Chapters of the training course “and the formation of new European civilization.” Solovyov e “The most difficult time”

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Soloviev Erich Yurievich- Doctor of Philosophy, Chief Researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Author of 120 scientific works, including books: Existentialism and scientific knowledge. M.: Higher School, 1966; The Undefeated Heretic (Martin Luther and His Times). M.: Young Guard, series: “ZhZL”, 1984; The past interprets us: (Essays on the history of philosophy and culture). M.: Politizdat, 1991; I. Kant: complementarity of morality and law. M.: Nauka, 1993; Categorical imperative of morality and law. M.: “Progress-tradition”, 2005.

Publications

+ - Fate historiosophy of M. Heidegger
The early existentialist works are now forgotten. In anniversary years, carnations are still placed on their title pages, but in current polemics no one remembers either the “Metaphysical Diaries” of G. Marcel (1918), or the “Hasidic Notebooks” of M. Buber (1919), or the “Psychology of World Outlooks” by K. Jaspers (1922), nor “Imagination” by J.-P. Sartre (1939). Even Jaspers’s three-volume “Philosophy” (1929), which in the 50s and 60s had the status of a reference book, these days is rarely involved in a lively conversation about man, history and the universe. And yet there is a primary existential text that has not sunk into oblivion. This is Heidegger's "Being and Time". Written in 1927, it appears on the stage of modern philosophical polemics in new and new directions, often completely unexpected. "Being and Time" is one of the most mysterious works in the history of philosophy.

Http://scepsis.net/library/id_2661.html
+ - Existentialism. Article in the journal Questions of Philosophy No. 3, 1966
In this essay we do not at all pretend to summarize this critical work, to generalize the characteristics of a wide range of problems that existentialism puts forward for Marxist research. We would like to draw attention to the cross-cutting, key theme of all variants of existentialism - to the question of “personality in a situation.” It seems to us that it is precisely this localization of the problem that allows us to consider the existentialist teaching in action and trace how it passed the test of the era. Strictly speaking, history has already pronounced its verdict on existentialism, treating it more mercilessly and harshly than any theoretical criticism, and the primary task, in our opinion, is precisely to reveal the content of this historical judgment. The purpose of this work is not to make conceptual objections, nor to explain why the existentialist concept of personality is, “generally speaking,” wrong. We would like to consider how existentialism has been tested over time. We would like to explain this philosophy from the conditions of its widespread influence in the recent past and from the circumstances that have led to its present crisis.

The era of religious wars, of which the first bourgeois revolutions (Dutch and English) were fragments, led to a deep secularization of public consciousness. By the end of the 17th century, religion had ceased to be a universal organizing form of the social cosmos. It has now become, on the one hand, an ideology in the strict sense of the word; on the other hand, an inalienable personal faith, which only roughly and conditionally formalizes itself in legalized confessions. This process was accompanied by an unprecedented ideological and moral crisis.

But a new value-normative system has emerged - a system of legal consciousness, main components which became:

* keen attention to the issues of distributive and punitive justice (to the implementation of the principle “to each his own” in the practice of authoritative arbitration decisions);
* development of contract ethics, that is, a culture of compliance with contracts, agreements, mutual obligations;
* the idea of inalienable rights and freedoms, granted to everyone from birth.

All these ideas were born as ethically significant, as new “moral absolutes” (Yu. N. Davydov). Observe justice, honor contracts, respect the freedom of others - they began to see unconditional, as if transtemporal requirements that oppose moral precepts warring religions and are made obligatory on everyone without exception.

GM. Servetus, Castellion, L. and F. Socin, P. Charron, M. Montaigne, R. Brown, W. Penn, P. Bayle found a universal normative language suitable for everyone and the mass of people, despairing of the philanthropy of each of the Christian faiths, spiritually came to life thanks to the supra-confessional idea of human rights.

This was expressed in the “First Philosophical Letter” by P. Ya. Chaadaev:

“Let superficial philosophy make as much noise as it wants about religious wars, bonfires lit by intolerance, - as for us, we can only envy the fate of the peoples who, in this clash of beliefs, in these bloody battles in defense of the truth, created for themselves a world of concepts that we We can’t even imagine, let alone be transported there body and soul, as we pretend to be.”

Only in the 16th-17th centuries did real legal consciousness, in its difference from morality, from religious judgment about the forbidden and sinful, appear for the first time.

It was a huge job which included:

* justification of the concept of private property;
* contractual interpretation of the powers of government;
* a radical rethinking of the concept of “natural law” (John Locke).

Locke turned out to be a great interpreter of the emerging legal consciousness, who was able to record and express such attitudes that not only retained their social effectiveness throughout the entire 18th century, but in a certain sense turned out to be “eternal.”

When creating the political and legal doctrine, Locke worked primarily as an analytical philosopher, expressing in the clear language of reason such evidence that implicitly already subjugated the current political consciousness. According to Marx, Locke's essay on the origin of the human mind was greeted as a "long and passionately awaited guest." And reading it in the 17th-18th centuries four letters on toleration and two treatises on government was accompanied by the maximum effect of recognizing what was already in the air and implied.

Marx put it this way: Locke “represented the new bourgeoisie in all its forms as opposed to feudalism.”

In the philosophical and legal theory of Locke, he first expressed civil legal ideal. Locke's state-legal theory turns out to be a philosophical conceptual construction, through which the revolutions of the XVI-XVII are replaced by bourgeois-democratic revolutions.

Locke's construction of "natural law""- this is no longer just a system of theoretical postulates of the existing state legal order, but a direct declaration of “inalienable rights.” The constitutional practice of the North American states, their famous bills of rights, is directly based on the teachings of Locke. Locke is the first philosopher to participate in drawing up the founding state act: he wrote a constitution for the North. Caroline in 1669.

It can be said that Locke's teaching for the first time guessed and analytically clarified the bourgeois-democratic legislative will.

Early bourgeois interpretation of equality

Locke's living subject of law and order is an individual seeking private gain. The “state of nature” (Locke’s second treatise on government) is, first of all, a state of “fair” competition based on mutual recognition.

"Natural Law" is understood by Locke primarily as a requirement for equal partnership: nature dictates that each individual accept the other as a free and independent contractor competing with him in the field of seeking benefits.

Equality and freedom, which are included in Locke's interpretation of the “state of nature” and “natural law”, are commodity-exchange relations. We are talking about equality of opportunity and aspirations.

The bottom line is that not a single individual, no matter how meager his natural wealth may be, can be excluded from competition or excluded from the free exchange of goods and services.

Paradoxical the idea of "equality without equalization"", equality that allows for the natural dissimilarity of people.

In his treatise “On the Citizen,” Hobbes outlined one of the main modes of “natural law” as follows:

"...everyone must be an advantage to the others. In order to understand this, one must pay attention to the fact that when societies are formed, differences in abilities are observed among people."

A. Smith: only through exchange do the natural differences of individuals become socially significant, and the individuals themselves become equally worthy in their limitations and peculiarities.

The "triple formula" of civil rights

In A Treatise of Government, Locke formulates three basic innate rights of the individual and, which individuals recognize one another in the "state of nature" and which are then guaranteed by the state itself: this right to life, liberty and property.

Locke's triple legal formula (freedom, life, property) was included in many early bourgeois constitutions and was the “cell” from which the more differentiated content of “human and civil rights” then developed.

The rights indicated in Locke's “triple formula” reflect each other: freedom in the narrow sense of the word and the right to life are already, as such, the right of property, because they assume that the individual is the owner of his goals and vital forces.

And vice versa, the right to property and the right to life are already, as such, the essence of freedom, for they provide scope for the realization of the same will, which expresses itself in the choice of vocation, in setting goals, in an unconstrained conscience and word.

1. Ownership. It includes the right to life and liberty and often appears in the text of Locke’s treatise as the most general designation of the political and legal status of an individual. “The great and chief object of uniting men into states, and placing themselves under the authority of government,” Locke declares, is their preservation of property.”

Velika the role of labor

Locke's idea about the origin of all property from labor, no matter how naive it may be, is not just a fallacy.

Firstly, it expresses an illusion that becomes truth under certain exceptional (“ideal”) conditions for organizing economic practice.

Secondly, this thought, erroneous as a judgment about the actual facts of economic history, nevertheless contains within itself a moment of normative truth.

It was the placing of labor at the basis of all private ownership that allowed Locke to merge together the three basic innate rights of the individual.

2. Labor aimed at achieving individual well-being and benefit is recognized by Locke as the defining form of human life, which primarily refers to the right to life.

This right, as interpreted by Locke, cannot be reduced to a simple prohibition on murder.

A violation of the right to life, according to Locke, is any enslavement of an individual, any forced appropriation of his productive abilities. Not murder as such, but slavery, when a person has the vital forces of another at his full disposal and is free to do anything over him, including murder.

For Locke, it is self-evident that a genuine right to life exists only where society consists of economically independent producers, some of whom (under the pressure of “needs and circumstances”, and not due to the compulsion of others) temporarily sell themselves to work. Under any other social conditions, life, strictly speaking, is no longer guaranteed.

Life is reduced by Locke to activity subordinated to happiness and benefit as the inalienable personal goals of each individual.

3. This makes clear the internal connection that exists between this right and the last member of Locke’s “triple formula,” namely freedom in the narrow sense of the word.

Freedom, Locke explains, exists where everyone is recognized as “the owner of his own person.”

But this right also has its own deep content. The point is that in a reasonable society no person can be a slave, vassal or servant of the state itself. (Locke against despotism and theocracy)

In addition, Locke considers doubtful any declaration of the right to property and the right to life that is not based on guarantees of free individual self-determination.

People cannot in fact be either full owners of their property or independent producers of goods if they are not guaranteed freedom of conscience. This statement is expressed quite clearly in his works: “An Essay on the Law of Nature” and the famous “Letter on Tolerance.”

"An Essay on the Law of Nature": utilitarian reduction of ethics, the right of a person to independently navigate problems related to his pleasure and pain, benefit and harm. Any attempt to decide for an individual what is beneficial for him and what is harmful is morally untenable.

The central idea echoes this most important setting of “Experience...” "Letters on Tolerance"", one of the works of the 17th century, where the principle of tolerance was brought to the direct defense of freedom of conscience and the separation of church and state.

Locke writes: “No one can be forced to be rich or healthy against his will”; in the same sense it should be recognized that "The care of one's own soul belongs to every person and should be left to him...

“I affirm,” writes Locke, “that the power of the sovereign does not extend to establishing the truths of faith and forms of worship by the force of his laws. For laws are powerless without punishment, and punishment in this case is absolutely intolerable, for they are not able to convince the soul.. . Only light and evidence can promote a change in opinions." And further: "It was not differences of opinion, which cannot be avoided, but the refusal to tolerate those who hold a different opinion, which gave rise to all the quarrels and wars that have existed in the Christian world. ...".

The acquisition of faith is a secret and inherently personal process for Locke..

An unfettered conscience forms the basis of all rights. Faith projects itself into goals, goals are realized in enterprise (labor), labor is embodied in property.

This picture, if understood as a depiction of a real socio-economic phenomenon, does not take into account the alienation of property from labor that is constantly occurring in the conditions of a class society.

The matter, however, will look different if this same picture is interpreted as a statement of some norm and pattern.

Only that activity is worthy of the name “labor” that rests on independent judgment, choice and goal-setting. Locke was the first to see in freedom of conscience an elementary condition, the observance of which alone makes the work itself personal work.

Locke's "natural law" formulated a new political and legal ideal: the ideal of society, in in which every person is recognized from the very beginning as an independent worker-owner.

Most Importantly - Locke's Discovery deep semantic unity of all rights and freedoms.

Locke's concept of natural law opposes not just feudal socio-political views, but also the way of thinking generally characteristic of pre-capitalist societies. It requires from the state not just “wise guardianship over its subjects,” not just paternal care and a rational combination of “general benefit with private benefit.” It places the highest priority on respect for the legal capacity and civil independence of the individual.

Articles

2018

« Bless your blue eye." Cosmopersonalism and historiosophical irony by Maximilian Voloshin// M.A. Voloshin: pro et contra, anthology./ Comp., intro. article, comment. T.A. Koshemchuk. - St. Petersburg: TsSO, 2017 - 800 p. - (Russian Way). M11. ISBN 978-5906623-12-16. pp. 425-438.

2017

. Part II // Philosophical Journal. 2017. T. 10. No. 3. P. 5-31. DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2017-10-3-5-31

The article is a historical and philosophical study that explains the original interpretation of the relationship between philosophy and ideology, which was born during the “Moscow philosophical thaw” and was taken up by Russian philosophers of the sixties. The focus is on the neo-Marxist theory of thinking, worked out by E.V. Ilyenkov, and the neo-Marxist theory of consciousness declared by M.K. Mamardashvili. The author sees the similarity and semantic relationship of these concepts: in the use of the concept “ideology” exclusively in the meaning of pejorative (a condemnatory negative term); in the same type of understanding of “ideal” (Ilyenkov) and “form” (Mamardashvili); in both of them thoroughly thinking through the problematics of illusions, objective appearances, “objective mental forms” and “transformed forms.” Ilyenkov and Mamardashvili are not just in a multifaceted exchange with each other. Both of them also echo Kant as the author of the article “Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” Analysis of this “transtemporal co-authorship” allows us to see that the struggle for the liberation of people from the power of ideologies cannot be successful (a) without a radical restructuring of education and (b) without philosophical enlightenment, freed from the flaws and one-sidedness of enlightenment.

Philosophy as a critique of ideologies . Part I // Philosophical Journal. 2016. T. 9. No. 4. P. 5-17. DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2016-9-4-5-17

The article examines the relationship between philosophy and ideology in the context of information warfare. It is characterized by the phenomenon of mirror ideological symmetry, when both sides of a semantic conflict use the same type of sophistry and casuistry. The mobilization of mass audiences, ensured by mirror ideological symmetry, is subject to two main intentions: (a) warning and (b) inspiration for the project. The warning effect is achieved by inciting proactive mistrust, creating an “enemy image,” inventive compromising evidence, and instilling a cult of vigilance. The typical discourse of ideological warnings is a “collage of disparate flashes of information,” allowing for loss of logical memory and logical dishonesty. The author proposes to turn to the very discursivity of speech and the logical defense of consciousness and thinking by means of logical-linguistic analysis. Inspiring projects quite accurately correspond to the concept of mission and continue to this day, fraught with the danger of geopolitical myths, interethnic intolerance and revived historicist speculation. According to the author, the philosophical response to these ideological threats should be a culture of skeptical verification of expectations and hopes, a strict distinction between the program and the ideal (target) and the further development of the concept of open history

A hotbed of enlightenment on Chistye Prudy// Question philosophy. 2017. No. 7. P.132-136.

2016

History of philosophy in the register of journalism// History of philosophy in article format / Comp. and resp. ed. Yu.V. Blue-eyed. M.: Cultural Revolution, 2016. pp. 71-109.

2014- 2015

The category of the crowd in Lermontov’s poetic thinking // Problems of Russian self-awareness: the worldview of M.Yu. Lermontov. Materials of the 11th All-Russian Conf. October 2014. Moscow-Penza-Tarkhany / Ed. S.A. Nikolsky. M.: Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2015. pp. 103-121.
History of philosophy as a museum and theater // History of philosophy: challenges of the 21st century. Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference / Ed. N.V. Motroshilova. M.: Kanon+, 2014. pp. 41-46.
Historical and philosophical journalism (signs and requirements) // Philosophy and culture. 2014. No. 5 (77). pp. 731-744.
On the culture of benevolence (the commandment of love for one’s neighbor in Kant and Tolstoy) // Problems of the philosophy of culture. Vol. 2. M.: Institute of Philosophy RAS. 2014. pp. 62-93.

“God forbid that I go crazy...” (the maxim of self-preservation of reason in Kant’s anthropology) // Historical and Philosophical Yearbook 2011. M.: Kanon+, 2012. pp. 205-232.
The tragedy of beauty in K. Kantor’s book “Beauty and Benefits” // Questions of Philosophy. 2012. No. 12. P. 177-188.
Graves of Marxists at the cemetery of Russian writers // Debt and Love. Collection of philological works in honor of the 65th anniversary of Professor M.V. Mikhailova. Articles, reviews, essays. M.: Krug, 2012. pp. 14-19.
Translation from German: Jurgen Habermas. The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights (Deutsche Zeitschrift fü r Philosophie. 2010. Hft. 3. S. 343-356) // Questions of Philosophy. 2012. No. 2. P. 66-80.
Philosophical and legal depths of Chekhov’s story “The Intruder” // Philosophy and Culture. 2011. No. 6. P. 87-98.
Antinomies of justice in Chekhov’s fiction // Problems of Russian self-awareness: Worldview of A.P. Chekhov. Materials of the Seventh All-Russian Conference. Moscow-Rostov, 2011. pp. 23-34.
Ethics of non-violence and the problem of legal nihilism // Problems of Russian self-awareness: Philosophy of Leo Tolstoy. Materials of the Sixth All-Russian Conference. Moscow-Tula, 2011. pp. 14-27.
On stereotyped prejudices in the interpretation of the genesis and meaning of human rights // Philosophy in the dialogue of cultures. Materials of World Philosophy Day (November 2009). M.: Progress-Tradition, 2010. pp. 136-154.
Antithetics of mass consciousness // Opening Grushina. M.: MSU, 2010. pp. 129-139.
Kant for all times // Philosophy and Ethics. Collection of scientific works for the 70th anniversary of Academician A.A. Guseinov. M.: Alfa-M, 2009. pp. 104-120.
Existential soteriology of Merab Mamardashvili // Merab Konstantinovich Mamardashvili [series Philosophy of Russia in the second half of the 20th century]. M.: ROSSPEN, 2009. pp. 174-202.
Predestination and firm will in the theology of John Calvin // Philosophy and culture. 2009. No. 10. P. 31-42.
Reformation and formation of new European civilization // Bulletin of the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation. 2009. No. 1 (54). pp. 68-75.
Reformation as a civilizational “geological shift” // Beresten (philosophical and cultural almanac). 2009. No. 1 (3). pp. 79-87.
A person under interrogation (untruthfulness, truthfulness and the right to silence) // Logos. Special issue. 2008. No. 5 (68). pp. 23-34.
Critical-verification function of philosophy // Current problems through the prism of philosophy. MION Yearbook. Vol. 2. Novgorod the Great. 2008. pp. 77-89.
The second formula of the categorical imperative in the moral and legal teaching of Vl. Solovyov // Immanuel Kant: Heritage and Project / Ed. V.S. Stepina, N.V. Motroshilova. M., 2007. pp. 550-558.
Self-awareness versus narcissism // Problems of Russian self-awareness: Proceedings of the 1st All-Russian Conference, Moscow-Orel, 2006 / Ed. S.A. Nikolsky. M.: IFRAN, 2007. pp. 38-43.
Historical and philosophical research as an example of transcultural communication (review of the book: Ryskeldieva L.T. Deontology in the history of philosophy) // Almanac “Totallogy”. Vol. 13. Kyiv, 2006 (0.6 al.).
Retributive justice and legal humanism // Justice and nonviolence: Russian context. Veliky Novgorod: NovGU Publishing House, 2006 (2.5 al.).
The main patterns of the new European civilization: “workaholic”, “professional”, “entrepreneur”, “human rights activist” // Internet site “Ethics: information resource” (ethicscenter.ru/solov-1). 2006 (1.6 a.l.).
I. Kant: an ethical response to the challenge of the era of secularization // Historical and Philosophical Yearbook "2004. M.: Nauka, 2005. pp. 209-226.
Providence versus fate // Philosophy and history of philosophy: current problems. To the 90th anniversary of Academician T.I. Oizerman. M., 2004. pp. 382-396.
Rethinking the talion. Punitive justice and legal humanism // New world. 2004. No. 4. P. 123-143.
Secularization-historicism-Marxism (the theme of man-goddess and the religion of progress in the philosophical journalism of S.N. Bulgakov // Forum of Contemporary Eastern European History and Culture. 2004. No. 2.
A moment of savagery (about human rights, justice and vodka) // Index: Dossier on censorship. 2003. No. 18.
Human deity and the religion of progress in S.N. Bulgakov’s journalism // Questions of Philosophy. 2002. No. 7.
Humanitarian and legal issues in the philosophical journalism of V.S. Solovyov // Solovyov collection. Proceedings of the international conference “B.S. Soloviev and his philosophical heritage” (Moscow, August 28-30, 2000) / Ed. I. Borisova and A. Kozyrev. M.: Phenomenology-Hermeneutics, 2001. pp. 29-51.
Secularization-historicism-Marxism: the theme of humanity and the religion of progress in the philosophical journalism of S.N. Bulgakov // Questions of Philosophy. 2001. No. 4. P. 31-37.
The concept of law in Kant and Hegel (a view from Russian tradition and modernity) // The fate of Hegelianism: philosophy, religion and politics say goodbye to modernity / Ed. Peter Kozlowski and Erich Solovyov. M.: Republic, 2000. pp. 272-286.
Bless your blue eye . Cosmopersonalism and historiosophical irony by Maximilian Voloshin// Russian magazine. 1998 (March).
Existential soteriology of Merab Mamardashvili // Historical and Philosophical Yearbook "1998. M.: Nauka, 2000. P. 387-407.
Human rights in the political experience of Russia (contributions and lessons of the 20th century) // Reformist ideas in the social development of Russia. M.,: IFRAN. 1998. pp. 131-199.
Philosophical journalism of the sixties: conquests, seductions, unfinished business // Questions of Philosophy. 1997. No. 8 (reprinted in the book: How it was: Memories and Reflections / Edited by V.A. Lektorsky. M.: ROSSPEN. 2010).
Let me announce myself // Ibid. No. 8. pp. 68-71.
Tolerance as a new European universal // Philosophical thought. Kyiv. No. 3-4. 1997.
Only after Vladimir Solovyov was Russian liberal thought able to acquire programmatic consistency // Liberalism in Russia / Ed. V.F. Pustarnakov and I. Khudushina. M.: IF RAS, 1996.
Legal nihilism and the humanistic meaning of law // Quintessence: a philosophical almanac. M.: Politizdat. 1990.
Individual, individuality, personality // Communist. 1988. No. 17. P. 50-63.
An attempt to substantiate a new philosophy of history in the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger // New trends in Western social philosophy. M.: IFAN (rotaprint), 1988. P. 11-50.
Moral and ethical issues in the “Critique of Pure Reason” // Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” and modernity / Rep. ed. V.A. Steinberg. Riga: Zinatne, 1984.
Biographical analysis as a type of historical and philosophical research // Questions of Philosophy. 1981. No. 7. P. 115-126. No. 9. P. 132-143.
Entrepreneurship and patriotic consciousness // Culture of Russian entrepreneurship. M., 1977. S. 58-70.
The theory of “social contract” and Kant’s moral justification of law // Kant’s Philosophy and Modernity. M.: Mysl, 1974.
Existentialism // Questions of Philosophy. 1966. No. 3. 1967. No. 1.

Encyclopedias

Articles: “” (Kant), “On the Slavery of the Will” (Luther), Practical Reason // New Philosophical Encyclopedia: In 4 volumes. M.: Mysl, 2000-2001.

Articles in foreign languages

The Philosophical-Historical Views of Herzen as a Problem in the History of Western European Philosophy // Russian Studies in Philosophy. Winter 2012-2013. Vol. 51. No. 3. P. 83-95.
The Philosophical-Legal Depth of Chekhov’s Story “A Malefactor”. Philosophical Views of Leo Tolstoy and Anton Chekhov // Russian Studies in Philosophy. 2011. Vol. 50. No. 2. P. 70-82.
The Existential Soteriology of Merab Mamardashvili // Russian Studies in Philosophy. Vol. 49, no. 1 (Summer 2010). P. 53-73.
The Institute of Philosophy Has Long Been an Institution of Civil Society // Russian Studies in Philosophy. Vol. 48, no. 1. 2009. P. 83- 100.
Eric Ju. Solowjow. Die zweite Formel des kategorischen Imperativs in der moralisch-rechtlichen Lehre Wladimir Solowjows // Kant in Spiegel der russischen Kantforschung heute / Hrsg. von Nelly Motroschilowa und Norbert Hinske. Stuttgart; Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboorg, 2008. S. 145-152.
The Humanistic-Legal Problematic in Solov"ev"s Philosophical Journalism // Studies in East European Thought. Special Issue/Ed. by Evert van der Zweerde. Vol. 55, No. 2. 2003. P. 115-139.
Sekularisation-Historizismus-Marxismus. Menschgottum und Fortschrittreligion in der philosophischen Publizistik S.N. Bulgakovs // Das Christentum und die totalitä ren Herausforderunden des 20. Jahrhunderts: Rußland, Deutschland, Italien und Polen im Vergleich/Hrsg. von Leonid Luks. K ö ln; Weimar; Wien: B ö hlau Verlag, 2002. S. 89 - 101.
Der Begriff des Rechts bei Hegel und Kant // Die Folgen des Hegelianismus (Philosophie, Religion und Politik im Abschied von der Moderne / Hrsg. von Peter Koslowski. München: Wilhelm Fink, 1998.
Ethische Begrü ndung des Rechts bei Vladimir Solovi"ev // Russisches Denken im europaeischen Dialog / Hrsg. von Maria Deppermann. Innsbruck; Wien: Studien-Verlag, 1998. S. 311-318.
Law as Politicians" Morality // Justice and Democracy: Cross-Cultural Approach. Honolulu, 1997.
Not a Forecast, but a Social Prophesy // Studies in East European Thought 45, no. 1- 2. P. 37 - 49.
Die Entstehung einer personalistischen Philosophie im heutigen Russland // Studies in Soviet Thought 44. 1992. P. 193- 201.

Translation from German

Soloviev, Erich Yurievich

(b. 04/20/1934) - special. in the region history of Western Europe. philosophy; Doctor of Philosophy Sci. Graduated from Philosophy. Faculty of Moscow State University (1957). From 1958 to 1968 - deputy. head department of modern zarub. Philosopher and. "VF". In 1968-1970 - present. With. Int. intern. labor movement, head social sector psychol. and masses, movements. Since 1970 - at the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences (RAN), to the present. vr. - Ch. n. With. Cand. diss. - “Existentialism and scientific knowledge” (1967). Dr. diss. - “The era of early bourgeois revolutions and the practical philosophy of Kant” (1991). In the 60s basic region interests of S. - the concepts of K. Jaspers, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre. In contrast to the common interpretation of existentialism as “philosophical despair and fear,” he argued that the essence of this movement is stoic resistance to pessimism born of the crisis of traditions. bourgeois religions of progress. He showed that criticism of existentialism presupposes liberation from the providentialist (historicist) interpretation of societies. development when developing the concept of an open, situationally moving story. S. sees one example of such an understanding of history in the works of Marx 1848-1852 (VF. 1968. No. 5). Since the 70s S. studied morals. and legal ideas. reformation, prepared (the first in the USSR) scientific. biography of Luther. He interprets the Reformation as a great sociocultural revolution, during which the entrepreneurial economic ethic, the early Bourgeois, was born. legal and contractual theory of state. Dr. region The research that interests S. is the ethics and philosophical and legal teachings of Kant. S. sees in Kant not so much the ancestor of mute. Class. Philosopher, much of the greatest finisher of the Enlightenment, many of whose ideas were not understood by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Works of S. last. years devoted to the problems of human rights and the rule of law. In discussions about the paths of development of Russia, S. insists that Russia is in the new history. conditions must repeat the spirit., ideal. efforts that ensured the formation of citizenship. society, the legal system and a profitable economy in Western countries. S.'s works also discuss methods. problems of biographical, situational history. analysis, comprehensive study of key eras of the spirit. development, as well as philosophical issues. personality theories.

Op.: Existentialism. Critical essay // VF. 1966. No. 12. 1967. No. 1;Existentialism and scientific knowledge. M., 1966 ;Classic and modern:two eras in the development of bourgeois philosophy.[In al.]// Philosophy and science. M., 1972 ;Church,state and law in the era of early bourgeois revolutions. M., 1983 ;The past interprets us. Essays on the history of philosophy and culture. M., 1990 ;I. Kant:complementary to morality and law. M., 1992.

Large biographical encyclopedia. 2009 .

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Soloviev E.Yu.

Locke's phenomenon

The era of religious wars, of which the first bourgeois revolutions (Dutch and English) were fragments, led to a deep secularization of public consciousness. By the end XVII centuries, the comprehensive scholastic-theological knowledge of faith no longer had authority for reason, and religion itself ceased to be a universal organizing form of the social cosmos. It has now become, on the one hand, an ideology in the strict sense of the word, that is, a more or less rationalized doctrinal-dogmatic complex, in each case serving special and specific state, coalition or class interests; on the other hand, an inalienable personal faith, which only roughly and conditionally formalizes itself in legalized confessions. This process was accompanied by an unprecedented ideological and moral crisis: the devaluation of traditional patriarchal customs and detailed moral and prescriptive codes, which each specific religion put forward in opposition to each other. Also lost credit were abstract religious declarations of altruism, compassion and mercy, which too often turned out to be instruments of hypocrisy.

And yet Western European society has not fallen into the swamp of unprincipledness. The moral crisis was accompanied by the emergence and strengthening of a new value-normative system - a system of legal consciousness, the main components of which were:

a) increased attention to the issues of distributive and punitive justice (to the implementation of the principle of “to each his own” in the practice of authoritative arbitration decisions);

b) the development of contract ethics, that is, a culture of compliance with contracts, agreements, mutual obligations (“bill honesty,” as the ideologist of Slavophilism K. S. Aksakov once put it with irony worthy of better use);

c) the idea of inalienable rights and freedoms granted to every human individual from birth.

All these ideas were born as ethically significant, as new “moral absolutes,” to use the terminology of Yu. N. Davydov, which is widely debated today. To observe justice, to honor agreements, to respect the freedom of others - these began to be seen as unconditional, as if transtemporal demands that oppose the moral precepts of warring religions and are obligated by all authorities without exception, not excluding the heavenly lord.

The crucible in which an ethically selfless legal consciousness was forged was in XVII century, the struggle for freedom of conscience. The “Apostles of Tolerance” (M. Servet, Castellion, L. and F. Socin, P. Charron, M. Montaigne, R. Brown, W. Peni, P. Bayle) found a universal normative language suitable for all developing human rights movements, starting with municipal burghers and ending with free trade. The mass of people, despairing of the love of humanity of each of the Christian faiths, spiritually came to life thanks to the supra-confessional idea of human rights.

If we may say that only with Galileo and Newton did science begin in the proper sense of the word; that it was only in easel painting and extra-temple sculpture of the late Renaissance that art as such was first constituted; that only after W. Petty does a genuine political-economic analysis arise, then with even greater justification one can assert that only in XVI - XVII centuries, for the first time, real legal consciousness appeared in its difference from morality, from religious judgment about the forbidden and sinful, as well as from simple reflection into the existing (decree-prohibition or decree-permissive) law.

It is this new form of normative consciousness that is systematically deployed by innovative philosophers XVII century, turning into theoretical legal understanding and civilized political science. Central to this monumental work, which included:

a) justification of the concept of private property as a necessary prerequisite for distributive justice;

b) contractual interpretation of the powers of government;

c) a radical rethinking of the concept of “natural law”,

belonged to the English philosopher John Locke.

In historical and philosophical concepts XIX century, Locke was often qualified as a typical representative of the “innovations of yesterday,” that is, those theoretical concepts that, before they had time to become covered with a venerable patina, turned into common platitudes of common sense. There were reasons for this. The empirical-inductive methodology and theory of the formation of abstractions developed by Locke really belonged entirely to XVII - early XVIII century. They retained their strength and significance only as long as their direct opponent, scholasticism, was alive.

The latter, however, cannot be said about Locke’s political and legal doctrine. Locke turned out to be a great interpreter of the emerging legal consciousness, who was able to record and express such attitudes that not only retained their social effectiveness throughout XVIII centuries, but in a certain sense they turned out to be “eternal”. Locke's political and legal judgments can neither grow old nor die out until the institutions of civil society, the beginnings of constitutionalism and the separation of powers are established throughout the world; until the concept of human rights ceases to develop and exert its normalizing influence on socio-political practice.

When creating his political and legal doctrine, Locke followed his empirical-inductive methodology only to a small extent. In this area, he worked primarily as an analytical philosopher, expressing in the distinct language of reason such evidence that implicitly already subordinated the current political consciousness and (at least in England) determined the semantics of ordinary language. It can therefore be said that in Locke’s political philosophy, the modern European legal consciousness itself, suffered through the difficult trials of the period of religious wars, appeared as a phenomenon, that is, as “a phenomenon that reveals, interprets and explicates itself in a rationally understandable way” (E. Husserl) .

According to Marx, Locke's essay on the origin of the human mind was greeted as a "long and passionately awaited guest." But, perhaps, with even greater right this can be asserted regarding four letters on toleration and two treatises on government. Their reading in XVII - XVIII centuries was accompanied by the maximum effect of recognition, a clear comprehension of what was already in the air and implied. Such an effect could only be achieved by a thinker who, firstly, perfectly mastered the art of analytical interpretation, and secondly, was quite close to the early bourgeois ideological movement.

In the language of class-ideological analysis, Marx expressed this as follows: Locke represented the new bourgeoisie in all its forms, he was a classic exponent of the legal ideas of bourgeois society as opposed to feudalism.

In Locke's philosophical and legal theory, for the first time, that civil legal ideal was expressed, which was objectively demanded by the era and by proclaiming which the rising bourgeoisie could only secure for itself the role of a general democratic leader.

It is not at all accidental that among the outstanding political figures of the period under review we only rarely encounter followers of G. Grotius, Spinoza or Hobbes (pre-Lockean philosophy of law, for all its theoretical significance, is still far from any real socio-political influence). And vice versa, in the political arena XVIII centuries - many convinced Lockeans (such as Jefferson and Franklin, Sieyès and Brissot). Locke's state-legal theory turns out to be a philosophical and conceptual construction through which revolutions XVI - XVII centuries pass on their bitter experience to the era of victorious bourgeois-democratic revolutions.

Locke's construction of “natural law” is no longer just a system of theoretical postulates intended (like Spinoza and Hobbes) to explain what was found, the presence of an existing state-legal order in its “true reality.” This is a direct declaration of “inalienable rights”, the totality of which is conceived as the fundamental law of the newly established (reasonable) social system. The constitutional practice of the North American states, their famous bills of rights, is directly based on Locke's teachings. Locke was the first philosopher in history to participate in the drafting of the fundamental act of state: on the recommendation of Shaftesbury, he wrote a constitution for the North. Carolina, which in 1669 was approved by the Assembly of People's Representatives and came into force.

Although the constitutional project proposed by Locke was not one of the radical documents of early bourgeois law-making (in many respects it stood below even the principles that the philosopher himself defended in the second Treatise on Government), nevertheless, the voting of this project was a historically significant event. It can be said that Locke’s teaching for the first time guessed and analytically clarified the bourgeois-democratic legislative will, and this latter for the first time recognized itself in the principles of Locke’s “natural law.”

Early bourgeois interpretation of equality

When speaking about a living subject of law and order, Locke always means an isolated individual seeking private gain. And social life in general is depicted by him primarily as a network of exchange relations into which simple commodity owners, personally free owners of their forces and property, enter. The “state of nature,” as depicted in Locke's second treatise on government, is primarily a state of “fair” competition based on mutual recognition.

Accordingly, “natural law” (that is, the rule of community dictated by nature itself) is understood by Locke primarily as a requirement of equal partnership: nature dictates that each individual accept the other as a free and independent counterparty, competing with him in the field of seeking benefits.

Equality and freedom, which are included in Locke’s interpretation of the “state of nature” and “natural law,” are the equality and freedom that are presupposed by the general social meaning of a more or less developed commodity-exchange relationship.

Equality, as Locke interprets it, does not at all mean the natural uniformity (equal quality) of individuals and does not contain a request for their preventive equalization in abilities, strengths, and property. We are talking only about the equality of possibilities and claims, and this immediately testifies to the closeness of Locke’s legal concept to the forms of consciousness adequate to the emerging commodity-capitalist production.

Legal equality, which the early bourgeois era insists on, only fixes this relationship, which is everywhere implied by developed commodity exchange. Its essence boils down to the fact that not one of the individuals, no matter how meager his natural wealth may be (his intellectual and physical strength, his skills and acquisitions), can be excluded from competition, rejected from the free exchange of goods and services. . Or (which is the same thing): all people, regardless of their natural inequality, must once and for all be recognized as economically independent subjects subject to voluntary mutual use.

The paradoxical (completely incomprehensible to any of the “traditional” societies) idea of “equality without equalization”, equality that allows - and, moreover, protects and stimulates - the natural dissimilarity of people, is one of the main themes in the political and legal teachings of innovative philosophers. On English soil, it is first outlined by Hobbes, and then - through Locke - it moves on to the classic of bourgeois political economy, Adam Smith.

Locke picks up the formula, which in Hobbes had the meaning of one of the norms of state expediency, and emphasizes the actual legal content: the opportunities that the state provides for the implementation of natural differences and inequalities are, paradoxical as it may be at first glance, the best means for eliminating unnatural privileges, then there is such a political state in which the noble and powerful have the exclusive right to economic and personal independence, and all others eke out a forced existence in various forms and gradations.

Finally, in the first two chapters of Smith's Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (chapters brilliant in thought and style), the idea of “unequal equality” is placed at the basis of the economic-legal program.

Smith sees the specificity of man, his defining feature as a natural being, in the ability to mutually use these individual differences from nature. The animal receives absolutely no benefit from the various abilities with which nature has endowed animals like it. On the contrary, among people the most dissimilar talents are useful to one another: their various products, thanks to their inclination to bargain and exchange, are collected, as it were, into one common mass, from which each person can buy for himself any number of the works of other people that he needs.

The tendency to bargain and exchange is elevated by Smith to a generic attribute of humanity: a person for him is in the same sense an exchanging animal in which for Aristotle he is a social animal, and for

Franklin - “an animal that produces tools.

There is no trade exchange in nature before humans, and no one has ever seen one dog exchange a bone with another. Therefore, there is no dignity in communication here, which grows out of the consciousness of one’s usefulness for another: an animal seeking contact is personified servility and flattery.

Only through exchange do the natural differences of individuals become socially significant, and the individuals themselves become equally worthy in their limitations and peculiarities.

Moreover, exchange forces people to develop and specify their originality, which at first is weakly expressed: This specification of pre-found differences is nothing more than the division of labor in which Smith sees the essence of progress.

It is not surprising that in his concept the right to exchange (that is, to independent activity, the voluntary alienation of its products and the unhampered acquisition of goods produced by other people without any restrictions) acts as the right to equal membership in civilization, in the progressive development of society and its overall wealth.

In a developed exchange relationship, Marx emphasized, the definition of equality is also accompanied by the definition of freedom. Although individual A feels the need for individual B's product, he does not seize this product by force and vice versa , but both of them recognize each other as owners, persons whose will permeates their goods. Therefore, this primarily includes the legal concept of a person and the moment of freedom, since the latter is contained in this concept. None of the exchangers seizes someone else's property by force. Everyone transmits it voluntarily... The individual, each of the individuals, is reflected into himself as the exclusive and dominant (determining) subject of exchange.

This statement may serve as a key to understanding the basic meaning of personal freedoms implied in Locke's concept of natural law.

In A Treatise of Government, Locke formulates three basic innate rights of personality that individuals recognize one another in the “state of nature” and which are then guaranteed by the state itself: these are the rights to life, liberty and property.

In the “state of nature,” Locke writes, every man has the consciousness that he “must not, except by doing justice to the criminal... take such action as would affect the preservation of life, liberty, health, limbs, or property of another. Accordingly, the coercive power in a state based on reason can never have the right to destroy, enslave or deliberately ruin its subjects... After all, people abandoned the freedom of the state of nature and tied themselves with appropriate bonds only for the sake of preserving their life, freedom and property.

These three rights form, according to Locke, the constitutional basis of the legal order and for the first time make possible legislation that is not restrictive, but emancipatory in its basic meaning - legislation, the very possibility of which was inconceivable for traditional legal thinking. Despite all sorts of false interpretations, the purpose of the law is not to destroy or restrict, but to preserve and expand freedom... After all, freedom consists in not experiencing restrictions and violence from others, and this cannot be realized where there is no law.. It represents the freedom of a person to dispose and dispose, as he pleases, of his person, his actions... and all his property.

Locke's triple legal formula (liberty, life, property) was included in many early bourgeois constitutions and was the “cell” from which it developedthen a more differentiated content of “human and civil rights.”

In Locke's treatise, the right to freedom, the right to life and the right to property do not appear as adjacent principles external to each other. They represent an elementary system of rights, where one norm necessarily refers to another.

Each of the three rights proclaimed by Locke is ultimately about the same thing: the recognition of people as full-fledged “subjects of exchange,” independent commodity owners, “whose will permeates their goods.

The exchange model is invisibly present in the very concept of freedom, as Locke uses it. This concept always implies a relationship to a counterparty who has consciousness, will, and intentionality. Almost nowhere do we find naturalistic metaphors of freedom in Locke: expressions like “freedom from heaviness,” “freedom from passions,” “freedom from poverty.” This is all the more remarkable since his closest predecessor, Hobbes, directly relied on a naturalistic metaphor as the basis for the philosophical definition of freedom: Hobbes, for example, considers water that flows freely over a surface to be free, and water locked in a vessel to be unfree.

Locke, unlike Hobbes, consistently pursues the point of view that the concepts of freedom and unfreedom are generally inapplicable to nature, as it exists before and outside of man. They make sense only where there are mutual relations between people, mutual conscious-volitional claims. The opposite of freedom is therefore not constraint and constraint in general (for example, dependence on circumstances), but coercion, oppression, violence, seizure. It is pointless to complain about “unfreedom” where someone else’s enslaving will and deliberate (imputable) expansion cannot be detected.

Accordingly, freedom is always a relationship between persons, a relationship of mutual voluntariness, the pure manifestation of which is the market. The state and society must recognize the individual in the sense in which he is already recognized by another individual who exchanges the products of labor with him.

The right to free disposal of property acts as a final, resultant, integrative one, and the right to freedom and life is its prerequisite.

Locke's systematic thought can be expressed, in my opinion, by the following statements:

a) freedom in the narrow sense (freedom of choice, or the right to subjective determination and pursuit of goals) is flawed and limited if it is not supplemented by the freedom to dispose of individual vital forces (the right to life) and the freedom to dispose of products that embody subjective goals and vital power (ownership);

b) the right of ownership is defective and limited if it extends only to things and does not guarantee the possibility of voluntary alienation of one’s vitality, labor power (the most important aspect of the right to life) and the ability to “dispose of one’s personality as one pleases” (freedom in the narrow sense of the word).

To understand how this interpenetration of three apparently heterogeneous rights became possible, let us consider in more detail Locke's understanding of each of them.

1. In the foreground of Locke’s natural law concept is the right of property. It includes the right to life and liberty and often appears in the text of Locke’s treatise as the most general designation of the political and legal status of an individual.

In property, the personality rises above itself as an empirical individuality; accordingly, through property, society and the state, as it were, recognize the individual in the last sources of his freedom and independence. In this regard, Locke refers to the following custom that developed in the Cromwellian army, a custom that captures one of the main maxims of the new (early bourgeois) legal consciousness: A general who can sentence a soldier to death for leaving his post without permission or for disobeying the most reckless orders does not can, with all his absolute power... dispose of at least one farthing from the property of this soldier or appropriate at least a small fraction of his property.

Property is sacred, more sacred than the very existence of its empirical bearer. Locke sees the explanation of this paradoxical maxim in the fact that property embodies labor, that is, the purposeful, conscious and systematic activity of the subject, through which he first constitutes himself as a person and recognized member of the human community.

More consistently than any of his predecessors, Locke expressed the basic objective appearance of the early bourgeois era - the appearance that labor is the substance of all private ownership.

Locke's concept was the prologue to one of the greatest scientific achievements XVIII century (the labor theory of value), and a whole complex of vulgar economic views, grouped around the idea of the direct coincidence of the worker and the owner in every “natural” individual.

It is labor, as Locke believed, that creates differences in the value of all things... If we correctly evaluate the things that we use and break down what their value is made up of, what is in them directly from nature and what is from labor, then we will see that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths must be attributed entirely to labor.

This is a formula that any representative of classical bourgeois political economy would subscribe to.

But since Locke is still very far from distinguishing between abstract and concrete labor, since the process of creating value is depicted to him as a process of direct embodiment in the product of living individual efforts, the consequence of the theoretically correct idea about the determination of value by labor turns out to be his theoretically erroneous idea regarding the labor origin of all property . What a person extracted from objects created and provided to him by nature, he merged with his labor, with something that inherently belongs to him, and thereby makes it his property. Thanks to his labor, he adds something to an object, and thereby makes it his property... His labor created the difference between these things and the general.

Let us note, however, that Locke’s idea about the origin of all property from labor, no matter how naive it may be by the standards of later economic and historical-economic views, is not just a delusion.

Firstly, it expresses a special kind of illusion, an illusion that becomes true under certain exceptional (“ideal”) conditions for the organization of economic practice (in the presence of an economic structure in which all agents would be simple commodity owners).

Secondly, this thought, erroneous as a judgment about the actual facts of economic history, nevertheless contains within itself a moment of normative truth. It is not true that property of different sizes arose as the result of different degrees of industry, but it is true that society must recognize and sanction differences in property if they are indeed the result of different degrees of industry; It is not true that any property is the fruit of the labor of its owner, but it is legally irrefutable in relation to any individual that the labor of his body and the work of his hands, by the very nature of things, belongs to him. The statement “labor is the substance of property” is a “rationalization”, a pseudo-explanation that turns into an essential (“true”) reality what is in fact true only in the sense of obligation and, moreover, strictly legal obligation: “society and the state are obliged to recognize all property , which is the result of labor."

This normative (and, moreover, normative-limiting) meaning of Locke’s reasoning about labor as the substance of property was clearly recorded by Marx in “Theories of Surplus Value.” According to Locke, he noted, natural law makes personal labor the limit of property.

It was the placing of labor at the basis of all private ownership that allowed Locke to merge together the three basic innate rights of the individual.

2. Labor aimed at achieving individual well-being and benefit is recognized by Locke as the defining form of human life, which primarily refers to the right to life.

This right, as interpreted by Locke, cannot be reduced to a simple prohibition of murder, to the codification of the third biblical commandment. Locke's treatises reproduce moral and religious arguments regarding the sacredness of life and its transcendental, divine origins * However, this is not the specific Lockean theme.

A violation of the right to life, according to Locke, is any enslavement of an individual, any forced appropriation of his productive abilities. It is not murder as such, but slavery, that is, an economic state in which one person has the vital forces of another at his complete disposal and is free to do anything over him, including murder - this is what is primarily prohibited by Locke’s right to life . It denies not so much the element of robbery and criminality, in which an attempt on life appears as a massive, but still random fact, but rather the right to murder, which crowns the utilitarian arbitrariness of the master over the slave - the socially sanctioned reduction of a person to the status of a working animal, a thing , guns.

From the idea that life, as a gift from God, is the inalienable property of the living, Locke draws not only the conclusion about the moral inadmissibility of murder as an individual act, but also the purely legal conclusion that voluntary slavery is unthinkable or (which is the same thing) about the legal unnaturalness the last one.

This is not the place to examine whether Locke is right in a historical sense. It is important that slavery seems to him to be a condition incompatible with a reasonable social order in the same sense in which murder is incompatible with the latter. That is why Locke cannot in any way allow that, under a social system described and sanctioned by the holy book - the Bible, there could be an indefinite and complete alienation of individual life force. For Locke, it is self-evident that a genuine right to life exists only where society consists of economically independent producers, some of whom (under the pressure of “needs and circumstances”, and not due to the compulsion of others) temporarily sell themselves to work. Under any other social conditions, life, strictly speaking, is no longer guaranteed.

We would express ourselves too strongly if we said that life in general is reduced by Locke to activity subordinated to happiness and benefit as the inalienable personal goals of each individual. And at the same time, there is no doubt that the existence of a person who has been deprived of the possibility of such activity does not fall under the concept of “life”, as it is thought of in Locke’s expression “the right to life.”

3. This makes clear the internal connection that exists between this right and the last member of Locke’s “triple formula”, namely freedom in the narrow sense of the word.

Freedom, Locke explains, exists where everyone is recognized as “the owner of his own person.

The right to freedom, thus, captures as its direct and immediate meaning that which was only implied in the right to life, present as its deep content. The right to freedom limine denies any relationship of personal dependence (the relationship between slave and slave owner, serf and serf owner, slave and master).

But this right also has its own deep content. If the ultimate intention of the right to life was the prohibition of slavery as an economic (privately owned) relationship, then the right of freedom ultimately means the denial of political slavery, or despotism. The point is that in a reasonable society no person can be a slave, vassal or servant of the state itself.

Let us take a closer look at the problem of complex conceptual distinctions that arises here (a problem that Locke was aware of, but was not completely solved by him). Under the conditions of slavery as an economic relationship, the individual is deprived of the very possibility of setting and pursuing his own goals (benefits): a slave is an irresponsible instrument of someone else’s will.

This form of unfreedom can also occur in the structure of a despotic state. However, its specific tendency is different. Despotic power enslaves the individual primarily in the way that it imposes its goals on him (its ideas about what is profitable, worthy, salutary, etc.). She lays claim not to the labor (productive force) of the individual directly, but to his very ability to set goals, to his convictions and conscience, mastering which she appropriates, among other things, his work. With classical clarity this form of domination was projected into medieval theocratic concepts. Here it was assumed that a Christian, as a subject of the “city of God” (church-state), can be prescribed his very subjective aspirations, that he can be subjected to violence and even destruction for reasons of his own, but “correctly understood” good (salvation, bliss). The frank and cynical utilization of the individual, which is characteristic of slavery as an economic relationship, was replaced here by utilization, carried out under the form of pastoral care, guidance, and education. By directly dominating the thoughts (and only the thoughts) of the believer, the medieval church received the opportunity to assign him and his affairs; by forcefully turning the individual away from independently perceived (and therefore “apparent”, “deceptive”) benefits, she extracted her own benefit from his labors and sacrifices.

State absolutism became a fairly consistent successor to the church in the matter of such paternalistic enslavement of the individual. XVII century, against which Locke's legal concept was directly directed.

It is no coincidence that Locke considers doubtful and unreliable any declaration of the right to property and the right to life that is not based on guarantees of free individual self-determination.

People cannot in fact be either full owners of their property or independent commodity producers if they are not guaranteed freedom of conscience (the right to an independent personal judgment about God and the world order), which then develops into freedom of vocation (the right to independently determine the ultimate goals, general meaning individual existence) and into utilitarian autonomy (the right of each person to independently determine what is useful and harmful, beneficial and unprofitable, salutary and harmful for him personally).

In the treatises on government this aspect of Locke's legal concept is not expressed explicitly. However, it is expressed quite clearly by earlier works: “An Essay on the Law of Nature” and the famous “Letter on Tolerance.”

The main idea of the “Essay on the Law of Nature,” at first glance, is simply a utilitarian reduction of ethics (reducing good to pleasure, and evil to suffering). However, this is not the real pathos of the treatise: Locke insists that each person has the ability to independently navigate problems related to his pleasure and pain, benefit and harm. Any attempt to decide for an individual what is beneficial for him and what is harmful is morally untenable. If it also results in social coercion, then such mentoring, no matter how good its motives, represents despotism (domestic, corporate or state).

The central idea of the “Letter on Tolerance,” one of the few works XVII century, where the principle of tolerance was brought to the direct defense of freedom of conscience and the separation of church and state.

Based on the principle of utilitarian autonomy postulated in “Experience...”, Locke believes that no one can be forced to be rich or healthy against his will, in the same sense it should be recognized that the care of his own soul belongs to every person and should be left to him ." One cannot look at things that a person must sincerely comprehend in himself and achieve their knowledge through reasoning, research, study and his own aspirations,as a special profession for one category of people.

No one has the right to comprehend God for another; no one is given the ability to have universally binding life-meaning knowledge about the world as a whole. An attempt to impose such knowledge with the help of state coercion should directly be classified as a socially dangerous action.

The acquisition of faith (or, in a broader sense, the formation of worldviews) is a secret and inherently personal process for Locke. Although from a theoretical-cognitive and psychological point of view there is nothing mysterious in it (here “light and evidence” reign), the coercive power must treat this process as if it were a kind of personal secret action.

One’s own conviction (faith, attitude) is the first property and the first freedom that a rational state guarantees to each individual: an unfettered conscience forms the basis of all rights.

This corresponds to the following overall picture of the life activity of the “natural individual”, emerging in the works of Locke: faith projects itself into goals, goals are realized in enterprise (labor), labor is embodied in property. Or (if we look at the same process from the other end): the owner in the individual always presupposes a worker, and this latter - a subject of independent convictions (independent).

This picture, if understood as a depiction of a real socio-economic phenomenon, is thoroughly idyllic. It does not take into account the constant alienation of property from labor, and labor itself from the subjectivity of the individual, which expresses itself in goal-setting, conviction and faith, which constantly occurs in the conditions of a class society.

The matter, however, will look different if this same picture is interpreted as a statement of some norm and pattern.

Only that activity is worthy of the name “free enterprise” (“labor” in the early bourgeois sense) that rests on independent judgment, choice and goal-setting. This is true in the same sense in which only property acquired by labor is recognized as the inalienable property of the individual. And if Marx saw Locke’s merit in the fact that his “natural law” “makes personal labor the limit of property,” then on the same basis we can say that Locke was the first to see in freedom of conscience an elementary condition (and in this sense, a normative limit) , the observance of which alone makes the work itself personal work.

Locke's "Natural Law" formulated a new political-legal ideal: the ideal of a society in which every person is recognized from the very beginning as an independent worker-owner.

This is the complete formula for Locke’s “natural individual” and at the same time the complete formula for the status of a legal entity. It implicitly contains the entire list of “freedoms”, which will then be deployed in bourgeois-democratic declarations of “human and civil rights”. In fact, to recognize a person as an independent means to legally guarantee freedom of conscience, speech, press, meetings, and unions; to recognize him as a worker means to raise the question of freedom of professions, freedom of movement, etc.

But what is even more significant is Locke’s discovery of the deep semantic unity of all rights and freedoms.

Locke's philosophical and legal treatises take the form of theoretical constructions that explain what a state, law, property is, how one social state arises from another, etc. In reality, however, Locke's explanations explain little: in their real content they are not what other than a roundabout way to an analytical clarification of the relationship between various norms, formulas of obligation, which were developed by the new, early bourgeois legal consciousness. Under the form of rational evidence (arguments from God, or from a wise, divinely ordered Nature) in Locke’s philosophical and legal treatises, judgments of the following type actually unfold: “while standing up for civil peace (order), one cannot help but stand up for law and order”; or: “there is no true respect for property without respect for independent belief”; or: “the right to life is worthless if it does not include the right to freely dispose of life,” etc.

The establishment of the internal unity of all rights and freedoms, which Locke, continuing the work of other innovative philosophers, carried out through pseudo-explanations (“rationalization”), was in itself a huge achievement of the early bourgeois era.

Thanks to this, a completely specific, holistically unified world of norms was seen, previously perceived either separately (fragmentarily) or as subordinate aspects of other normative formations: morality and custom, canon law and “statesmanship”; as a result, the subjectivity with which jurisprudence deals as a special science, “branched off” from traditional, “moral” philosophy, was first established.

Locke's concept of natural law opposes not just feudal socio-political views, but also the way of thinking generally characteristic of pre-capitalist societies. It requires from the state not just “wise guardianship over its subjects,” not just paternal care and a rational combination of “general benefit with private benefit” (even Roman law, the most unconventional of the traditional political and legal systems, is not free from such attitudes). It places the highest priority on respect for the legal capacity and civil independence of the individual.

Soloviev E.Yu. The Locke phenomenon // Soloviev E.Yu. The past interprets us. –M.1991-s. 146-166.

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