Salary of officers of the tsarist army. The Russian army through the eyes of an eyewitness

If we objectively consider the position of the army at the time of the death of the Russian Empire, a sad picture easily emerges. There is a myth about the officers of the tsarist army. This will be somewhat surprising, but, in my opinion, it was created primarily by Soviet propaganda.

In the heat of the class struggle, “gentlemen officers” were portrayed as rich, well-groomed and, as a rule, dangerous enemies, the antipodes of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army in general and its command staff in particular. This was especially evident in the film “Chapaev”, where instead of Kolchak’s rather poorly dressed and trained troops, Chapaev was confronted by the “Kappelites” in clean black and white uniforms, advancing in a “psychic” attack in a beautiful formation. According to high income, training was also assumed, and as a consequence, a high level of training and skills. All this was picked up and developed by fans of “The Russia We Lost” and the White Cause. Despite the fact that among them there are, of course, talented historians and simply lovers of military history, the praise of the officers often reached the point of absurdity.

In fact, the situation with the combat training of officers was initially sad. And not the least role in this was played by the rather difficult financial situation of the officers. Roughly speaking, the best students of the gymnasium simply did not want to “pull the burden” in the service of an officer, when much simpler and more profitable career prospects in the civilian field opened up before them. It is no coincidence that the future Marshal of the Soviet Union, and at the beginning of the 20th century, cadet Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, wrote in his memoirs:

“My then comrades, of course, found it difficult to understand my decision to go to military school. The fact is that I graduated from a real school, as noted above, with an average score of 4.3. With this score they usually entered higher technical educational institutions. In general, young people with weak theoretical training went to military schools. At the turn of the 20th century, such an opinion about the command staff of the army was quite widespread.”

Boris Mikhailovich himself joined the army because “My parents lived very frugally, because my younger sister Yulia also began to study in Chelyabinsk at a girls’ gymnasium. I had to think more than once about the questions: how can I make life easier for my family? More than once the thought came to mind: “Shouldn’t I go into military service?” Secondary education would allow one to enter directly into a military school. I couldn’t even dream of studying at a higher technical institution for five years at my parents’ expense. Therefore, I have already, privately, firmly decided to go along the military line.”

Contrary to the cliche about officers as noble landowners, in fact, officers at the end of the Romanov era, although they came, as a rule, from the nobility, were close to commoners in their financial situation.

“The presence of land ownership even among the generals and, oddly enough, the guards was far from a frequent occurrence. Let's look at the numbers. Of the 37 corps commanders (36 army and one guards), data regarding land ownership is available on 36. Of these, five had it. The largest landowner was the commander of the Guards Corps, General. V.M. Bezobrazov, who owned an estate of 6 thousand dessiatines and gold mines in Siberia. Of the remaining four, one had no indication of the size of his estate, and each of the three had about one thousand dessiatines. Thus, in the highest command category, with the rank of general, only 13.9% had land ownership.

Of the 70 heads of infantry divisions (67 army and 3 guards), as well as 17 cavalry divisions (15 army and two guards), i.e. 87 people, 6 people have no information about property. Of the remaining 81, only five have it (two guards generals, who were large landowners, and three army generals, two of whom had estates, and one had his own house). Consequently, 4 people, or 4.9%, had land ownership.

Let's turn to the regiment commanders. As mentioned above, we analyze all the grenadier and rifle regiments, and half of the infantry regiments that were part of the divisions. This amounted to 164 infantry regiments, or 61.1% of the total. In addition, 48 cavalry (hussars, lancers and dragoons) regiments, which were part of 16 cavalry divisions, are considered.” If we compare these figures with similar ones for civil officials of the same classes, we get the following: “Let us turn to the list of civil ranks of the first three classes. In 1914, there were 98 second-class officials, of which 44 owned land property, which was 44.9%; third class - 697 people, of which 215 people owned property, which was 30.8%.

Let us compare data on the availability of land ownership among military and civilian officials of the corresponding classes. So, we have: second class ranks - military - 13.9%, civilians - 44.8%; third class - military - 4.9%, civilians - 30.8%. The difference is colossal."

Regarding the financial situation, P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: “So, the officer corps, which included up to 80% of the nobles, consisted of serving nobility and in terms of financial situation was no different from the commoners.” Quoting Protopresbyter Shavelsky, the same author writes:

“The officer was an outcast from the royal treasury. It is impossible to indicate a class in Tsarist Russia that was worse off than the officers. The officer received a meager salary that did not cover all his urgent expenses /.../. Especially if he had a family, eked out a miserable existence, was malnourished, entangled in debt, denying himself the most necessary things.”

As we have already seen, the land holdings of even the highest command staff were in no way comparable to those of civil officials. In part, this was a consequence of the fact that the salary of officials was significantly higher than that of generals: “As mentioned above, the annual salary of the head of a division was 6,000 rubles, and the salary of the governor was from 9,600 thousand to 12.6 thousand rubles per year, i.e. almost twice as much." Only the guardsmen lived lavishly. General Ignatiev colorfully, although perhaps somewhat tendentiously, describes his service in perhaps the most elite regiment of the army of the Russian Empire - the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment. He notes the enormous “cost” of serving in this regiment, which was associated with the cost of uniforms, two particularly expensive horses, etc. However, P.A. Zayonchkovsky believes that even this was not the most “expensive” regiment. He considers this to be the Life Guards Hussar Regiment, during service in which he had to spend 500 rubles a month - the salary of the division chief! In general, the Guard was a completely separate corporation, the existence of which brought great confusion to the career growth of officers.

On the one hand, the guard was staffed by the best graduates of schools. To do this, you had to get a “guards score” (more than 10 out of 12). Moreover, thanks to the system in which graduates chose their vacancies in order of average scores, the best cadets entered the guard. On the other hand, vacancies in the guard were available only in elite educational institutions. For example, it was almost impossible for a non-nobleman to get into the most elite Corps of Pages. Already fourth on the semi-official list of the most prestigious schools, Aleksandrovskoe always had a minimum of guards vacancies, and therefore Tukhachevsky was very lucky in that he was able to graduate as the best among the cadets. Thus, the already closed nature of the schools, which had a significant number of vacancies, greatly limited the entry of unborn cadets there.

However, this was not the last obstacle to getting into the guard. According to an unspoken, but firmly followed and noted by many researchers law: entry into the regiment must be approved by the regiment's officers. This closedness and casteism could block the path up the career ladder for any “freethinker,” since loyal feelings were mandatory for service in the guard. Finally, we have already talked about the “property qualification”. Thus, first of all, rich, well-born officers ended up in the guard. True, they had to complete the school course with excellence, but most equally, if not more talented officers did not even have the opportunity to join the guards regiment. But the guard was the “forge of personnel” for the generals of the tsarist army! Moreover, promotion in the guard was, in principle, faster and easier. Not only did the guardsmen have a 2-rank advantage over army officers, but there was also no rank of lieutenant colonel, which further accelerated growth. We are no longer talking about connections and prestige! As a result, most of the generals came from the Guard; moreover, most of the generals who did not have an education at the General Staff Academy came from there.

For example, “in 1914, the army had 36 army corps and 1 guard corps. ... Let us turn to the data on education. Of the 37 corps commanders, 34 had higher military education. Of these, 29 people graduated from the General Staff Academy, 2 from the Artillery Academy, and 1 from the Engineering and Legal Academy. Thus, 90% had a higher education. The three who did not have higher education included the commander of the Guards Corps, General. V.M. Bezobrazov, 12th Army Corps General. A.A. Brusilov and the 2nd Caucasian Corps, General. G.E. Berkhman. Of the listed corps commanders, 25 people in the past, and one (General Bezobrazov) currently served in the guard.”

It is difficult to agree with the author that this was explained solely by the “ability” of the guards. After all, it was they who first got to the top positions, without having an education from the Academy of the General Staff, which the author himself admits: “According to the “Schedule” of 1914, the Russian army had 70 infantry divisions: 3 guards, 4 grenadiers, 52 infantry and 11 Siberian riflemen. Their commanders were lieutenant generals... By education: 51 people had higher military education (46 of them graduated from the General Staff Academy, 41 graduated from the Military Engineering Academy, 1 from the Artillery Academy). Thus, 63.2% had higher education. Of the 70 commanders of infantry divisions, 38 were guardsmen (past or present). It is interesting to note that of the 19 people who did not have a higher military education, 15 were guards officers. The guards’ advantage was already showing here.” As you can see, the “guards advantage” affects the level of division commanders. Where does it go when the same people are appointed to the slightly higher post of corps chief? Moreover, for some unknown reason, the author was mistaken about G.E. Berkhman’s lack of higher education, and the rest of the generals were precisely from the guard. Bezobrazov, who did not have a higher education, but was very rich, generally commanded the Guards Corps. Thus, the guard was a “supplier” of academically uneducated officers to the highest echelons of the army.

We can talk about such a serious problem as the lack of fairness in the distribution of ranks and positions: richer and more well-born officers, once in the guard, had a much better chance of making a career than those who pulled the burden and were sometimes more prepared (if only because of less ceremonial conditions of service) army colleagues. This could not but affect the quality of training of senior command staff or the psychological climate. It is known that division into “castes” reigned in the army. As already mentioned, guardsmen were allocated to a special group, having significant preferences among all officers. But it cannot be said that there were no frictions and differences within the guard and the rest of the army. Thus, the most educated officers traditionally served in the engineering troops and artillery. This was even reflected in jokes: “a handsome man serves in the cavalry, a smart man serves in the artillery, a drunkard serves in the navy, and a fool serves in the infantry.” The least prestigious was, of course, the infantry. And the “aristocratic” cavalry was considered the most prestigious. However, she also shared. So the hussars and lancers looked down on the dragoons. The 1st Heavy Brigade of the Guards Cavalry stood apart: the “courtiers” of the Cavalry Guards and the Life Guards Horse Regiment, “fought” for the title of the most elite regiment. In the foot guards, the so-called "Petrovskaya Brigade" - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments. But, as Minakov notes, even here there was no equality: Preobrazhensky was more well-born. In the artillery, the cavalry was considered the elite, but the serfs were traditionally considered “outcasts,” which came back to haunt them in 1915 during the defense of fortresses. Of course, it cannot be said that such differences do not exist in other armies, but there was nothing good in separating and isolating different types of troops from each other.

Almost the only opportunity to accelerate career growth for talented army officers was admission to the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. The selection there was very careful. To do this, it was necessary to pass preliminary exams, and then entrance exams. At the same time, the best officers of the regiments initially surrendered them. According to Shaposhnikov, in the year of his admission, 82.6% of those who passed the preliminary exams passed the competition. However, despite such a careful selection of applicants, applicants had serious problems with general education subjects. “1) Very poor literacy, gross spelling errors. 2) Poor overall development. Bad style. Lack of clarity of thinking and general lack of mental discipline. 3) Extremely poor knowledge of history and geography. Insufficient literary education” However, it cannot be said that this applied to all General Staff officers. Using the example of B.M. Shaposhnikov, it is easy to see that many of them did not have even a shadow of the problems mentioned above in the document. However, it should be noted that subsequent problems with education in the Red Army were radically different from similar ones in the tsarist army. The image of a well-educated tsarist officer is fairly idealized.

Training at the General Staff Academy lasted two years. In the first year, both military and general education subjects were covered, while military officers mastered disciplines related to the combat operations of units. In the second year, general education subjects were completed, and disciplines related to strategy were studied from the military. In addition, every day there were horse riding lessons in the arena. As Shaposhnikov notes, this was a consequence of the experience of the Russian-Japanese War, when the division, during the battles near the Yantai mines, Orlov’s division scattered, ending up in a high kaoliang, when the chief of staff’s horse bolted and he could not stop it, leaving the division completely decapitated, since the commander division was wounded. Perhaps this was already unnecessary for the positional massacre of the First World War, but in response to the critical remark of Boris Mikhailovich himself about the archaic nature of the horse as a method of transportation compared to the automobile introduced in Europe, we note that Russian industry simply did not have the ability to supply the army with a sufficient amount of transport. Buying it abroad was expensive and quite reckless from the point of view of independence from foreign supplies.

The training itself also had significant shortcomings. For example, many authors note little attention to the development of initiative and practical skills in general. Classes consisted almost exclusively of lectures. The end result, instead of highly qualified staff workers, was theoreticians who did not always have an idea of ​​how to act in a real situation. According to Ignatiev, only one teacher even focused on the will to win.

Another problem was the enormous amount of time spent on some completely outdated items, such as drawing the terrain in line drawings. In general, this art was such a memorable subject that many memoirists write unkind words about it.
Contrary to the well-known myth about the generals’ passion for the French school of Grandmaison, “élan vitale”6, Shaposhnikov testifies to his sympathy for German theories. True, he notes that the top generals were not familiar with German methods of war.

In general, the strengths of the career officers of the tsarist army were their fighting spirit and readiness for self-sacrifice. And there could be no talk of carelessness like conversations about absolutely secret things in a cafe, which Shaposhnikov describes in “The Brain of the Army” in relation to the Austrian army. The concept of an officer’s honor was worth a lot to career military personnel. Young officers of the General Staff, after the reforms carried out by Golovin, received a generally good education, despite many shortcomings. What was especially important was that the tactics of the German troops were no longer a revelation to them, as they were to more senior commanders. The problem of the latter was a weak interest in self-development, in innovations both in technology and in the art of war. As A.M. Zayonchkovsky notes, the disastrous situation with the training of senior command personnel was partly a consequence of the General Staff’s inattention to the problem:

“Paying great attention to the training of troops and the improvement of junior command personnel, the Russian General Staff completely ignored the selection and training of senior command personnel: the appointment of persons who had spent their entire lives after graduating from the academy in an administrative position immediately to the position of division chief and corps commander was not uncommon ." Before the Russo-Japanese War, this situation was especially clear. There were jokes: “in 1905–1906. Commander of the Amur Military District, Gen. N.P. Linevich, seeing the howitzer, asked in surprise: “What kind of weapon is this?” The same author notes: “The same Lenevich (correctly Linevich - N.B.) did not know how to read maps properly and did not understand what train movement on schedule was. “And among the commanders of regiments and brigades,” Shavelsky further notes, “sometimes there were complete ignoramuses in military affairs. Military science was not loved by our military.” Denikin echoes them:

“The Japanese War, among other revelations, led us to the realization that command personnel need to learn. Forgetting this rule was one of the reasons for the dependence of many commanders on their headquarters. Before the war, the commander, starting from the position of regiment commander, could remain calm with the “scientific” baggage that he once carried out from the military or cadet school; may not have followed the progress of military science at all, and it never occurred to anyone to take an interest in his knowledge. Any inspection would be considered insulting... The general condition of the unit and partly only its control during maneuvers provided a criterion for the commander’s assessment. The latter, however, is very relative: given the inevitable conventionality of maneuvering actions and our general complacency during maneuvers, it was possible to make as many gross mistakes as we wanted and with impunity; the disapproving review in the description of large maneuvers, which reached the units after a few months, lost its sharpness.”

In addition, the officer corps at the highest echelons was extremely old. The corps commanders were distributed by age as follows: from 51 to 55 years old - 9 people, from 56 to 60 - 20, and from 61 to 65 - 7. Thus, over 75% of corps commanders were over 55 years old. Their average age was 57.7 years. The division commanders were only slightly younger. From 51 to 55 years old - 17, from 56 to 60 - 48 and from 61 to 65 - 5. Thus, the bulk of the commanders of infantry divisions were over 55 years old. Their average age was 57.0 years. True, the commanders of cavalry divisions were on average 5.4 years younger. And this was after the “purge” carried out by the energetic Minister of War Roediger, who, however, quickly lost his portfolio and was replaced by the less firm Sukhomlinov. During his rather short reign, the certification commission that worked under his leadership was appointed: commanders of district troops - 6; their assistants – 7; corps commanders - 34; fortress commandants – 23; chiefs of infantry divisions - 61; chiefs of cavalry divisions - 18; heads of individual brigades (infantry and cavalry) - 87; commanders of non-separate brigades - 140; commanders of infantry regiments - 255; commanders of individual battalions - 108; commanders of cavalry regiments - 45.

He also petitioned for the dismissal of the most incompetent commanders from the army. But Nicholas II became the problem. Now praised with all his might, the monarch cared little about the combat effectiveness of the army, paying much more attention to its uniform and loyalty to the throne. The tsar in every possible way prevented the removal of generals he liked and the financing of the army to the detriment of the fleet. The appointment of Yanushkevich, who was completely inappropriate for the position of Chief of the General Staff, for example, became possible only thanks to the patronage of the Sovereign. No less blame lies with the prime minister, since the distribution of budget funds largely depended on him. That is why he protected from dismissal the generals who showed talent in pacifying the rebels, and not on the battlefield. Quoting Polivanov’s diary P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes:

""Received from E.V. journal of the Higher Attestation Commission regarding corps commanders; permission followed for the dismissal of the gene. Shutleworth; against the conclusion on the dismissal of the general. Krause and Novosiltseva - the highest resolution is to “leave”, but against the gene. Adlerberg: “I know him, he is not a genius, but an honest soldier: in 1905 he defended Kronstadt.” What blood it cost to appoint Rennenkampf, who had not distinguished himself in any way on the battlefields of Manchuria, but was the “hero” of the suppression of the 1905 revolution, as commander of the army invading East Prussia is well known.

True, it cannot be said that they did not try to rectify the situation. As the same Denikin writes:

“One way or another, after the Japanese war, senior command staff were also forced to study. In the spring of 1906, the order of the Minister of War first appeared by order of the highest order: “Troop commanders should establish appropriate training for senior command personnel, starting with unit commanders up to and including corps commanders, aimed at developing military knowledge.” This innovation caused irritation at the top: the old people grumbled, seeing in it a desecration of gray hairs and an undermining of authority... But things progressed little by little, although at first there were some frictions and even oddities.” It was also possible to partially instill an interest in self-development in artillery: “Probably never before has military thought worked as intensively as in the years following the Japanese war. They talked, wrote, and shouted about the need to reorganize the army. The need for self-education increased, and, accordingly, interest in military literature increased significantly, causing the emergence of a number of new bodies. It seems to me that if it were not for the lesson of the Japanese campaign and the subsequent recovery and feverish work, our army would not have withstood even several months of the test of the world war...” However, the white general immediately admits that the work was proceeding at a very slow pace.

However, it cannot be said that these measures did not affect the combat effectiveness of the army. A.A. Svechin writes: “No less progress should be noted in relation to the tactical training of troops and in improving the qualifications of middle and lower command personnel.”

But this was not enough. It’s hard to disagree with A.M. Zayonchkovsky, who gave a very short but very succinct description of the Russian army before the First World War: “In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps, and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in the broad sense of preparation, but not personal qualities."

The Achilles heel of the old army was the complete absence of any political preparation. The officers were ready to go to their own death, but they did not know how to lead. Svechin in his book “The Art of Driving a Regiment” points to the inability of career officers to communicate with soldiers, understand their needs and build discipline that is suitable not only in peacetime. We must understand that the days of Friedrich’s principle “a soldier should be more afraid of the non-commissioned officer’s stick than the enemy’s bullet” are long gone and it is impossible to keep a soldier at the front only by force. Alas, no one simply taught Russian officers this. And given their completely childish knowledge of social and political sciences, it is not difficult to understand that the officers were completely disoriented when faced with the propaganda of socialist parties. The separation of officers from the mass of soldiers also had an effect. For example, Ignatiev notes that scuffles in the 1st Guards Cavalry Division were not used solely due to Guards tradition. The so-called “tsug”, similar in meaning to modern hazing, was also considered a completely normal phenomenon. All this was not noticeable for a significant part of the war, but the collapse of discipline, and as a consequence of the entire army in 1917, perfectly showed what inattention to the moral climate within the army team could lead to.

The outbreak of World War II completely revolutionized the officer training system. If before that they were trained according to a completely harmonious system, going from the cadet corps to the school, and after graduation and service the best of them could graduate from one of the academies, now, although the schools continued to train lieutenants, but only according to a greatly reduced accelerated course. But they could not satisfy the needs of the army. A significant number of warrant officer schools were opened, producing officers with extremely poor skills and knowledge.

The most difficult situation was in the infantry. You can often see ratings like this:

“Our infantry regiments lost several sets of command staff during the World War. As far as I can judge from the data I have, only in a few regiments the loss of officers killed and wounded drops to 300%, but usually reaches 400 - 500% or more.

For artillery I do not have sufficiently complete data. Information for a number of artillery brigades indicates officer losses (over the entire war) of 15 - 40%. The losses of technical troops are even less. In the cavalry, losses are very uneven. There are parts that have suffered greatly, while in others the loss is completely insignificant. In any case, even the losses of the most damaged cavalry units are negligible in comparison with the losses of the infantry.”

The consequence of this situation was, on the one hand, a sharp “washing out” of the best-trained personnel. Those. even those officers who were available and commanded units did not have sufficient education and experience by the end of the war. “The senior command (commanding) staff, taken from the army alone, does not represent a group so large in number that the results of its consideration could be made without essential reservations apply to the entire Russian army...

First of all, when considering the data on the command staff, a significant percentage of temporary commanders strikes the eye: namely, 11 out of 32 regiments... According to the previous service before receiving the regiment, 27 regiment commanders (i.e., almost 85% of their total number) belong to the combat officers ; the remaining five held positions in various institutions and institutions of the military department (corps, military schools, etc.). Among the 32 regiment commanders there was not a single General officer. Headquarters. Undoubtedly, this is an accident, but a very characteristic accident, indicating a significant decrease among the infantry command staff of persons with higher military education... The qualifications for commanding regiments for the majority are very low:

From 1 to 3 months. at 8 regiments,
from 3 to 6 months. at 11 regiments,
from 6 to 12 months. at 8 regiments,
from 1 to 2 years. at 3 regiments,
more than 2 years. at 2 rows of regiments,

The entire officer corps under study can be divided into 2 unequal, sharply different groups - career officers and wartime officers.
The first group includes all staff officers, almost all captains (9 or 10) and a small part of staff captains (7 out of 38).
The total number of career officers is 27, i.e. not a full 4% of the total. The remaining 96% are wartime officers."

So, the regular infantry officers have been knocked out. And who replaced them? This is where the very serious problem of the future Red Army lies. The fact is that the retired officers were replaced mainly by people who had completely insufficient training, both military and simply general education. The same author provides the corresponding tables:

These tables speak volumes. Firstly, it is clear that the rank of “captain” was almost unattainable for a wartime officer. It was the senior officers, therefore, who were most interesting as future cadres of the Red Army in terms of professional training. On the other hand, they had already reached high positions under the “old regime” and therefore the incentive for a career in the new army under new conditions was not as strong for them and therefore were not as loyal as junior officers. Secondly, it should be noted the difference in general education. His level of education for career officers was equal, however, it should be noted that incomplete secondary education is not exactly what was required of an officer in such a technically intensive war as the First World War. But already among the staff captains there is complete discord. Officers with higher education appear. Obviously, these are wartime volunteers who initially chose the civilian path for themselves, but whose fate was changed by the Great War.

As the famous military writer Golovin notes, this was the best material for obtaining officers, since an intellectual could easily escape conscription and therefore those who joined the army had not only the best general education, but also the best fighting spirit, and in some ways the best moral qualities than, for example, the notorious “Zemgusars”. On the other hand, many officers did not even have a secondary education, but a lower one, or had no general education at all. Only a little more than a third of the staff captains had completed secondary education. This suggests, on the one hand, that the intelligentsia did not really want to join the army. On the other hand, the image of an officer of the “old army” as a person from the “educated classes”, which became widespread in the mass consciousness thanks to Soviet cinema, is far from the truth. The army was replenished mainly by poorly educated people. There was also some advantage to this. After all, these statistics indicate the class affinity of wartime officers (and, obviously, they were the main contingent among staff captains who did not receive a secondary education) of the new government.

Among lieutenants, second lieutenants and especially warrant officers, the situation with education becomes even worse. Among warrant officers, only less than a quarter of officers had a complete secondary education, and less than a third of the total graduated from military schools, rather than warrant officer schools.

Thus, two features should be noted. Firstly, the infantry personnel were largely eliminated. Companies, and often battalions, were commanded by wartime officers who, in principle, did not have sufficient training. Moreover, wartime officers did not have a reasonable education to be able to make up for educational deficiencies in the future.

In general, we have to admit that even before the Great War, officers had significant shortcomings in training. Moreover, if young commanders managed to receive an education in reformed schools and academies, then the senior, older command staff continued to lag far behind the requirements of the time in terms of their qualities. Theses about the loss of senior command personnel by the Red Army as a catastrophe are untenable. Even without mentioning the dubious benefits of elderly generals of the First World War during the Second World War, of which France is a brilliant example, one cannot help but see the superiority of the senior command staff of future opponents over domestic strategists, if not in talent, then in the level of training. Much worse was the killing of young officers during the First World War, and then the Civil War. Unfortunately, unlike Germany, the Republic of Ingushetia was unable to establish high-quality training for wartime officers, and this was for completely objective reasons: in Russia there simply was not a sufficient number of educated people. Like the Franco-Prussian War, the war on the Eastern Front was largely won by a Berlin schoolteacher.

It is interesting to note that large numbers of cadres of technical troops that were not knocked out ended up in the Red Army. But it was precisely these people “with a learned piping and a velvet collar,” according to Shaposhnikov, who had the highest percentage of those who graduated from the Academy of the General Staff among those admitted there, which indicates the best preparation. So, out of 6 engineers who entered together with Shaposhnikov, all 6 graduated. Of 35 artillerymen, 20, but out of 67 infantry officers, only 19!

Prices and salaries in Tsarist Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, based only on real documents: orders and decrees of the government and ministries of the Russian Empire, price lists, price tags, reports, extracts from books of income and expenses, menus and accounts of that time, starting in 1900.

Starting with the main product of those times - vodka.
Vodka in Tsarist Russia was sold only in special state-owned wine shops. Above the entrance to the liquor store, as at the entrance to any government institution, there was a state emblem: a double-headed eagle. The state maintained a monopoly on the production and sale of vodka. Two types of vodka were always sold here without any queue. Krasnogolovka (red cap), vodka, popularly called “kazenka”. The price for a bottle of this vodka (0.61 liters) at the beginning of the 20th century was 40 kopecks. And the second type of vodka is “Belogolovka” (white cap), this is double purified vodka.

A bottle of this vodka in pre-revolutionary Russia cost 60 kopecks. Bottles with a capacity of a quarter (1/4 bucket) were sold in wicker baskets, which amounted to 3 liters. And the smallest bottles of vodka were 1/10 of a regular bottle, which people even then called “bastard” 0.061 liters. For such a bottle you had to pay only 6 kopecks in a state-owned wine store. At the same time, draft beer of cheap varieties “Svetloe”, “Venskoe”, “Starogradskoe”, “Munichskoe” at the beginning of the 20th century cost from 6 to 10 kopecks per liter. Bottled beer was more expensive due to the cost of glass, about 20 kopecks per bottle. Wine of expensive and prestigious brands reached 5-9 rubles per bottle. The capacity of a wine bottle in pre-revolutionary years was 0.75 liters. At the same time, for cheap bottled wine in different provinces of Russia you had to pay only 5-20 kopecks per liter. Cognacs cost from 3 rubles and ended with prices up to 100 rubles per bottle.

Well, these are all store prices, but how much did you have to pay for a shot of vodka (1/6 bottle = 100 grams) in a tavern, which in those days of pre-revolutionary Russia were already called taverns. In general, the difference between the tavern and its more ancient predecessor, the “tavern,” is that in the tavern you could only buy alcohol, and in the tavern, in addition to alcohol, you could also dine. So, in a cheap tavern on the outskirts of a provincial town, having paid 5 kopecks, you could drink half a shot, i.e. 50-60 grams of cheap and most likely highly diluted vodka. For a quick snack, they offered the most popular snack for vodka at all times - that's right, a pickled cucumber for just 1 kopeck. And you could eat to your heart’s content in these cheap taverns for only 10 kopecks. By the way, at the market for two kopecks you could easily choose a dozen selected pickled cucumbers (12 pieces).

It’s a completely different matter; these are decent taverns, or, in our opinion, cafes and restaurants. It cost 30-50 kopecks to dine here in the 1900s in Russia. But judging by the memoirs of contemporaries, this justified it. A glass of vodka in such a cultural establishment cost 10 kopecks, but it was definitely official vodka! Not spoiled. For a glass of beer (0.61 liters) you had to pay up to 10 kopecks. Tea with two lumps of sugar cost only 5 kopecks. Naturally, it was more expensive to eat in good, well-known restaurants. On average, for lunch in a decent restaurant of the 20th century in Imperial Russia you had to pay 1.5 - 2 rubles. This is the price for a regular lunch: first course, second course, salad, a couple of glasses of vodka, dessert, no frills. After lunch, the well-fed and respectable Russian citizens, at the exit from the restaurant, were vying with each other to persuade the cab drivers to take a cab ride. In large cities in those years, the only public transport was the tram; as a rule, the price was 5 kopecks without a transfer, and 7 kopecks with a transfer. But, of course, the main mode of transport was cabs driven by dashing cab drivers. Typically, cab drivers charged 20 kopecks for a trip in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century within the city. But the price was always negotiable and varied depending on the degree of supply/demand ratio. Although, even in those pre-revolutionary times, station cabs were the most expensive, who shamelessly charged 50 kopecks for an often not very long trip from the station to the nearest hotel. Regarding stations and travel. Naturally, in those years we mostly traveled by rail. A first-class ticket to St. Petersburg from Moscow cost 16 rubles, and you could travel in a seated carriage for 6 rubles 40 kopecks. You could get to Tver from Moscow in first class for 7 rubles 25 kopecks, and in third class you could get there for 3 rubles 10 kopecks. The porters happily offered the service of carrying suitcases for 5 kopecks. Large luggage, occupying the entire cart, was taken to the train or back for a maximum fee of 10 kopecks. Let's return to hotels... In hotels for very wealthy gentlemen in luxurious rooms with all amenities, telephone, restaurant, etc. The cost of the room per day was 5-8 rubles. A hotel room without frills, but quite decent, cost 0.7-2 rubles per day. Furnished rooms cost 15-60 kopecks per day. In general, in pre-revolutionary Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, rented housing on average cost 20 kopecks per month per square meter.

List of prices of that time for products, although then everything was measured in pounds, the cost is indicated per kilogram for ease of perception:
A loaf of black stale bread weighing 400 grams - 3 kopecks,
A loaf of fresh rye bread weighing 400 grams - 4 kopecks,
A loaf of white butter bread weighing 300 grams - 7 kopecks,
Fresh harvest potatoes 1 kilogram - 15 kopecks,
Old harvest potatoes 1 kilogram - 5 kopecks,
Rye flour 1 kilogram - 6 kopecks,
Oat flour 1 kilogram - 10 kopecks,
Premium wheat flour 1 kilogram - 24 kopecks,
Potato flour 1 kilogram - 30 kopecks,
Plain pasta 1 kilogram - 20 kopecks,
Vermicelli made from premium flour 1 kilogram - 32 kopecks,
Second grade granulated sugar 1 kilogram – 25 kopecks,
Selected lump refined sugar 1 kilogram - 60 kopecks,
Tula gingerbread with jam 1 kilogram - 80 kopecks,
Chocolate candies 1 kilogram – 3 rubles,
Coffee beans 1 kilogram – 2 rubles,
Leaf tea 1 kilogram – 3 rubles,
Table salt 1 kilogram - 3 kopecks,
Fresh milk 1 liter – 14 kopecks,
Heavy cream 1 liter – 60 kopecks,
Sour cream 1 liter – 80 kopecks,
Cottage cheese 1 kilogram - 25 kopecks,
Cheese "Russian" 1 kilogram - 70 kopecks,
Cheese using foreign technology “Swiss” 1 kilogram - 1 ruble 40 kopecks
Butter 1 kilogram – 1 ruble 20 kopecks,
Sunflower oil 1 liter – 40 kopecks,
Steamed chicken 1 kilogram – 80 kopecks,
A dozen choice eggs - 25 kopecks,
Veal meat, steamed tenderloin, 1 kilogram – 70 kopecks,
Beef shoulder blade 1 kilogram – 45 kopecks,
Pork neck meat 1 kilogram - 30 kopecks,
Fresh river perch fish 1 kilogram - 28 kopecks,
Fresh river pike perch fish 1 kilogram – 50 kopecks,
Fresh fish catfish 1 kilogram – 20 kopecks,
Fresh fish bream 1 kilogram – 24 kopecks,
Frozen pink salmon fish 1 kilogram – 60 kopecks,
Frozen fish salmon 1 kilogram – 80 kopecks,
Frozen fish sturgeon 1 kilogram – 90 kopecks,
Black granular caviar 1 kilogram – 3 rubles 20 kopecks,
Pressed black caviar, 1st grade, 1 kilogram – 1 ruble 80 kopecks,
Pressed black caviar, 2 grades, 1 kilogram – 1 ruble 20 kopecks,
Pressed black caviar 3 grades 1 kilogram – 80 kopecks,
Salted red caviar 1 kilogram – 2 rubles 50 kopecks,
Vegetables fresh cabbage 1 kilogram - 10 kopecks,
Vegetables, pickled cabbage 1 kilogram - 20 kopecks,
Vegetables onions 1 kilogram - 5 kopecks,
Vegetables carrots 1 kilogram - 8 kopecks,
Vegetables, tomatoes, selected 1 kilogram - 45 kopecks.
A little about the cost of things at the beginning of the 20th century in Tsarist Russia:
Uniforms and military uniforms, which Russian officers were forced to purchase with their own money, and taking into account the low officer salary (which will be given at the end of the article), clearly cost them a lot.
Officer's dress boots - 20 rubles,
Dress officer's uniform - 70 rubles,
Chief officer's cap - 3 rubles,
Uhlan hat – 20 rubles,
Hussar staff cap – 12 rubles,
Gilded staff officers' epaulettes – 13 rubles,
Spurs – 14 rubles,
Dragoon and Cossack sabers – 15 rubles,
Officer's backpack - 4 rubles.
Clothing for civilians was much cheaper:
Weekend shirt – 3 rubles,
Business suit for clerks - 8 rubles,
Long coat – 15 rubles,
Cow boots – 5 rubles,
Summer boots - 2 rubles,
Garmon - 7 rubles 50 kopecks,
Gramophone - 40 rubles,
Grand piano of a famous brand - 200 rubles,
Car without additional equipment – ​​2,000 rubles,
The alternative and main means of transportation in those days, naturally, was the horse, which cost
Horse for a cart - 100 rubles,
Draft horse, working horse - 70 rubles,
Old nag for sausage – 20 rubles,
A good horse, on which it was not a shame to appear in front of people - from 150 rubles,
A good cash cow - from 60 rubles.

The average salary in the Russian Empire for factory workers and junior employees from 1880 to 1913 increased from 16 to 24 rubles per month.
The low-paid part of hired workers in Russia was the servant, who received per month: from 3 to 5 rubles for women and from 5 to 10 rubles for men.
Mostly workers at metallurgical plants in Moscow and St. Petersburg earned more. The salary of these workers at the beginning of the 20th century in Tsarist Russia ranged from 25 to 35 rubles. And representatives of the so-called labor aristocracy, i.e. professional turners, mechanics, foremen, and foremen received from 50 to 80 rubles per month.
The smallest salaries at the beginning of the 20th century were for junior ranks of civil servants in the amount of 20 rubles per month.

The same amount was received by ordinary postal employees, zemstvo elementary school teachers, pharmacists' assistants, orderlies, librarians, etc. Doctors received much more, for example, in zemstvo hospitals they had a salary of 80 rubles, paramedics 35 rubles, and the head of the hospital received 125 rubles a month. In small rural hospitals, where there was only one paramedic on staff, he received a salary of 55 rubles. High school teachers in women's and men's gymnasiums received from 80 to 100 rubles per month. The heads of postal, railway, and steamship stations in large cities had monthly salaries from 150 to 300 rubles. Deputies of the State Duma received a salary of 350 rubles, governors had salaries of about one thousand rubles, and ministers and senior officials, members of the State Council - 1,500 rubles per month.

In the army, officer salaries at the beginning of the 20th century in the Russian Empire, after an increase in 1909, were as follows. The second lieutenant had a salary of 70 rubles a month, plus 30 kopecks a day for guard duty and an additional 7 rubles for renting housing, for a total of 80 rubles. The lieutenant received a salary of 80 rubles, plus the same apartment and guard duty another 10 rubles, for a total of 90 rubles . A staff captain received a salary from 93 to 123 rubles, a captain from 135 to 145 rubles, and a lieutenant colonel from 185 to 200 rubles per month. A colonel in the Tsarist Army received a salary of 320 rubles per month from the Sovereign, a general in the position of division commander had a salary of 500 rubles, and a general in the position of corps commander had a salary of 725 rubles per month.

In Russia in the 16th and 17th centuries, silver money was highly valued. In the middle of the 16th century in 1550, Ivan the Terrible established the first musketeer branch of the army in Russia - the Streletsky regiments. It was very difficult to get there, because in addition to good physical strength and endurance, you had to be able to use a musket, which at that time was a complex technical product. Due to improper use of a musket, a soldier could injure not only himself, but also his comrades. The Tsar's archers of the Moscow regiment were given a high salary - 4 rubles a year (in the middle of the 16th century, approximately 45 kopecks were minted from a thaler). The same amount of 4 rubles a year was the minimum noble salary. Streltsy in other cities received only two rubles per year, and gunners received a ruble. The only thing, in addition to the monetary salary, they were also given grain allowances. In peacetime, in addition to performing guard duty, the archers could engage in small trade and crafts.

The civilian population's salaries were also low. A craftsman, a clerk, a clerk in an order received 40 kopecks a month; carpenter, mason about 15 kopecks. But the prices were also low compared to Europe - a pound of rye (16 kg) cost 8 kopecks, a chicken - 1-2 kopecks, a cow - 80 kopecks, a gelding - 1 ruble, a good horse - 5 rubles.

Since the end of the Time of Troubles (1613), a thaler has already cost 64 kopecks. Since the 17th century, the salary of archers was increased: Moscow archers - 5 rubles per year, in other cities - 3.50 rubles. But prices during the Time of Troubles increased five to six times. Later, by 1620-1630, prices dropped slightly. But a cow already cost 2 rubles, a chicken 3 kopecks, bread - 3/4 kopecks per kg.

During the time of Alexei Mikhailovich (the beginning of the second half of the 17th century) in the elite regiments of the new system (they were called elective regiments of the soldier system), the salary was: To an ordinary person not from a noble family - 90 kopecks per month, from a noble family or foreigners - 1.05 rubles, to a corporal - 1.20 rubles, sergeant - 1.35 rubles, warrant officer - 1.50 rubles, married people were paid an additional 15 kopecks per month. Widows were paid 22 kopecks a month. Boys, drummers, and cooks were paid 30 kopecks. This salary was paid only for six months (late spring - early autumn), i.e. when military companies were marching. In winter they didn’t pay anything - they sent them home, or they paid half their salary for guard duty. The officer's salary was: colonel -45 rubles. per month, lieutenant colonel - 15 rubles, major - 14 rubles, captain - 7 rubles, lieutenant - 5 rubles.

A simple Russian soldier not in an elite unit received only 50 kopecks a month and one dress for a year. After the monetary reform of Peter I, he reduced the silver content in the ruble to the weight of one taler (1 taler = 1 ruble = 100 kopecks) and due to the increase in taxes for the Northern War with Sweden, prices soon doubled. Nowhere in the West in the 16th - 18th centuries did the price of money fall as quickly as in Russia. But Peter’s monetary reform was the very first decimal monetary system in the world.

Salary of ranks of the Russian Navy in 1914

The pay of admirals, generals, staff and chief officers, as well as class ranks of the military fleet consisted of the following types:
salary, which was paid depending on rank,
table money, which was paid depending on the position held,
sea ​​allowance, which also depended on the position, but was paid only for the duration of the voyage. At the same time, the sea allowance differed for domestic navigation (accrued from the moment the company began and until the end) and for foreign navigation (accrued from the day of leaving the last domestic port or from the moment of leaving the territorial waters of Russia during inter-base transitions). We note here that the amount of canteen money and payments of naval allowances to naval officers generally depended on the rank of the ship and the place of service, for which a division of salaries into 3 categories was introduced.

1st category - in the Baltic and Black Sea fleets;

2nd category - in the Caspian flotilla, as well as ranks of artillery training, mine training detachments, naval corps training detachment, naval rifle training team, officers of the diving school, diving training detachment, students of the Nikolaev Naval Academy and some other categories of positions;

3rd category - in the Siberian Flotilla.

But only those who received additional payments and bonuses managed to make money from the war. Napoleon distributed 16 million francs to generals and marshals, Alexander I, after winning the war, 5 million rubles.

It is surprising that all French prisoners were given a monetary allowance “for food” at the rate of 5 kopecks per day for each private, non-commissioned officer or non-combatant, 50 kopecks for a chief officer, 1 ruble for a major, 1.5 rubles for lieutenant colonels and colonels and 3 rubles for a general. The wives of prisoners were also paid the same salary that they received in Napoleon's army.

Salary of the Russian Army

Peter the Great began paying salaries to his soldiers for the first time. Then a warrant officer earned 50 rubles, a colonel - 300 and 600 rubles. One kilogram of wheat flour cost 1 kopeck, a chicken - 2 kopecks, a horse - 30 kopecks.

Therefore, even junior officers at that time occupied a very enviable position in society in terms of material support.

However, later, the wage gap between civilians and the army decreased. And gradually the financial situation of the officers worsened even in comparison with the armies of other states.

And if in the 18th - early 19th centuries a significant part of the officers owned land and other property and salaries were not their only source of existence, then already in the middle of the 19th century this became exactly the case. In 1903, even among lieutenant generals, only 15.2% were landowners, and among officers only a few owned any property.

Before the War of 1812, salaries for military personnel were increased, which was associated with preparations for military operations against France, the need to fill command positions in the army with experienced officers who retired during the reign of Paul I. However, salaries were paid in paper notes, the rate of which had fallen significantly compared to silver .

The annual salary of a soldier under Alexander I was about 10 rubles. In addition, 72 “meat” and 15 “salt” kopecks were due per year. They were given money 3 times a year, for the general construction of the unit.

For the expulsion of Napoleon's troops and the crossing of the state border by the Russian army, all military personnel without exception were paid by Alexander I a six-month salary totaling 4 million rubles. Another million rubles were spent on incentives for won battles and on providing medical care to wounded officers. Another 300 thousand rubles were allocated for awards to those who distinguished themselves at parades and shows. Individual officers and generals received another 300 thousand for their military exploits. For example, General Alexander Tormasov received 50,000 for the first battle near Kobrin won by the Russian army in 1812 (with an annual salary of 2,000 rubles).

Monthly salaries of Russian officers in 1812 and 2012, and their equivalents in products at current prices

In the Russian army of the 19th century, there were three main types of payments to officers: salary (depending on rank), table money (depending on position) and apartment money (depending on rank, city and marital status).

Pensions in the Russian Army

According to the decree of May 21, 1803, officers who served 20 years without fault received a disability allowance, 30 years received half pay according to their rank, and 40 years received full pay in the form of a pension. Salaries for disabled people were previously determined in the amount of 1/3 of the salary according to the states of the infantry regiments of 1802. Lieutenant colonel - 558-690 rubles, captain and staff captain - 340-400, lieutenant - 237-285, second lieutenant and warrant officer - 200-236. For 1 ruble you could buy 10 kg of butter or 5 kilograms of beef.

Salary of the "Great Army"

Serving in Napoleon's army was the duty of a citizen. Therefore, the soldiers’ earnings were meager - a line infantry fusilier received “clean” 5 francs a month - the wages of a good worker in Paris for one day. With this money, a soldier could afford to go to a tavern several times a month or buy some small items.

This is what Barres, an infantryman of the Imperial Guard, recalled: “Our salary was 23 sous and 1 centime per day (1 franc 16 centimes). For food, 9 sous were deducted from this money, 4 sous were kept in the company treasury for the purchase of linen and shoes, and the remaining 10 sous were given to us every 10 days as pocket money. We were fed well, and there was enough pocket money for all the basic necessities, but often this money was used to make various deductions, which were not always absolutely legal, but we were in no hurry to complain, since the senior sergeants were all-powerful in the companies.”

However, Napoleon's officers received very handsome salaries. In terms of purchasing power, it was more than one and a half times the salary of Russian officers. The monetary allowance of the Guards officers was especially large: already the captain of the Guard, in terms of his income, could safely be classified as a very wealthy person.

"Do you like chocolate?" - Napoleon asked Marshal Lefebvre at the gala reception, where the latter was informed of his elevation to the ducal dignity. The old commander, somewhat surprised, answered in the affirmative. “In that case, I give you a pound of chocolate from Danzig, because since you conquered it, it must bring you at least something,” and the Emperor, smiling, handed the oblivious Lefebvre a bag in the shape of a bar... When after several hours after returning to his place, Lefebvre bothered to unwrap the “chocolate”; he saw three hundred thousand franc notes.

In addition to salaries and such gifts, Napoleon distributed 16,071,871 francs in various annual payments among his generals and marshals. True, he encouraged first of all those who stood out with talent and courage and led the regiments into the fire. “I am disgusted by the idea of ​​rewarding them in the same way as those who shed blood,” said Napoleon.

But the highest incomes were the high command of the Grande Armée - Berthier (1,254,945 francs per year), Ney (1,028,973), Davout (910,000), Massena (683,375). For comparison, the annual income of the factories of the richest capitalist in France of that era, Oberkampf, was about one and a half million francs per year.

Monthly salaries of French officers in 1812 and 2012, their equivalents in products at current prices

Special money was also paid for an apartment, horses, and uniforms; as a result, the actual income was approximately 1.5 times higher than that shown in the table.

Officer pay in the Russian and foreign armies for 1863 (in rubles)

All types of payments are included and averages are taken for all branches of the military; comparison is given in terms of rubles

From the book by S. Volkov “Russian Officer Corps”

Sometimes it's interesting to know how people lived before. What did you eat, what did you read, what did you do? It is interesting to compare the life of our ancestors with modern life. Now every person knows which salary is small and which is quite decent, when buying a product you can completely reliably decide for yourself whether it is expensive or not, and many have a completely justified curiosity - how much did people earn before and what were the prices?

Salaries of hired workers.
Most low paid part of the workers in Russia at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century were servants who received per month: from 3 to 5 rubles for women, and from 5 to 10 rubles for men. But, in addition to monetary allowance, the employer provided the servants with free accommodation, food and even clothing.
Next come the workers of provincial factories, village factories, laborers and loaders. Their salary ranged from 8 to 15 rubles per month. Moreover, it was not uncommon for one tenth of the salary to be paid in cards, which could only be used to purchase goods in the factory store and, of course, at inflated prices. Workers at metallurgical plants in Moscow and St. Petersburg received more than their provincial colleagues, their salaries ranged from 25 to 35 rubles, and qualified turners, mechanics, foremen, foremen or workers of rare specializations - for example, electricians received from 50 to 80 rubles per month.
Salaries of employees in pre-revolutionary Russia.
The smallest salaries were for junior ranks of civil servants, as well as for zemstvo teachers of junior classes, assistant pharmacists, orderlies, librarians, postal workers, etc. they were paid 20 rubles a month. Doctors received much more; their monthly salary was 80 rubles, and the head of the hospital received 125 rubles a month. The salary of paramedics was 35 rubles, and where there was only one paramedic on staff, 55 rubles. High school teachers in women's and men's gymnasiums received from 80 to 100 rubles per month. The heads of postal, railway, and steamship stations in large cities had monthly salaries from 150 to 300 rubles. Deputies of the State Duma received a salary of 350 rubles, governors had salaries of about one thousand rubles, and ministers and senior officials, members of the State Council - 1,500 rubles per month.
Salary of officers of the Russian Empire.
The second lieutenant had a salary of 70 rubles a month, plus 30 kopecks a day for guard duty and an additional 7 rubles for renting housing, for a total of 80 rubles. The lieutenant received a salary of 80 rubles, plus the same apartment and guard duty, for a total of approximately 90 rubles . A staff captain received a salary from 93 to 123 rubles, a captain from 135 to 145 rubles, and a lieutenant colonel from 185 to 200 rubles per month. A colonel in the Tsarist Army received a salary of 320 rubles per month, a general in the position of division commander had a salary of 500 rubles, and a general in the position of corps commander had a salary of 725 rubles per month.
Cost of various public and private services.
At the beginning of the 20th century, cab drivers charged 15-20 kopecks for a trip within the city. But the price was basically negotiable and in remote areas they could ask for 30 - 40 kopecks. Station cabs were the most expensive even then; they could absolutely without a twinge of conscience demand 50 kopecks for a not very long trip from the station to the nearest hotel. It must be said that the profession of a cab driver was not very profitable; in a day a horse could eat 3 rubles worth of oats. A tram ride cost 5 kopecks until the end of the route; if a transfer was needed, a free transfer ticket was issued. Travel around the entire Garden Ring cost 7 kopecks. Students were given free travel passes with photographs so that they could not transfer them to others.
In those years, people traveled long distances mainly by rail. A first-class ticket to St. Petersburg from Moscow cost 16 rubles, and you could travel in a seated carriage for 6 rubles 40 kopecks. You could get to Tver from Moscow in first class for 7 rubles 25 kopecks, and in third class you could get there for 3 rubles 10 kopecks. The service of a porter at the station cost 5 kopecks, and if the luggage was large, it was transported on a trolley, and the cost was 10 kopecks.
Traveling people needed to stop somewhere. Luxurious room with all amenities - telephone, restaurant, etc. in hotels it cost 5-8 rubles per day. A decent room without frills cost from 70 kopecks to 2 rubles per day. Furnished rooms cost 15-60 kopecks per day. But many came for a long time and they had to rent housing for a long time. In the center of Moscow, a luxurious multi-room apartment cost 100-150 rubles per month. A small apartment on the outskirts cost 5-7 rubles. A bed in a workers' dormitory costs 2 rubles.
For owners of their own property, of course, there were also utilities. A home telephone cost 71 rubles per year, electricity - 25 kopecks per 1 kWh. Water supply - at home for 12 kopecks per bucket, at the water carrier for 13 kopecks. In hand-held dishes on a column - free of charge.
Treatment, as now, was a very significant expense item. An ordinary family doctor charged 3 rubles for a visit, an academy professor had to pay 20 rubles, and the most famous and fashionable doctors provided services for no less than a hundred.
In addition to everyday worries, people had to somehow relax. The easiest way to relax was to go to a tavern or restaurant. In a cheap tavern, or as it was called then - “pyrka”, on the outskirts of a provincial town, for 5 kopecks, you could drink half a shot glass, that is, 50 grams of vodka. For an appetizer, they offered the most popular appetizer for vodka at all times - a pickled cucumber for just 1 kopeck. And you could eat your fill in such cheap taverns for 10 kopecks. In addition to the cheap taverns, there were also more expensive taverns, and accordingly the class of service in them was better and the prices were higher. In such taverns it cost 30-50 kopecks to dine, a mug of beer or a glass of vodka cost 10 kopecks, but this vodka was of good quality and definitely not diluted. For 3 kopecks you could eat a plate of cabbage soup, for 5 kopecks you could eat noodles with hemp oil or fried potatoes. Drinking tea with 2 lumps of sugar cost 5 kopecks, pancakes with fresh grainy caviar and vodka cost 1 ruble. In good and well-known restaurants you could pay for lunch in the range of 1.5 - 3 rubles, but in principle everything depended on the possibility and desire of the client. In addition to restaurants and taverns, one could also have cultural entertainment, for example going to the theater. Tickets to the Bolshoi Theater for the opera in privileged boxes cost up to 30 rubles, for seats in the front rows of the porter they paid from 3 to 5 rubles, and to watch a performance in the gallery cost only 30-60 kopecks. A subscription to the Small Hall of the Conservatory for 3 musical evenings with a good performer was sold from 2 rubles 40 kopecks to 7 rubles 30 kopecks.
Average all-Russian prices for various goods at the beginning of the 20th century.
Products:
-A loaf of black stale bread weighing 400 grams - 3 kopecks,
-A loaf of fresh rye bread weighing 400 grams - 4 kopecks,
-A loaf of white butter bread weighing 300 grams - 7 kopecks,
-Raw alcohol bucket – 75 kopecks,
-Fresh harvest potatoes 1 kilogram - 15 kopecks,
- Old harvest potatoes 1 kilogram - 5 kopecks,
-Rye flour 1 kilogram - 6 kopecks,
-Oatmeal flour 1 kilogram - 10 kopecks,
- Premium wheat flour 1 kilogram - 24 kopecks,
- Potato flour 1 kilogram - 30 kopecks,
-Plain pasta 1 kilogram - 20 kopecks,
-Vermicelli made from premium flour 1 kilogram - 32 kopecks,
-Sweet syrup bottle – 25 kopecks,
-Second grade granulated sugar 1 kilogram – 25 kopecks,
- Selected lump refined sugar 1 kilogram - 60 kopecks,
- Tula gingerbread with jam 1 kilogram - 80 kopecks,
-Chocolate candies 1 kilogram – 3 rubles,
-Coffee beans 1 kilogram – 2 rubles,
-Leaf tea 1 kilogram – 3 rubles,
-Fruit water: 2 rubles per bucket, 10 kopecks per bottle,
- Table salt 1 kilogram - 3 kopecks,
-Fresh milk 1 liter – 14 kopecks,
-Fat cream 1 liter – 60 kopecks,
-Sour cream 1 liter – 80 kopecks,
-Cottage cheese 1 kilogram - 25 kopecks,
-Russian cheese 1 kilogram - 70 kopecks,
- Cheese using foreign technology “Swiss” 1 kilogram - 1 ruble 40 kopecks,
-Butter 1 kilogram – 1 ruble 20 kopecks,
-Sunflower oil 1 liter – 40 kopecks,
- Steamed chicken 1 kilogram – 80 kopecks,
-A dozen choice eggs - 25 kopecks,
-Meat, steamed veal tenderloin, 1 kilogram – 70 kopecks,
-Beef shoulder blade 1 kilogram – 45 kopecks,
- Pork neck meat 1 kilogram - 30 kopecks,
-Fresh river perch fish 1 kilogram - 28 kopecks,
-Fresh river pike perch fish 1 kilogram – 50 kopecks,
-Fresh fish catfish 1 kilogram – 20 kopecks,
-Fresh bream fish 1 kilogram - 24 kopecks,
-Frozen pink salmon fish 1 kilogram – 60 kopecks,
-Frozen fish salmon 1 kilogram – 80 kopecks,
-Frozen fish sturgeon 1 kilogram – 90 kopecks,
-Salted salmon fish 1 kilogram from 50 kopecks to 1 ruble
-Black granular caviar 1 kilogram – 3 rubles 20 kopecks,
- Black pressed caviar, 1st grade, 1 kilogram – 1 ruble 80 kopecks,
- Black pressed caviar, 2 grades, 1 kilogram – 1 ruble 20 kopecks,
-Black pressed caviar 3 grades 1 kilogram – 80 kopecks,
-Red salted caviar 1 kilogram – 2 rubles 50 kopecks,
-Fresh cabbage vegetables 1 kilogram - 10 kopecks,
-Vegetables, pickled cabbage 1 kilogram – 20 kopecks,
-Vegetables onions 1 kilogram - 5 kopecks,
-Vegetables carrots 1 kilogram – 8 kopecks,
-Vegetables, tomatoes, 1 kilogram - 45 kopecks.
Civilian clothing:
- Weekend shirt – 3 rubles,
- Short fur coat and sheepskin coat - 10 rubles,
-Business suit for clerks – 8 rubles,
-Long coat – 15 rubles,
-Mittens a pair – 40 kopecks,
- pair of gloves – 50 kopecks,
- Cow boots – 5 rubles,
-Summer boots - 2 rubles,
-Women's boots in black leather - from 3 rubles 50 kopecks, colored leather - 1 ruble more expensive
-Pair of stockings – 40 kopecks.
Military uniform and equipment:
-Officer dress boots – 20 rubles,
-A formal officer’s uniform – 70 rubles,
- Chief officer's cap – 3 rubles,
- Uhlan hat – 20 rubles,
- Hussar staff cap – 12 rubles,
-Gold-plated staff officer epaulettes – 13 rubles,
-Spurs – 14 rubles,
-Dragoon and Cossack sabers – 15 rubles,
-Officer's backpack – 4 rubles.
Animals:
-Horse for the cart -100 rubles,
-Draft horse, working horse – 70 rubles,
-Old nag for sausage – 20 rubles,
-A good riding horse – from 150 rubles,
-A good cash cow – from 60 rubles.
Miscellaneous:
-Garmon- 7 rubles 50 kopecks,
-Samovar – 10 rubles 50 kopecks,
-gramophone - 40 rubles,
-Telephone device – 50 rubles,
-Sickle – 20 kopecks,
-Piano of a famous brand - 200 rubles,
-Blanket – 6 rubles 75 kopecks,
-Car without additional equipment – ​​2,000 rubles,
- Briefcase – 4 rubles 80 kopecks,
-Radio receiver – 75 rubles,
-Beehive – 5 rubles,
-Camera – 10 rubles,
-electric light bulb – 40 kopecks,
-Leather suitcase – 12 rubles,
-Ink 35 kopecks.
Prices, of course, are average prices; they could differ in different regions of the country, but only slightly.