in this direction. In the battle zone of the 5th Guards Tank Army, in addition to reserve units, formations of the 5th Guards Army, for example, the 9th Guards Parachute Division, also operated. Vatutin also sent Rotmistrov 5 artillery and 2 mortar regiments, reinforced with anti-tank units, and 10 anti-tank artillery brigades. As a result, in the Prokhorovka area the density of fire was such that the chances of surviving outside armor protection were minimal. The Soviet counterattack was supported by two air armies, while the German side could only occasionally count on air support at the climax of the battle. The 8th Air Corps was supposed to allocate two-thirds of the aircraft at its disposal for operations on other fronts, in particular in the offensive zone of the 9th Army.

In this regard, one should not neglect psychological aspect. In the 2nd SS Panzer Corps since July 5, soldiers were in continuous combat and experienced serious supply difficulties. Now they found fresh Soviet units, namely the elite units of the Fifth Guards Tank Army led by P.A. Rotmistrov, a famous tank specialist in the Red Army. The Germans were afraid of the principles of warfare by Russian troops, distinctive feature of which there were avalanche-like massive attacks without taking into account losses. It was not just the overwhelming numerical superiority that caused concern. The attacking soldiers often fell into a kind of trance and did not react to the danger at all. What role did vodka play in the fighting? Eastern Front was no secret to the Germans; Russian historiography, apparently, only recently began to consider this topic. According to two American military historians, such a violent attack near Prokhorovka on July 12 was not without the use of psychotropic drugs.
This may be a partial explanation for the mysterious events that occurred at altitude 252.2. For the rest it was a complete surprise. This was an outstanding achievement by Rotmistrov and his staff - to quickly and quietly bring an armada of tanks and other weapons into battle. Vehicle. This was supposed to be the logical conclusion of a three-day march with a length of 330-380 km. German intelligence indeed expected a counterattack, but not on such a scale.

The day of July 11 ended with local success for the Leibstandarte panzergrenadier division. The next day, the division was tasked with overcoming the anti-tank ditch. Then it swept over the height of 252.2 like a “giant wave”. Having occupied the heights, the Leibstandarte went to the Oktyabrsky state farm, where it encountered resistance from the 9th Guards Airborne Division 2.5 kilometers from Prokhorovka. But at the same time, they themselves exposed the flanks of their position. On the right flank, the Leibstandarte could be supported by the motorized division "Das Reich". Even more dangerous situation formed on the left wing, which was almost hanging in the air.

The commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, Obergruppenführer P. Hausser (left), sets a task for the artillery commander of the SS division Totenkopf, SS Brigadeführer Priss

Since the attack of the SS motorized division Death's Head was not in the east, but rather in the north, the striking wedges dispersed. A gap was created, which was monitored by the Leibstandarte intelligence department, but was unlikely to be controlled by it. An enemy strike along the Psl could lead to fatal consequences at this stage. Therefore, the Leibstandarte was tasked with stopping the enemy’s advance.

The 2nd SS Panzer Corps went on the offensive the next day. The first blow, under the noticeable impact of the entire artillery of the corps, was the attack of the “Totenkopf” division on the Pselsky bridgehead and the dominant height of 226.6. Only after capturing the heights north of the Psel River could the other two divisions continue their attack. The Leibstandarte formations advanced scatteredly. On the right southern wing of the railway embankment the 1st SS Motorized Regiment operated; to the left, closer to height 252.2, the 2nd SS Motorized Regiment operated. The tank regiment redeployed to a bridgehead beyond Height 252.2 to recuperate. But the regiment actually consisted of only one battalion with three companies, and one battalion of heavy tanks with four combat-ready Tigers. The second battalion, equipped with Panther tanks, was sent to the zone of operation of the Das Reich division.

It is necessary to note the following bright point - in the space between the Prokhorovka station and the Psel River there was no German tank army with 800 combat-ready tanks, as Soviet historians claim, but only one tank battalion. It is also a legend that on the morning of July 12, two tank armadas met in battle, attacking in close formation, like knights clad in armor.

According to Rotmistrov, at 7:30 (8:30 Moscow time) the attacks of the Leibstandarte tankmen began - “In deep silence, the enemy appeared behind us, without receiving a worthy response, because we had seven difficult days of fighting and sleep, as a rule, was very short".

At that time, the 3rd tank battalion of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment was operating on the front line, whose commander was Sturmbannführer Jochen Peiper (someday I will finish his biography, he was a damn interesting person), who became known later (during the offensive in the Ardennes).

Joachim Piper

The day before, his formation occupied the trenches at an altitude of 252.2. On this hill on the morning of July 12, the following scene played out: “We were almost all asleep when they suddenly, with the support of aviation, threw all their tanks and motorized infantry at us. It was hell. They were around us, above us, and between us. We fought against each other." The first German tankman who saw the approaching columns of Soviet tanks was Obersturmführer Rudolf von Ribbentrop (son of the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs J. von Ribbentrop - A.K.)

Rudolf von Ribbentrop

When he looked up at 252.2 that morning, he saw a purple flare that meant "Attention Tanks." While the other two tank companies continued to stand behind the ditch, he led his company's seven Panzer IV tanks into the attack. Suddenly he saw a huge tank column coming towards him. “Having walked 100 - 200 meters, we were shocked - 15, 20, 30, 40, and then simply countless numbers of Russian T-34s appeared in front of us. Now this wall of tanks was coming at us. Vehicle after vehicle, wave after wave, increasing incredible pressure on maximum speed was coming towards us. Seven German tanks had no chance against superior forces. Four of them were immediately captured, while the other three tanks escaped."

At this moment, the 29th Tank Corps, led by Major General Kirichenko, consisting of 212 combat vehicles, entered the battle. The attack was carried out by the 31st and 32nd tank brigades and the 53rd motorized rifle brigade, with the support of a self-propelled gun regiment and the 26th Guards Airborne Regiment. When the tanks passed the peak of height 252.2 at maximum speed, they went down the slope to attack two German tank companies that were stationed in the lowlands and opened fire on them. The Russians mistook the German tanks for Tigers and wanted to destroy them using their technical superiority. A German eyewitness reported: “Those who saw all this believed in the kamikaze attack that the Russians were forced to undertake. If the Russian tanks had continued to break through, the collapse of the German front would have followed.”

However, in a matter of minutes everything changed, and the seemingly inevitable success turned into a disaster for the attackers. The reason for this was incredible Soviet carelessness. The Russians forgot about their anti-tank ditches. The aforementioned obstacles, 2 meters deep, were dug by Soviet sappers below the level of Hill 252.2 along the entire line of the German - and now Soviet - attack. The German soldiers saw the following picture: “All the new T-34s were going up the hill, and then picking up speed and falling into their own anti-tank ditches before seeing us.” Ribbentrop was saved by the fact that he managed to slip between Soviet tanks in his tank, covered with a dense cloud of dust: “Well, obviously, these were T-34s trying to get out of their own ditches. The Russians were concentrated on the bridge and presented an easy target for encirclement; most of their tanks were shot down. It was a Hell of fire, smoke, dead and wounded, as well as burning T-34s!” - he wrote.

On the opposite side of the ditch, there were only two German tank companies that could not stop this steel avalanche. But now there was no “shooting at a moving target.” Finally, four Tiger tanks, which were located on the left flank of the division, were brought into battle. The 2nd SS Panzer Regiment managed to carry out a counterattack before noon to capture Hill 252.2 and the Oktyabrsky state farm. The front edge of this height looked like a tank cemetery. Here were the most charred wrecks of more than 100 Soviet tanks and several armored personnel carriers from Peiper's battalion.

As can be seen from the logistics of the Leibstandarte division, on July 12, the division captured more than 190 abandoned Soviet tanks. Most of them were found in a small area on the indicated hill. However, this number seemed so incredible that Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser, commander of the II SS Panzer Corps, went to the front line to see it with his own eyes. According to the latest Russian information, the 29th Tank Corps alone lost 172 of its 219 tanks and assault guns on July 12, 118 of which were permanently lost. The casualties in manpower amounted to 1,991 people, of which 1,033 were dead and missing.

"Pappa" Hausser. Judging by his profile photo, he has already taken an excursion to the Borodino field

While at height 252.2, the frontal offensive of the 19th Panzer Corps was repulsed and reached its climax critical situation on the left flank of the Leibstandarte division. Here, the offensive of units of the 18th Tank Corps of Major General Bakharov, advancing in the area of ​​the Psel River with forces of 170, 110 and 181 tank brigades, was supported by the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and a number of front-line units, such as the 36th Guards Tank Regiment, equipped with British tanks." Churchill."

Commander of the 18th Tank Corps, Major General B.S. Bakharov

From the German point of view, this unexpected attack was the worst case scenario, namely, the attack was delivered into the previously described gap between the SS motorized divisions "Totenkopf" and "Leibstandarte". The 18th Soviet Tank Corps penetrated almost unhindered into enemy positions. The left flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment was in disarray, and a clear front line no longer existed. Both sides lost control, control, and the course of the battle fell apart into many separate battles in which it was difficult to determine “who is attacking and who is defending.”

Commander of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division, SS Oberführer Theodor Wisch

Soviet ideas about this battle are full of myths, and in the next episode the level of drama reaches its climax. On the morning of July 12, the second battalion of the 181st Armored Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps joined the offensive along the Petrovka-Psel line. A shell fired from a Tiger tank hit the T-34 tank of the guard battalion commander, Captain Skripkin. The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev replaced him in the burning car.

Senior lieutenant (captain during the Battle of Kursk) P.A. Skripkin,

commander of the 1st tank battalion 181st brigade 18th tank with his daughter Galya. 1941

This episode is traditionally interpreted as follows: “The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev jumped back into the burning tank, started the engine and rushed towards the enemy. The tank rushed like a flaming fireball towards the enemy. The Tiger stopped and prepared to retreat. But it was too late. A burning Soviet tank crashed into a German tank at full speed. The explosion shook the ground. The courage of the Soviet tank crews shocked the Germans, and they retreated."

Tank driver Alexander Nikolaev

This episode became business card Battle of Kursk. Artists captured this dramatic scene on artistic canvases, directors - on movie screens. But what did this incident look like in reality? The mechanic-driver of the allegedly exploded Tiger, Scharführer Georg Letzsch, describes the events as follows: “In the morning the company was on the left flank of the second tank division. Suddenly, about 50 enemy tanks, protected by a small forest, attacked us on a wide front [...] I knocked out 2 tanks T-34, one of which, blazing like a torch, was rushing towards me. At the last moment I was able to dodge the burning mass of metal coming at me with great speed.” The attack by the 18th Tank Corps was repelled with heavy losses, including (according to Soviet data) 55 tanks.

The attack of Soviet troops in the southeast of the Prokhorovka-Belgorod railway embankment developed no less unsuccessfully. At the Stalinskoe 1 state farm there was an SS panzergrenadier regiment operating on the right wing of the Leibstandarte division, without any tank support and with lightly armored Marder tank destroyers as reinforcement. They were opposed by the 25th Tank Brigade of the 19th Tank Corps, with the support of the 1446th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment of the 28th Guards Airborne Regiment and part of the formations of the 169th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps.

To the south was the extended right flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was covered by the Das Reich division. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps operated in this direction. Their attacks, planned in the Yasnaya Polyana-Kalinin direction, were repulsed after heavy fighting. Then German troops counterattacked and captured the village of Storozhevoye, located on the left wing.

The most significant successes were achieved on July 12 by the motorized SS division "Totenkopf", which, contrary to Soviet ideas, did not fight with the 5th Guards Tank Army of General Rotmistrov in the Prokhorovka area. In fact, all the tanks operated on the opposite bank of the Psel and attacked north from there. Despite the losses suffered, the division planned to counterattack in the Mikhailovka area in order to knock over the Soviet tanks, which were striking at the Leibstandarte division, with a blow in the back. But this attempt failed due to the swampy banks of the river. Only in the Kozlovka area did some infantry units remain, operating as part of the 6th SS Motorized Regiment. They remained on the south bank to provide a reserve.

SS Gruppenführer Max Simon - commander of the "Totenkopf" division

Also incorrect is Rotmistrov’s statement that on July 12 he launched an attack on the “Dead Head” positions with the forces of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and with the help of his reserves. Although he sent the 24th Guards Tank Brigade and the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade on an offensive north of the Psel River. But, as American historians write, these formations were delayed on the march and took part in the battle only the next day.

The "Dead Head" division at this time attacked the positions of the 5th Guards Army of General Alexei Semenovich Zhadov, reinforced by units of the 6th Guards Army and the 31st Tank Corps. By mid-day, crushing Russian attacks in the direction of the Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road were repulsed, which made Rotmistrov nervous. He was afraid of losing control of his formations due to the threat to his flanks and rear. This northernmost attack became a symbol of the entire day of July 12th. The German forces were initially surprised by the strength of the Soviet counteroffensive and huddled together to defend themselves, but then abruptly launched a counterattack and drove back the Soviet formations with heavy losses, leaving the Russians unable to continue their offensive in the afternoon.