Second Chechen war. The war in Chechnya: history, beginning and results

1. The First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between Russian troops (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya, and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus, with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991.

2. Officially, the conflict was defined as “measures to maintain constitutional order”; military actions were called the “first Chechen war”, less often the “Russian-Chechen” or “Russian-Caucasian war”. The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of ethnic cleansing of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.

3. Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the withdrawal of Russian units, mass destruction and casualties, de facto independence of Chechnya before the Second Chechen War and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.

4. With the beginning of perestroika in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements intensified. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev.

5. On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power arose in the republic.

6. During the “August putsch” in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House. More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. The head of the Chechen Republic, D. G. Zavgaev, spoke on this issue in 1996 at a meeting of the State Duma."

Yes, on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic (today it is divided) the war began in the fall of 1991, it was the war against a multinational people, when the criminal regime, with some support from those who today also show an unhealthy interest in the situation, flooded this people with blood. The first victim of what was happening was the people of this republic, and the Chechens first of all. The war began when Vitaly Kutsenko, chairman of the Grozny City Council, was killed in broad daylight during a meeting of the Supreme Council of the republic. When Besliev, vice-rector, was shot on the street state university. When Kancalik, the rector of the same state university, was killed. When every day in the fall of 1991, up to 30 people were found killed on the streets of Grozny. When, from the autumn of 1991 until 1994, the morgues of Grozny were filled to the ceiling, announcements were made on local television with a request to take them away, to establish who was there, and so on.

8. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation

9. On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991).” After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply worsened - separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted; the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Checheno-Ingush Republic (1991)” was canceled on November 11, three days after its signing, after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and from the republic The withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses.

10. Dudayev’s forces received a lot of weapons: Two launchers of an operational-tactical missile system in a non-combat-ready state. 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 trainer aircraft, the aircraft converted into light attack aircraft; three MiG-17 fighters and two MiG-15 fighters; six An-2 aircraft and two Mi-8 helicopters, 117 R-23 and R-24 aircraft missiles, 126 R-60 aircraft; about 7 thousand GSh-23 aerial shells. 42 tanks T-62 and T-72; 34 BMP-1 and BMP-2; 30 BTR-70 and BRDM; 44 MT-LB, 942 vehicles. 18 Grad MLRS and more than 1000 shells for them. 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-30 howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them; as well as self-propelled guns 2S1 and 2S3; anti-tank guns MT-12. Five air defense systems, 25 missiles of various types, 88 MANPADS; 105 pcs. S-75 missile defense system. 590 anti-tank weapons, including two Konkurs ATGMs, 24 Fagot ATGM systems, 51 Metis ATGM systems, 113 RPG-7 systems. About 50 thousand small arms, more than 150 thousand grenades. 27 wagons of ammunition; 1620 tons of fuels and lubricants; about 10 thousand sets of clothing, 72 tons of food; 90 tons of medical equipment.

12. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains.

13. The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.

14. The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia was not demarcated and has not yet been determined (2012). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.

16. As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The Republic had state symbols- flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.

17. In reality, the state system of the CRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994. In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. For the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus railway 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand wagons and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994

18. A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.

19. Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer money to Chechnya cash from the budget. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.

21. In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. Amendments were made to the constitution adopted last year; a regime of Dudayev’s personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament

22. After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).

23. Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.

24. The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and none of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.

25. In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, the Dudayevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the General Staff Armed Forces ChRI Aslan Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, Bislan Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander Ruslan Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.

26. On November 26, oppositionists unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.

27. Deployment of troops (December 1994)

At that time, the use of the expression “the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya,” according to deputy and journalist Alexander Nevzorov, was, to a greater extent, caused by journalistic terminological confusion - Chechnya was part of Russia.

Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government that justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya as consistent with the Constitution.

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different directions - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.

Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.

A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Regiment blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.

Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance

In mid-December, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bomb attack was carried out on the city center. The artillery shelling and bombing killed and injured many civilians (including ethnic Russians).

Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops had aerial photographs of the city, outdated plans of the city in limited quantities. The communications facilities were not equipped with closed-circuit communications equipment, which allowed the enemy to intercept communications. The troops were given an order to occupy only industrial buildings and areas and not to invade the homes of the civilian population.

The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade (more than 300 people), a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company of the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment (10 tanks), under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. Federal forces were surrounded - the losses of the battalions of the Maykop brigade, according to official data, amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured.

The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.

On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.

Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.

Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions in Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.

By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the line of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.

In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of ​​Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.

As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.

29. Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)

After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.

The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.

Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya). It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). After Russian soldiers entered the village, some residents who had weapons began to resist, and shootouts broke out on the streets of the village.

According to a number of international organizations (in particular, the UN Commission on Human Rights - UNCHR), many civilians died during the battle for Samashki. This information, disseminated by the separatist agency Chechen Press, however, turned out to be quite contradictory - thus, according to representatives of the Memorial human rights center, this data “does not inspire confidence.” According to Memorial, the minimum number of civilians killed during the clearing of the village was 112-114 people.

One way or another, this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for waging a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk and resumed in February 1996.

By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.

30. Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)

From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.

The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.

Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.

Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory in trucks and stopped in the city of Budennovsk.

The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.

Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.

After the failure of military action to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded

32. The situation in the republic in June - December 1995

After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.

From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.

Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.

On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.

In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to remain in accordance with previously reached agreements.

On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made on the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.

On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu.

The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Dokka Zavgaev.

On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.

On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar. The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.

The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.

On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded

On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoy, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses - almost all the armored vehicles and half of the personnel were lost.

From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.

On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of ​​the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.

By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the titles of Heroes of the Russian Federation

37. Negotiations with the separatists (May - July 1996)

Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to Once again go to negotiations with the separatists.

On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the cancellation military duty.

On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.

The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.

On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.

On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.

On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; They blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city.

Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).

According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements

On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

40. The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).

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42. Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% of the contract amount. . Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War."

43. According to data released by the OGV headquarters, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, 19,794 wounded

44. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen).

45. However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the militants’ losses did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.

46. ​​On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission public organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev”). “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations; the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial human rights center.

47. On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the assault on Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon the wounded and prisoners began to appear there Russian soldiers. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,

48. According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev’s entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “because of his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.” In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya”

49. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) launched an extensive relief program since the beginning of the conflict, providing more than 250,000 internally displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance. In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. The following year, 1996, more than 230 million liters were produced drinking water for residents of the North Caucasus.

51. During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to assist those affected by the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen militants in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to the recipients on Red Cross message forms, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the reconstruction and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, and provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and orphanages shelters.

Russian troops fought in Chechnya under the Tsars, when the Caucasus region was just part of the Russian Empire. But in the nineties of the last century, a real massacre began there, the echoes of which have not subsided to this day. The Chechen war in 1994-1996 and in 1999-2000 are two disasters for the Russian army.

Prerequisites for the Chechen wars

The Caucasus has always been a very difficult region for Russia. Issues of nationality, religion, and culture have always been raised very sharply and were resolved in far from peaceful ways.

After it collapsed in 1991 Soviet Union, in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, on the basis of national and religious hostility, the influence of separatists increased, as a result of which the Republic of Ichkeria was self-proclaimed. She entered into confrontation with Russia.

In November 1991, Boris Yeltsin, then the President of Russia, issued a decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic.” But this decree was not supported in the Supreme Council of Russia, due to the fact that most of the seats there were occupied by Yeltsin’s opponents.

In 1992, on March 3, Dzhokhar Dudayev said that he would enter into negotiations only when Chechnya received complete independence. A few days later, on the twelfth, the Chechen parliament adopted a new constitution, self-proclaiming the country as a secular independent state.

Almost immediately all government buildings, all military bases, all strategically important objects were captured. The territory of Chechnya completely came under the control of the separatists. From that moment on, legitimate centralized power ceased to exist. The situation got out of control: the trade in arms and people flourished, drug trafficking passed through the territory, bandits robbed the population (especially the Slavic ones).

In June 1993, soldiers from Dudayev's personal guard seized the parliament building in Grozny, and Dudayev himself proclaimed the emergence of a “sovereign Ichkeria” - a state that he completely controlled.

A year later, the First Chechen War (1994-1996) will begin, which will mark the beginning of a whole series of wars and conflicts that have become, perhaps, the bloodiest and most brutal throughout the entire territory of the former Soviet Union.

First Chechen: the beginning

In 1994, on the eleventh of December, Russian troops in three groups entered the territory of Chechnya. One entered from the west, through North Ossetia, another - through Mozdok, and the third group - from the territory of Dagestan. Initially, command was entrusted to Eduard Vorobyov, but he refused and resigned, citing complete unpreparedness for this operation. Later, the operation in Chechnya will be headed by Anatoly Kvashnin.

Of the three groups, only the Mozdok group was able to successfully reach Grozny on December 12th - the other two were blocked in different parts of Chechnya by local residents and partisan militant groups. A few days later, the remaining two groups of Russian troops approached Grozny and blocked it from all sides, with the exception of the southern direction. Until the start of the assault from this side, access to the city would be free for militants; this later influenced the siege of Grozny by federal forces.

Storm of Grozny

On December 31, 1994, the assault began, which claimed many lives of Russian soldiers and remained one of the most tragic episodes in Russian history. About two hundred units of armored vehicles entered Grozny from three sides, which were almost powerless in the conditions of street fighting. There was poor communication between the companies, which made it difficult to coordinate joint actions.

Russian troops are stuck on the streets of the city, constantly falling under the crossfire of militants. The battalion of the Maykop brigade, which advanced the furthest to the city center, was surrounded and was almost completely destroyed along with its commander, Colonel Savin. The battalion of the Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment, which went to the rescue of the “Maikopians”, after two days of fighting consisted of about thirty percent of the original composition.

By the beginning of February, the number of attackers was increased to seventy thousand people, but the assault on the city continued. It was not until the third of February that Grozny was blocked from the south and encircled.

On March 6, part of the last detachments of Chechen separatists was killed, others left the city. Grozny remained under the control of Russian troops. In fact, little remained of the city - both sides actively used both artillery and armored vehicles, so Grozny was practically in ruins.

In the rest of the area there were continuous local battles between Russian troops and militant groups. In addition, the militants prepared and carried out a series (June 1995) in Kizlyar (January 1996). In March 1996, militants made an attempt to recapture Grozny, but the assault was repelled by Russian soldiers. And Dudayev was liquidated.

In August, the militants repeated their attempt to take Grozny, this time they were successful. Many important facilities in the city were blocked by the separatists, and Russian troops suffered very heavy losses. Along with Grozny, the militants took Gudermes and Argun. On August 31, 1996, the Khasavyurt Agreement was signed - the First Chechen War ended with huge losses for Russia.

Human losses in the First Chechen War

The data varies depending on which side is doing the counting. Actually, this is not surprising and it has always been this way. Therefore, all options are provided below.

Losses in the Chechen War (table No. 1 according to the headquarters of the Russian troops):

The two numbers in each column indicating the losses of Russian troops are two headquarters investigations that were conducted a year apart.

According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the consequences of the Chechen war are completely different. The number of people killed there alone is about fourteen thousand.

Losses in the Chechen War (Table No. 2) of militants according to Ichkeria and a human rights organization:

Among the civilian population, Memorial put forward a figure of 30-40 thousand people, and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation A. I. Lebed - 80,000.

Second Chechen: main events

Even after the signing of the peace agreements, Chechnya did not become calmer. Militants were in charge, there was a brisk trade in drugs and weapons, people were kidnapped and killed. There was anxiety on the border between Dagestan and Chechnya.

After a series of kidnappings of major businessmen, officers, and journalists, it became clear that the continuation of the conflict in a more acute phase was simply inevitable. Moreover, since April, small groups of militants began to probe the weak points of the defense of Russian troops, preparing an invasion of Dagestan. The invasion operation was led by Basayev and Khattab. The place where the militants planned to strike was in the mountainous zone of Dagestan. There, the small number of Russian troops was combined with the inconvenient location of the roads, along which reinforcements could not be transferred very quickly. On August 7, 1999, militants crossed the border.

The main striking force of the bandits were mercenaries and Islamists from Al-Qaeda. The fighting continued for almost a month with varying success, but finally the militants were driven back to Chechnya. At the same time, the bandits carried out a number of terrorist attacks in different cities of Russia, including Moscow.

As a response, on September 23, a powerful shelling of Grozny began, and a week later, Russian troops entered Chechnya.

Human losses in the Second Chechen War among Russian military personnel

The situation changed, and Russian troops now played a dominant role. But many mothers never saw their sons.

Losses in the Chechen War (table No. 3):

In June 2010, the commander in chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs cited the following figures: 2,984 killed and about 9,000 wounded.

Militant losses

Losses in the Chechen War (table No. 4):

Civilian casualties

According to officially confirmed data, as of February 2001, over a thousand civilians were killed. In the book by S.V. Ryazantsev “Demographic and migration portrait of the North Caucasus” the losses of the parties in the Chechen war are called five thousand people, although it is it's already underway about 2003

Judging by the assessment of the Amnesty International organization, which calls itself non-governmental and objective, there were about twenty-five thousand civilian deaths. They can count for a long time and diligently, but when asked: “How many actually died in the Chechen war?” - hardly anyone will give an intelligible answer.

Results of the war: peace conditions, restoration of Chechnya

While the Chechen war was going on, the loss of equipment, enterprises, land, any resources and everything else was not even considered, because people always remain the main ones. But the war ended, Chechnya remained part of Russia, and the need arose to restore the republic practically from ruins.

Huge amounts of money were allocated for Grozny. After several assaults, there were almost no entire buildings left there, but at the moment it is a large and beautiful city.

The economy of the republic was also raised artificially - it was necessary to give time for the population to get used to the new realities, so that new factories and farms could be built. Roads, communication lines, and electricity were needed. Today we can say that the republic has almost completely emerged from the crisis.

Chechen wars: reflected in films, books

Dozens of films were made based on events that took place in Chechnya. Many books have been published. Now it is no longer possible to understand where are the fictions and where are the real horrors of war. The Chechen war (like the war in Afghanistan) claimed too many lives and swept through an entire generation, so it simply could not remain unnoticed. Russia's losses in the Chechen wars are colossal, and, according to some researchers, the losses are even greater than during the ten years of war in Afghanistan. Below is a list of films that most deeply show us the tragic events of the Chechen campaigns.

• documentary film of five episodes "Chechen Trap";
• "Purgatory";
• "Cursed and Forgotten";
• "Prisoner of the Caucasus".

Many fiction and journalistic books describe the events in Chechnya. For example, the now famous writer Zakhar Prilepin fought as part of the Russian troops, who wrote the novel “Pathologies” specifically about this war. Writer and publicist Konstantin Semenov published a series of stories "Grozny Stories" (about the storming of the city) and the novel "We were betrayed by our homeland." Vyacheslav Mironov’s novel “I Was in This War” is dedicated to the storming of Grozny.

Video recordings made in Chechnya by rock musician Yuri Shevchuk are widely known. He and his group "DDT" performed more than once in Chechnya in front of Russian soldiers in Grozny and at military bases.

Conclusion

The State Council of Chechnya published data from which it follows that between 1991 and 2005, almost one hundred and sixty thousand people died - this figure includes militants, civilians, and Russian soldiers. One hundred sixty thousand.

Even if the numbers are exaggerated (which is quite likely), the volume of losses is still simply colossal. Russia's losses in the Chechen wars are a terrible memory of the nineties. The old wound will ache and itch in every family that lost a man there, in the Chechen war.

(officially called counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (WHO) - a common name for military operations on the territory of Chechnya and the border regions of the North Caucasus. It began on September 30, 1999 (the date of entry of the Russian Armed Forces into Chechnya). The active phase of hostilities lasted from 1999 to 2000, then, as the Russian Armed Forces established control over the territory of Chechnya, it developed into a smoldering conflict, which actually continues to this day. From 0 o'clock on April 16, 2009, the CTO regime was cancelled.

Background

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1996, there was no peace and tranquility in Chechnya and the surrounding regions.

Chechen criminal structures made a business out of mass kidnappings with impunity. Hostage-taking for ransom regularly occurred - both of official Russian representatives and foreign citizens working in Chechnya - journalists, humanitarian workers, religious missionaries and even people coming to the funerals of relatives. In particular, in the Nadterechny region in November 1997, two Ukrainian citizens who came to attend their mother’s funeral were captured; in 1998, in the neighboring republics of the North Caucasus, Turkish builders and businessmen were regularly kidnapped and taken to Chechnya; in January 1998, in Vladikavkaz / North Ossetia / French citizen and representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Vincent Costel was kidnapped. He was released in Chechnya 11 months later; on October 3, 1998, four employees of the British company Granger Telecom were kidnapped in Grozny, and in December they were brutally murdered and beheaded). The bandits profited from the theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil wells, the production and smuggling of drugs, the issuance and distribution of counterfeit banknotes, terrorist attacks and attacks on neighboring Russian regions. Camps were created on the territory of Chechnya to train militants - young people from Muslim regions of Russia. Mine demolition instructors and Islamic preachers were sent here from abroad. Numerous Arab volunteers began to play a significant role in the life of Chechnya. Their main goal was to destabilize the situation in the Russian regions neighboring Chechnya and spread the ideas of separatism to the North Caucasian republics (primarily Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria).

At the beginning of March 1999, Gennady Shpigun, plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, was kidnapped by terrorists at the Grozny airport. For the Russian leadership, this was evidence that the President of the Chechen Republic, Maskhadov, was unable to independently fight terrorism. The federal center took measures to strengthen the fight against Chechen gangs: self-defense units were armed and police units were strengthened throughout the entire perimeter of Chechnya, the best operatives of units fighting ethnic organized crime were sent to the North Caucasus, several Tochka-U missile launchers were deployed from the Stavropol region ", intended for delivering targeted strikes. An economic blockade of Chechnya was introduced, which led to cash flow from Russia began to dry up sharply. Due to the tightening of the regime at the border, it has become increasingly difficult to smuggle drugs into Russia and take hostages. Gasoline produced in clandestine factories has become impossible to export outside Chechnya. The fight against Chechen criminal groups that actively financed militants in Chechnya was also intensified. In May-July 1999, the Chechen-Dagestan border turned into a militarized zone. As a result, the income of Chechen warlords fell sharply and they had problems purchasing weapons and paying mercenaries. In April 1999, Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov, who successfully led a number of operations during the First Chechen War, was appointed commander-in-chief of the internal troops. In May 1999, Russian helicopters launched a missile attack on the positions of Khattab militants on the Terek River in response to an attempt by gangs to seize an outpost of internal troops on the Chechen-Dagestan border. After this, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Vladimir Rushailo, announced the preparation of large-scale preventive strikes.

Meanwhile, Chechen gangs under the command of Shamil Basayev and Khattab were preparing for an armed invasion of Dagestan. From April to August 1999, conducting reconnaissance in force, they made more than 30 forays in Stavropol and Dagestan alone, as a result of which several dozen military personnel, law enforcement officers and civilians were killed and injured. Realizing that the strongest groups of federal troops were concentrated in the Kizlyar and Khasavyurt directions, the militants decided to strike at the mountainous part of Dagestan. When choosing this direction, the bandits proceeded from the fact that there were no troops there, and it would not be possible to transfer forces to this inaccessible area in the shortest possible time. In addition, the militants were counting on a possible attack in the rear of federal forces from the Kadar zone of Dagestan, controlled by local Wahhabis since August 1998.

As researchers note, the destabilization of the situation in the North Caucasus was beneficial to many. First of all, Islamic fundamentalists seeking to spread their influence throughout the world, as well as Arab oil sheikhs and financial oligarchs of the Persian Gulf countries, who are not interested in starting to exploit the oil and gas fields of the Caspian Sea.

On August 7, 1999, a massive invasion of Dagestan by militants was carried out from the territory of Chechnya under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab field commander Khattab. The core of the militant group consisted of foreign mercenaries and fighters of the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, associated with Al-Qaeda. The militants’ plan to have the population of Dagestan come over to their side failed; the Dagestanis offered desperate resistance to the invading bandits. The Russian authorities proposed that the Ichkerian leadership conduct a joint operation with federal forces against Islamists in Dagestan. It was also proposed to “resolve the issue of liquidating bases, storage and rest areas of illegal armed groups, which the Chechen leadership in every possible way denies.” Aslan Maskhadov verbally condemned the attacks on Dagestan and their organizers and instigators, but did not take real measures to counter them.

Fighting between federal forces and invading militants continued for more than a month, ending with the militants being forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya. On these same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks - explosions of residential buildings - were carried out in several Russian cities (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk).

Considering Maskhadov’s inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops.

On September 23, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation.” The decree provided for the creation of a Joint Group of Forces in the North Caucasus to conduct a counter-terrorism operation.

On September 23, Russian troops began massive bombing of Grozny and its environs, and on September 30 they entered the territory of Chechnya.

Character

Having broken the resistance of militants using army units and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the command of Russian troops successfully uses military tricks, such as luring militants to minefields, raids behind enemy lines and many others), the Kremlin relied on the “Chechenization” of the conflict and luring on their side were parts of the elite and former members of the Chechen armed forces. Thus, in 2000, the former supporter of the separatists, the chief mufti of Chechnya, Akhmat Kadyrov, became the head of the pro-Kremlin administration of Chechnya in 2000. The militants, on the contrary, relied on the internationalization of the conflict, involving armed groups of non-Chechen origin in their struggle. By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Barayev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants decreased significantly. During 2005-2008, not a single major terrorist attack was committed in Russia, and the only large-scale militant operation (Raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in complete failure. However, since 2010, several major terrorist attacks have been recorded, the Terrorist Act in Vladikavkaz (2010), the Terrorist Act at Domodedovo Airport).

KGB General Philip Bobkov in 2005 gave the following characterization of the actions of the Chechen resistance: “These operations are not much different from the military operations of the Israelis before the creation of their state in Palestine, and then Palestinian extremists in Israel or now Albanian armed forces in Kosovo.”

Chronology

1999

Aggravation of the situation on the border with Chechnya

Attack on Dagestan

• August 1 - Armed detachments from the villages of Echeda, Gakko, Gigatl and Agvali in the Tsumadinsky region of Dagestan, as well as the Chechens supporting them, announced that Sharia rule was being introduced in the region.
• August 2 - In the area of ​​​​the village of Echeda in the high-mountainous Tsumadinsky region of Dagestan, a military clash occurred between police officers and Wahhabis. Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Dagestan Magomed Omarov flew to the scene of the incident. As a result of the incident, 1 riot policeman and several Wahhabis were killed. According to the local police department, the incident was provoked from Chechnya.
• August 3 - As a result of shootouts in the Tsumadinsky region of Dagestan with Islamic extremists who broke through from Chechnya, two more Dagestan police officers and one serviceman of the Russian internal troops were killed. Thus, the losses of the Dagestan police reached four people killed, in addition, two policemen were wounded and three more were missing. Meanwhile, one of the leaders of the Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan, Shamil Basayev, announced the creation of an Islamic Shura, which has its own armed units in Dagestan, which established control over several settlements in the Tsumadinsky region. The Dagestan leadership is asking the federal authorities for weapons for self-defense units that are planned to be created on the border of Chechnya and Dagestan. This decision was made by the State Council of the People's Assembly and the Government of the Republic. The official authorities of Dagestan qualified the incursions of militants as: “an open armed aggression of extremist forces against the Republic of Dagestan, an open encroachment on the territorial integrity and the foundations of its constitutional system, the life and safety of its inhabitants.”
• August 4 - Up to 500 militants driven back from the regional center of Agvali dug in at previously prepared positions in one of the mountain villages, but did not put forward any demands and did not enter into negotiations. Presumably they have three employees of the Tsumadinsky regional department of internal affairs who disappeared on August 3. The security ministers and ministries of Chechnya have been transferred to round-the-clock operation. This was done in accordance with the decree of Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. True, the Chechen authorities deny the connection of these measures with the fighting in Dagestan. At 12.10 Moscow time, on one of the roads in the Botlikh district of Dagestan, five armed people opened fire on a police squad who tried to stop a Niva car for inspection. In the shootout, two bandits were killed and a car was damaged. There were no casualties among the security forces. Two Russian attack aircraft launched a powerful missile and bomb attack on the village of Kenkhi, where a large detachment of militants was prepared to be sent to Dagestan. A regrouping of the forces of the internal troops of the Operational Group in the North Caucasus has begun to block the border with Chechnya. It is planned to deploy additional units of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the Tsumadinsky and Botlikhsky regions of Dagestan.
• August 5 - In the morning, the redeployment of units of the 102nd brigade of internal troops began to the Tsumadinsky district according to the plan for blocking the administrative Dagestan-Chechen border. This decision was made by the commander of the internal troops, Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov, during a trip to the sites of recent military operations. Meanwhile, sources in the Russian special services said that a rebellion was being prepared in Dagestan. According to the plan, a group of 600 militants was transferred to Dagestan through the village of Kenkhi. According to the same plan, the city of Makhachkala will be divided into zones of responsibility of field commanders, as well as the taking of hostages in the most crowded places, after which the official authorities of Dagestan will be asked to resign. However, the official authorities of Makhachkala deny this information.
• August 7 - September 14 - from the territory of the ChRI, detachments of field commanders Shamil Basayev and Khattab invaded the territory of Dagestan. Fierce fighting continued for more than a month. The official government of the ChRI, unable to control the actions of various armed groups on the territory of Chechnya, dissociated itself from the actions of Shamil Basayev, but did not take practical action against him.
• August 12 - Deputy Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation I. Zubov reported that a letter was sent to the President of the Chechen Republic of Igor Maskhadov with a proposal to conduct a joint operation with federal troops against Islamists in Dagestan.
• August 13 - Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that “strikes will be carried out on bases and concentrations of militants, regardless of their location, including on the territory of Chechnya.”
• August 16 - CRI President Aslan Maskhadov introduced martial law in Chechnya for a period of 30 days, announced the partial mobilization of reservists and participants in the First Chechen War.

Aerial bombing of Chechnya

• August 25 - Russian aircraft strike militant bases in the Vedeno Gorge in Chechnya. In response to the official protest from the ChRI, the command of the federal forces declares that they “reserve the right to strike militant bases in the territory of any North Caucasus region, including Chechnya.”
• September 6 - 18 - Russian aviation carries out numerous missile and bomb attacks on military camps and militant fortifications in Chechnya.
• September 11 - Maskhadov announced general mobilization in Chechnya.
• September 14 - Putin said that “the Khasavyurt agreements should be subjected to an impartial analysis”, as well as “a strict quarantine should be temporarily introduced” along the entire perimeter of Chechnya.
• September 18 - Russian troops block the border of Chechnya from Dagestan, Stavropol Territory, North Ossetia and Ingushetia.
• September 23 - Russian aircraft began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. As a result, several electrical substations, a number of oil and gas complex factories, the Grozny mobile communications center, a television and radio broadcasting center, and an An-2 aircraft were destroyed. The press service of the Russian Air Force stated that “aircraft will continue to strike targets that gangs can use in their interests.”
• September 27 - Chairman of the Russian Government V. Putin categorically rejected the possibility of a meeting between the Presidents of Russia and the ChRI. “There will be no meetings to let the militants lick their wounds,” he said.

Start of ground operation

2000

2001

• January 23 - Vladimir Putin decided to reduce and partially withdraw troops from Chechnya.
• June 23-24 - in the village of Alkhan-Kala, a special joint detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB conducted a special operation to eliminate a detachment of militants of field commander Arbi Barayev. 16 militants were killed, including Barayev himself.
• June 25-26 - militant attack on Khankala
• July 11 - in the village of Mayrtup, Shalinsky district of Chechnya, during a special operation of the FSB and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Khattab's assistant Abu Umar was killed.
• August 25 - in the city of Argun, during a special operation, FSB officers killed field commander Movsan Suleimenov, nephew of Arbi Barayev.
• September 17 - an Mi-8 helicopter with a General Staff commission on board was shot down in Grozny (2 generals and 8 officers were killed).
• September 17-18 - militant attack on Gudermes: the attack was repulsed, as a result of the use of the Tochka-U missile system, a group of more than 100 people was destroyed.
• November 3 - during a special operation, the influential field commander Shamil Iriskhanov, who was part of Basayev’s inner circle, was killed.
• December 15 - in Argun, during a special operation, federal forces killed 20 militants.

2002

• January 27 - an Mi-8 helicopter was shot down in the Shelkovsky district of Chechnya. Among the dead were the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Lieutenant General Mikhail Rudchenko, and the commander of the group of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, Major General Nikolai Goridov.
• March 20 - as a result of a special operation by the FSB, terrorist Khattab was killed by poisoning.
• April 18 - in his Address to the Federal Assembly, President Vladimir Putin announced the end of the military stage of the conflict in Chechnya.
• May 9 - a terrorist attack occurred in Kaspiysk during the celebration of Victory Day. 43 people were killed and more than 100 were injured.
• August 19 - Chechen separatists using Igla MANPADS shot down a Russian military transport helicopter Mi-26 in the area of ​​the Khankala military base. Of the 147 people on board, 127 died.
• August 25 - the famous field commander Aslambek Abdulkhadzhiev was killed in Shali.
• September 23 - Raid on Ingushetia (2002)
• October 10 - an explosion occurred in the building of the Zavodsky district police department in Grozny. The explosive device was planted in the office of the head of the department. 25 policemen were killed, about 20 were wounded.
• October 23 - 26 - hostage taking in the theater center on Dubrovka in Moscow, 129 hostages died. All 44 terrorists were killed, including Movsar Barayev.
• December 27 - explosion of the Government House in Grozny. As a result of the terrorist attack, more than 70 people were killed. Shamil Basayev took responsibility for the terrorist attack.

2003

• May 12 - in the village of Znamenskoye of the Nadterechny district of Chechnya, three suicide bombers carried out a terrorist attack in the area of ​​​​the buildings of the administration of the Nadterechny district and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. A KamAZ car loaded with explosives demolished the barrier in front of the building and exploded. 60 people were killed and more than 250 were injured.
• May 14 - in the village of Ilshan-Yurt, Gudermes region, a suicide bomber blew herself up in a crowd celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, where Akhmat Kadyrov was present. 18 people were killed and 145 people were injured.
• June 5 - a suicide bomber blew herself up next to a passenger bus carrying airbase employees en route to a military base in Mozdok. 16 people died on the spot. Four more died from their wounds later.
• July 5 - terrorist attack in Moscow at the Wings rock festival. 16 people were killed and 57 were injured.
• August 1 - Bombing of a military hospital in Mozdok. A KamAZ army truck loaded with explosives rammed the gate and exploded near the building. There was one suicide bomber in the cockpit. The death toll was 52 people.
• September 3 - terrorist attack on the Kislovodsk-Minvody train on the Podkumok-White Coal section; railway tracks were blown up using a landmine: 5 people were killed and 20 were injured.
• November 23 - three kilometers east of Serzhen-Yurt, GRU special forces destroyed a gang of mercenaries from Germany, Turkey and Algeria, numbering about 20 people.
• December 5 - suicide bombing on the Kislovodsk-Minvody train in Essentuki: 41 people were killed, 212 were injured.
• December 9 - suicide bombing near the National Hotel (Moscow).
• December 15, 2003 - February 28, 2004 - Raid on Dagestan by a detachment under the command of Ruslan Gelayev.

2004

• February 6 - terrorist attack in the Moscow metro, on the stretch between the Avtozavodskaya and Paveletskaya stations. 39 people were killed and 122 were injured.
• February 28 - famous field commander Ruslan Gelayev was mortally wounded during a shootout with border guards
• April 16 - during the shelling of the Chechen mountains, the leader of foreign mercenaries in Chechnya, Abu al-Walid al-Ghamidi, was killed
• May 9 - in Grozny at the Dynamo stadium, where the parade in honor of Victory Day was taking place, at 10:32 a powerful explosion occurred on the newly renovated VIP stand. At that moment, there were the President of Chechnya Akhmat Kadyrov, the Chairman of the State Council of the Chechen Republic Kh. Isaev, the commander of the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus General V. Baranov, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Chechnya Alu Alkhanov and the military commandant of the republic G. Fomenko. 2 people died directly in the explosion, 4 more died in hospitals: Akhmat Kadyrov, Kh. Isaev, Reuters journalist A. Khasanov, a child (whose name was not reported) and two Kadyrov security officers. In total, 63 people were injured from the explosion in Grozny, including 5 children.
• June 21 - 22 - Raid on Ingushetia
• July 12 - 13 - a large detachment of militants captured the village of Avtury, Shali district
• August 21 - 400 militants attacked Grozny. According to the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs, 44 people were killed and 36 were seriously injured.
• August 24 - explosions of two Russian passenger airliners, killing 89 people.
• August 31 - terrorist attack near the Rizhskaya metro station in Moscow. 10 people were killed and more than 50 people were injured.
• September 1 - 3 - terrorist attack in Beslan, which killed 334 people, 186 of whom were children.
• October 7 - in a battle north of the village of Niki-Khit, Kurchaloevsky district, a demolition instructor, African-American Khalil Rudvan, was killed.

2005

• February 18 - as a result of a special operation in the Oktyabrsky district of Grozny, the forces of the PPS-2 detachment killed the “Emir of Grozny” Yunadi Turchaev, “ right hand» one of the terrorist leaders Doku Umarov.
• March 8 - During a special operation by the FSB in the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov, was eliminated.
• May 15 - former vice-president of the Chechen Republic of Ichryssia Vakha Arsanov was killed in Grozny. Arsanov and his accomplices, while in a private house, fired at a police patrol and were destroyed by arriving reinforcements.
• May 15 - in the Dubovsky forest of the Shelkovsky district, as a result of a special operation of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the “emir” of the Shelkovsky district of the Chechen Republic, Rasul Tambulatov (Volchek), was killed.
• June 4 - Cleanup in the village of Borozdinovskaya
• October 13 - Militants attack the city of Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria), as a result of which, according to Russian authorities, 12 civilians and 35 law enforcement officers were killed. According to various sources, from 40 to 124 militants were destroyed.

2006

• January 31 - Russian President Vladimir Putin said at a press conference that it is now possible to talk about the end of the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya.
• February 9-11 - in the village of Tukuy-Mekteb in the Stavropol Territory, 12 so-called militants were killed during a special operation. “Nogai battalion of the Armed Forces of the ChRI”, federal forces lost 7 people killed. During the operation, the federal side actively uses helicopters and tanks.
• March 28 - in Chechnya, the former head of the state security department of the ChRI Sultan Gelikhanov voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.
• June 16 - “ChRI President” Abdul-Halim Sadulaev was killed in Argun
• July 4 - in Chechnya, a military convoy was attacked near the village of Avtury, Shalinsky district. Representatives of the federal forces report 6 military personnel killed, bandits - more than 20.
• July 9 - the website of Chechen militants "Caucasus Center" announced the creation of the Ural and Volga fronts as part of the Armed Forces of the ChRI.
• July 10 - in Ingushetia, one of the terrorist leaders Shamil Basayev was killed as a result of a special operation (according to other sources, he died due to careless handling of explosives).
• July 12 - on the border of Chechnya and Dagestan, the police of both republics destroy a relatively large but poorly armed gang consisting of 15 militants. 13 bandits were destroyed, 2 more were detained.
• August 23 - Chechen militants attacked a military convoy on the Grozny - Shatoy highway, not far from the entrance to the Argun Gorge. The column consisted of a Ural vehicle and two escort armored personnel carriers. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic, four federal servicemen were wounded as a result.
• November 7 - in the area of ​​the village of Dai, Shatoi district, a gang of S.-E. Dadaev killed seven riot policemen from Mordovia.
• November 26 - the leader of foreign mercenaries in Chechnya, Abu Hafs al-Urdani, was killed in Khasavyurt. Along with him, 4 more militants were killed.

2007

• April 4 - one of the most influential militant leaders, commander Eastern Front CHRISuleiman Ilmurzaev (call sign “Khairulla”), involved in the murder of Chechen President Akhmat Kadyrov.
• June 13 - in the Vedeno district on the Verkhnie Kurchali - Belgata highway, militants shot at a convoy of police cars.
• July 23 - battle near the village of Tazen-Kale, Vedensky district, between the Vostok battalion of Sulim Yamadayev and a detachment of Chechen militants led by Doku Umarov. The death of 6 militants was reported.
• September 18 - as a result of a counter-terrorist operation in the village of New Sulak, “Amir Rabbani” - Rappani Khalilov - was killed.
• October 7 - Doku Umarov announced the abolition of the ChRI and its transformation into the “vilayat of Nokhchiycho of the Caucasus Emirate”

2008

• January - during special operations in Makhachkala and the Tabasaran region of Dagestan, at least 9 militants were killed, 6 of them were part of the group of field commander I. Mallochiev. There were no casualties on the part of the security forces in these clashes. At the same time, during the clashes in Grozny, the Chechen police killed 5 militants, among them was the field commander U. Techiev, the “emir” of the capital of Chechnya.
• March 19 - an armed attack by militants was carried out on the village of Alkhazurovo. As a result, seven people died, five law enforcement officers and two civilians.
• May 5 - a military vehicle was blown up by a landmine in the village of Tashkola, a suburb of Grozny. 5 policemen were killed, 2 were injured.
• June 13 - night attack by militants in the village of Benoy-Vedeno
• September 2008 - major leaders of the illegal armed formations of Dagestan Ilgar Mallochiev and A. Gudayev were killed, a total of up to 10 militants.
• December 18 - battle in the city of Argun, 2 policemen were killed and 6 were wounded. One person was killed by militants in Argun.
• December 23-25 ​​- special operation of the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the village of Verkhny Alkun in Ingushetia. Field commander Vakha Dzhenaraliev, who fought against federal troops in Chechnya and Ingushetia since 1999, and his deputy Khamkhoev were killed, a total of 12 militants were killed. 4 illegal armed formation bases have been liquidated.
• June 19 - Said Buryatsky announced his joining the underground.

2009

• April 15 is the last day of the counter-terrorist operation regime.

Aggravation of the situation in the North Caucasus in 2009

Despite the official cancellation of the counter-terrorism operation on April 16, 2009, the situation in the region has not become calmer, quite the contrary. Militants waging guerrilla warfare have become more active, and incidents of terrorist acts have become more frequent. Beginning in the fall of 2009, a number of major special operations were carried out to eliminate gangs and militant leaders. In response, a series of terrorist attacks were carried out, including, for the first time in for a long time, in Moscow.

Military clashes, terrorist attacks and police operations are actively taking place not only on the territory of Chechnya, but also on the territory of Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria. In certain territories, the CTO regime was repeatedly temporarily introduced.

Starting from May 15, 2009, Russian security forces intensified operations against militant groups in the mountainous regions of Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan, which caused a retaliatory intensification of terrorist activities by militants. At the end of July 2010, there were all signs of an escalation of the conflict and its spread to nearby regions.

Command

Heads of the Regional Operational Headquarters for the counter-terrorism operation in the North Caucasus (2001-2006)

The Regional Operational Headquarters (ROH) was created by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of January 22, 2001 No. 61 “On measures to combat terrorism in the territory of the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation.”

• German Ugryumov (January - May 2001)
• Anatoly Ezhkov (June 2001 - July 2003)
• Yuri Maltsev (July 2003 - September 2004)
• Arkady Edelev (September 2004 - August 2006)

In 2006, on the basis of ROSH, the Operational Headquarters of the Chechen Republic was created to conduct a counter-terrorism operation.

Commanders of the Joint Group of Troops (Forces) for conducting counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation (since 1999)

The united group was formed by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of September 23, 1999 No. 1255c “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation.”

• Victor Kazantsev (September 1999 - February 2000)
• Gennady Troshev (acting February - March 2000, commander April - June 2000)
• Alexander Baranov (acting March 2000)
• Alexander Baranov (acting July - September 2000, commander September 2000 - October 2001, September 2003 - May 2004)
• Vladimir Moltenskoy (acting May - August 2001, commander October 2001 - September 2002)
• Sergei Makarov (acting July - August 2002, commander October 2002 - September 2003)
• Mikhail Pankov (acting May 2004)
• Vyacheslav Dadonov (acting June 2004 - July 2005)
• Evgeny Lazebin (July 2005 - June 2006)
• Evgeny Baryaev (June - December 2006)
• Yakov Nedobitko (December 2006 - January 2008)
• Nikolay Sivak (January 2008 - August 2011)
• Sergey Melikov (since September 2011)

Conflict in literature, cinema, music

Books

• Alexander Karasev. Traitor. Ufa: Vagant, 2011, 256 p. ISBN 978-5-9635-0344-7.
• Alexander Karasev. Chechen stories. M.: Literary Russia, 2008, 320 p. ISBN 978-5-7809-0114-3.
• Zherebtsova, Polina Viktorovna. Diary of Polina Zherebtsova. Detective Press, 2011, 576 pp. ISBN 978-5-89935-101-3
• Vyacheslav Mironov. "I was in that war."

Films and TV series

• War is a feature film.
• Alexandra - feature film.
• Forced March - feature film.
• Caucasian Roulette is a feature film.
• A man's work (8-episode film).
• Storm Gates (4-episode film).
• Special forces (TV series).
• I have the honor (TV series).
• Lethal force-3 “Strength limit” (1st - 4th series)
• Mistrust - documentary film.
• Alive (film, 2006) - feature film
• Breakthrough (film, 2006) - feature film

Songs and music

Songs dedicated to the Second Chechen War:

• "Lube"- “After the War” (2000), “Soldier” (2000), Let’s get... (2002)
• Yuri Shevchuk- Star (2006), Smoke (2009)
• Timur Gordeev- Tell me, major, we're going home.
• Timur Mutsuraev- “Hava Barayeva” (the view from the militants)
• Igor Rasteryaev- “Song about Yura Prishchepny” (2011)
• Nikolay Anisimov- The rooks have arrived (2010)

Ilya Kramnik, military observer for RIA Novosti.

The second Chechen war in modern Russian history is officially over. The National Anti-Terrorism Committee of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, lifted the counter-terrorism operation (CTO) regime that had been in effect for almost 10 years. This regime in Chechnya was introduced by decree of Boris Yeltsin on September 23, 1999.

The operation, which began in August 1999 with repelling the attack of militants Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan, naturally continued on the territory of Chechnya - where the gangs driven back from Dagestan territory retreated.

The second Chechen war could not help but begin. Events that took place in the region after the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements that ended the previous war in 1996 left no doubt that hostilities would break out again.

Yeltsin era

The nature of the first and second Chechen wars was very different. In 1994, the bet on the “Chechenization” of the conflict was lost - the opposition units were unable (and were unlikely to be able) to resist Dudayev’s formations. The entry of Russian troops into the territory of the republic, which were seriously constrained in their actions and were not very well prepared for the operation, aggravated the situation - the troops encountered fierce resistance, which led to significant losses during the fighting.

The assault on Grozny, which began on December 31, 1994, was especially costly for the Russian army. Disputes about the responsibility of certain individuals for losses during the assault are still ongoing. Experts place the main blame on the then Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who wanted to take the city as quickly as possible.

As a result, the Russian army got involved in multi-week battles in a city with dense buildings. The losses of the armed forces and troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the battles for Grozny in January-February 1995 amounted to more than 1,500 people killed and missing, and about 150 units of irretrievably lost armored vehicles.

As a result of two months of fighting, the Russian army cleared Grozny of gangs, which lost about 7,000 people and a large amount of equipment and weapons. It should be noted that the Chechen separatists received equipment in the early 90s, seizing warehouses located on the territory of Chechnya military units with the connivance of first the authorities of the USSR, and then the Russian Federation.

With the capture of Grozny, however, the war did not end. The fighting continued, capturing more and more of the territory of Chechnya, but it was not possible to suppress the gangs. On June 14, 1995, Basayev’s gang raided the city of Budennovsk, Stavropol Territory, where they seized the city hospital, taking patients and staff hostage. The militants managed to get to Budennovsk by road. The guilt of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was obvious, but, for the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that chaos and decay in those days were almost universal.

The bandits demanded to stop the fighting in Chechnya and begin negotiations with the Dudayev regime. Russian special forces began an operation to free the hostages. However, it was interrupted by the order of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who entered into negotiations with Basayev by telephone. After an unsuccessful assault and negotiations, the Russian authorities agreed to give the terrorists the opportunity to leave unhindered if they released the captured hostages. Basayev's terrorist group returned to Chechnya. As a result of the terrorist attack, 129 people were killed and 415 were injured.

Responsibility for what happened was placed on the director of the Federal Grid Company, Sergei Stepashin, and the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Viktor Erin, who lost their posts.

Meanwhile, the war continued. Federal troops managed to take control of most of the territory of Chechnya, but the attacks by militants hiding in mountainous and wooded areas and enjoying the support of the population did not stop.

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants under the command of Raduev and Israpilov attacked Kizlyar and took a group of hostages in a local maternity hospital and hospital. The militants demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya and the North Caucasus. On January 10, 1996, the bandits left Kizlyar, taking with them hundreds of hostages, the number of which increased after they disarmed the Ministry of Internal Affairs checkpoint.

Soon, Raduev’s group was blocked in the village of Pervomaiskoye, which was stormed by Russian troops on January 15-18. As a result of the attack by Raduev's gang on Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye, 78 military personnel, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and civilians of Dagestan were killed, several hundred people were injured of varying degrees of severity. Some of the militants, including the leaders, broke into the territory of Chechnya through gaps in the poorly organized cordon.

On April 21, 1996, the federal center managed to achieve a major success by eliminating Dzhokhar Dudayev, but his death did not lead to an end to the war. On August 6, 1996, gangs recaptured Grozny, blocking the positions of our troops. The prepared operation to destroy the militants was cancelled.

Finally, on August 14, a ceasefire agreement was signed, after which negotiations between representatives of Russia and Chechnya began on the development of “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.” Negotiations end on August 31, 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements. On the Russian side, the document was signed by Alexander Lebed, then Secretary of the Security Council, and on the Chechen side by Aslan Maskhadov.

De facto, the Khasavyurt agreements and the subsequent “agreement on peace and principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Chechnya,” signed in May 1997 by Yeltsin and Maskhadov, opened the way to the independence of Chechnya. The second article of the agreement directly provided for the construction of relations between the parties on the basis of the principles of international law and agreements of the parties.

Results of the first campaign

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the actions of Russian troops during the first Chechen war. On the one hand, the actions of the troops were seriously limited by numerous non-military considerations - the country's leadership and the Ministry of Defense regularly limited the use of heavy weapons and aircraft for political reasons. There was a severe lack of modern weapons, and the lessons learned from the Afghan conflict, which took place under similar conditions, were forgotten.

In addition, an information war was launched against the army - a number of media outlets and politicians carried out a targeted campaign to support the separatists. The causes and background of the war were kept silent, in particular, the genocide of the Russian-speaking population of Chechnya in the early 90s. Many were killed, others were driven from their homes and were forced to leave Chechnya. Meanwhile, human rights activists and the press paid close attention to any real and imagined sins of the federal forces, but kept silent on the topic of the misfortunes of the Russian residents of Chechnya.

The information war against Russia was also waged abroad. In many Western countries, as well as in states of Eastern Europe and some ex-Soviet republics, organizations arose with the goal of supporting the Chechen separatists. The intelligence services of Western countries also provided assistance to the gangs. A number of countries provided shelter, medical and financial assistance to the militants, and helped them with weapons and documents.

At the same time, it is obvious that one of the reasons for the failures were gross mistakes made by both the top leadership and the operational command, as well as the wave of army corruption, as a consequence of the deliberate and general disintegration of the army, when operational information could simply be sold. In addition, a number of successful operations by militants against Russian columns would have been impossible provided that Russian troops complied with the basic statutory requirements for organizing combat security, reconnaissance, coordination of actions, etc.

The Khasavyurt agreements did not guarantee a peaceful life for Chechnya. Chechen criminal structures made business with impunity on mass kidnappings, hostage-taking (including official Russian representatives working in Chechnya), theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil wells, the production and smuggling of drugs, the issuance and distribution of counterfeit banknotes, terrorist attacks and attacks on neighboring Russian regions. The authorities of Ichkeria even stole the money that Moscow continued to send to Chechen pensioners. A zone of instability arose around Chechnya, which gradually spread across Russian territory.

Second Chechen campaign

In Chechnya itself, in the summer of 1999, the gangs of Shamil Basayev and Khattab, the most prominent Arab mercenary on the territory of the republic, were preparing for the invasion of Dagestan. The bandits counted on weakness Russian authorities, and the surrender of Dagestan. The attack was carried out on the mountainous part of this province, where there were almost no troops.

The fighting with the terrorists who invaded Dagestan on August 7 lasted more than a month. At this time, major terrorist attacks were carried out in several cities of Russia - bombings were carried out in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk. residential buildings. Many civilians died.

The second Chechen war was significantly different from the first. The bet on the weakness of the Russian government and army did not come true. General leadership The new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin took charge of the new Chechen war.

The troops, taught by the bitter experience of 1994-96, behaved much more carefully, actively using various new tactics that made it possible to destroy large forces of militants with few losses. The militants’ individual “successes” cost them too much and could not change anything.

Like, for example, the battle at Height 776, when the bandits managed to escape from encirclement through the positions of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division. During this battle, 90 paratroopers, without air and artillery support due to bad weather, held back the onslaught of more than 2,000 militants for 24 hours. The bandits broke through the company's positions only when it was almost completely destroyed (only six out of 90 people remained alive). The militants' losses amounted to about 500 people. After this, the main type of action by militants becomes terrorist attacks - hostage-taking, explosions on roads and in public places.

Moscow actively exploited the split in Chechnya itself - many field commanders went over to the side of the federal forces. Within Russia itself, the new war also enjoyed significantly greater support than before. This time, in the highest echelons of power, there was no indecision that was one of the reasons for the success of gangs in the 90s. One by one, the most prominent militant leaders are being destroyed. A few leaders who escaped death fled abroad.

The head of the republic becomes the Mufti of Chechnya, who defected to Russia, Akhmat Kadyrov, who died on May 9, 2004 as a result of a terrorist attack. His successor was his son, Ramzan Kadyrov.

Gradually, with the cessation of foreign funding and the death of underground leaders, the militants' activity decreased. The federal center has sent and continues to send large amounts of money to help and restore peaceful life in Chechnya. Units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are permanently deployed in Chechnya to maintain order in the republic. It is not yet clear whether the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops will remain in Chechnya after the abolition of the CTO.

Assessing the current situation, we can say that the fight against separatism in Chechnya has successfully ended. However, the victory cannot be called final. The North Caucasus is a rather restless region, in which various forces, both local and supported from abroad, are operating, seeking to fan the flames of a new conflict, so the final stabilization of the situation in the region is still far away.

In this regard, the abolition of the anti-terrorist regime in Chechnya will only mean the successful completion of another, very important stage struggle for their territorial integrity.

Ilya Kramnik, military observer for RIA Novosti.

The second Chechen war in modern Russian history is officially over. The National Anti-Terrorism Committee of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, lifted the counter-terrorism operation (CTO) regime that had been in effect for almost 10 years. This regime in Chechnya was introduced by decree of Boris Yeltsin on September 23, 1999.

The operation, which began in August 1999 with repelling the attack of militants Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan, naturally continued on the territory of Chechnya - where the gangs driven back from Dagestan territory retreated.

The second Chechen war could not help but begin. Events that took place in the region after the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements that ended the previous war in 1996 left no doubt that hostilities would break out again.

Yeltsin era

The nature of the first and second Chechen wars was very different. In 1994, the bet on the “Chechenization” of the conflict was lost - the opposition units were unable (and were unlikely to be able) to resist Dudayev’s formations. The entry of Russian troops into the territory of the republic, which were seriously constrained in their actions and were not very well prepared for the operation, aggravated the situation - the troops encountered fierce resistance, which led to significant losses during the fighting.

The assault on Grozny, which began on December 31, 1994, was especially costly for the Russian army. Disputes about the responsibility of certain individuals for losses during the assault are still ongoing. Experts place the main blame on the then Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who wanted to take the city as quickly as possible.

As a result, the Russian army got involved in multi-week battles in a city with dense buildings. The losses of the armed forces and troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the battles for Grozny in January-February 1995 amounted to more than 1,500 people killed and missing, and about 150 units of irretrievably lost armored vehicles.

As a result of two months of fighting, the Russian army cleared Grozny of gangs, which lost about 7,000 people and a large amount of equipment and weapons. It should be noted that the Chechen separatists received the equipment in the early 90s, seizing the warehouses of military units located on the territory of Chechnya with the connivance of first the authorities of the USSR and then the Russian Federation.

With the capture of Grozny, however, the war did not end. The fighting continued, capturing more and more of the territory of Chechnya, but it was not possible to suppress the gangs. On June 14, 1995, Basayev’s gang raided the city of Budennovsk, Stavropol Territory, where they seized the city hospital, taking patients and staff hostage. The militants managed to get to Budennovsk by road. The guilt of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was obvious, but, for the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that chaos and decay in those days were almost universal.

The bandits demanded to stop the fighting in Chechnya and begin negotiations with the Dudayev regime. Russian special forces began an operation to free the hostages. However, it was interrupted by the order of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who entered into negotiations with Basayev by telephone. After an unsuccessful assault and negotiations, the Russian authorities agreed to give the terrorists the opportunity to leave unhindered if they released the captured hostages. Basayev's terrorist group returned to Chechnya. As a result of the terrorist attack, 129 people were killed and 415 were injured.

Responsibility for what happened was placed on the director of the Federal Grid Company, Sergei Stepashin, and the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Viktor Erin, who lost their posts.

Meanwhile, the war continued. Federal troops managed to take control of most of the territory of Chechnya, but the attacks by militants hiding in mountainous and wooded areas and enjoying the support of the population did not stop.

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants under the command of Raduev and Israpilov attacked Kizlyar and took a group of hostages in a local maternity hospital and hospital. The militants demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya and the North Caucasus. On January 10, 1996, the bandits left Kizlyar, taking with them hundreds of hostages, the number of which increased after they disarmed the Ministry of Internal Affairs checkpoint.

Soon, Raduev’s group was blocked in the village of Pervomaiskoye, which was stormed by Russian troops on January 15-18. As a result of the attack by Raduev's gang on Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye, 78 military personnel, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and civilians of Dagestan were killed, several hundred people were injured of varying degrees of severity. Some of the militants, including the leaders, broke into the territory of Chechnya through gaps in the poorly organized cordon.

On April 21, 1996, the federal center managed to achieve a major success by eliminating Dzhokhar Dudayev, but his death did not lead to an end to the war. On August 6, 1996, gangs recaptured Grozny, blocking the positions of our troops. The prepared operation to destroy the militants was cancelled.

Finally, on August 14, a ceasefire agreement was signed, after which negotiations between representatives of Russia and Chechnya began on the development of “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.” Negotiations end on August 31, 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements. On the Russian side, the document was signed by Alexander Lebed, then Secretary of the Security Council, and on the Chechen side by Aslan Maskhadov.

De facto, the Khasavyurt agreements and the subsequent “agreement on peace and principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Chechnya,” signed in May 1997 by Yeltsin and Maskhadov, opened the way to the independence of Chechnya. The second article of the agreement directly provided for the construction of relations between the parties on the basis of the principles of international law and agreements of the parties.

Results of the first campaign

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the actions of Russian troops during the first Chechen war. On the one hand, the actions of the troops were seriously limited by numerous non-military considerations - the country's leadership and the Ministry of Defense regularly limited the use of heavy weapons and aircraft for political reasons. There was a severe lack of modern weapons, and the lessons learned from the Afghan conflict, which took place under similar conditions, were forgotten.

In addition, an information war was launched against the army - a number of media outlets and politicians carried out a targeted campaign to support the separatists. The causes and background of the war were kept silent, in particular, the genocide of the Russian-speaking population of Chechnya in the early 90s. Many were killed, others were driven from their homes and were forced to leave Chechnya. Meanwhile, human rights activists and the press paid close attention to any real and imagined sins of the federal forces, but kept silent on the topic of the misfortunes of the Russian residents of Chechnya.

The information war against Russia was also waged abroad. In many Western countries, as well as in Eastern European countries and some ex-Soviet republics, organizations arose with the goal of supporting the Chechen separatists. The intelligence services of Western countries also provided assistance to the gangs. A number of countries provided shelter, medical and financial assistance to the militants, and helped them with weapons and documents.

At the same time, it is obvious that one of the reasons for the failures were gross mistakes made by both the top leadership and the operational command, as well as the wave of army corruption, as a consequence of the deliberate and general disintegration of the army, when operational information could simply be sold. In addition, a number of successful operations by militants against Russian columns would have been impossible provided that Russian troops complied with the basic statutory requirements for organizing combat security, reconnaissance, coordination of actions, etc.

The Khasavyurt agreements did not guarantee a peaceful life for Chechnya. Chechen criminal structures made business with impunity on mass kidnappings, hostage-taking (including official Russian representatives working in Chechnya), theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil wells, the production and smuggling of drugs, the issuance and distribution of counterfeit banknotes, terrorist attacks and attacks on neighboring Russian regions. The authorities of Ichkeria even stole the money that Moscow continued to send to Chechen pensioners. A zone of instability arose around Chechnya, which gradually spread across Russian territory.

Second Chechen campaign

In Chechnya itself, in the summer of 1999, the gangs of Shamil Basayev and Khattab, the most prominent Arab mercenary on the territory of the republic, were preparing for the invasion of Dagestan. The bandits were counting on the weakness of the Russian government and the surrender of Dagestan. The attack was carried out on the mountainous part of this province, where there were almost no troops.

The fighting with the terrorists who invaded Dagestan on August 7 lasted more than a month. At this time, major terrorist attacks were carried out in several Russian cities - residential buildings were blown up in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk. Many civilians died.

The second Chechen war was significantly different from the first. The bet on the weakness of the Russian government and army did not come true. The new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has taken overall leadership of the new Chechen war.

The troops, taught by the bitter experience of 1994-96, behaved much more carefully, actively using various new tactics that made it possible to destroy large forces of militants with few losses. The militants’ individual “successes” cost them too much and could not change anything.

Like, for example, the battle at Height 776, when the bandits managed to escape from encirclement through the positions of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division. During this battle, 90 paratroopers, without air and artillery support due to bad weather, held back the onslaught of more than 2,000 militants for 24 hours. The bandits broke through the company's positions only when it was almost completely destroyed (only six out of 90 people remained alive). The militants' losses amounted to about 500 people. After this, the main type of action by militants becomes terrorist attacks - hostage-taking, explosions on roads and in public places.

Moscow actively exploited the split in Chechnya itself - many field commanders went over to the side of the federal forces. Within Russia itself, the new war also enjoyed significantly greater support than before. This time, in the highest echelons of power, there was no indecision that was one of the reasons for the success of gangs in the 90s. One by one, the most prominent militant leaders are being destroyed. A few leaders who escaped death fled abroad.

The head of the republic becomes the Mufti of Chechnya, who defected to Russia, Akhmat Kadyrov, who died on May 9, 2004 as a result of a terrorist attack. His successor was his son, Ramzan Kadyrov.

Gradually, with the cessation of foreign funding and the death of underground leaders, the militants' activity decreased. The federal center has sent and continues to send large amounts of money to help and restore peaceful life in Chechnya. Units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are permanently deployed in Chechnya to maintain order in the republic. It is not yet clear whether the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops will remain in Chechnya after the abolition of the CTO.

Assessing the current situation, we can say that the fight against separatism in Chechnya has successfully ended. However, the victory cannot be called final. The North Caucasus is a rather restless region, in which various forces, both local and supported from abroad, are operating, seeking to fan the flames of a new conflict, so the final stabilization of the situation in the region is still far away.

In this regard, the abolition of the anti-terrorist regime in Chechnya will only mean the successful completion for Russia of another, very important stage in the struggle for its territorial integrity.